Why Science and Philosophy Need Each Other | Lauren Ross & Megan Peters

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Megan, Lauren, thanks so much
for joining me today.

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We have an exciting colloquium
planned.

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The topic is why science and
philosophy need each other.

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I can't think of the perfect two
guests to be on the show because

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Lauren, you could be seen as a a
scientifically informed

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philosopher.
Megan, you could be seen as a

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philosophically informed
scientist.

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However, one could argue that
both of you are actually both.

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So I think that brings us to
this first question, which is

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fundamental to setting the
stage.

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Why do both of you think science
and philosophy are often seen as

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separate, even antagonistic,
when historically they emerged

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together?
Lauren, do you want to perhaps

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start?
And then Megan, you can take it

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from there.
Sounds great.

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It's a very interesting
question, and it partly has to

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do with how we think of both
science and philosophy in modern

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times.
For science, usually we have

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more awareness and understanding
of what we're referring to, but

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with philosophy, that's less the
case.

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Philosophy is this label that
can be applied to many different

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things, many different types of
thinking.

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I mean, philosophy is also a
field, of course, that involves

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different types of work.
In everyday life conversations,

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we use the term philosophy to
sometimes refer to places where

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you have questions without
answers, a place where anything

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goes, where maybe we're
interested in your own

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subjective views, your beliefs
and your thoughts.

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And sometimes philosophy in this
space is viewed as the opposite

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of pragmatic.
It's your philosophical musings

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or, or you'll sometimes hear
even scientists say that they're

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asking a philosophical question
where they mean there's this

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sort of unbounded open question.
Or you'll hear the expression

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near philosophy.
So I I think that starts to show

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and paint a picture for how
science and philosophy can be

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seen as opposites.
And I would say mistakenly,

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because that picture of
philosophy is not how we think

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of science.
This picture of philosophy

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questions without answers and
the sort of unbounded anything

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goes, well, science doesn't
operate like that.

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And part of what can help here
is to specify different types of

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philosophy, and in this case,
philosophy of science,

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philosophy of mind, philosophy
of cognitive science, where we

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don't have an anything goes type
project.

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We have an interest in the
principles of science.

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We have an interest in
precision, clarity, rigor.

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And so this would be one reason
I would suggest for why they're

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sometimes seen as separate or in
contrast.

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It'll partly depend on who you
talk to.

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Many scientists do view them as
helpful colleagues that kind of

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need to work together or that
when they do work together can

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lead to various types of
successes.

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So that would be a first answer
that I would give.

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Megan same question.
Yeah, actually there's a lot of

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of what Lauren said that I agree
with, but I'm actually kind of

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surprised by this question in
general, because from my

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perspective, I don't find them
antagonistic at all.

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And I guess it's my privilege
that the philosophers and

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scientists that I tend to hang
out with might agree with me

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that they are not antagonistic.
But again, that's, that's my own

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privilege in the space that I, I
choose to occupy and that I'm

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privileged to occupy.
I I feel that, yes, there is

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this general tenor, this general
feeling that philosophy and

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science might be separate,
antagonistic, because there's

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the empirical scientists who are
doing the real work.

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And it's the philosophers who
are over here in their armchairs

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kind of, you know, deciding that
there is a difference when maybe

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there isn't really a difference
in in the real world.

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And so there could be that
tension where it's like, do we

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really need to be having that
particular type of conversation?

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Does that really matter to the
experiments that I'm going to be

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doing?
But I think that again, the

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folks that I tend to interact
with within the science and the

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philosophy space recognize that
these are truly synergistic, not

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even just friendly, that they
both can learn from each other

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in the ways that that Lauren
pointed out.

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But I will disagree, Lauren,
with one thing that you said,

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which is that the realm of
questions without answers might

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be more the philosophical realm.
And I feel like there's just so

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much of science that is that
too.

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There's so much where the
purpose of what we're doing as

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scientists at the at the cutting
edge, at the forefront of our

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knowledge is, well, maybe there
isn't an answer yet, but the

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role of philosophy and the role
of philosophically informed

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science could be to discover, is
there an answer to be had here?

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So we don't know the answer yet
and we need to decide, is this

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something that we could actually
go after scientifically?

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So a lot of what I do is a
question without an answer yet

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too.
So, yeah, I think that, sure,

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the general tenor might be that
these are antagonistic, but I

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think that there are quite a lot
of people who also disagree with

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that general assessment.
Yeah, I think that a lot of

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people actually forget that when
you do a PhD in in anything

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scientific, you're just
fundamentally getting a

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doctorate in philosophy because
I mean, this, this is an

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enriched history of just
philosophy that's expanded over

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time.
Natural philosophy has become

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what science is today.
Lauren, for you, as a

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philosopher of science and a
trained physician, I know as a

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medical doctor, it's that most
people who when I worked in the

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medical field, when I do work in
the medical field, is that it's

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very uninformed philosophically.
It's a quite a common theme.

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They're not not interested in
it.

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It's just that they just don't
have the time perhaps to explore

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this as much as maybe someone
like like myself does.

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So what do you think scientists
most often misunderstand about

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what philosophy actually
contributes?

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I think that scientists, if they
are misunderstanding what

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philosophy is here, primarily
philosophy of science and what

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it can contribute.
It's this view that philosophy

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is sort of so open and so
anything goes that it isn't

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useful and that it's this base
where you can't always get

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traction on questions or how to
understand the world.

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Part of what's coming up in this
question and part of, as you

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mentioned, Ted, why this is so
interesting, the kind of current

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views in some areas that these
are disparate types of study is

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that they very much were part of
the same program in early work.

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So natural philosophy, we refer
to early scientists as natural

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philosophers.
Aristotle is both someone we

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think of as an early biologist
and also a philosopher.

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And in in Darwin's lifetime, the
term scientist was created.

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And so he was a natural
philosopher perhaps early on in

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his career and then was only
referred to as a scientist

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later.
So they very much do have a

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shared root and a shared
history.

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Currently, the common
misconceptions I see is that

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philosophy is so open that you
can't use it to get guidance.

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And that's, as Megan is
suggesting, very much

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antithetical to the kind of work
that you see in a lot of

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philosophy of Cogsai, a lot of
philosophy of mind, a lot of

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philosophy of neuroscience.
This is a space where you have

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scientists, sorry, you have
philosophers who are doing work

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where they're interested in, I'd
say 3 main things.

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There's an interest in getting
precision about foundational

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topics and methods in science.
They want to know the principles

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and the justification that are
guiding those concepts, those

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methods.
And then they want to know, and

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they want to be able to specify
how something works.

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If you have a scientist giving
an explanation, how do you know

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it's a good one?
If you have scientists debating

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how we should understand
causation or what the mechanism

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is for something, how do you
know when it works and when it

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doesn't?
So here we're often looking at

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science from a functional
perspective where scientists

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have goals and you can assess
the success of science with

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respect to when scientists are
reaching those goals.

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And so in this space, we think
of science as a as a, a practice

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that gives us our best
understanding of the world.

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And it often involves this
theorizing that we sometimes

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call philosophy, that scientists
are very much doing and

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philosophers of science are
engaged in as well, where

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you're, you're looking at these
fundamental scientific concepts

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and practices that scientists
engage in.

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If science does give us our best
understanding of the world, we

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should be able to say how it
does.

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And that's where here it's
helpful to get precision about

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what is an explanation in
science, what is causation?

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What is getting information
about the causal structure of

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the world?
What are the principles that

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scientists use that we can
identify to help guide work in

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this space?
And then how do you know when it

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works?
How do you know when scientists

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have met the standards of their
field?

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And that partly involves
specifying what they are.

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And so I think it's sometimes
surprising to physicians,

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healthcare practitioners who are
more in a professional space and

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they aren't necessarily
theorizing the way that other

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types of scientists are, to hear
that this is a kind of

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philosophy of that this is a
kind of work that happens in

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philosophy and philosophy of
science.

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So, yeah, there's a kind of
difference, I think, across

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types of researchers.
Some of them are more on the

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front lines of professional
work, and maybe others are more

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engaged with research.
And you have some of these

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researchers who are working with
philosophers and kind of

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interested in these theoretical
questions that show up in

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philosophy of science.
Megan As a neuroscientist deeply

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grounded in philosophy, what do
philosophers sometimes overlook

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about how scientific practice
really works today?

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You're asking me to to say
what's wrong with all my

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colleagues.
So I think for me this is a, a

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challenge that maybe
philosophers face more than some

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scientists, but scientists
certainly face this challenge as

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well.
And that is, I hinted at this

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earlier, this idea of is this a
difference that makes a

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difference?
So philosophers of science,

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philosophers of mind,
philosophers of modeling of

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cognitive science will often try
to drive at the the conceptual

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distinctions that provide
clarity with respect to the

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questions that we're asking and
an assessment of the validity of

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the methods that we're using to
answer those questions.

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But sometimes I think
philosophers and scientists to a

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certain extent as well, we get
so into the details of finding

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the joints in nature, you know,
finding the separation between

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two concepts that ultimately, if
we were to take a step back and

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say, all right, well, maybe
there is this separation in

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concepts that you've identified,
this difference between concept

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A and concept B that you've
started to really home in on.

