Is Consciousness Fundamental? Interfaces of Reality & Mathematizing Phenomenology | Robert Prentner

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Robert, thanks so much for
joining me.

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I've been reading your work for
so many years.

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It's it's been a long time
coming.

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I've read all your papers with
Prakash Fields Hoffman.

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You guys are pioneers in this
field.

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And something you actually
extend on Donald Hoffman's work.

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He's someone who's familiar on
this channel.

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He's been on the channel many
times.

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And you work on the interface
theory of perception, and your

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own emphasis seems to be more on
the process in mathematics.

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Do you see your work?
So this is just a primate?

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Do you see your work as a
natural evolution to Don's work,

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or do you see there seems to be
a slight departure from his?

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Right.
First of all, thanks for having

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me here.
It's a pleasure to be here.

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So I was, I was very lucky a few
years ago that I could

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collaborate with Don for, for,
for several years now.

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And it's still ongoing actually.
Now coming to your question, I

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think the if you, if you buy
into the interface theory of

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perception or if you, if you, if
you maintain it like I do, then

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one natural question is what
would you do with this

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information?
What would you do then?

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So the interface theory of
perception basically says

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perception has been shaped by
evolution to be useful, useful

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meaning allowing an agent to act
in a certain way, which is good

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for the agent, evolutionarily
speaking.

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And it also entails that we
thereby not necessarily see the

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true structure of reality.
Now the question is, if you have

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this statement, what are you
going to do with it?

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And, and, and that's very much
an open statement, an open

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question.
I mean, you, you, you, you can

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probably do various things.
And one of the things which I

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think are, but which, which I
think is the most interesting

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thing is to expand this to
consciousness.

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And I mean, there's a lot of
work already and that has been

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done in the vicinity of
consciousness.

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And, and you already mentioned
some of that.

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And so another thing which I did
over the last couple of years is

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the study of phenomenology,
which is the name for a specific

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philosophical school of trying
to systematically approach first

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personal or subjective
experience.

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There's some subtleties or we
can go into that later maybe.

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And I'm very interested in this
question, whether you or how you

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can connect interface theory of
perception with this more

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subjectivity based approach in
phenomenology.

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So I think that's a it's a
natural fit.

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So the way how I see it and one,
one way of seeing consciousness

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or this question of
consciousness is to try to bring

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together 2 perspectives on this
phenomenon.

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On the one hand, you have a
first personal perspective which

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studies the brain and what the
brain is doing and what

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computers maybe are doing.
And on the other hand is first

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person perspective, the
subjectivity like perspective.

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So how what it, what, what it's
like to whatever.

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And so I see the interface here
of Perception very interestingly

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lying on his first personal
side, and I want to add his

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first personal perspective to
it.

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Well, I guess I jumped the gun a
bit.

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I should have asked for you to
define that.

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But I mean, you've, you've done
so very eloquently.

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But I think since you've brought
up in traditional philosophy of

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mind consciousness, it's it's
often treated as this inner

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theatre and and your view treats
it instead as a relational

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interface.
Does this dissolve the hard

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problem of consciousness, or
does it simply reframe it?

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So I'm in philosophy, you meet
two types of people.

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The first type is kind of not
bothered by the hard problem at

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all and think it's a kind of
pseudo program.

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And the second type really takes
it seriously and think it's

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really a problem.
And I'm of course I'm, I'm, I'm

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of the second kind.
I think it's, it's, it's an

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important thing to say.
I mean, one reaction to our

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problem would be to say, OK,
it's it's it's, it's a kind of

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artifact of doing some bad
metaphysics and then asking how

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consciousness fits in the
picture.

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That's one way of seeing it.
But it still leaves open various

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problems.
I mean, there, there.

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This correlates between what the
brain is doing and what you're

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subjectively experiencing.
And you still need to explain

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that somehow.
So even if you say, OK, the

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metaphysical frame is kind of
wrong and the hard problem shows

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you that it's basically a
symptom of that you, you still

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have a lot of work to do.
And so one thing I would say is

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the hub problem in some sense
forces my hand to, to, to take

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on a new perspective.
So I think the, the, the kind of

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standard physicalism or standard
materialism just won't do.

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It's just not fit for the job of
explaining consciousness.

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Now together with this insight
from the interface theory of

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perception that this idea of
having an observer independent

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reality out there is maybe not a
good idea.

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Together these these two ideas
suggest something like a more

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relational approach to reality,
which I currently think just.

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OK, so reality.
Let's let's see it from this

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lens.
If consciousness is interface,

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not essence, but interface, what
what would you say grounds its

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ontological status?
Is it merely epistemic

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convenience, or does it, Or does
the interface have its own

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metaphysical reality?
So I wouldn't say consciousness

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is the interface.
I, I would say the way how we

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subjectively experience the
world is through an interface.

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Of course, that still is open.
This important question that you

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just asked.
What, what is this interface?

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I mean, what's the metaphysical
status of this interface?

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And they, they, they, I would
actually say I'm, I'm not 100%

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sure just because of the very
fact that I think this, this,

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this whole metaphysical game in
the end is, is somewhat of a

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weird thing that many people
actually were playing, but which

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I don't think is, is so
fruitful.

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But I, I would say if, if, if
you, if you, if you start with

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consciousness and, and if, if,
if part of consciousness

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observes itself, then it
distorts itself.

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Yeah.
I mean, it, it, it doesn't see

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it as it, as it truly is.
And I think that's the interface

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idea.
That just is this interface

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idea.
Yeah.

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Because then you cash out the
interface metaphysically as a

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kind of collection of subjective
experiences that belong to one

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agent or not.
That's that's a possibility.

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But I wouldn't be ultra
automatic about that.

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Yeah, it's it's it's something
I've often thought about when

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when when talking to idealist
philosophers and trying to

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understand exactly how they're
going to approach the theory.

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And I know you guys are working
on this very mathematically.

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One of the terms I love, I love
talking about when I discuss

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your work is how you guys are
mathematizing phenomenology,

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which is a beautiful statement.
It's quite, it's quite, it's

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almost oxymoronic when you think
about it to to do that.

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But one of the main questions I
did have was you just mentioned

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this distortion that could
happen if someone is perceiving

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consciousness through a certain
lens.

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How does someone's relational
substrate avoid, well, how does

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yours at least avoid falling
into a naive realism?

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So how do you avoid this while
saying that reality in itself,

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we're not seeing it at at 100%
because I've asked on this

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question, it's, it's, it's
almost difficult to to grasp

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this.
If we're not seeing reality as

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it is and almost let's say at a
probability of 100%, then what

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are the chances that the
idealist physicists are going to

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find any form of truth from
this?

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Sorry, that's a that's a long
winded question.

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Yeah.
So I, I, I think first of all,

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I, I will distinguish different
senses of of, of when, when,

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when we perceive reality as it
is or something like that.

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Then there are, I would say
different, slightly different

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things that you could mean by
it.

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And and I mean as far as the
interface year of perception is

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concerned, it really just means
the way how perceptual system

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represent their environment.
That's that's the pure technical

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meaning.
I would say that doesn't imply

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necessarily something like a
metaphysical, let's say approach

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of ultra agnosticism.
You cannot say anything that

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that might be true actually, but
it's not necessarily the case

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when you just have this
interface theory and it's an

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additional step.
So there are various other

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things in addition to the stuff
that that interface theory of

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perception talks about.
I mean, you have reasoning,

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philosophical reasoning, I think
that's limited to, but well, you

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have it.
You have like a pure subjective

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first personal experience and
that might tell you a different

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story altogether.
So I.

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Think, I think it's, it's like
that for anyone.

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So if you're a materialist
trying to to explain things,

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phenomena, philosophy, the
nature of reality, everybody

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gets stuck at some point.
So it's it's it makes sense to

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me that at some point there's
going to be agnostic pictures

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that are formed from such a
groundbreaking thought process.

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And in in your view, do you do
you seeing it aligning more with

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some sort of A and neutral
monism or a dual aspect theory?

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Or is it closer to some sort of
a process metaphysics?

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Well, I think if you, if you, if
you take the interface theory

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seriously, you are left with a
few, with several options

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actually.
And I, I would count the things

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that you said, neutral monism to
all aspect theory, process,

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relational view, standard
idealism as it's kind of of

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those options that are still on
the table.

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Now a more important thing I
think is to realise that these

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different labels, I mean, people
came up with them in order to

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classify certain doctrines over
the years.

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I mean, just just, if you, if
you look at the history of

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idealism, for example, there is
no such thing actually.

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They're just different versions
of different thinkers.

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So even if you take the what we
call paradigmatic idealists,

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Berkeley, Leibnitz, can't they
all have different, very

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different systems and they even
refer, didn't refer to

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themselves as being idealists.
Like Leibnitz for example, spoke

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about his pre established
harmonies and Berkeley talked

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about immaterialism.
So there are slight nuances

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between those things and, and
the if you, if you open up a

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textbook on analytic philosophy
or analytic metaphysics of the

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20th century, then you will read
it and you will send, OK, that

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was dualism and there's
physicalism and there's this and

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that and this and that and this
and that.

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And then you have like these
needs distinctions between them

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and that's all.
I mean, that's all fine as far

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as it goes, but I think that's
purely kind of textbook way of

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making sense of a very long
convoluted history.

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It's not itself a kind of, you
know, scientific treatise on

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those things.
I briefly touched on the fact

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that you you argue for a sort of
a a mathematization of

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phenomenology.
What does a category theoretic?

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It's a topological or
topological formalization.

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Capture that phenomenological
description alone can't.

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Yes.
So I mean, there's before I come

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to that and there's AI would say
there's a very important thing

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to to, to to clarify.
When one says mathematical

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phenomenology, often what people
often have in mind is a kind of

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very shallow.
I'm not sure whether it's

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shallow, but it's, it's just a
description of what's going on

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inside your head, so to say.
And, and, and that's fine, of

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course, and it's necessary if
you, if you want to do some

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research in psychology, for
example, you, you probably need

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it.
But there's also a second

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dimension to phenomenology,
which I, which technically

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people call it a transcendental
direct not though not everyone

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needs to be.
I mean, there are different

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varieties of of that as well,
but I would say at the minimum,

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one could say something like
that.

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Phenomenology is about the
creation of meaning within a

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certain interaction, I mean,
within a certain process.

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And actually that contains
typically what we, what we call

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subjective and objective
aspects.

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They're still first personal in
the sense that we experienced it

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or that it kind of underlies our
experience.

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It flows into our experience,
but that doesn't necessarily

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mean it's purely subjective.
It's, it's a purely subjective

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business what phenomenology is
doing.

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So that's that.
I think that's, that's one

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important thing to say in
France.

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Now the specific question, what
mathematics actually adds to it?

230
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I, I think that's, there are
several reasons actually.

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And there are several things
that mathematics adds to that.

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So that's why I mean, I like it
obviously, but I would say the

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00:13:44,640 --> 00:13:48,920
most important one.
Well, now it's hard to say which

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00:13:48,920 --> 00:13:51,240
one is the most important one,
but one important one is

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mathematics has on the one
handed kind of clarifying role.

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So a lot of people are talking
about different stuff and no one

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has, you know, everyone has
their slide on kind of ways of

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talking and mathematics is
quite, quite precise actually at

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00:14:09,120 --> 00:14:12,320
it hammering down things.
So that's a good word.