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How could we ever know if that's
a real difference, if that, And

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not just that this is a
difference that we can

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conceptualize, that we can come
up with, that we can describe,

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but that this is a real
difference in the world.

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This is a real joint in nature.
And I think that sometimes the

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pushback that scientists will
give towards philosophers is

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this like, Oh, well, you're
making distinctions that don't

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really have any bearing on
anything that's physical, that's

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real, that's empirical.
And so you're, you're really

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just kind of in this space as as
Lauren said, that where

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everything, anything goes, like
you've, you've discovered a

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difference and you've decided
that that's an important

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difference.
But I think that the hard part

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is, is not just dismissing these
differences or these

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distinctions and saying, well, I
could never test for them.

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So it's not, it's not a
meaningful distinction.

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The hard part is deciding
whether there is a meaningful

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distinction there.
And so deciding whether this is

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a problem where philosopher of
science or cogs I or modeling

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has come up with this
distinction that may or may not

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be empirically testable.
And the challenge is to say, do

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we care to empirically test
this?

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And if we do care to empirically
test it, can we even come up

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with something that would allow
us to see whether this joint in

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nature is actually present?
And so I think that that's a

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hard hump between science and
and some philosophy, where some

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more pure philosophers of
science will see the intrinsic

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value of making the distinction
and clarifying it to begin with.

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And some empirical scientists
will say, well, that's great,

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you can write it down, That's
lovely.

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You can draw a picture.
But like, do I actually care?

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Is this a thing that I can go
and find with some sort of

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empirical study?
So that, I think would be the

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closest thing that I can think
of to a a kind of something that

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philosophers might overlook or
that they the relative value

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placed on that enterprise is
different between philosophy of

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science and empirical science.
Megan, before we started, while

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we were waiting, Lauren, we've
accidentally sent.

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I might have missed mistakenly
not sent the ring link to the

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right place, but we were
chatting about one of our

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favorite heroes, who's Dan
Daniel Dennett.

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And, and I often looked at Dan
growing growing up as a as a

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neuroscientist and a
philosopher.

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He was someone so ingrained into
both of these fields.

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And and he often touched on this
deeper reflection culturally.

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So this whole this, does this
reflect something deeper,

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perhaps so like objectivity
versus reflection or shut up and

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00:15:40,960 --> 00:15:45,040
calculate versus anything goes.
What do both of you think about

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this?
And how might we bridge this

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divide to transform how we study
the mind and consciousness?

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It partly relates to what has
come up already because, as

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Megan suggested, it's sometimes
is confusing to think of there

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being a difference between this
kind of philosophical work in

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science, because you see
scientists who are engaged in

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philosophical questions and
theorizing.

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So from my perspective, I look
at what they're doing and

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they're doing philosophy, and
then looking at these

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philosophers who are interested
in providing analysis and

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accounts that, as Megan was
suggesting, kind of latch onto

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the world matter.
You can do something with them.

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You can show why this would be a
good account to have or not.

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You see how both of them are
really interrelated types of

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projects.
And so I think it partly boils

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down to sometimes we have
cartoon pictures of both.

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We have a kind of cartoon
picture of a scientist who just

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takes out a measuring device and
goes out and studies the world.

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And what you miss if you look at
that picture, is all the

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theorizing that took place
before you set up that

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experiment.
There's so many assumptions

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involved.
There's so many methods you can

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choose from.
There's so many questions that

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scientists need to and do ask
themselves an answer before they

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just go out and get the
objective facts about the world.

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And it's going to depend on the
questions they ask, which is

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partly what Megan brought up.
And in some cases, you've got to

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ask the right kind of question
too, or appreciate the different

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questions require different
methods and then they give you

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different answers.
This is also just fascinating

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from the standpoint of how
complex the world is.

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Scientists have to deal with
that and they want order.

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And it's fascinating how they're
able to do that given the

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complexity of the world.
And so, you know, they are able

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to do that.
We kind of look at the places

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where they've done it, and then
we're looking at these other

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situations where there's a a
complex new question, there's

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some new territory they're
trying to understand, right?

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Is the brain the most
complicated machine on the

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planet?
You know, the brain is so

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00:18:11,400 --> 00:18:13,800
complicated, the world is so
complicated.

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And so you see how they're
making decisions about what to

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do with that because they can't
cite all detail that's out there

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00:18:23,680 --> 00:18:27,200
and not all of it matters.
So they have to figure out what

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00:18:27,680 --> 00:18:31,800
details of the world matter and
how to carve out questions that

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allow them to give principled
answers to those kind of topics

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of interest.
And so this is both science and

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00:18:41,080 --> 00:18:45,640
philosophy, the way I think
Megan and I often see it.

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00:18:45,640 --> 00:18:49,200
But if you have a toy picture of
science and a toy picture of

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00:18:49,200 --> 00:18:51,600
philosophy, they look very
distinct.

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00:18:51,600 --> 00:18:53,680
And there are types of
philosophy, as Megan is

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00:18:53,680 --> 00:18:56,760
suggesting, where it's more
armchair type work.

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00:18:57,320 --> 00:19:03,200
And in this case what we want is
we want philosophy that's useful

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00:19:03,280 --> 00:19:05,240
for these kind of scientific
questions.

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00:19:05,280 --> 00:19:07,560
And we see many examples of
that.

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00:19:07,920 --> 00:19:12,480
That might be that would be part
of the kind of answer I would

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00:19:12,480 --> 00:19:17,960
give.
I, I totally agree with the, the

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00:19:18,000 --> 00:19:22,360
cartoonification of science
versus philosophy and in in

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00:19:22,360 --> 00:19:26,640
particular this version of
science, which is that you pull

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00:19:26,640 --> 00:19:29,480
out your, you know, measurement
O meter or whatever, and you

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00:19:29,480 --> 00:19:32,040
point it at the thing and you
get some sort of objective

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00:19:32,320 --> 00:19:35,080
answer.
And so this mischaracterization

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00:19:35,080 --> 00:19:39,000
of philosophy as this subjective
anything goes and science is

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00:19:39,000 --> 00:19:41,880
objective and like, definitely
we're just measuring the world.

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00:19:42,480 --> 00:19:46,720
No, like there is no such thing
as objective science.

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00:19:46,720 --> 00:19:49,840
Sorry, but there just isn't
that.

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00:19:50,040 --> 00:19:55,280
We carry, as Lauren you said,
the the assumptions that we make

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00:19:55,280 --> 00:19:58,600
about the structure of reality,
about the types of measurements

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00:19:58,600 --> 00:20:01,760
that are going to be useful,
about the types of models that

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00:20:01,760 --> 00:20:04,840
we can build that will be useful
to answering a particular type

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00:20:04,840 --> 00:20:08,080
of question or retrieving a
particular type of explanatory

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00:20:08,080 --> 00:20:12,040
goal.
There's so many cases where if

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00:20:12,040 --> 00:20:16,600
you actually do kind of a
historical overview of a

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00:20:16,600 --> 00:20:19,800
particular niche field.
For example, like this

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00:20:19,800 --> 00:20:24,160
particular type of model of
decisions and reaction times in,

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00:20:24,560 --> 00:20:28,040
in neuroscience, you know, how,
how do people make decisions in

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00:20:28,040 --> 00:20:30,800
a noisy environment and how long
does it take them to come to a

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00:20:30,800 --> 00:20:33,360
decision under the conditions of
noise in the world?

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00:20:33,360 --> 00:20:36,320
You know, you're driving down a
foggy Rd. it's foggy.

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00:20:36,360 --> 00:20:40,040
How long do you take to decide
what you're seeing, right?

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00:20:40,120 --> 00:20:41,840
And what do you decide that
you're seeing?

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00:20:42,280 --> 00:20:45,520
There's models of that kind of
decision process and those

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00:20:45,520 --> 00:20:50,200
models have been successful for
literally decades since they

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00:20:50,200 --> 00:20:51,840
were developed.
And there's been a lot of really

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00:20:51,840 --> 00:20:54,760
beautiful work to say this is
now like the dominant

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00:20:54,760 --> 00:20:57,880
explanation of how we make these
types of decisions.