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00:14:13,080 --> 00:14:15,520
But I think more important than
that I that that's already

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important.
But even more important is the

242
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fact that if you want people who
are interested in phenomenology

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00:14:24,520 --> 00:14:27,040
or interested in the humanities
or interested in the art or

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00:14:27,040 --> 00:14:31,960
whatever to be able to
communicate or to integrate into

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00:14:31,960 --> 00:14:36,400
a more scientific study of the
mind, then you need a common

246
00:14:36,400 --> 00:14:41,600
basis of, of, of talking and a
common language and, and, and

247
00:14:41,600 --> 00:14:45,320
mathematics seems to be the the
the best choice for this.

248
00:14:45,920 --> 00:14:48,880
Yeah, Yeah, it's true.
I mean, it's, it's, it's very

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00:14:48,880 --> 00:14:51,240
difficult to communicate with
someone if they're not speaking

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the same language, which is why
I love philosophy when it comes

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00:14:54,080 --> 00:14:57,400
to trying to understand anything
scientific is because it gives

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00:14:57,400 --> 00:15:00,360
you those, that tool kit to, to
discuss things.

253
00:15:00,760 --> 00:15:02,920
And, and within philosophy,
you've got someone like Husse

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Husserl, who Hussellian
phenomenology insists on, on the

255
00:15:07,920 --> 00:15:13,360
irreducibility of lived
experience by mathematizing

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00:15:13,360 --> 00:15:15,760
phenomenology.
Do you, do you guys ever get

257
00:15:15,760 --> 00:15:20,160
afraid that there's a risk of of
the very reductionism that

258
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phenomenology sort of resist in
the first place?

259
00:15:23,680 --> 00:15:26,120
Yes, I mean that's that's AI
would say that's a that's a

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00:15:26,120 --> 00:15:29,120
common objection to this whole
business to say, well, if you

261
00:15:29,120 --> 00:15:32,080
use mathematics, then you're
kind of you're already loose

262
00:15:32,480 --> 00:15:35,440
kind of side of of of this basic
ideas in phenomenology.

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And I think this danger exists
and this danger exists

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particularly then when people
start, I call it an anything

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00:15:46,120 --> 00:15:49,280
goes approach to to
mathematizing phenomenology.

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So whatever, whatever works, you
just take it and you just write

267
00:15:52,360 --> 00:15:54,800
it down and then then you look
at this and say, well, why

268
00:15:54,800 --> 00:16:00,800
should this be so I think this
this this approach runs in into

269
00:16:00,800 --> 00:16:06,240
exactly this danger.
So you need certain

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00:16:06,240 --> 00:16:10,120
justifications and reasoning why
one particular way of applying

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00:16:10,120 --> 00:16:15,160
mathematics to this kind of
converges at least with some

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00:16:15,240 --> 00:16:18,080
motifs that that that that that
are typically mentioned in

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00:16:18,080 --> 00:16:20,800
phenomenology itself.
So I don't think actually that

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00:16:20,800 --> 00:16:27,240
mathematics by itself,
mathematics is the same as as as

275
00:16:27,240 --> 00:16:31,160
reducing stuff to, I don't know,
quantitative reasoning or so

276
00:16:32,520 --> 00:16:34,920
that's the the to 1 application
of mathematics.

277
00:16:34,920 --> 00:16:39,480
But mathematics is is a very
rich, a very rich thing.

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00:16:39,640 --> 00:16:42,960
I mean, it's mainly about
structures and that's that seems

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to be what phenomenology is
really.

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Interested in, I mean, and you
can see that with the the way

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00:16:48,680 --> 00:16:50,640
you guys approach the work, the
way you approach the work, you

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00:16:50,640 --> 00:16:54,360
can tell that it's, it's, I
mean, you can sort of tell when

283
00:16:54,360 --> 00:16:56,400
someone's purely reducing
something to the sum of its

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parts.
But this is someone trying to

285
00:16:57,960 --> 00:17:01,720
understand the whole system
while trying to break it down to

286
00:17:01,720 --> 00:17:04,760
understand the whole system.
And in one of your papers, I

287
00:17:04,760 --> 00:17:09,880
think it was the topological,
structured phenomenological

288
00:17:09,880 --> 00:17:13,839
spaces, phenomenal spaces.
I, I know you suggested that

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00:17:13,839 --> 00:17:15,520
experience has a sort of
geometry.

290
00:17:16,280 --> 00:17:20,000
And what would you say is the
philosophical significance of

291
00:17:20,000 --> 00:17:24,880
treating qualia as structured
topological spaces rather than

292
00:17:24,960 --> 00:17:27,040
ineffable states?
So let's, let's talk about some

293
00:17:27,040 --> 00:17:29,200
of these positives.
What, what kind of work we get

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done with this now, now that
we've set this premise and this

295
00:17:32,000 --> 00:17:34,720
baseline?
I mean, a very, very, very basic

296
00:17:34,720 --> 00:17:38,760
thing is if if you want to
classify experiences or types of

297
00:17:38,760 --> 00:17:44,000
experiences, then you would need
a kind of a very useful way to

298
00:17:44,480 --> 00:17:49,400
classification scheme.
So very much to to what people,

299
00:17:49,400 --> 00:17:53,320
people in in earlier days in
biology actually did this animal

300
00:17:53,320 --> 00:17:55,200
or bad animal or this animal or
dead animal.

301
00:17:56,240 --> 00:18:02,480
And I just think this whole idea
of geometry, geometry, give me a

302
00:18:02,480 --> 00:18:07,080
geometry or topology of things
is very useful if you want to

303
00:18:07,080 --> 00:18:09,000
come up with such a
classification scheme.

304
00:18:09,720 --> 00:18:12,200
Now let me, let me say, let me
say one more thing to, to, to,

305
00:18:12,320 --> 00:18:14,840
to this, to this reductionism
topic, because it triggered me a

306
00:18:14,840 --> 00:18:20,240
little bit.
I I actually think that's one of

307
00:18:20,240 --> 00:18:26,800
the difficulties in some, not
all, but in some idealist

308
00:18:26,800 --> 00:18:30,640
positions that they're very
reductive in the end.

309
00:18:30,640 --> 00:18:35,560
They try to reduce everything to
some very simple whatever.

310
00:18:35,880 --> 00:18:38,800
And I think that's one of the
dangers which we one of the

311
00:18:38,800 --> 00:18:43,920
traps we shouldn't fall into.
That's exactly what we, what

312
00:18:43,920 --> 00:18:47,520
phenomenologist actually like
rightfully criticize when, when,

313
00:18:47,520 --> 00:18:50,640
when, when doing about this
naturalization strategies.

314
00:18:52,200 --> 00:18:55,520
And that's also true for some
non physicalist theories.

315
00:18:56,080 --> 00:18:57,960
Yes, yes.
And how do you go about doing

316
00:18:57,960 --> 00:19:00,640
that, Robert?
Is it, is it, is it difficult?

317
00:19:00,640 --> 00:19:04,200
Because as, as an idealist, I
think because, I mean, look, if

318
00:19:04,200 --> 00:19:06,800
you look at the last 30 years,
let's say, and you see how this

319
00:19:06,800 --> 00:19:09,920
wheel of time is occurring.
And previously idealism was huge

320
00:19:09,920 --> 00:19:11,920
and then slowly materialism took
hold again.

321
00:19:12,200 --> 00:19:14,240
And now it seems to be growing
and thriving again.

322
00:19:14,640 --> 00:19:18,360
But as it's doing so, you've got
a whole bunch of materialists

323
00:19:18,360 --> 00:19:21,520
who grew up in this world who
see it as a non scientific

324
00:19:21,520 --> 00:19:23,760
approach.
I'm not saying I do.

325
00:19:23,760 --> 00:19:26,240
I'm saying that this is the
perception some people have, and

326
00:19:26,240 --> 00:19:28,400
then you're stuck trying to
explain this, and the more

327
00:19:28,400 --> 00:19:32,360
detailed you you get, the more
they start accusing you of being

328
00:19:32,360 --> 00:19:34,480
too reductionist.
So it's almost like you're stuck

329
00:19:34,480 --> 00:19:36,840
between a rock and a hard place
trying to explain yourself in

330
00:19:36,840 --> 00:19:38,720
both sides.
So how do you guys approach

331
00:19:38,720 --> 00:19:39,960
that?
Right.

332
00:19:40,000 --> 00:19:42,600
I mean, that's the you, you're
perfectly right to point out the

333
00:19:42,600 --> 00:19:45,600
dialectic that that that's
really a kind of pity.

334
00:19:45,600 --> 00:19:49,080
And then it happens often time.
Well, you hear a lot of people

335
00:19:49,080 --> 00:19:52,200
who talk about experience that
you need to, you need, you need

336
00:19:52,200 --> 00:19:55,360
to integrate experience into the
natural order of things.

337
00:19:55,720 --> 00:20:01,320
And I'm always a bit, you know,
sometimes feel a bit uneasy

338
00:20:01,320 --> 00:20:03,440
about that.
I think experience is just not

339
00:20:03,440 --> 00:20:06,200
integratable.
It's just, it's crazy.

340
00:20:06,840 --> 00:20:11,000
And, but the important thing is
if it happens, what, what then?

341
00:20:11,000 --> 00:20:14,080
What happens then?
And so I think you, you, you,

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00:20:14,200 --> 00:20:16,760
you need to come up with a with
a framework, with theory,

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00:20:16,760 --> 00:20:21,280
ideally mathematical, of course.
Well, let's just say with a,

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00:20:21,520 --> 00:20:26,040
with a kind of rational theory
that lets you explains this,

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00:20:26,600 --> 00:20:28,960
this process of having an
experience and then something

346
00:20:28,960 --> 00:20:32,240
happens and it's completely it
shatters everything that you

347
00:20:32,680 --> 00:20:38,120
believe, but it still leads to a
certain kind of noticeable

348
00:20:38,120 --> 00:20:41,560
change in your behaviour in the
way how you kind of perceive the

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00:20:41,560 --> 00:20:43,240
world, how you how you approach
the world.

350
00:20:44,480 --> 00:20:47,960
And I think that's that's,
that's already if, if we can get

351
00:20:47,960 --> 00:20:49,880
to that, that would be already
great.

352
00:20:51,040 --> 00:20:54,720
Your, your lab explodes some
incredible stuff, one of them

353
00:20:54,720 --> 00:20:56,640
being you.
You guys touch on artificial

354
00:20:56,640 --> 00:21:00,200
phenomenology.
How, how do we, I mean, us

355
00:21:00,200 --> 00:21:03,400
exploring this podcast and this
the mind body problem comes in

356
00:21:03,440 --> 00:21:05,360
this reality.
It's what it's my favorite topic

357
00:21:05,360 --> 00:21:07,240
and it's always fun to see what
people are doing with it.

358
00:21:07,640 --> 00:21:11,280
How do you or how can we
distinguish between a simulated

359
00:21:11,680 --> 00:21:16,720
phenomenological system or a
structured one in in in humans

360
00:21:16,920 --> 00:21:20,560
or non artificial systems?
Yes.

361
00:21:20,560 --> 00:21:24,920
So that's, that's a, that's a
very urgent question I think.