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00:20:58,240 --> 00:21:02,160
But they have assumptions and
those assumptions, Dr., the

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00:21:02,160 --> 00:21:07,760
experiments that are done to to
generate the objective empirical

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00:21:07,760 --> 00:21:11,800
data that then goes on to
validate or 'cause those models

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00:21:11,800 --> 00:21:16,080
to be modified a little bit.
And if you take a step back and

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00:21:16,080 --> 00:21:20,160
you look at those assumptions,
they have constrained the space

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00:21:20,160 --> 00:21:25,720
of inquiry in a way that
obscured potential alternative

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00:21:25,720 --> 00:21:28,880
explanations.
So this is a particular hobby

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00:21:28,880 --> 00:21:31,120
horse of mine because we've got
a couple papers on this

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00:21:31,120 --> 00:21:33,000
recently.
But I think the general

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00:21:33,000 --> 00:21:38,200
principle applies across all of
science, not just cognitive

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00:21:38,200 --> 00:21:42,080
science and psychology and you
know, complexity sciences within

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00:21:42,080 --> 00:21:46,120
neuroscience, but in general,
the, the way you think the world

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00:21:46,120 --> 00:21:49,720
works and the models that you've
built and their relative success

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00:21:49,720 --> 00:21:54,360
in capturing the components of
the system that you're trying to

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00:21:54,360 --> 00:22:01,000
explain that gives you myopia.
And if you don't get out of

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00:22:01,000 --> 00:22:03,400
that, if you don't take off the
blinders, you're going to miss a

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00:22:03,400 --> 00:22:07,040
whole lot.
And simply the recognition that

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00:22:07,040 --> 00:22:10,120
you have blinders on in the
first place allows you to

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00:22:10,120 --> 00:22:14,040
acknowledge that science is not
an objective enterprise, that

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00:22:14,040 --> 00:22:18,640
there is always a scientist in
the picture, and that we are

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00:22:18,640 --> 00:22:21,520
human beings and we have biases
and we have preconceived notions

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00:22:21,520 --> 00:22:26,920
and we have assumptions and we
we shape the way that we go

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00:22:26,920 --> 00:22:30,720
about trying to understand the
world in ways that we not, we

356
00:22:30,720 --> 00:22:32,320
may not be fully aware of at
all.

357
00:22:32,320 --> 00:22:35,240
Those biases and implicit
assumptions are, are implicit.

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00:22:35,320 --> 00:22:40,080
They are deeply buried and and
they're going to shape the new

359
00:22:40,080 --> 00:22:44,440
models that we built.
So I fully, fully agree with

360
00:22:44,440 --> 00:22:47,720
Lauren here.
And this is another case where I

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00:22:47,720 --> 00:22:50,240
think there's a, you know,
seeming divide between

362
00:22:50,920 --> 00:22:54,520
objectivity and subjectivity,
philosophy versus science, that

363
00:22:54,520 --> 00:22:56,920
kind of thing.
And it's we're kidding ourselves

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00:22:56,920 --> 00:22:59,480
if we think that science is
truly objective, because it just

365
00:22:59,480 --> 00:23:03,520
really is not.
Well, OK, so the stage is set,

366
00:23:03,600 --> 00:23:06,480
and I think now would be a great
way to explore both of your work

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00:23:07,000 --> 00:23:10,000
together while trying to
illuminate each other's work.

368
00:23:10,240 --> 00:23:13,080
So in that, with that being
said, let's try this.

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00:23:13,560 --> 00:23:18,120
Megan, perhaps could you tell us
why Lauren's work helps

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00:23:18,680 --> 00:23:20,360
illuminate?
So let's say, why does her

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00:23:20,360 --> 00:23:22,720
philosophical work help
illuminate science?

372
00:23:22,840 --> 00:23:25,280
And then I'm going to ask you,
Lauren, do the same question but

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in reverse.
Sure.

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00:23:28,400 --> 00:23:32,280
So I as probably was, was said,
you know, in, in my

375
00:23:32,280 --> 00:23:34,600
introduction, you can go like
Google both of us.

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00:23:35,000 --> 00:23:39,440
So I am a a philosopher and
scientist of subjective

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00:23:39,440 --> 00:23:41,440
experience.
I study the brain and the mind.

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00:23:41,440 --> 00:23:44,320
I try to reverse engineer the
software that's running on the

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00:23:44,320 --> 00:23:48,840
wetware of our brains and how
that creates the subjective

380
00:23:48,840 --> 00:23:53,200
experiences that you have of the
world and the models that you

381
00:23:53,200 --> 00:23:57,240
build and query and kind of run
forward to predict what's going

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00:23:57,240 --> 00:23:59,760
to happen in your environment
and how you're going to interact

383
00:23:59,760 --> 00:24:03,200
with it.
So the kind of work that Lauren

384
00:24:03,200 --> 00:24:07,280
does is really helpful to me
because it brings this

385
00:24:07,280 --> 00:24:09,640
conceptual clarity.
You know, the consciousness

386
00:24:09,640 --> 00:24:14,520
science as a broadly writ field
is a little bit all over the

387
00:24:14,520 --> 00:24:16,840
place.
You've got everybody from folks

388
00:24:16,840 --> 00:24:20,120
who are studying this from, you
know, kind of the, the quantum

389
00:24:20,120 --> 00:24:21,880
or mathematical side.
And then you've got the

390
00:24:21,880 --> 00:24:24,160
cognitive neuroscientists who
like to go look at brain

391
00:24:24,160 --> 00:24:25,320
activity.
And then you've got the

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00:24:25,320 --> 00:24:28,120
theoreticians.
So it's, it's a little bit all

393
00:24:28,120 --> 00:24:29,720
over the place, like a lot of
fields.

394
00:24:29,720 --> 00:24:33,200
Sure, you've got a lot of
interdisciplinarity, but the

395
00:24:33,200 --> 00:24:37,560
nature of what we are studying
as folks who are interested in

396
00:24:37,560 --> 00:24:43,160
subjective experience is even
less objectively identifiable

397
00:24:43,160 --> 00:24:46,440
than basically anything else in
the world because it is the

398
00:24:46,440 --> 00:24:48,880
thing that lives inside your
head by definition.

399
00:24:49,960 --> 00:24:55,360
And so having clarity on those
concepts or seeking clarity on

400
00:24:55,360 --> 00:24:58,160
those concepts, what do I mean
when I say consciousness, when I

401
00:24:58,160 --> 00:25:01,520
say subjective experience, when
I say qualitative experience?

402
00:25:02,640 --> 00:25:08,800
This gives us Lauren's work.
And, and I saw this very clearly

403
00:25:08,800 --> 00:25:10,840
actually at the Southern
California Consciousness

404
00:25:10,840 --> 00:25:14,800
Conference that we both went to,
I don't know, last spring where

405
00:25:14,800 --> 00:25:17,400
Lauren kept pushing the rest of
us scientists in the room to

406
00:25:17,440 --> 00:25:20,800
say, what is it in what actually
are you trying to explain?

407
00:25:22,040 --> 00:25:24,120
What is the target of your
explanation?

408
00:25:24,600 --> 00:25:27,560
Because every time you all say
the word consciousness, I'm

409
00:25:27,560 --> 00:25:30,600
paraphrasing here, Lauren was a
lot more, you know, diplomatic.

410
00:25:30,600 --> 00:25:34,000
But basically, you know, every
time that we said the word

411
00:25:34,000 --> 00:25:36,280
consciousness, everybody in the
room meant something slightly

412
00:25:36,280 --> 00:25:38,400
different.
And it wasn't.

413
00:25:38,400 --> 00:25:41,640
This isn't just a taxonomic or
linguistic problem.

414
00:25:41,680 --> 00:25:43,640
This is a conceptual clarity
problem.

415
00:25:44,560 --> 00:25:51,480
And so I think that for the kind
of work that I do and even more

416
00:25:51,480 --> 00:25:54,080
expansive, the kind of work that
any cognitive scientist or

417
00:25:54,080 --> 00:25:56,640
computational neuroscientist
does, where we're really trying

418
00:25:56,640 --> 00:25:59,200
to reverse engineer the software
of the mind.

419
00:25:59,480 --> 00:26:04,680
In a lot of ways, the target of
the explanation itself is

420
00:26:04,680 --> 00:26:08,760
unclear from the beginning.
And it's really hard to come up

421
00:26:08,760 --> 00:26:12,960
with a nicely constrained little
box to live in and say that is

422
00:26:12,960 --> 00:26:14,760
the thing that I want to
explain.

423
00:26:15,280 --> 00:26:19,120
And so this is where someone
like Lauren and Lauren is

424
00:26:19,120 --> 00:26:22,640
particularly good at doing this
in a way that corrals the cats

425
00:26:22,640 --> 00:26:25,360
and herds the cats into coming
up with something useful.

426
00:26:26,960 --> 00:26:30,680
It's it's really valuable
because without that clarity,

427
00:26:31,080 --> 00:26:34,120
we're just going to have the
same conversations over and over

428
00:26:34,120 --> 00:26:36,920
and over again and they will
always devolve into what is it

429
00:26:36,920 --> 00:26:38,440
that we're even trying to
understand.

430
00:26:40,480 --> 00:26:42,360
Lauren, same question, but about
Megan's work.

431
00:26:44,120 --> 00:26:48,240
Perfect.
It's, it's so important as a

432
00:26:48,240 --> 00:26:55,200
philosopher of science to talk
to actual scientists to make

433
00:26:55,200 --> 00:27:00,000
sure that the way you're
characterizing what they do

434
00:27:00,760 --> 00:27:06,760
makes sense, is accurate, and it
sort of keeps you in check a

435
00:27:06,760 --> 00:27:10,920
bit.
One of the challenges of my

436
00:27:10,920 --> 00:27:14,920
field is that sometimes
philosophers will have toy

437
00:27:15,720 --> 00:27:20,120
simplified characterizations of
what scientists are interested

438
00:27:20,120 --> 00:27:23,560
in, what they want to explain,
and then what they're doing in

439
00:27:23,560 --> 00:27:27,280
the 1st place.
And so one of the areas I work

440
00:27:27,280 --> 00:27:30,600
on is scientific explanation.
How do scientists give

441
00:27:30,600 --> 00:27:32,920
explanations?
How do you know they've got a

442
00:27:32,920 --> 00:27:35,800
real one?
What are the standards that need

443
00:27:35,800 --> 00:27:38,400
to be met?
Well, one thing you need as a

444
00:27:38,400 --> 00:27:41,240
philosopher of science, if
you're going to do that well, is

445
00:27:41,240 --> 00:27:44,120
you need to capture the actual
explanatory targets that

446
00:27:44,120 --> 00:27:49,160
scientists are interested in.
And so one of the many values of

447
00:27:49,160 --> 00:27:55,600
talking to Megan is looking at
the types of explanatory targets

448
00:27:55,840 --> 00:28:01,000
that she's interested in her
work and then in her field,

449
00:28:01,480 --> 00:28:06,040
they're far more complicated
than a lot of the more simple

450
00:28:06,040 --> 00:28:08,920
models we have for how
explanations work.

451
00:28:09,400 --> 00:28:14,520
And so if we're going to provide
hopeful, accurate accounts,

452
00:28:14,520 --> 00:28:19,600
scientific explanation, we need
to make sure that we're not just

453
00:28:19,600 --> 00:28:25,280
talking about explaining how if
you throw a rock and a bottle,

454
00:28:25,280 --> 00:28:28,600
it shatters, which is a, you
know, there's these kind of

455
00:28:28,600 --> 00:28:33,640
classic examples that show up a
lot in philosophy that are often

456
00:28:33,640 --> 00:28:35,680
quite simple.
They have an explanatory target

457
00:28:35,680 --> 00:28:37,560
that's binary.
It sort of happens or it

458
00:28:37,560 --> 00:28:40,240
doesn't.
And you can even think of these

459
00:28:40,240 --> 00:28:44,960
examples that are more sciency.
So you might want to explain eye

460
00:28:44,960 --> 00:28:48,800
color in a fruit fly.
There's different colors that

461
00:28:48,800 --> 00:28:51,280
will show up and you want to
know well what explains why it's

462
00:28:51,280 --> 00:28:55,200
got red eyes or white or black.
Or you might want to explain the

463
00:28:55,200 --> 00:28:57,520
height of a plant.
You have genetically identical

464
00:28:57,520 --> 00:28:59,080
plants and they've got different
heights.

465
00:28:59,160 --> 00:29:03,960
What explains that?
Those are getting us real

466
00:29:03,960 --> 00:29:12,000
scientific examples, but those
are so much more simplified and

467
00:29:14,360 --> 00:29:17,880
not complex when you compare it
to something like explaining

468
00:29:18,000 --> 00:29:20,560
subjective experience.
When you look at explaining

469
00:29:20,560 --> 00:29:23,720
consciousness, even when you
look at explaining disease

470
00:29:23,720 --> 00:29:27,360
outcomes that are harder to
identify and measure.

471
00:29:27,360 --> 00:29:31,320
And so keeping us honest, right?
And so that's one of the main

472
00:29:31,320 --> 00:29:37,600
advantages of of working with
Megan is it keeps your

473
00:29:37,600 --> 00:29:47,320
philosophy honest, both in terms
of are we actually capturing the

474
00:29:47,920 --> 00:29:51,000
phenomena in the world that
scientists are interested, that

475
00:29:51,000 --> 00:29:52,800
they're studying and then how
they do it.

476
00:29:52,800 --> 00:29:57,600
So another nice thing that Megan
mentioned is that scientists,

477
00:29:58,080 --> 00:30:01,360
you know, and humans, when we're
reasoning in everyday life and

478
00:30:01,360 --> 00:30:05,120
in scientific context, we have
limited information about the

479
00:30:05,120 --> 00:30:10,400
world.
We don't have that picture where

480
00:30:10,400 --> 00:30:14,040
you've got information about all
of the details.

481
00:30:15,000 --> 00:30:20,760
And so one of the features we
need to include in our accounts

482
00:30:20,760 --> 00:30:24,560
is that limitation.
When humans reason, there's

483
00:30:24,560 --> 00:30:28,560
limitations in terms of
computational abilities,

484
00:30:28,560 --> 00:30:31,280
computational power, the time
scale in which they're making

485
00:30:31,280 --> 00:30:33,960
decisions.
Scientists are humans and so

486
00:30:35,040 --> 00:30:38,240
what's what's important is our
accounts of explanation need to

487
00:30:38,240 --> 00:30:42,080
include those limitations, but
also they managed to be

488
00:30:42,080 --> 00:30:45,160
successful despite those
constraints.

489
00:30:45,160 --> 00:30:51,720
And so part of what is so
helpful about interdisciplinary

490
00:30:51,720 --> 00:30:55,080
connections of being a
philosopher of science, working

491
00:30:55,080 --> 00:30:59,360
with an actual scientist is that
when we're coming up with

492
00:31:00,360 --> 00:31:03,720
accounts of how scientific
practice and explanations work,

493
00:31:03,920 --> 00:31:08,920
you can actually check it with
the practice of scientists that

494
00:31:08,920 --> 00:31:11,880
are right next door to you.
You can talk to them about it.

495
00:31:13,040 --> 00:31:17,560
You can make sure that you have
clarity on what their goals are,

496
00:31:17,640 --> 00:31:19,160
right?
That's, that's something that's

497
00:31:19,160 --> 00:31:23,960
very important for, in order for
us to provide criteria for

498
00:31:23,960 --> 00:31:27,560
explanation or ways of
understanding causality that are

499
00:31:27,560 --> 00:31:31,200
useful, that we need to know
what goals scientists have.

500
00:31:31,200 --> 00:31:35,200
And then are these concepts
useful for their goals.

501
00:31:35,320 --> 00:31:42,720
And so there's a a whole host of
reasons why working with Megan

502
00:31:42,720 --> 00:31:49,480
and talking with Megan kind of
helps keep my philosophy honest

503
00:31:49,480 --> 00:31:53,000
in a way that I wouldn't be able
to do on my own, right?

504
00:31:53,000 --> 00:31:57,440
Because he's doing that kind of
scientific work in a way that

505
00:31:57,440 --> 00:31:59,280
I'm not.
So it's a big advantage of this

506
00:31:59,280 --> 00:32:03,240
interdisciplinary approach.
Yeah, I completely agree.

507
00:32:03,240 --> 00:32:06,320
I think that both of you work
works together.

508
00:32:06,440 --> 00:32:08,040
It's a very symbiotic
relationship.

509
00:32:08,040 --> 00:32:09,880
It's it's something that should
be seen as one.

510
00:32:09,880 --> 00:32:12,120
And I think that by the end of
this conversation, hopefully you

511
00:32:12,120 --> 00:32:16,320
both do identify as both
philosopher and neuroscientist.

512
00:32:16,320 --> 00:32:18,680
But Megan, let's let's go to
your work for a moment.

513
00:32:18,840 --> 00:32:21,880
In computational and cognitive
neuroscience, models attempt to

514
00:32:21,880 --> 00:32:24,280
capture how the brain handles
uncertainty.

515
00:32:24,960 --> 00:32:28,000
What can these models truly
reveal about something you just

516
00:32:28,000 --> 00:32:30,640
touched on earlier, subjective
experience.

517
00:32:31,560 --> 00:32:35,400
So if this is truly subjective,
are these models going to give

518
00:32:35,400 --> 00:32:37,440
us any sort of objective
information?

519
00:32:39,120 --> 00:32:42,600
Yeah, great, great question.
And this is maybe not the hard

520
00:32:42,600 --> 00:32:44,880
problem, but this is one of the
hard questions, right.

521
00:32:44,880 --> 00:32:50,080
So the, the idea here is can any
empirical science give us any

522
00:32:50,080 --> 00:32:55,760
sort of foothold or toehold or
fingernail hold on, on something

523
00:32:55,760 --> 00:32:57,480
that we might refer to as the
hard problem?

524
00:32:57,560 --> 00:32:59,840
And then the nature of
subjective experience.

525
00:33:00,480 --> 00:33:06,000
And I, I think, you know, I'm
gonna use a couple overused

526
00:33:06,000 --> 00:33:09,200
examples here maybe to explain
where I'm coming from.

527
00:33:09,200 --> 00:33:15,600
But a lot of folks that in the
philosophically informed science

528
00:33:15,600 --> 00:33:20,760
of consciousness might say that
consciousness science right now

529
00:33:20,760 --> 00:33:23,880
is in the state that life
sciences was, you know, several

530
00:33:23,880 --> 00:33:26,440
100 years ago where there was
this magical force that we

531
00:33:26,440 --> 00:33:29,680
called life.
And it was this vital force.