362
00:21:24,920 --> 00:21:29,840
And you know, you, you have a
lot of kind of research coming

363
00:21:29,840 --> 00:21:32,720
up.
It's still considered to a bit

364
00:21:32,760 --> 00:21:36,040
fringy, but you know, it gets
more into the mainstream of this

365
00:21:36,040 --> 00:21:37,800
relation between AI and
consciousness.

366
00:21:39,160 --> 00:21:41,360
And I think that's a very
important question and a very

367
00:21:41,360 --> 00:21:45,600
important kind of research.
But I think also think that most

368
00:21:45,600 --> 00:21:47,240
people think about it the wrong
way.

369
00:21:48,080 --> 00:21:52,240
And the the the current way to
think about this is to say, OK,

370
00:21:52,440 --> 00:21:56,680
let's use AI to don't know,
reproduce a particular

371
00:21:56,680 --> 00:22:00,080
computational abstract artefact
in the world, let's say the

372
00:22:00,080 --> 00:22:02,480
human brain, let's try to
reproduce it.

373
00:22:03,280 --> 00:22:07,280
Look whether the AI realises a
certain computational function

374
00:22:07,280 --> 00:22:10,000
that is also performed by the
brain, global workspace or

375
00:22:10,000 --> 00:22:15,040
whatever.
I think that focus on one

376
00:22:15,040 --> 00:22:20,720
particular artifact, but it
misses much more there is to

377
00:22:20,720 --> 00:22:22,360
say.
I mean the consciousness is is

378
00:22:22,360 --> 00:22:27,400
much bigger than that I think.
So the way how I think about it

379
00:22:27,400 --> 00:22:31,320
is the question to to, to, to,
to ask a much more modest

380
00:22:31,320 --> 00:22:33,280
question.
And the question would be how

381
00:22:33,280 --> 00:22:37,840
can we use AI to modify or
engineer those what I call

382
00:22:37,840 --> 00:22:39,960
interfere or what the interface
theory of perception calls

383
00:22:39,960 --> 00:22:44,120
interfaces to reality.
That doesn't necessarily mean

384
00:22:44,120 --> 00:22:49,080
that we use AI to construct
conscious or to build conscious

385
00:22:49,080 --> 00:22:51,400
machines.
It just says, OK, well, let

386
00:22:51,400 --> 00:22:55,640
let's let's try to figure out
first how or whether AI is

387
00:22:55,640 --> 00:22:59,360
useful when we think about
expanding or changing or

388
00:22:59,360 --> 00:23:01,960
whatever, exploring our
interface to reality.

389
00:23:03,040 --> 00:23:08,000
One of the things I think I read
was the is it an SLP test where

390
00:23:08,960 --> 00:23:12,640
I think you propose that?
Alternatively, I recently, I

391
00:23:12,640 --> 00:23:14,480
recently published a paper about
that.

392
00:23:16,160 --> 00:23:19,720
Yeah, I mean, if you, if you,
if, if you're sympathetic to, to

393
00:23:20,520 --> 00:23:24,720
what what I just said, then one
question would be how to assess

394
00:23:24,960 --> 00:23:31,240
those interfaces, how to, you
know, in AI research now it's

395
00:23:31,240 --> 00:23:33,320
very fashionable to have all
these benchmarks.

396
00:23:33,600 --> 00:23:35,880
You have a benchmark for this
and benchmark for that and and

397
00:23:35,880 --> 00:23:38,240
so on.
And then then, you know, the big

398
00:23:38,240 --> 00:23:42,800
companies, they, they, they kind
of, they compete with the

399
00:23:42,800 --> 00:23:44,800
models.
What model is better with this

400
00:23:44,800 --> 00:23:48,280
benchmark or that better and?
And they all fighting with

401
00:23:48,400 --> 00:23:50,280
grants and funds and it's the
perfect.

402
00:23:50,320 --> 00:23:53,920
Yes, I mean, that's not just an
academia apparently that's

403
00:23:54,120 --> 00:23:58,320
always the case.
Now the natural questions, of

404
00:23:58,320 --> 00:24:00,560
course, what, what would that
mean?

405
00:24:00,560 --> 00:24:04,000
If you, if you think about the
benchmark for consciousness, I

406
00:24:04,040 --> 00:24:08,280
mean to put it very naively, and
I mean that's already quite

407
00:24:08,280 --> 00:24:12,440
problematic, especially if you
believe that intelligence and

408
00:24:12,440 --> 00:24:14,160
consciousness are two different
things.

409
00:24:14,720 --> 00:24:17,120
Then we could say, well, OK,
those benchmarks are maybe,

410
00:24:17,480 --> 00:24:19,840
maybe that that's an argument to
have.

411
00:24:19,840 --> 00:24:22,160
But there are people who know
more about these benchmarks than

412
00:24:22,160 --> 00:24:27,280
I do, whether they're a good
measure for intelligent

413
00:24:27,280 --> 00:24:31,720
behaviour or for intelligence.
But if you believe in this

414
00:24:31,720 --> 00:24:33,840
dissociation between
consciousness and intelligence,

415
00:24:35,000 --> 00:24:37,640
it's completely open whether
that has anything to do with

416
00:24:37,640 --> 00:24:42,000
consciousness.
And these SLP tests that you

417
00:24:42,000 --> 00:24:47,920
briefly mentioned are actually a
way of of, of of where I try to

418
00:24:47,920 --> 00:24:52,520
say, OK, if we, if we want to
subject those interfaces to, to,

419
00:24:52,520 --> 00:24:56,160
to, to, to a similar benchmark
like test, then you would you

420
00:24:56,840 --> 00:24:58,960
would do such a thing like an
SAP test.

421
00:25:00,280 --> 00:25:02,040
For anyone who does, who's not
familiar, do you?

422
00:25:02,040 --> 00:25:03,400
Can you give us an example of
one of them?

423
00:25:04,520 --> 00:25:07,520
Well, there are no examples of,
of, of, of any of them because I

424
00:25:07,520 --> 00:25:09,840
mean, I just, I just recently
thought about this thing.

425
00:25:10,960 --> 00:25:13,720
So I'm very happy actually, if
someone has good ideas.

426
00:25:14,760 --> 00:25:19,040
So I, I maybe, maybe maybe we
can, I can briefly explain S

427
00:25:19,040 --> 00:25:23,280
this stays for subjective.
So it's about language, whether

428
00:25:24,920 --> 00:25:28,400
language model, for example,
starts talking about

429
00:25:28,640 --> 00:25:32,640
consciousness, but it's not just
about the the question whether

430
00:25:32,640 --> 00:25:35,360
it talks like, like it, because
I mean, surely it will do.

431
00:25:35,400 --> 00:25:38,920
I mean, we humans speak about
consciousness all the time and

432
00:25:38,920 --> 00:25:41,080
large language models are very
good at picking up those

433
00:25:41,080 --> 00:25:43,440
regularities.
But it's also the question

434
00:25:43,440 --> 00:25:49,240
whether whether the fact that
you talk about it also have an

435
00:25:50,000 --> 00:25:55,440
has an effect on the behaviour
on or continued whatever modes

436
00:25:55,440 --> 00:25:58,280
of existence or processing of
these of these things.

437
00:25:58,800 --> 00:26:01,680
The L test is very similar, but
it's not about language, but

438
00:26:01,680 --> 00:26:03,840
it's about emergent types of
behaviour.

439
00:26:04,400 --> 00:26:07,440
Again, it's not the question of
the behaviour as such, of the

440
00:26:07,440 --> 00:26:10,880
problem solving as such, but
about whether this problem

441
00:26:10,880 --> 00:26:15,600
solving is kind of integrated
into a, a larger process that is

442
00:26:15,600 --> 00:26:20,400
about the the sustainance of
this program where it continues

443
00:26:20,400 --> 00:26:23,000
to exist.
And then the third test, the P

444
00:26:23,000 --> 00:26:24,880
test, P stands for
phenomenology.

445
00:26:25,760 --> 00:26:29,520
It's this question how
interfaces present data or

446
00:26:29,520 --> 00:26:33,000
structure data that they get,
and whether that aligns with

447
00:26:33,000 --> 00:26:35,880
certain principles that you also
find in the phenomenological

448
00:26:35,880 --> 00:26:38,200
literature.
Well, this is a perfect call to

449
00:26:38,200 --> 00:26:39,320
action.
If anyone's watching or

450
00:26:39,320 --> 00:26:42,800
listening, try and give us
examples of an SLP test in the

451
00:26:42,800 --> 00:26:45,880
comment section as an
alternative to the basic curing

452
00:26:45,880 --> 00:26:53,480
test of of course, when when
we're operationalizing these, he

453
00:26:53,480 --> 00:26:54,680
says.
I mean, we briefly touched on

454
00:26:54,680 --> 00:26:57,120
this, but let's just one last
time go into it.

455
00:26:57,440 --> 00:27:01,240
How, how, how much are you guys
working on this while trying to

456
00:27:01,240 --> 00:27:03,440
avoid collapsing into
behaviourism?

457
00:27:03,440 --> 00:27:07,160
Is that something you're
constantly thinking about, or is

458
00:27:07,160 --> 00:27:08,520
it something you just you,
you've decided?

459
00:27:08,520 --> 00:27:09,800
You know what?
We're doing this properly.

460
00:27:09,800 --> 00:27:11,960
We're doing great work.
Let's just continue and enjoy

461
00:27:11,960 --> 00:27:15,280
ourselves.
Well, I mean when when when you

462
00:27:15,280 --> 00:27:20,040
say behaviorism, I'm not 100%
sure what you are actually

463
00:27:20,040 --> 00:27:23,880
meaning.
We're operationalizing

464
00:27:24,120 --> 00:27:27,080
phenomenological richness.
So if you're if you're trying to

465
00:27:27,080 --> 00:27:30,480
do that, it's it's oh, it's very
similar to sort of a behaviorism

466
00:27:30,760 --> 00:27:34,400
outlook.
It slightly is, would you say

467
00:27:34,400 --> 00:27:37,160
that that's something you you
try you guys look into or not

468
00:27:37,160 --> 00:27:40,120
really?
So I would, I would actually say

469
00:27:40,120 --> 00:27:43,320
it's not, it's not, it's it's
very different from behaviorism.

470
00:27:43,320 --> 00:27:46,440
But I mean then of of course,
then then the questions how,

471
00:27:46,440 --> 00:27:48,240
how, how you define things,
right.

472
00:27:49,360 --> 00:27:51,160
So when when you say
behaviorism?

473
00:27:51,800 --> 00:27:54,360
I just mean, yeah.
The association, yeah, the

474
00:27:54,440 --> 00:27:58,280
association that I have is, is
just to say, OK, looking at what

475
00:27:58,280 --> 00:28:01,600
the system does, you kind of, I
don't know that that's

476
00:28:01,600 --> 00:28:02,920
everything there is to the
system.

477
00:28:03,200 --> 00:28:07,840
And then I would say, no, it's
exactly not what the system

478
00:28:07,840 --> 00:28:10,600
does.
It's it's more about how the

479
00:28:10,600 --> 00:28:12,960
system does things.
I mean, it's important that the

480
00:28:12,960 --> 00:28:15,600
system does something which is
interesting, but the question is

481
00:28:15,600 --> 00:28:19,200
how it does it.
Yeah, maybe, maybe, maybe it's

482
00:28:19,200 --> 00:28:21,960
closer to an interpretability
idea.