532
00:33:29,920 --> 00:33:32,400
And we didn't know what it was,
but it was like a thing that was

533
00:33:32,400 --> 00:33:36,280
out there and, and it was magic.
And that as we learned more

534
00:33:36,280 --> 00:33:40,280
about biology, the problem just
kind of dissolved that we found

535
00:33:40,280 --> 00:33:44,360
ways of describing and
explaining what was going on

536
00:33:44,680 --> 00:33:47,560
that made it very clear, well,
this is a thing that's alive and

537
00:33:47,560 --> 00:33:48,720
this is a thing that's not
alive.

538
00:33:48,720 --> 00:33:51,640
And this is a thing that's maybe
halfway in between like viruses

539
00:33:52,000 --> 00:33:53,840
and we're not really sure
whether they're alive or not

540
00:33:53,840 --> 00:33:55,600
alive by, by different
definitions.

541
00:33:55,600 --> 00:33:58,320
But it kind of doesn't matter
where the the bifurcation where

542
00:33:58,320 --> 00:34:00,120
we put that binary point
anymore.

543
00:34:00,560 --> 00:34:05,760
And I feel like I agree with the
folks who will, who will state

544
00:34:05,760 --> 00:34:10,239
that consciousness science may
have a similar future ahead of

545
00:34:10,239 --> 00:34:13,480
it, where right now we have this
monolithic thing that we call

546
00:34:13,480 --> 00:34:15,760
consciousness or subjective
experience.

547
00:34:16,719 --> 00:34:23,880
And it seems like there is this
massive explanatory gap, but the

548
00:34:23,880 --> 00:34:27,400
reality very well could be that
as we approach that explanatory

549
00:34:27,400 --> 00:34:31,440
gap, it it shrinks and it, it
appears to be this big chasm

550
00:34:31,440 --> 00:34:33,679
from over here.
But as we take tiny baby steps

551
00:34:33,679 --> 00:34:37,120
towards it, it turns out that
that was an illusion or a

552
00:34:37,120 --> 00:34:41,159
barrage or, or something.
So I think that the work that

553
00:34:41,159 --> 00:34:45,400
we're doing on how the brain
deals with uncertainty, how it

554
00:34:45,400 --> 00:34:49,520
arrives at the best that it it
does, that kind of inference to

555
00:34:49,520 --> 00:34:52,400
the best explanation.
You know, your brain is itself a

556
00:34:52,400 --> 00:34:55,280
natural philosopher and that
it's trying to understand the

557
00:34:55,280 --> 00:34:58,400
environment and build a model of
the environment all the time.

558
00:34:58,400 --> 00:35:03,800
It's doing what scientists are
trying to do with, you know,

559
00:35:03,800 --> 00:35:05,600
with help from philosophers of
science.

560
00:35:05,680 --> 00:35:11,600
And so I think that in a way,
understanding how the brain is,

561
00:35:11,640 --> 00:35:13,680
is building these models of the
world.

562
00:35:14,120 --> 00:35:18,680
The result of those models is
ultimately somehow magically our

563
00:35:18,680 --> 00:35:21,040
subjective experience.
Unless you want to deny that

564
00:35:21,040 --> 00:35:24,240
subjective experience exists.
And that again, might be like,

565
00:35:24,560 --> 00:35:27,560
OK, I'm going to leave that over
there for the the folks who want

566
00:35:28,160 --> 00:35:30,800
to to argue that maybe
subjective experience doesn't

567
00:35:30,800 --> 00:35:33,280
exist.
But for me, it's a useful

568
00:35:33,280 --> 00:35:38,000
assumption to say, Yep,
subjective experience exists,

569
00:35:38,280 --> 00:35:43,360
conscious awareness exists.
So I'm going to try to build

570
00:35:43,480 --> 00:35:51,440
ways of capturing variants in it
and linking that variance to

571
00:35:52,920 --> 00:35:56,280
simplified components of models
that I build.

572
00:35:56,600 --> 00:35:59,640
If I twist this knob in my
model, it predicts that some

573
00:35:59,640 --> 00:36:02,960
sort of output on the subjective
experience side is going to

574
00:36:02,960 --> 00:36:06,320
change in a particular way.
I'd go do an experiment.

575
00:36:06,520 --> 00:36:09,840
Yeah, it did OK when people say,
oh, I have a stronger subjective

576
00:36:09,840 --> 00:36:12,080
experience.
OK, so maybe I'm on to something

577
00:36:12,080 --> 00:36:14,320
there.
I'll link it up with the brain

578
00:36:14,320 --> 00:36:17,360
and say, OK, if I twist this
knob, then I see like this area

579
00:36:17,360 --> 00:36:20,640
of the brain lights up more or
the pattern changes or

580
00:36:20,640 --> 00:36:24,040
something, then I can say, OK, I
think that this is the nature of

581
00:36:24,040 --> 00:36:27,880
the information being
represented in the patterns of

582
00:36:27,880 --> 00:36:30,840
neural activity.
And it maps onto this component

583
00:36:30,840 --> 00:36:33,520
of the model and it maps onto
this report of your subjective

584
00:36:33,520 --> 00:36:36,000
experience.
So that's how I'm trying to go

585
00:36:36,000 --> 00:36:38,760
about it.
I'm not going to say that any

586
00:36:38,760 --> 00:36:45,240
work that I'm doing is, is
building, is solving any sort of

587
00:36:45,240 --> 00:36:48,160
hard problem or jumping any sort
of explanatory gap.

588
00:36:48,160 --> 00:36:52,400
But I think that if we sit over
here and we say, hey, look at

589
00:36:52,400 --> 00:36:55,520
that explanatory gap, it's the
size of the Grand Canyon.

590
00:36:55,760 --> 00:36:58,240
I'm not even going to bother
approaching it to see how big it

591
00:36:58,240 --> 00:37:00,080
is.
I don't think that that's a

592
00:37:00,080 --> 00:37:02,800
useful enterprise.
So I want to take, I want to

593
00:37:02,800 --> 00:37:05,200
create approaches to take those
baby steps.

594
00:37:05,200 --> 00:37:08,320
And that's some of the work that
we're doing on metacognition

595
00:37:08,320 --> 00:37:12,680
specifically is not just
understanding how the brain kind

596
00:37:12,680 --> 00:37:15,680
of builds models of the world or
how the mind builds models of

597
00:37:15,680 --> 00:37:19,680
the world, but how it also puts
itself into those models, how it

598
00:37:19,680 --> 00:37:23,200
builds models of itself.
And the subjective experiences

599
00:37:23,200 --> 00:37:28,360
that we have are ultimately the
reflection of a combination of

600
00:37:28,360 --> 00:37:33,360
the model that we've built of
our environments and kind of our

601
00:37:33,360 --> 00:37:38,080
own understanding or
introspective insight into that

602
00:37:38,080 --> 00:37:41,000
model that we built that we can
query and and evaluate that

603
00:37:41,000 --> 00:37:43,760
model and look at it.
So that's how I use uncertainty

604
00:37:43,880 --> 00:37:51,800
or noise or variation is to look
for how it dictates how it

605
00:37:51,800 --> 00:37:54,880
interacts with the subjective
experiences that we can report

606
00:37:54,880 --> 00:37:57,160
in these kinds of experimental
approaches.

607
00:37:58,760 --> 00:38:01,560
Lauren, my question for you it,
you'll notice that these

608
00:38:01,560 --> 00:38:05,240
questions sort of inform each
other and then bounce back and

609
00:38:05,240 --> 00:38:08,160
forth.
So your research as a, as a sort

610
00:38:08,160 --> 00:38:12,200
of reply to Megan, your
research, Lauren, distinguishes

611
00:38:12,200 --> 00:38:15,040
between types of explanation.
So, mechanistic causal

612
00:38:15,040 --> 00:38:19,600
unification based.
When a neuroscientist claims

613
00:38:19,600 --> 00:38:22,680
that they've explained
something, for example

614
00:38:22,680 --> 00:38:25,600
consciousness, which form of
explanation are they actually

615
00:38:25,600 --> 00:38:30,640
offering?
I think the short answer to this

616
00:38:31,080 --> 00:38:37,720
question is that it's still a
bit of an open, It's still a bit

617
00:38:37,720 --> 00:38:45,720
of an open question, what we
expect these explanations to

618
00:38:45,720 --> 00:38:50,080
meet in terms of the criteria.
I also think that few people in

619
00:38:50,080 --> 00:38:54,200
this space suggest that they
have a full explanation or

620
00:38:54,640 --> 00:38:58,440
almost any explanation of
consciousness.

621
00:38:58,800 --> 00:39:03,560
So let me back up a little bit.
Here in my work in philosophy of

622
00:39:03,560 --> 00:39:07,160
science, we study scientific
explanation.

623
00:39:07,600 --> 00:39:12,320
What does it take for a
scientist to have an explanation

624
00:39:12,320 --> 00:39:15,480
and to give an explanation?
Something that's very important

625
00:39:15,480 --> 00:39:22,120
about this space is that is
saying a little bit about what

626
00:39:22,160 --> 00:39:25,520
explanation is.
So we often think of explanation

627
00:39:25,520 --> 00:39:29,640
as one of the most important
things that scientists do.

628
00:39:29,800 --> 00:39:31,960
It's a very difficult thing for
them to do.

629
00:39:32,200 --> 00:39:36,280
We think of explanations as
giving deep understanding of the

630
00:39:36,280 --> 00:39:38,920
world.
So in this sense, explanation is

631
00:39:38,920 --> 00:39:42,120
different from other types of
projects that scientists engage

632
00:39:42,120 --> 00:39:45,000
in that are very important
projects, like giving

633
00:39:45,440 --> 00:39:49,520
descriptions of the world.
So I can describe the color of a

634
00:39:49,520 --> 00:39:53,000
leaf on a tree, but I haven't
explained why it has that color.

635
00:39:53,000 --> 00:39:55,280
So that's a description.
Scientists engage in

636
00:39:55,280 --> 00:39:58,920
classification.
They sort things into helpful

637
00:39:58,920 --> 00:40:02,480
categories.
That's also not an explanation

638
00:40:02,520 --> 00:40:05,200
of something in the world.
And in other cases they give

639
00:40:05,200 --> 00:40:08,280
predictions.
And giving a prediction is of

640
00:40:08,280 --> 00:40:11,680
course very useful, but it's not
yet giving an explanation.

641
00:40:11,920 --> 00:40:15,160
We think of explanations as
answering why questions.

642
00:40:15,560 --> 00:40:18,640
So why is it the case that that
leaf is green?

643
00:40:18,880 --> 00:40:22,000
Why does this person have a
disease as opposed to not?

644
00:40:22,280 --> 00:40:28,280
Why does this?
Plant have a certain height as

645
00:40:28,280 --> 00:40:29,680
opposed to having another
height.

646
00:40:29,960 --> 00:40:37,280
And so and so a first thing to
point out is that explanations

647
00:40:37,280 --> 00:40:39,440
offer deep understanding of the
world.

648
00:40:39,440 --> 00:40:41,920
We want to know what criteria
they need to meet to know that

649
00:40:41,920 --> 00:40:45,440
we have good ones right.
How do you know when you have a

650
00:40:45,440 --> 00:40:50,400
right, a good or an appropriate
explanation of any kind of

651
00:40:50,400 --> 00:40:54,680
phenomenon of interest, right, A
disease outcome, social

652
00:40:54,680 --> 00:40:56,920
inequalities, right?
This doesn't just extend to

653
00:40:56,920 --> 00:40:59,080
neuroscience.
This is all scientific domains.

654
00:40:59,400 --> 00:41:03,520
So the two parts that you see
here for an explanation or two

655
00:41:03,520 --> 00:41:07,200
parts that show up is you first
need to ask an explanatory why

656
00:41:07,200 --> 00:41:12,280
question, or you can couch your
explanatory target in terms of a

657
00:41:12,280 --> 00:41:15,400
why question, right?
What explains consciousness is

658
00:41:15,400 --> 00:41:19,560
going to be a sort of start or
you can put in any kind of

659
00:41:20,080 --> 00:41:22,600
target of interest.
So you ask a why question.

660
00:41:22,840 --> 00:41:27,760
The explanation is the answer.
So why is it the case that this

661
00:41:27,760 --> 00:41:30,440
patient has measles as opposed
to not?

662
00:41:30,520 --> 00:41:34,600
Well, part of the explanation is
there's some virus that they

663
00:41:35,040 --> 00:41:38,840
encountered and then there's a
bunch of other interactions in

664
00:41:38,840 --> 00:41:42,320
the immune system that explain
why they have that disease

665
00:41:42,320 --> 00:41:44,760
outcome.
SO2 parts of an explanation,

666
00:41:45,880 --> 00:41:49,840
explanatory why question and
then your answer to that

667
00:41:49,840 --> 00:41:53,200
question.
So in order to give an

668
00:41:53,200 --> 00:41:56,680
explanation for something, you
need to say what you want to

669
00:41:56,680 --> 00:42:00,280
explain.
And that's where that why

670
00:42:00,280 --> 00:42:04,320
question shows up.
And there's actually a lot of

671
00:42:04,320 --> 00:42:08,960
features involved in providing a
well defined explanatory target.

672
00:42:09,280 --> 00:42:11,920
And so right now in
consciousness research, there's

673
00:42:11,920 --> 00:42:19,200
debate and investigation and
discussion about what's the

674
00:42:19,200 --> 00:42:21,600
explanatory target and then
what's the answer?

675
00:42:21,600 --> 00:42:24,720
What's the stuff that explains
that target?

676
00:42:24,720 --> 00:42:29,560
And as Megan dimensioned, there
are many different explanatory

677
00:42:29,560 --> 00:42:32,160
targets that are showing up in
consciousness research.

678
00:42:32,160 --> 00:42:37,680
And part of the challenge is
being very clear about which one

679
00:42:37,800 --> 00:42:41,960
a scientist is interested in.
So saying you know what explains

680
00:42:41,960 --> 00:42:45,720
consciousness, that's not a well
defined scientific question yet.

681
00:42:45,920 --> 00:42:49,280
It's not yet a well defined
explanatory why question for two

682
00:42:49,280 --> 00:42:51,960
reasons.
First, you need to define

683
00:42:52,120 --> 00:42:55,640
consciousness and we don't have
a consensus definition.

684
00:42:55,640 --> 00:42:58,480
So then you need to be precise
about which one you have in

685
00:42:58,480 --> 00:43:00,520
mind.
And then the second is you need

686
00:43:00,520 --> 00:43:03,160
a contrast.
You always have to say as

687
00:43:03,160 --> 00:43:06,200
opposed to what?
So if I'm interested in

688
00:43:06,200 --> 00:43:10,040
explaining why someone has a
loss of sensation in their hand,

689
00:43:11,200 --> 00:43:13,680
I can't just say what explains
why they have a loss of

690
00:43:13,680 --> 00:43:16,320
sensation in their hand.
I have to say as opposed to

691
00:43:16,320 --> 00:43:19,560
what?
As opposed to full sensation in

692
00:43:19,560 --> 00:43:22,960
their hand, or as opposed to a
loss of sensation in their leg,

693
00:43:23,280 --> 00:43:25,680
right.
If I don't specify the contrast,

694
00:43:26,280 --> 00:43:28,000
you don't know what answer to
give me.

695
00:43:28,160 --> 00:43:32,520
And so part of what?
Philosophers of science do here

696
00:43:32,520 --> 00:43:35,480
is we're looking at what are the
things that need to be met to

697
00:43:35,480 --> 00:43:38,000
have a well defined explanatory
target.

698
00:43:38,000 --> 00:43:40,400
And you see them in other
scientific fields.

699
00:43:40,400 --> 00:43:44,440
So we're looking at cases where
we have scientists who've

700
00:43:44,440 --> 00:43:48,840
successfully given explanations
and we're looking at the

701
00:43:48,840 --> 00:43:50,360
criteria.
And then we're looking at

702
00:43:50,360 --> 00:43:52,840
consciousness research and these
other spaces where you have

703
00:43:52,840 --> 00:43:57,800
scientists working on answering
really difficult questions that

704
00:43:58,120 --> 00:44:01,880
we don't yet have answers to.
But you first have to ask the

705
00:44:01,880 --> 00:44:05,440
right kind of question before
you can get an answer.

706
00:44:05,880 --> 00:44:08,040
And so there's two main
challenges.

707
00:44:08,040 --> 00:44:11,880
What's the right question?
And then in terms of what's the

708
00:44:11,880 --> 00:44:17,360
right answer, here's where you
start to see what do you need to

709
00:44:17,560 --> 00:44:20,320
give an answer.
Do you want causal information?

710
00:44:20,480 --> 00:44:22,160
Do you want a causal
explanation?

711
00:44:22,600 --> 00:44:24,440
Do you want a functional
explanation?

712
00:44:25,120 --> 00:44:30,200
We sometimes think that
computational explanations are.

713
00:44:30,400 --> 00:44:33,440
There's something there that we
need that's going to help answer

714
00:44:33,440 --> 00:44:36,440
that question.
Mechanism, of course, shows up

715
00:44:37,240 --> 00:44:40,560
in philosophy of science.
We have different categories of

716
00:44:40,560 --> 00:44:42,760
explanations.
Causal is a main one.

717
00:44:43,800 --> 00:44:47,000
I would put mechanistic
explanation that's just a causal

718
00:44:47,000 --> 00:44:50,160
explanation.
Mechanisms are just saying

719
00:44:50,160 --> 00:44:53,640
you've identified.
Well in most cases mechanism is

720
00:44:53,640 --> 00:44:57,080
a causal explanation.
In other cases there might be a

721
00:44:57,080 --> 00:44:59,560
non causal mathematical
explanation.

722
00:45:00,720 --> 00:45:04,960
So I guess 3 categories I would
pin down are causal explanation,

723
00:45:06,200 --> 00:45:08,880
non causal, mathematical.
There's a lot of debate about

724
00:45:08,880 --> 00:45:12,400
what those look like.
Functional explanations you

725
00:45:12,400 --> 00:45:14,560
could think like evolutionary
explanation.