483
00:28:23,080 --> 00:28:25,640
OK, yeah.
And when I look at your work, by

484
00:28:25,640 --> 00:28:27,000
the way, I don't think you're a
behaviourist.

485
00:28:28,160 --> 00:28:30,280
When I, when I look at your
work, I see sort of a very

486
00:28:30,280 --> 00:28:34,200
processional side to it.
It's very intertwined and

487
00:28:34,200 --> 00:28:36,600
interconnected, which is
beautiful to watch and to

488
00:28:36,600 --> 00:28:40,000
explore.
How does your, does your work

489
00:28:40,280 --> 00:28:42,640
align with that of Whitehead's
process metaphysics?

490
00:28:42,640 --> 00:28:44,120
Do you ever, do you ever look
into that?

491
00:28:44,120 --> 00:28:46,280
Do you know there's a lot of
similarities there?

492
00:28:47,160 --> 00:28:50,280
Yes, I mean, I'm, I'm, I'm a big
fan of Whitehead and I think

493
00:28:50,280 --> 00:28:53,320
he's, he was probably the the
greatest metaphysician of the

494
00:28:53,320 --> 00:28:58,120
20th century, but he was also
one of the most difficult ones.

495
00:28:58,600 --> 00:29:01,600
There's so many things.
So I often rewrite it and, and,

496
00:29:01,600 --> 00:29:03,520
and, and I think, oh, it's, it's
beautiful.

497
00:29:03,520 --> 00:29:06,000
It's great.
And then at one point I was

498
00:29:06,000 --> 00:29:07,840
like, now I don't understand it
anymore.

499
00:29:08,080 --> 00:29:13,120
So it's really hard to make
sense of in in that sense.

500
00:29:13,120 --> 00:29:17,120
I would say, well, yes,
definitely.

501
00:29:18,520 --> 00:29:24,120
But no, if you mean by it, you
know, there there's a school of

502
00:29:24,120 --> 00:29:27,760
Whiteheadians and they, they
really get into the stuff and

503
00:29:27,880 --> 00:29:31,480
you really start to adopt this,
this this way of thinking.

504
00:29:31,480 --> 00:29:35,240
Also the concepts in the jungle.
And I try to avoid that a little

505
00:29:35,240 --> 00:29:37,080
bit because it means ultra
difficult.

506
00:29:37,960 --> 00:29:40,840
Yeah, it's, it's almost like
it's, it's so, it's so

507
00:29:40,840 --> 00:29:42,280
consuming.
It can become a sort of

508
00:29:42,280 --> 00:29:45,320
religious view at some point,
yes, yeah.

509
00:29:45,360 --> 00:29:47,600
Which I've seen many of my
friends, that's happened to them

510
00:29:47,600 --> 00:29:50,720
quite, quite a bit, where
there's nothing about their life

511
00:29:50,720 --> 00:29:52,360
that isn't white Hadian in a
sense.

512
00:29:53,520 --> 00:29:57,120
Yes, you, you, you can, you can,
you can really color everything

513
00:29:57,160 --> 00:29:58,960
or you look at everything for
this lens.

514
00:29:59,440 --> 00:30:02,120
I mean, by the way, I mean this
process theology thing which

515
00:30:02,120 --> 00:30:03,680
happened in the in the 20th
century.

516
00:30:03,920 --> 00:30:07,440
And it's a prime example
actually of, of how white Hadian

517
00:30:07,440 --> 00:30:09,680
thought and religious thought
came together.

518
00:30:10,040 --> 00:30:12,640
I mean, it's, it's, it's a very,
I think it's a very interesting

519
00:30:13,240 --> 00:30:16,160
approach, but it has certain
difficulties.

520
00:30:16,640 --> 00:30:19,520
Yeah, yeah, I agree.
He's a he's an absolute legend

521
00:30:19,520 --> 00:30:22,760
in the field.
But your work beautifully

522
00:30:22,760 --> 00:30:28,120
bridges AI and the humanities.
How can phenomenology and art

523
00:30:28,240 --> 00:30:31,160
actually inform artificial
regions beyond me?

524
00:30:31,160 --> 00:30:33,680
A metaphor.
Yes.

525
00:30:33,680 --> 00:30:38,960
So, I mean, at first, maybe I, I
would, I would, I would go the

526
00:30:38,960 --> 00:30:40,920
other way around.
Maybe, maybe then that clarifies

527
00:30:40,920 --> 00:30:44,440
already this question as well.
So I'm very interested in, in

528
00:30:44,440 --> 00:30:48,560
what's called the digital
humanities, this idea of using

529
00:30:49,080 --> 00:30:53,400
computer technology or AI maybe
now for the humanities.

530
00:30:54,600 --> 00:31:00,240
But I think from the perspective
of the humanities, there's one

531
00:31:00,240 --> 00:31:03,280
thing which is really missing
and which is really deficient in

532
00:31:03,280 --> 00:31:06,000
the way how digital humanities
are practiced nowadays.

533
00:31:06,360 --> 00:31:09,440
And that's the way that that has
something to do with, with, with

534
00:31:09,440 --> 00:31:13,000
experience or with meaning.
When you look what, what's done

535
00:31:13,000 --> 00:31:17,560
in digital humanities, it's
often not about the question,

536
00:31:17,560 --> 00:31:20,480
how is meaning encoded?
How is consciousness encoded?

537
00:31:20,480 --> 00:31:26,520
How is subjectivity?
I don't know in, in how

538
00:31:26,520 --> 00:31:29,160
subjectivity led to the creation
of certain artefacts or

539
00:31:29,160 --> 00:31:32,400
whatever, and how it is, how is
it transmitted?

540
00:31:33,360 --> 00:31:36,240
And, and, and those are
questions which I would really

541
00:31:37,440 --> 00:31:41,440
expect the humanities, the
digital humanities to actually

542
00:31:41,440 --> 00:31:43,560
work on.
And that's not the case at the

543
00:31:43,560 --> 00:31:47,200
moment.
And so I think there's a there's

544
00:31:47,280 --> 00:31:51,080
there's, there's lots of of, of
possibility here, but that

545
00:31:51,080 --> 00:31:58,160
requires that one is actually
able to translate some of those

546
00:31:58,160 --> 00:32:01,200
ideas into the AI field.
Yeah.

547
00:32:02,440 --> 00:32:04,080
And I think.
I think one of the things you

548
00:32:04,560 --> 00:32:09,560
you spoke about in your previous
work was the is to, in order to

549
00:32:09,560 --> 00:32:12,080
sort of understand and apply
artificial phenomenology to

550
00:32:12,080 --> 00:32:15,600
cultural artifacts, you suggest
that we simulate historical

551
00:32:15,600 --> 00:32:17,440
subjectivities.
But I think it's quite an

552
00:32:17,440 --> 00:32:20,200
interesting, yeah, it's quite an
interesting thing in itself.

553
00:32:21,520 --> 00:32:22,840
Yes.
So I think, I think one of the

554
00:32:24,000 --> 00:32:28,440
if if you go to a museum now and
then you look at the things in

555
00:32:28,440 --> 00:32:34,840
the museum that hang there.
But typically, I mean, we, we,

556
00:32:34,840 --> 00:32:38,360
we, we can kind of think about
preserving those, those, those,

557
00:32:38,480 --> 00:32:40,840
those, those things and stuff
and knowledge.

558
00:32:41,880 --> 00:32:48,320
But what's ultimately what's
often lost in the process is

559
00:32:49,640 --> 00:32:52,880
knowledge.
Or is it way of being able to

560
00:32:52,880 --> 00:32:57,400
recapitulate the very process
that actually led to the to the

561
00:32:57,400 --> 00:33:00,720
generation of those artefacts?
And that's what I mean when,

562
00:33:00,720 --> 00:33:03,520
when, when, when this this this
bit about historical

563
00:33:03,520 --> 00:33:06,600
subjectivity.
That's exactly what what, what,

564
00:33:06,600 --> 00:33:11,400
what, what related to to these
questions of the way how I see

565
00:33:11,400 --> 00:33:13,240
this this culture.
A lot of facts that you can

566
00:33:13,240 --> 00:33:17,600
study in the humanities are
something of test testimonies of

567
00:33:17,640 --> 00:33:23,840
of of of subjectivities.
And if you want to use digital

568
00:33:23,840 --> 00:33:31,360
methods to preserve or produce
certain kinds of knowledges or

569
00:33:31,360 --> 00:33:36,360
experiences or exhibitions or
whatever, then you should try to

570
00:33:36,400 --> 00:33:40,440
recapitulate this historical
forms of subjectivity.

571
00:33:41,760 --> 00:33:45,080
Yep, it's the, there's so much
to explore here.

572
00:33:45,080 --> 00:33:47,760
But one, one of the things would
be, I mean, if artificial

573
00:33:47,760 --> 00:33:52,800
phenomenology is possible, and I
mean we've got these SLPTS,

574
00:33:52,800 --> 00:33:54,320
hopefully someone gives us great
ideas.

575
00:33:54,680 --> 00:33:59,120
Then when we experience or
witness other sort of

576
00:33:59,400 --> 00:34:04,080
phenomenological interfaces in
machines, let's say, how does

577
00:34:04,080 --> 00:34:05,960
this shift our ethical stance in
general?

578
00:34:05,960 --> 00:34:08,320
Because many theories of
consciousness obviously have

579
00:34:08,320 --> 00:34:10,400
certain layers of where they
stop thinking something's

580
00:34:10,400 --> 00:34:12,719
conscious and therefore treat
things differently.

581
00:34:13,040 --> 00:34:15,719
In this case, they could be
various different interfaces

582
00:34:15,719 --> 00:34:18,840
that are absolutely alien to us.
I think it's a good ethical

583
00:34:18,840 --> 00:34:20,520
framework to actually make you a
better person.

584
00:34:22,280 --> 00:34:26,080
Right.
I mean, I on the one hand, I, I

585
00:34:26,080 --> 00:34:32,639
would like to say something like
it and it certainly does it, it,

586
00:34:32,639 --> 00:34:37,080
it, it shifts the outlook that
way that we we have on these

587
00:34:37,080 --> 00:34:39,719
questions.
Or at the moment, as you said,

588
00:34:39,719 --> 00:34:42,600
there's this hierarchy and then
there's just couple of things

589
00:34:42,600 --> 00:34:45,360
you typically living things.
And then you would say, OK, this

590
00:34:45,360 --> 00:34:47,719
one here maybe and this one here
definitely.

591
00:34:47,719 --> 00:34:52,239
And this year, probably not.
Now when you take a different

592
00:34:52,239 --> 00:34:54,880
view, then you would say, OK,
they're just different forms or

593
00:34:54,880 --> 00:35:00,360
manifestations of consciousness.
And, and it's not clear how how

594
00:35:00,360 --> 00:35:03,760
that relates to these ethical
standards in a sense that I

595
00:35:03,760 --> 00:35:07,960
mean, that could all kinds of
things could be, you know, could

596
00:35:07,960 --> 00:35:11,120
be related to, to, to, to a
first person perspective or to

597
00:35:11,120 --> 00:35:14,000
consciousness.
Whether that's a living thing or

598
00:35:14,000 --> 00:35:16,040
a non living thing doesn't
matter.

599
00:35:16,040 --> 00:35:19,080
It's just maybe a part of an
interface description or part of

600
00:35:19,080 --> 00:35:23,440
an artefact, but it still
doesn't solve this question how

601
00:35:23,440 --> 00:35:27,640
you should proceed and how you
should treat and those things.

602
00:35:29,480 --> 00:35:31,400
So for me, for example, when
you, when you, when you, when

603
00:35:31,400 --> 00:35:35,280
you talk about various problems
that we face, is, is, is

604
00:35:35,280 --> 00:35:38,480
humanity climate problem, for
example.

605
00:35:38,960 --> 00:35:41,720
And then it's really an ethical
problem for me, it's the

606
00:35:41,720 --> 00:35:45,920
question how should we treat?
I'm not saying that the climate

607
00:35:45,920 --> 00:35:49,080
is a living being, but I would
say, but I, but I say something

608
00:35:49,080 --> 00:35:54,600
like, well, it's still very
similar to a, to an interface

609
00:35:54,600 --> 00:35:57,880
description of something that's
going on and, and, and behind

610
00:35:57,880 --> 00:36:02,120
interface, so to speak.
And the question is, how should

611
00:36:02,160 --> 00:36:04,520
you, should you, should you
think about that?

612
00:36:04,520 --> 00:36:08,600
I mean, when you, one of the
things that interfaces do or

613
00:36:08,600 --> 00:36:13,280
allow you to do is, is, is to
interact with those things and

614
00:36:13,280 --> 00:36:15,280
the ethical questions, obviously
then the question how to

615
00:36:15,280 --> 00:36:19,280
interact with those things.
But I don't have yet an answer

616
00:36:19,280 --> 00:36:23,440
how you how that shapes how that
should shape our ethical

617
00:36:23,440 --> 00:36:26,960
policies?
It does your relational view of

618
00:36:26,960 --> 00:36:29,720
consciousness reframe human
freedom?

619
00:36:29,720 --> 00:36:32,640
So if we're constituted by
interfaces, how should we

620
00:36:32,640 --> 00:36:36,160
understand agency and autonomy?
Yes, the question of human

621
00:36:36,160 --> 00:36:39,600
freedom or freedom more
generally, it's a very

622
00:36:39,600 --> 00:36:43,600
interesting question.
As I said somewhere in the

623
00:36:43,600 --> 00:36:45,760
beginning with these two camps
of philosophers with, with

624
00:36:45,960 --> 00:36:48,720
respect to freedom, it's all
it's, it's also very similar.

625
00:36:49,800 --> 00:36:54,800
And I think you can interpret
interface theory in two ways.

626
00:36:55,080 --> 00:37:02,520
And you can either say, Ah,
well, it says it's very likely

627
00:37:02,520 --> 00:37:04,840
that that stuff is not
predictable.

628
00:37:07,200 --> 00:37:11,480
You know, you have you have a
fundamental form of, of non

629
00:37:11,480 --> 00:37:15,680
predictability or probability,
but that's not quite the same as

630
00:37:15,680 --> 00:37:19,040
saying you have fundamental
notion of freedom that's

631
00:37:19,040 --> 00:37:21,720
happening here.
And that's, that's I would say

632
00:37:21,720 --> 00:37:26,640
that's a further leap of faith
that you need to, that's

633
00:37:26,640 --> 00:37:29,560
something that you need to post
it in addition to say, OK, that

634
00:37:29,560 --> 00:37:33,200
really gives you a relation to
freedom.

635
00:37:33,200 --> 00:37:39,040
So I personally think that this
free reel question and this

636
00:37:39,040 --> 00:37:41,960
question of consciousness is, is
quite strongly related.

637
00:37:43,320 --> 00:37:47,120
But lots of people and maybe
even the majority of people in

638
00:37:47,120 --> 00:37:51,840
in doing consciousness science
are actually not so much worried

639
00:37:51,840 --> 00:37:55,960
about this close relationship.
And I think the interfaith

640
00:37:55,960 --> 00:38:00,960
theory by itself cannot really
help you settle this question.

641
00:38:01,520 --> 00:38:03,800
So I'll interrupt you there,
Robert.

642
00:38:03,800 --> 00:38:09,040
What do you see as the biggest,
let's say, gap, The biggest gap

643
00:38:09,040 --> 00:38:11,840
in current consciousness?
Is it metaphysical clarity?

644
00:38:11,840 --> 00:38:15,000
Is it formal rigor or empirical
validation?

645
00:38:15,000 --> 00:38:22,120
What are your thoughts on that?
So I mean one of the so there

646
00:38:22,120 --> 00:38:25,880
was there was recently this,
this, this this paper by Robert

647
00:38:25,880 --> 00:38:28,680
Lawrence Kuhn with with 300
theories of consciousness.

648
00:38:28,680 --> 00:38:32,000
So I think one of the one of the
one of the things which is not a

649
00:38:32,000 --> 00:38:34,640
problem is that there are too
few theories of consciousness

650
00:38:35,120 --> 00:38:37,200
and there might be not enough
good theories.

651
00:38:37,200 --> 00:38:40,320
But then, but it's not a problem
that So whenever, whenever I

652
00:38:40,320 --> 00:38:44,360
read a paper, for example, by
someone who proposes yet another

653
00:38:44,360 --> 00:38:46,920
theory of consciousness, and I'm
already a bit sceptical and

654
00:38:47,160 --> 00:38:50,320
well, that's not quite what the
field is actually seems to be

655
00:38:50,320 --> 00:38:53,800
needing.
So that I would say at the

656
00:38:53,800 --> 00:39:01,280
moment the the big gap is to
find a a framework which which

657
00:39:01,320 --> 00:39:04,480
could be formal, which would
hopefully would be formal, which

658
00:39:04,480 --> 00:39:07,320
is able to integrate various
perspectives on consciousness.

659
00:39:08,280 --> 00:39:10,240
You've been working in this
field for so many years.

660
00:39:10,480 --> 00:39:12,240
What, what is it about it?
About it?

661
00:39:12,240 --> 00:39:13,480
I mean, I know I love this
topic.

662
00:39:13,480 --> 00:39:15,840
It's one of my favorite things
to chat about, just to discuss

663
00:39:15,840 --> 00:39:17,880
it with friends.
What every morning when you wake

664
00:39:17,880 --> 00:39:21,120
up to, to go to work, What, what
gets you going?

665
00:39:21,120 --> 00:39:25,320
What keeps you going?
Well, I think, I mean, as you

666
00:39:25,320 --> 00:39:27,920
said, I think it's, it's, it's,
it's, it's, it's it's hell of an

667
00:39:27,920 --> 00:39:29,440
interesting topic.
And I think it's the most

668
00:39:29,440 --> 00:39:32,000
interesting scientific topic
that we currently have or the

669
00:39:32,000 --> 00:39:34,400
biggest scientific question
currently is around.

670
00:39:35,480 --> 00:39:39,560
So I mean, that's that's I think
that's that's one obvious thing.

671
00:39:40,280 --> 00:39:42,640
So it's it's not the case that
when I wake up in the morning, I

672
00:39:42,640 --> 00:39:44,080
immediately think about
consciousness.

673
00:39:44,720 --> 00:39:46,760
That would be that would.
I think that would be a bit of

674
00:39:46,760 --> 00:39:52,280
an exaggeration, but but still.
But it still must be fun to know

675
00:39:52,280 --> 00:39:54,560
that you, you guys are exploring
the frontiers of consciousness

676
00:39:54,560 --> 00:39:56,680
in a sense there.
There was something I wanted to

677
00:39:56,720 --> 00:39:59,200
touch on where it it was the
fact that when you take

678
00:39:59,200 --> 00:40:02,480
interface theory of perception,
and I know when I was writing my

679
00:40:02,480 --> 00:40:04,520
dissertation many years ago, I
was thinking about the fact that

680
00:40:04,520 --> 00:40:07,240
you can use it to also go down
the lines of an illusionism

681
00:40:07,520 --> 00:40:09,160
argument.
Yes.

682
00:40:09,400 --> 00:40:11,920
So what about it made you go
down the other route?

683
00:40:11,920 --> 00:40:13,840
So you could either go down the
Illusionist route or the

684
00:40:13,880 --> 00:40:16,600
idealist route.
Was it more idealism because you

685
00:40:16,600 --> 00:40:19,120
would grew up fundamentally
believing that consciousness was

686
00:40:19,120 --> 00:40:22,240
always fundamental or or some
other reason?

687
00:40:23,120 --> 00:40:24,840
Yes.
So I, I I think that there are

688
00:40:24,880 --> 00:40:26,880
multiple answers to this
question.

689
00:40:26,880 --> 00:40:30,120
The probably the most honest
answer would be to say aesthetic

690
00:40:30,120 --> 00:40:32,080
preference or personal
preference.

691
00:40:33,680 --> 00:40:41,720
I, I think that illusionism is a
can be presented as a very self

692
00:40:41,720 --> 00:40:45,000
consistent theory, though.
There, there, there there are

693
00:40:45,000 --> 00:40:48,080
people who who say, ah,
illusionism that kind of begs

694
00:40:48,080 --> 00:40:50,320
the question and it's kind of
circular reasoning.

695
00:40:50,320 --> 00:40:54,800
And so, and I think that's not,
you know, there, of course

696
00:40:54,800 --> 00:40:57,040
there's something to this
criticism, but you could still,

697
00:40:57,240 --> 00:41:01,040
I mean, I, I, I, I, I'm pretty
sure actually that the very top

698
00:41:01,040 --> 00:41:05,640
illusionists, Frankish, they,
they, they, they could tell a

699
00:41:05,640 --> 00:41:08,160
very consistent system story
about it.

700
00:41:08,400 --> 00:41:10,760
And, and here you're perfectly
right, the interface fear of

701
00:41:10,760 --> 00:41:15,200
perception could actually very
well fit into such a story.

702
00:41:17,240 --> 00:41:20,920
So Daniel Dennett in the 90s
already, I mean he he had, he

703
00:41:20,920 --> 00:41:25,680
had a very similar metaphor than
the one that Don is using of

704
00:41:25,680 --> 00:41:29,720
this maybe I don't know whether
he said interface or

705
00:41:29,720 --> 00:41:30,800
graphically.
Interface I'm.

706
00:41:31,760 --> 00:41:35,640
Not sure user interface.
OK, so, so I think it's

707
00:41:35,640 --> 00:41:39,840
perfectly it it, it's perfectly
possible to embed it into an

708
00:41:39,840 --> 00:41:43,800
illusionist story.
So everything everyone who says,

709
00:41:43,800 --> 00:41:48,040
ah, logically and it doesn't
work and you know, interface.

710
00:41:48,040 --> 00:41:51,800
And so that logically leads to
the that that, that you have to

711
00:41:51,800 --> 00:41:55,920
kind of get rid of illusionism,
that that's probably wrong.

712
00:41:58,000 --> 00:41:59,560
But still, I'm not an
illusionist.

713
00:42:01,200 --> 00:42:05,600
And I would say the main reason
is just because I have a

714
00:42:05,600 --> 00:42:09,000
preference for something else.
Now, different questions.