726
00:45:14,560 --> 00:45:16,880
That's not quite what we're
interested in here.

727
00:45:17,920 --> 00:45:22,680
And computational, there's a
question what you know, are

728
00:45:22,680 --> 00:45:25,200
computational explanations
causal?

729
00:45:25,200 --> 00:45:27,160
Do they, are they a subcategory
of causal?

730
00:45:27,720 --> 00:45:33,480
But for the most part, we're
often interested in causal

731
00:45:33,480 --> 00:45:36,080
explanations.
So you're, you're looking for

732
00:45:36,080 --> 00:45:39,520
the main factors that 'cause
that target of interest.

733
00:45:39,520 --> 00:45:43,720
And there's also debate here
about in consciousness research.

734
00:45:43,720 --> 00:45:46,360
Do you have the right factors
there?

735
00:45:46,800 --> 00:45:49,960
If you're interested in
correlates, neural correlates,

736
00:45:49,960 --> 00:45:57,840
there's often a bit of slippage
in how that's used.

737
00:45:58,080 --> 00:46:00,960
But if something is a mere
correlation with your target,

738
00:46:01,080 --> 00:46:03,560
then you don't yet have
causality.

739
00:46:04,120 --> 00:46:09,840
So this is where a philosopher
is working with scientists to,

740
00:46:09,960 --> 00:46:14,320
to to help determine what are
your different explanatory

741
00:46:14,320 --> 00:46:19,920
targets, because that's going to
help you get the right answer to

742
00:46:19,920 --> 00:46:23,840
that question.
And what I would say is there

743
00:46:23,840 --> 00:46:27,840
isn't one question here.
There almost never is for

744
00:46:27,840 --> 00:46:34,000
complex systems.
There isn't A1 complete full

745
00:46:34,360 --> 00:46:36,240
theory of everything
explanation.

746
00:46:36,800 --> 00:46:39,800
It's piece meal.
And so you're asking different

747
00:46:40,160 --> 00:46:42,400
why questions about a complex
system.

748
00:46:42,720 --> 00:46:45,920
And that's the sort of trick
that scientists have to manage

749
00:46:45,920 --> 00:46:49,920
this complexity.
But part of what that shows are

750
00:46:49,920 --> 00:46:51,760
those two pieces of an
explanation.

751
00:46:51,960 --> 00:46:57,240
Your explanatory why question
the X we, the fancy word here is

752
00:46:57,800 --> 00:46:59,600
explanondem.
This is what you want to

753
00:46:59,600 --> 00:47:02,080
explain.
And then the explanons is what

754
00:47:02,760 --> 00:47:05,200
answers that question.
What gives you the explanation?

755
00:47:05,200 --> 00:47:08,640
Usually some kind of causal
information causes explain their

756
00:47:08,640 --> 00:47:10,400
effects.
And so there's a whole challenge

757
00:47:10,400 --> 00:47:13,920
of once you have a well defined
explanatory target going out in

758
00:47:13,920 --> 00:47:19,000
the world and identifying the
main causes that are relevant to

759
00:47:19,000 --> 00:47:23,240
that target.
I think let's try and bridge

760
00:47:23,240 --> 00:47:25,440
these two together.
So Megan, taking all of that

761
00:47:25,440 --> 00:47:28,000
into account, these levels of
explanation, your work in

762
00:47:28,000 --> 00:47:31,840
metacognition or your research
in neuroimaging modelling,

763
00:47:31,840 --> 00:47:35,160
etcetera, how would you then
address what Lawrence talking

764
00:47:35,160 --> 00:47:38,440
about using your work as a as a
guide for us?

765
00:47:40,160 --> 00:47:41,960
Yeah, great.
Great question.

766
00:47:42,120 --> 00:47:43,760
That's kind of the whole
enterprise, right?

767
00:47:44,760 --> 00:47:48,760
I think there's a couple things
that Lauren said that really

768
00:47:50,000 --> 00:47:53,200
resonate with me.
And this is the nature of being

769
00:47:53,200 --> 00:47:56,000
very clear about the the
questions that you're asking.

770
00:47:56,000 --> 00:48:01,160
So in actually this is this is
what we try to instill in our

771
00:48:01,160 --> 00:48:04,480
students at Neuromash is the
asking and answering the right

772
00:48:04,480 --> 00:48:07,360
kind of question is, is the
primary thing that you should be

773
00:48:07,360 --> 00:48:09,320
looking at.
The technique can come

774
00:48:09,320 --> 00:48:10,920
afterwards.
You have to pick the technique

775
00:48:10,920 --> 00:48:14,480
later in order to answer the
question, but you got to get the

776
00:48:14,480 --> 00:48:18,360
question right first.
And, and I just had a piece come

777
00:48:18,360 --> 00:48:21,640
out recently about how to come
up with good scientific

778
00:48:21,640 --> 00:48:23,520
questions and what that really
looks like.

779
00:48:24,080 --> 00:48:28,680
And there's been a lot of work
in computational neuroscience

780
00:48:28,680 --> 00:48:31,760
and cognitive neuroscience in
how to think about the

781
00:48:31,760 --> 00:48:34,520
interaction between the
questions that you're asking and

782
00:48:34,520 --> 00:48:37,440
the goals that you have as a
modeler or as a scientist in

783
00:48:37,440 --> 00:48:41,640
general.
And the plurality that Lauren

784
00:48:41,640 --> 00:48:46,440
noted is absolutely right that
there's, you know, depending on

785
00:48:46,440 --> 00:48:49,200
who you ask, there's what, how
and why questions.

786
00:48:49,200 --> 00:48:51,480
That's classic Diane and Abbott
2005.

787
00:48:51,480 --> 00:48:54,840
There's, you know, Mars levels
of analysis, which are

788
00:48:55,440 --> 00:48:58,520
computational and algorithmic
and implementation.

789
00:48:58,520 --> 00:49:02,440
You can ask questions about each
of those levels of, you know, at

790
00:49:02,480 --> 00:49:06,160
each of those levels of inquiry,
you can have questions that

791
00:49:06,520 --> 00:49:08,680
target different levels of
granularity.

792
00:49:08,680 --> 00:49:12,360
So you have micro versus macro
versus organismal versus like

793
00:49:12,360 --> 00:49:15,720
societal.
And so this plurality of

794
00:49:15,720 --> 00:49:18,960
questions and plurality of
approaches I think is really

795
00:49:18,960 --> 00:49:22,600
critical because as Lauren said,
there is no one question to rule

796
00:49:22,600 --> 00:49:24,520
them all.
There is no one answer or one

797
00:49:24,520 --> 00:49:29,560
explanation to rule them all.
There's no one ring to rule them

798
00:49:29,560 --> 00:49:30,800
all.
It's just not going to happen.

799
00:49:31,160 --> 00:49:36,400
So I think that from our
perspective, this is this is

800
00:49:36,400 --> 00:49:39,920
actually something that I try to
instill in all of not just my,

801
00:49:39,960 --> 00:49:42,920
you know, doctoral trainees, but
the undergraduates that I teach

802
00:49:42,920 --> 00:49:45,320
and the folks that we reach out
to at Neuromatch as well.

803
00:49:45,840 --> 00:49:50,760
Is that this the recognition
that the heterogeneity is, is a

804
00:49:50,760 --> 00:49:55,640
feature, not a bug that I think
is is really, really critical.

805
00:49:55,840 --> 00:49:58,360
There was something else that
that Lauren said to earlier

806
00:49:58,360 --> 00:50:05,200
though about this, which is in
coming up with your your type of

807
00:50:05,200 --> 00:50:07,760
question, you have to have a
little bit of an understanding

808
00:50:07,760 --> 00:50:11,280
of the the way in which you
might go about building that

809
00:50:11,280 --> 00:50:15,600
explanons that explanation of
the target and the level of

810
00:50:15,600 --> 00:50:18,920
visibility that you might have
into the system.

811
00:50:18,920 --> 00:50:21,520
The level of access that you
might have into the system.

812
00:50:22,160 --> 00:50:25,920
Because you can come up with
this amazing question that is

813
00:50:26,200 --> 00:50:30,960
actually unanswerable with the
tools that we have available to

814
00:50:30,960 --> 00:50:35,200
us.
And you can also come up with a

815
00:50:35,200 --> 00:50:39,600
question that might be
answerable in.

816
00:50:39,800 --> 00:50:42,440
So it's, it's answerable in
principle, but not in practice.

817
00:50:42,440 --> 00:50:44,880
That's one kind.
But then there are others that

818
00:50:44,880 --> 00:50:48,400
might like not be answerable in
principle, at least not yet.

819
00:50:49,320 --> 00:50:54,000
Because we don't have, it's not
that we don't have the right

820
00:50:54,000 --> 00:50:56,800
tool, the right neuroimaging
technique or the right model or

821
00:50:56,800 --> 00:50:58,320
something.
It's that we don't know how to

822
00:50:58,560 --> 00:51:01,080
ask that question by the right
way yet.