715
00:42:09,000 --> 00:42:14,200
What, what do you think could be
the best approach to make

716
00:42:14,200 --> 00:42:19,800
progress?
So I don't think that any

717
00:42:19,800 --> 00:42:24,760
scientist and then nor any
philosopher, they have the

718
00:42:24,760 --> 00:42:28,680
ultimate answer currently.
I mean, they're just good

719
00:42:28,680 --> 00:42:30,480
guesses.
Some guesses are better than

720
00:42:30,480 --> 00:42:33,360
others, maybe it's a bit more
than a guess, but still, I mean

721
00:42:33,360 --> 00:42:37,440
you get the idea And any
questions automatically what

722
00:42:37,680 --> 00:42:41,680
would lead to better guesses or
what would lead to better system

723
00:42:41,680 --> 00:42:46,600
to better applications based on
this and here I think more

724
00:42:47,200 --> 00:42:54,480
consciousness realistic outlook
has a much better chance chance

725
00:42:54,480 --> 00:42:56,880
than an.
What?

726
00:42:56,880 --> 00:42:58,760
What would make you happier,
Robert?

727
00:42:59,560 --> 00:43:04,320
A working artificial
phenomenology or mathematical

728
00:43:04,320 --> 00:43:08,400
theory of experience.
That's a that's a tough

729
00:43:08,520 --> 00:43:14,080
question.
Now I have to think about that.

730
00:43:14,920 --> 00:43:17,720
You only get to choose one.
This is something your lab could

731
00:43:17,720 --> 00:43:21,440
discover the next 10 years.
So.

732
00:43:21,840 --> 00:43:25,120
You guys could do better.
Yeah, I, I guess the, the

733
00:43:25,200 --> 00:43:29,840
artificial phenomenology would
have a bigger impact, right.

734
00:43:30,200 --> 00:43:35,040
I mean, having, having, having
mathematical theories, I might

735
00:43:35,040 --> 00:43:37,080
be personally a bit more fond of
that.

736
00:43:37,840 --> 00:43:40,440
But I think the other thing
would have a better would have a

737
00:43:40,440 --> 00:43:43,560
higher impact on society, on
science more generally.

738
00:43:44,280 --> 00:43:46,760
It's true. the IT, it makes
sense.

739
00:43:46,760 --> 00:43:48,120
I mean, when you look at
language and you look at

740
00:43:48,120 --> 00:43:50,040
mathematics and how it can
explain, it's got so much

741
00:43:50,040 --> 00:43:52,320
explanatory power.
It's similar to when people talk

742
00:43:52,320 --> 00:43:55,560
about quantum physics and it's
and the fact that it's a, the

743
00:43:55,600 --> 00:43:58,520
absurd effectiveness of it.
I've got the exact phrase there,

744
00:43:58,960 --> 00:44:01,880
but it's amazing how mathematics
does explain so many things.

745
00:44:01,880 --> 00:44:05,680
So it's sort of intuitively
makes sense that at some point

746
00:44:05,880 --> 00:44:12,560
it would explain an experience.
Yes, and and and you know, 111

747
00:44:12,560 --> 00:44:17,000
thing with philosophy, which I
which I always find a bit was a

748
00:44:17,080 --> 00:44:19,720
bit uneasy about it.
It kind of bothers me about

749
00:44:19,720 --> 00:44:22,160
philosophy sometimes.
You know, you, you, you could

750
00:44:22,160 --> 00:44:26,320
have this perfectly well
balanced and logical and I don't

751
00:44:26,320 --> 00:44:29,480
know, loophole free and whatever
philosophy and no one cares

752
00:44:29,480 --> 00:44:31,480
about it.
And if you take whiter, we

753
00:44:31,480 --> 00:44:33,680
already talked about whiter,
then I mean, it's, it's it's a

754
00:44:33,680 --> 00:44:36,480
great system.
And probably if you criticize

755
00:44:36,480 --> 00:44:39,040
him and he would still be alive,
he would have very good answers

756
00:44:39,040 --> 00:44:43,280
to it, but not so much came out
of it.

757
00:44:43,720 --> 00:44:45,560
Or if you take, if you take if
you take Hagel.

758
00:44:45,560 --> 00:44:48,160
I mean, obviously probably
history.

759
00:44:48,160 --> 00:44:51,000
I mean, there were many
important things that go back

760
00:44:51,000 --> 00:44:54,760
to, to, to, to his philosophy,
but he would be the person to

761
00:44:54,760 --> 00:44:57,960
say, well, any criticism that
you had, he, he probably could

762
00:44:57,960 --> 00:44:59,960
answer it.
I mean, he was very intelligent.

763
00:45:01,240 --> 00:45:07,400
But still, I, I, I don't see how
it informs us, at least nowadays

764
00:45:08,960 --> 00:45:13,360
to make this big think these
these big types of progress is

765
00:45:13,360 --> 00:45:16,600
that we would want to, I mean,
given this current age and time.

766
00:45:17,880 --> 00:45:22,600
So that's why I think this this
first option would be

767
00:45:22,600 --> 00:45:26,200
pragmatically maybe more
beneficial.

768
00:45:26,480 --> 00:45:28,760
The other thing would be very
nice for me.

769
00:45:28,760 --> 00:45:30,840
I.
Think a question I often ask my

770
00:45:30,840 --> 00:45:32,160
guest.
Sometimes I start with this

771
00:45:32,160 --> 00:45:35,680
question actually is if you were
to give a philosophical history

772
00:45:35,680 --> 00:45:39,240
of the mind body problem, what
story would you tell?

773
00:45:39,280 --> 00:45:41,880
So let's say this, this field
needs a philosophical

774
00:45:41,880 --> 00:45:44,480
reorientation of the sciences
and and you want to tell the

775
00:45:44,480 --> 00:45:47,000
story, your perspective, how it
should be told.

776
00:45:47,000 --> 00:45:50,840
What story would you tell?
Oh, that's a very difficult

777
00:45:50,840 --> 00:45:53,840
question.
A philosophical history of the

778
00:45:53,840 --> 00:45:54,840
mind.
Body problem.

779
00:45:54,840 --> 00:45:59,120
Or a brief synopsis.
A brief synopsis.

780
00:45:59,360 --> 00:46:03,200
It's more difficult.
So I, I guess I wouldn't, I

781
00:46:03,200 --> 00:46:06,640
wouldn't, I wouldn't want to,
you know, the, the, the, the,

782
00:46:06,760 --> 00:46:11,600
the, the way how the story's
mostly told, not told nowadays

783
00:46:11,600 --> 00:46:17,440
is, is kind of on the one hand
it's, it's, it is on a very

784
00:46:17,440 --> 00:46:19,160
certain time and a very certain
place.

785
00:46:19,920 --> 00:46:22,040
You know, you had long times of
nothing and then you had the

786
00:46:22,040 --> 00:46:23,840
card basically.
And then you had this kind of

787
00:46:23,840 --> 00:46:26,080
strange dualism and his
reactions to dualism and so on

788
00:46:26,080 --> 00:46:27,680
and so on.
And obviously that's an

789
00:46:27,840 --> 00:46:31,520
important part of the story.
But I mean, I think it's just a

790
00:46:31,520 --> 00:46:35,440
part of the story now, the
difficulties that the word

791
00:46:35,440 --> 00:46:39,640
consciousness wasn't really
used.

792
00:46:39,720 --> 00:46:44,280
I mean, I think John Locke was
the you find something, some

793
00:46:44,600 --> 00:46:48,640
something related conterior.
But but but, but but but I mean

794
00:46:48,640 --> 00:46:52,920
the modern way, how we how we
use consciousness wasn't there.

795
00:46:52,920 --> 00:46:59,600
So even in the dcard actually, I
mean, we, we translated as as

796
00:46:59,600 --> 00:47:02,360
this, but but it it it, it, it's
a question for historical

797
00:47:02,360 --> 00:47:03,840
scholarship.
What's actually meant there.

798
00:47:04,880 --> 00:47:11,120
So I would if I were to, if I
had the the duty of, of, of

799
00:47:11,120 --> 00:47:13,800
telling a philosophical history
of, of, of this whole mind body

800
00:47:13,800 --> 00:47:18,800
programming.
On the one hand, I think there

801
00:47:18,800 --> 00:47:20,640
there start much earlier with
it.

802
00:47:20,640 --> 00:47:24,120
I mean, when, when, when you
look at how the ancient Greeks

803
00:47:24,800 --> 00:47:28,360
thought about, about mind, I
mean mind body problem, of

804
00:47:28,360 --> 00:47:31,600
course they didn't have the
terminology at this specific

805
00:47:31,600 --> 00:47:35,960
problem back then, but they had
very different ways of, of, of

806
00:47:35,960 --> 00:47:38,640
thinking about, about the world,
about reality.

807
00:47:38,640 --> 00:47:42,240
I mean, you said that you have
spirits that can enter your body

808
00:47:42,240 --> 00:47:46,960
and, and into things.
It's, it's a very different way

809
00:47:46,960 --> 00:47:49,280
of, of looking at things.
And, and, and then the second

810
00:47:49,280 --> 00:47:53,840
thing, not only about going back
in time, but also looking at,

811
00:47:53,840 --> 00:47:56,400
at, at different cultures and
the different places, how they

812
00:47:56,440 --> 00:47:58,840
thought about it.
So I'm, I'm currently working

813
00:47:58,840 --> 00:48:04,320
in, in, in China and, and there
are various East Asian cultures

814
00:48:04,600 --> 00:48:06,680
and they have completely
different ways of thinking about

815
00:48:06,680 --> 00:48:10,240
these things, whether those are
Chinese philosophies or Indian

816
00:48:10,240 --> 00:48:12,560
philosophies.
I mean, even the word philosophy

817
00:48:12,560 --> 00:48:16,880
is kind of very specific to what
we were doing in the West.

818
00:48:17,120 --> 00:48:19,800
And so it's arguably whether
that should be called a

819
00:48:19,800 --> 00:48:22,880
philosophy or something else.
But but still, I mean, I get

820
00:48:22,880 --> 00:48:24,720
the, I think you get the the
idea.

821
00:48:24,720 --> 00:48:29,680
I think it's a much it would
would be a much broader story to

822
00:48:29,680 --> 00:48:32,400
tell how exactly I would tell
that story.

823
00:48:33,560 --> 00:48:35,640
I would really have to think
about it.

824
00:48:35,640 --> 00:48:38,640
And then there's so many gaps of
knowledge that I have here.

825
00:48:39,640 --> 00:48:42,080
But I think the important thing
is to be aware of those gaps.

826
00:48:42,560 --> 00:48:46,120
Is good as home good?
Yes, but from your experience

827
00:48:46,120 --> 00:48:48,800
working in at, at Shanghai,
you're, you're in Shanghai,

828
00:48:48,800 --> 00:48:50,040
right?
Yes, yes.

829
00:48:50,320 --> 00:48:52,680
So in your experience, when you
look at the way the West

830
00:48:52,680 --> 00:48:55,600
perceives idealism and the way
the East perceives it now from

831
00:48:55,600 --> 00:48:58,160
your experience and your lived
experience, how's the shift

832
00:48:58,160 --> 00:49:00,160
been?
Has there been a complete change

833
00:49:00,160 --> 00:49:03,560
in perception from others or, or
or do you find that it's quite

834
00:49:03,560 --> 00:49:06,520
similar at this point?
The world's sort of uniting in a

835
00:49:06,520 --> 00:49:11,360
similar sort of thought frame.
I mean, so this, this, this

836
00:49:13,160 --> 00:49:17,640
project of or this, this, this
idea of using, of, of looking as

837
00:49:17,640 --> 00:49:20,320
idealism as to claim that the
fundamental nature of reality is

838
00:49:20,320 --> 00:49:22,880
kind of mental.
I would say that's a very

839
00:49:23,160 --> 00:49:26,560
peculiar way how we in the West
think about things.

840
00:49:26,880 --> 00:49:30,160
And it also has to do with the
kind of historical contingencies

841
00:49:30,160 --> 00:49:32,800
that happens.
What is mine, what is matter,

842
00:49:34,080 --> 00:49:37,080
the theory of ideas.
And so there, there, there,

843
00:49:37,360 --> 00:49:40,680
there's so many, so many things
that that that happened and that

844
00:49:40,680 --> 00:49:43,720
are completely absent if you if
you go to a different place.

845
00:49:44,000 --> 00:49:48,800
So that's why I, I think it's,
it's, it's a bit difficult to

846
00:49:48,800 --> 00:49:51,960
answer that question
specifically when you when you

847
00:49:51,960 --> 00:49:54,200
say, OK, how is idealism
perceived here?

848
00:49:55,440 --> 00:50:04,200
Now be that as it may in well
certainly that in if if if you

849
00:50:04,200 --> 00:50:09,320
go to the Indian subcontinent,
there's much more affinity to

850
00:50:09,960 --> 00:50:14,560
certain idealist like doctrines,
whether that's in in in Vedanta

851
00:50:14,560 --> 00:50:16,400
or whether that's in Yogachara
Buddhism.

852
00:50:17,480 --> 00:50:20,080
Whereas in, in, in, in the
Chinese philosophy, in Chinese

853
00:50:20,080 --> 00:50:24,600
philosophy, specifically in
Taoism and then also

854
00:50:24,600 --> 00:50:27,320
Confucianism and new
Confucianism, which is a kind of

855
00:50:27,320 --> 00:50:31,400
fusion between Taoism,
Confucianism and certain strands

856
00:50:31,400 --> 00:50:35,960
of Buddhism.
That's much more, that's much

857
00:50:35,960 --> 00:50:41,280
less explicitly talked about.
So a big motive, for example,

858
00:50:41,280 --> 00:50:45,160
in, in Chinese philosophy, which
I found to be a big motive in,

859
00:50:45,160 --> 00:50:50,120
in Chinese philosophy is this
idea of not, not, not being able

860
00:50:50,120 --> 00:50:53,800
to talk about the fundamental
nature of reality, the Tao that

861
00:50:53,800 --> 00:50:55,280
can be said, it's not the real
Tao.

862
00:50:57,160 --> 00:51:01,920
And this idea of, of harmonizing
different dialectically opposed

863
00:51:02,080 --> 00:51:04,840
concepts of ways of thinking,
It's very prominent here.

864
00:51:05,480 --> 00:51:08,400
And so, for example, you, you
already mentioned we, we talked

865
00:51:08,400 --> 00:51:12,280
a little bit about Whitehead
previously and Whitehead is, is,

866
00:51:12,280 --> 00:51:15,200
is becoming a big figure here.
It's a very interesting

867
00:51:15,200 --> 00:51:18,880
development, especially in
China, but I think in Asia more

868
00:51:18,880 --> 00:51:23,720
generally, this whole idea of,
of process relational thinking

869
00:51:23,720 --> 00:51:27,280
is, is is very much trendy now.
I do.

870
00:51:27,280 --> 00:51:29,120
I see that as a global trend at
this point.

871
00:51:29,920 --> 00:51:32,160
The more philosophers I speak
to, the more they started

872
00:51:32,160 --> 00:51:35,160
reading White Ted after many
years, which is which is

873
00:51:35,160 --> 00:51:37,640
intriguing because I find myself
reading White Ted every now and

874
00:51:37,640 --> 00:51:39,720
then, which is not something I
did 10 years ago.

875
00:51:39,920 --> 00:51:42,760
So it's very intriguing how you
sort of getting into this

876
00:51:42,840 --> 00:51:46,520
zeitgeist.
That's how's your Mandarin doing

877
00:51:46,600 --> 00:51:49,040
at this point.
Oh very bad.

878
00:51:50,480 --> 00:51:54,080
It's it's almost non existent.
My son is my is is my son.

879
00:51:54,080 --> 00:51:57,840
Mandarin is better than mine and
he learned it cool but but mine

880
00:51:57,840 --> 00:52:00,760
is not very good unfortunately.
Robert, if you.

881
00:52:00,880 --> 00:52:03,400
It's the most difficult language
for us Europeans to learn.

882
00:52:03,720 --> 00:52:06,800
Yeah, no, look, when I was in
China, I remember just I spent a

883
00:52:06,800 --> 00:52:09,680
month there, but struggled.
I struggled.

884
00:52:09,680 --> 00:52:12,440
It took me, it took me a long
time to just leave saying a few

885
00:52:12,440 --> 00:52:15,720
coherent sentences.
Yeah, So I have to probably me

886
00:52:15,880 --> 00:52:20,720
if when I try to to talk to,
when I try to talk to a Chinese

887
00:52:20,720 --> 00:52:25,800
native speaker, then he or she,
they won't understand me.

888
00:52:25,880 --> 00:52:28,280
What are you talking?
And it's probably because I

889
00:52:28,280 --> 00:52:32,080
pronounce things so weirdly that
I'm I'm talking complete

890
00:52:32,080 --> 00:52:36,040
nonsense to them.
And then I don't know.

891
00:52:36,040 --> 00:52:37,320
That's the only explanation that
I.

892
00:52:37,320 --> 00:52:39,720
Yeah, I think it's such a
nuanced language that it's very

893
00:52:39,720 --> 00:52:42,080
easy to slip into nonsense.
Yes.

894
00:52:42,600 --> 00:52:45,200
And, and for me, I don't, I
don't even hear the differences.

895
00:52:45,520 --> 00:52:49,200
I mean, they have these 4 tones
and it's really hard for me to,

896
00:52:50,760 --> 00:52:53,280
I mean, if they're very slowly
and of course explain it to me

897
00:52:53,280 --> 00:52:57,000
and then I might get it.
But normally if they just talk,

898
00:52:57,000 --> 00:52:59,640
I don't, I don't hear it.
And then if I go, well, if I ask

899
00:52:59,640 --> 00:53:01,400
someone now what, what does this
word mean?

900
00:53:01,400 --> 00:53:04,520
And then he says it and then I
tried to repeat it and I say it

901
00:53:04,520 --> 00:53:08,440
completely wrongly and then it
kind of slips out of my mind.

902
00:53:08,480 --> 00:53:10,560
So that's why it's very hard to
learn from me.

903
00:53:10,840 --> 00:53:12,680
Do you think that's a big
problem with unconsciousness

904
00:53:12,680 --> 00:53:14,760
studies?
Is this linguistic limitation?

905
00:53:14,760 --> 00:53:17,840
The fact that we're already
struggling to to communicate

906
00:53:17,840 --> 00:53:20,000
with each other means we'll
never be able to fully define

907
00:53:20,000 --> 00:53:21,720
this concept of what is
consciousness.

908
00:53:23,800 --> 00:53:27,800
Well, it's certainly, that's
certainly a danger, but I

909
00:53:27,800 --> 00:53:32,800
wouldn't, let's say premature
prematurely give, give in,

910
00:53:33,160 --> 00:53:34,960
right.
I, I mean that that's one of the

911
00:53:34,960 --> 00:53:38,760
reasons why I think mathematics
is nice, because then that

912
00:53:38,760 --> 00:53:42,840
problem doesn't really happen.
And often in consciousness when

913
00:53:42,840 --> 00:53:45,000
you, when you say you, you're
doing consciousness studies or

914
00:53:45,000 --> 00:53:46,960
something like that, or
scientific studies of

915
00:53:46,960 --> 00:53:50,360
consciousness or whatever, then
people one, one of the typical

916
00:53:50,360 --> 00:53:53,800
reactions is, oh, everyone means
something slightly different.

917
00:53:53,800 --> 00:53:55,800
It's not a scientific subject to
think about.

918
00:53:56,120 --> 00:54:00,880
And I think we should try to
overcome this kind of prejudice.

919
00:54:01,320 --> 00:54:06,760
Yeah, Robert to to sort of close
up and round up what, what do

920
00:54:06,760 --> 00:54:09,480
you look forward to most in your
field and what you guys are

921
00:54:09,480 --> 00:54:11,440
doing with your lab and your
studies?

922
00:54:12,960 --> 00:54:16,240
Well, so there are, there are a
couple of things that I'm really

923
00:54:16,240 --> 00:54:19,040
looking forward.
So, I mean, I'm not, although

924
00:54:19,040 --> 00:54:25,000
I'm not a neuroscientist, but it
seems to me that if you look at

925
00:54:25,000 --> 00:54:28,040
the neuroscientific study of
consciousness, people are

926
00:54:28,040 --> 00:54:32,520
starting to rethink a lot of
what they have been doing, which

927
00:54:32,520 --> 00:54:36,240
is due to the fact that they
reached a certain point.

928
00:54:36,840 --> 00:54:39,320
You probably have heard about
this, this search for the new

929
00:54:39,320 --> 00:54:42,520
correlates of consciousness, and
it hasn't really been resolved.

930
00:54:42,960 --> 00:54:44,720
And so there's a lot of
uncertainty.

931
00:54:44,720 --> 00:54:48,400
And now people start thinking
like, oh, can I really do what I

932
00:54:48,400 --> 00:54:51,600
want to do?
So this whole field kind of

933
00:54:51,600 --> 00:54:58,120
reached its limitations, but I
don't think that we should draw

934
00:54:58,120 --> 00:54:59,760
the conclusion that it's a
useless field.

935
00:55:00,560 --> 00:55:06,040
It, it just starts to enter a
new phase, a new more mature

936
00:55:06,040 --> 00:55:07,440
phase.
And I'm very excited to see

937
00:55:07,440 --> 00:55:10,200
what's coming out there, even
though I'm not the scientist

938
00:55:10,200 --> 00:55:13,160
working in that field itself.
But I'm very interested in that

939
00:55:13,440 --> 00:55:17,760
second thing, which I'm kind of
excited about and has to do with

940
00:55:17,760 --> 00:55:23,160
AI.
There isn't, I would say, at

941
00:55:23,160 --> 00:55:26,480
least it seems to be there is
this big rise in in AI

942
00:55:26,480 --> 00:55:31,040
technology and it, it, our
everyday lives are more and more

943
00:55:32,800 --> 00:55:34,400
well enriched.
It depends a bit on the

944
00:55:34,400 --> 00:55:38,520
perspective whether you say
enriched or impoverished, but AI

945
00:55:38,520 --> 00:55:40,800
plays a ever bigger role in our
lives.

946
00:55:41,200 --> 00:55:44,440
And so I think there are,
there's the possibility that

947
00:55:44,720 --> 00:55:48,240
consciousness research might
really get a boost from that.

948
00:55:49,120 --> 00:55:53,720
There's also a danger that AI
ruins consciousness research.

949
00:55:53,920 --> 00:55:58,680
So we're at the kind of tipping
point it could go, could go both

950
00:55:58,680 --> 00:56:02,160
ways.
So I'm I'm, I'm kind of excited

951
00:56:02,160 --> 00:56:05,400
to see, of course, I hope that
it's going to the direction

952
00:56:05,400 --> 00:56:08,040
which I find more interesting.
I'm not ruining it.

953
00:56:08,360 --> 00:56:11,240
But yeah, and you person and you
personally, Robert, what are,

954
00:56:11,240 --> 00:56:13,880
what are you working on at the
moment that you that you're most

955
00:56:13,880 --> 00:56:17,520
excited about?
Oh, what I'm, what I'm

956
00:56:17,520 --> 00:56:19,360
personally working well, I'm
most excited about.

957
00:56:19,600 --> 00:56:25,920
Well, so I'm going to Japan in
one week, a bit more than a

958
00:56:25,920 --> 00:56:27,200
week.
And we have a big consciousness

959
00:56:27,200 --> 00:56:28,840
conference there.
I'm very excited about that

960
00:56:28,840 --> 00:56:31,160
because I think that that's so
such a great conference.

961
00:56:31,160 --> 00:56:36,160
And we have a, we have a, that's
an almost an ultimate program

962
00:56:36,160 --> 00:56:38,680
from my perspective.
And we will talk philosophy,

963
00:56:38,680 --> 00:56:41,120
artificial consciousness,
mathematics.

964
00:56:41,760 --> 00:56:44,560
We have some quantum stuff
going, going on there.

965
00:56:45,200 --> 00:56:49,400
So all the topics that we have.
And then I just had section

966
00:56:49,400 --> 00:56:51,240
titles about this conference.
It's called models of

967
00:56:51,240 --> 00:56:53,920
consciousness.
It's really, really, really

968
00:56:53,920 --> 00:56:56,080
exciting to me what will happen
there.

969
00:56:56,320 --> 00:56:59,440
It's a lot of work.
So I'm not unhappy when it's

970
00:56:59,440 --> 00:57:02,120
over, but but I'm, I'm, I'm
really excited about it.

971
00:57:02,320 --> 00:57:05,640
So that's the really the near
future thing that I'm very

972
00:57:05,640 --> 00:57:10,960
excited about and more like
outlook in the next over the

973
00:57:10,960 --> 00:57:16,040
next month or so, I hope to
really make some progress on

974
00:57:16,040 --> 00:57:20,120
this artificial consciousness
SAP test stuff and also on, on,

975
00:57:20,160 --> 00:57:23,480
on on getting some more concrete
things about this digital

976
00:57:23,480 --> 00:57:26,560
humanities ideas.
So I'm I'm currently involved

977
00:57:26,560 --> 00:57:32,560
with a project with an art
scholar to kind of recreate

978
00:57:32,560 --> 00:57:36,160
artificial philosophy,
philosophical discourses and

979
00:57:36,160 --> 00:57:39,240
putting them in putting
philosophy into discourse and

980
00:57:39,240 --> 00:57:42,720
see what conceptual emergent
concepts come out of that.

981
00:57:42,960 --> 00:57:45,840
So that's really very exciting
metre.

982
00:57:46,320 --> 00:57:50,520
Yeah, NASA's exciting stuff,
Robert D keep up the great work.

983
00:57:50,520 --> 00:57:54,280
It's it's always great to watch
and to explore mean reading all

984
00:57:54,280 --> 00:57:56,920
your papers for many years.
As I said, it's it's it's long

985
00:57:56,920 --> 00:58:00,680
overdue that we spoke before we
close, though, I, I need to

986
00:58:00,960 --> 00:58:03,720
because interface theory of
perception is quite, is very

987
00:58:03,720 --> 00:58:06,160
misunderstood by many people.
I find that you guys often have

988
00:58:06,160 --> 00:58:08,720
to backtrack before you're able
to actually express yourself and

989
00:58:08,720 --> 00:58:11,240
explore yourself openly and, and
have fun with it.

990
00:58:11,560 --> 00:58:14,200
What about it today?
Do you feel you haven't said or

991
00:58:14,200 --> 00:58:17,520
you need to clarify you feel
should be said before we

992
00:58:17,520 --> 00:58:22,600
actually close off?
With respect to the interface

993
00:58:22,600 --> 00:58:28,320
theory of perception, I think
what people often miss, it's

994
00:58:28,320 --> 00:58:33,600
often perceived as a very
philosophical, but in

995
00:58:33,600 --> 00:58:36,360
philosophically in a bad way,
not in a good way, a way of

996
00:58:36,360 --> 00:58:38,960
thinking about things and
they're kind of unscientific or

997
00:58:38,960 --> 00:58:41,200
or Contra scientific way of
thinking about thinking that.

998
00:58:41,200 --> 00:58:45,640
I think that's not the case.
And it's just an extrapolation

999
00:58:46,240 --> 00:58:51,480
based on some very common
assumptions that we would do in

1000
00:58:51,480 --> 00:58:54,840
scientific modelling.
And if you don't like what comes

1001
00:58:54,840 --> 00:58:58,640
out of it, then you might need
to question those assumptions.

1002
00:58:59,560 --> 00:59:01,960
But I think the theory is often
dismissed as like an

1003
00:59:01,960 --> 00:59:04,480
unscientific, overly theoretical
thing.

1004
00:59:04,480 --> 00:59:06,320
And then I think that's that's a
bit unfair.

1005
00:59:07,640 --> 00:59:10,960
We've got a lot of researchers,
post docs, students who watch

1006
00:59:10,960 --> 00:59:13,480
the show.
If anyone's looking to get into

1007
00:59:13,480 --> 00:59:16,200
this field, trying to to
navigate their way through this

1008
00:59:16,200 --> 00:59:17,440
field.
Are there any sort of

1009
00:59:17,440 --> 00:59:18,640
recommendations you have for
them?

1010
00:59:18,640 --> 00:59:20,640
Any advice?
What would you give to the

1011
00:59:20,640 --> 00:59:22,640
average mind, body, solution,
listener or viewer?

1012
00:59:23,920 --> 00:59:25,680
Because I feel a bit too young
for giving advice.

1013
00:59:26,040 --> 00:59:30,000
But so I think one of the one of
the difficulties that that

1014
00:59:30,000 --> 00:59:35,160
people will face, it's, it got a
bit better over the last years,

1015
00:59:35,160 --> 00:59:38,760
but but it's still there that
consciousness science is not

1016
00:59:38,760 --> 00:59:43,280
really institutionalized.
There is no department for

1017
00:59:43,280 --> 00:59:45,360
consciousness research at any
university.

1018
00:59:46,400 --> 00:59:50,600
So what for people still have to
do is to kind of, you know,

1019
00:59:52,040 --> 00:59:55,360
sneak into it a bit, you know,
and then, and then if you're

1020
00:59:55,640 --> 00:59:59,280
going to neuroscience or
philosophy or maybe computer

1021
00:59:59,280 --> 01:00:03,560
science in, in, in the coming
years, and then kind of try to

1022
01:00:04,240 --> 01:00:06,680
secretly build the tunnel of
consciousness research.

1023
01:00:07,640 --> 01:00:11,560
And that creates, that creates a
lot of institutional difficulty

1024
01:00:11,560 --> 01:00:13,160
for people who actually want to
find a job.

1025
01:00:13,160 --> 01:00:16,160
Because when you, I mean, when
you do science, it's, it's one

1026
01:00:16,160 --> 01:00:18,360
thing and it's interesting and
nice and everything.

1027
01:00:18,680 --> 01:00:21,640
But at one point you also,
there's also a probe.

1028
01:00:22,040 --> 01:00:25,040
Pragmatic aspect to it, you need
to have a position, you need to

1029
01:00:25,040 --> 01:00:33,640
get a job.
And so here it's very difficult

1030
01:00:33,640 --> 01:00:36,960
at the moment.
I think to, to, to give

1031
01:00:36,960 --> 01:00:43,400
particular advice here because
everyone that I know who is

1032
01:00:44,400 --> 01:00:47,040
around my age or maybe a bit
older, a bit younger kind of

1033
01:00:47,040 --> 01:00:51,600
struggles.
So whoever finds that completely

1034
01:00:51,600 --> 01:00:54,560
depressing and, and, and, and it
shouldn't, shouldn't, shouldn't

1035
01:00:54,560 --> 01:00:59,720
take it so much on, on, on, on
on one's own, you know, fault.

1036
01:00:59,720 --> 01:01:02,480
Because I, I think it's really,
it's really, the environment is

1037
01:01:02,480 --> 01:01:06,680
very difficult.
So what, what one should do is

1038
01:01:06,680 --> 01:01:10,320
to get in contact with kind of
like minded researchers, for

1039
01:01:10,320 --> 01:01:14,960
example, go to my conference.
But there are also other good

1040
01:01:15,160 --> 01:01:19,800
occasions and and and and and
and and, and good communities to

1041
01:01:19,800 --> 01:01:22,280
go into.
But I think one must not be

1042
01:01:22,280 --> 01:01:25,640
afraid or one must not think
that it's because one's on

1043
01:01:25,760 --> 01:01:30,160
problems that one cannot find a
kind of job in this field.

1044
01:01:30,400 --> 01:01:35,960
I think it's still a kind of
it's the Wild West that makes it

1045
01:01:35,960 --> 01:01:38,560
exciting as well.
Yeah, I have, Robert.

1046
01:01:38,560 --> 01:01:39,840
Thanks.
That is a beautiful.

1047
01:01:39,840 --> 01:01:42,640
Thank you so much for that.
I completely agree with you

1048
01:01:42,640 --> 01:01:44,680
because that's that's sort of
what I did as well.

1049
01:01:44,680 --> 01:01:46,720
I mean, I started six years of
mid school, two years I've

1050
01:01:46,720 --> 01:01:49,560
worked as an internship, one
year of community service.

1051
01:01:49,560 --> 01:01:51,640
In South Africa, we have to do a
compulsory year.

1052
01:01:51,960 --> 01:01:54,840
I worked in the military and
that's when I did my

1053
01:01:54,840 --> 01:01:57,080
dissertation in consciousness
because I kind of wanted to do

1054
01:01:57,080 --> 01:02:00,360
this for all my life.
But the safe route was to be a

1055
01:02:00,360 --> 01:02:03,880
doctor first just in case,
because it is one of those

1056
01:02:03,880 --> 01:02:06,480
fields where you're afraid to
actually go delve deep into it.

1057
01:02:06,480 --> 01:02:08,720
And I grew up in an Indian house
where you expected to be a

1058
01:02:08,720 --> 01:02:12,360
doctor, which is unreasonable,
but it helped out quite a bit.

1059
01:02:13,160 --> 01:02:15,960
But yeah, so it's it's it's one
of the things where I say, OK,

1060
01:02:15,960 --> 01:02:18,160
if you get the chance, just do
it because it's it's the most

1061
01:02:18,160 --> 01:02:21,160
fun subject you can have you to
have conversations like this.

1062
01:02:21,160 --> 01:02:22,800
And yeah, it's been an absolute
pleasure.

1063
01:02:22,800 --> 01:02:25,200
Thank you.
Thank you very much for having

1064
01:02:25,200 --> 01:02:25,360
me.