823
00:51:01,720 --> 00:51:05,000
And and you said something,
Lauren, that that really struck

824
00:51:05,000 --> 00:51:08,440
me, this kind of limited
visibility into the world idea

825
00:51:08,440 --> 00:51:15,160
that we always have this, these
barriers that shape the types of

826
00:51:15,160 --> 00:51:17,800
explanations we seek, the types
of questions that we can shape,

827
00:51:18,080 --> 00:51:22,120
types of answers that we can go
out and look for and the kinds

828
00:51:22,120 --> 00:51:27,080
of data that we can acquire.
But I do think that there are

829
00:51:27,160 --> 00:51:29,440
there are other kinds of
limitations that are not these

830
00:51:29,440 --> 00:51:32,520
kind of practical like, you
know, the parts of the world are

831
00:51:32,520 --> 00:51:35,160
unobservable.
I think that there are other

832
00:51:35,160 --> 00:51:40,360
limitations that that we should
acknowledge in building these

833
00:51:40,360 --> 00:51:44,280
questions as well.
So, you know, imagine a case

834
00:51:44,280 --> 00:51:48,080
where you have I've built some
sort of magical machine in the

835
00:51:48,080 --> 00:51:51,160
future, some magical brain
imaging device that has perfect

836
00:51:51,160 --> 00:51:54,320
visibility into everything that
the that every neuron is do on

837
00:51:54,320 --> 00:51:57,360
every every synapse.
I have the morphology, the shape

838
00:51:57,360 --> 00:51:59,360
of every neuron.
I have the structure of the

839
00:51:59,360 --> 00:52:01,040
dendritic tree.
I have all the chemical

840
00:52:01,040 --> 00:52:03,240
interactions.
I have literally everything

841
00:52:03,240 --> 00:52:07,640
about the brain.
I still could shape all sorts of

842
00:52:07,640 --> 00:52:11,160
different kinds of questions.
I can't just take that model of

843
00:52:11,160 --> 00:52:13,600
the brain and shove it into some
artificial intelligence and be

844
00:52:13,600 --> 00:52:15,400
like, poof, great.
I understand.

845
00:52:15,720 --> 00:52:19,120
I have an explanation.
It's still like even if we had

846
00:52:19,120 --> 00:52:22,280
perfect visibility, the
questions are still going to be

847
00:52:22,680 --> 00:52:26,320
the primary driver and the lack
of visibility into certain kinds

848
00:52:26,320 --> 00:52:29,440
of systems is still going to be
the limitation.

849
00:52:30,040 --> 00:52:34,040
And that lack of visibility is
now not coming from the tools

850
00:52:34,040 --> 00:52:36,840
that we have available.
It's like the lack of conceptual

851
00:52:36,840 --> 00:52:41,320
clarity, the lack of, of being
very precise about the target of

852
00:52:41,320 --> 00:52:45,680
explanation.
So yeah, I think it's, it's all

853
00:52:45,680 --> 00:52:48,680
got to come down to the
questions that you that you ask,

854
00:52:48,680 --> 00:52:51,640
the shape of those and how those
questions interact with the

855
00:52:51,640 --> 00:52:54,440
goals that you have as a, as a
scientist.

856
00:52:55,560 --> 00:52:59,520
So do you want to build an
explanation that has clinical

857
00:52:59,520 --> 00:53:00,920
impact?
Do you want to build an

858
00:53:00,920 --> 00:53:06,040
explanation that is beautiful
and intuitive and simple and

859
00:53:06,040 --> 00:53:09,400
like easy to explain to others?
Do you, you know, So what is?

860
00:53:09,400 --> 00:53:12,200
What is the kind of explanation
that you want to build too, not

861
00:53:12,200 --> 00:53:13,800
just the kind of question that
you want to ask?

862
00:53:15,200 --> 00:53:16,480
Lauren, anything you want to add
to that?

863
00:53:17,920 --> 00:53:22,200
Absolutely.
We sometimes discuss this in

864
00:53:22,200 --> 00:53:26,720
philosophy in terms of having a
God's eye view of the world or

865
00:53:26,720 --> 00:53:32,120
the Laplacian demon sort of
knowledge about all of the stuff

866
00:53:32,320 --> 00:53:35,960
that's out there.
And it can be very tempting as a

867
00:53:35,960 --> 00:53:40,200
philosopher, sometimes a
scientist too, to think there's

868
00:53:40,200 --> 00:53:44,040
all of this stuff out there.
If I just knew more about all of

869
00:53:44,040 --> 00:53:49,560
the stuff, I would get the
perfect complete explanation.

870
00:53:50,000 --> 00:53:58,480
And the challenge for that
picture is we currently don't

871
00:53:58,480 --> 00:54:03,120
have that information yet.
We're successful at navigating

872
00:54:03,120 --> 00:54:05,960
the world.
So part of what we're looking at

873
00:54:05,960 --> 00:54:09,920
here as philosophers is how
scientists reason and how

874
00:54:09,920 --> 00:54:12,600
they're successful.
But also in everyday life, we

875
00:54:12,600 --> 00:54:16,880
give explanations, we engage in
causal reasoning, and we do that

876
00:54:16,880 --> 00:54:18,520
pretty well.
Are we perfect?

877
00:54:18,520 --> 00:54:24,520
No, but we do it pretty well.
And we just don't have that kind

878
00:54:24,520 --> 00:54:27,080
of full, complete information
about the world.

879
00:54:27,080 --> 00:54:30,080
So the question is, how do we do
that?

880
00:54:30,080 --> 00:54:34,800
It looks like we don't need that
sort of information.

881
00:54:34,800 --> 00:54:38,560
And if you wanna provide an an
account of how a human or a

882
00:54:38,560 --> 00:54:43,240
scientist ever studies the
world, you can never include

883
00:54:43,600 --> 00:54:49,840
that kind of picture because
it's just that's, that's a

884
00:54:49,840 --> 00:54:54,600
fantasy story, right?
Where all scientists are humans

885
00:54:54,600 --> 00:54:56,160
and they're engaged with the
world.

886
00:54:56,680 --> 00:55:01,120
And if you want to talk about
having all those details, you're

887
00:55:01,120 --> 00:55:03,400
talking about a future science
that doesn't exist.

888
00:55:03,400 --> 00:55:06,840
And I'm not sure my future
science is going to match up to.

889
00:55:06,880 --> 00:55:12,440
So what we want to talk about is
current science and and past and

890
00:55:12,440 --> 00:55:17,280
what has worked.
And so one of the fun parts of

891
00:55:17,440 --> 00:55:21,560
doing this kind of work for me,
I think Megan has this too, is

892
00:55:21,560 --> 00:55:25,080
you're looking at what has
worked in these different

893
00:55:25,080 --> 00:55:30,600
scientific contexts, and you
have a sort of domain, general

894
00:55:30,600 --> 00:55:35,320
view of real scientific practice
and how scientists manage those

895
00:55:35,320 --> 00:55:39,880
limitations to get information
about the world.

896
00:55:39,920 --> 00:55:41,760
And so, yeah, it can be very
tempting.

897
00:55:42,000 --> 00:55:45,360
There's interesting temptations
and interesting pictures we have

898
00:55:46,440 --> 00:55:50,880
in everyday life, philosophers
and scientists about getting

899
00:55:51,040 --> 00:55:53,840
full detail is very attractive
to us.

900
00:55:53,840 --> 00:55:55,920
Also reduction, which I think
will come up.

901
00:55:56,440 --> 00:55:59,640
If we just could get more
information about stuff at lower

902
00:55:59,640 --> 00:56:04,200
levels, we could get better
explanations or the view that

903
00:56:04,960 --> 00:56:09,440
that's where we should look to
get the right kind of

904
00:56:09,920 --> 00:56:18,120
explanatory account.
So yes, very much, very much

905
00:56:18,120 --> 00:56:22,920
compatible with this kind of
realistic picture of scientific

906
00:56:22,920 --> 00:56:31,120
practice and scientific work, as
opposed to this idealized view

907
00:56:31,120 --> 00:56:33,920
where we ever had access to all
of the details.

908
00:56:35,240 --> 00:56:37,800
There's a, let me just follow up
on that for two seconds.

909
00:56:37,800 --> 00:56:42,040
There's a, a favorite paper that
I like to send students in my

910
00:56:42,040 --> 00:56:45,040
neuroanalytics class to, to kind
of highlight this.

911
00:56:45,520 --> 00:56:48,320
If only we had perfect access to
everything, then we would

912
00:56:48,320 --> 00:56:53,040
definitely understand.
And it's this paper that Conrad

913
00:56:53,040 --> 00:56:55,320
recording and, and some
colleagues wrote, I don't know,

914
00:56:55,320 --> 00:56:58,480
10 to something years ago.
It's it's called could a

915
00:56:58,480 --> 00:57:01,080
neuroscient, Could a
neuroscientist understand a

916
00:57:01,080 --> 00:57:05,800
microprocessor?
And they have this toy example

917
00:57:05,800 --> 00:57:08,400
where they say, OK, I've got
this microprocessor and it runs

918
00:57:08,400 --> 00:57:12,440
like Donkey Kong and Sonic the
Hedgehog and Mario or something

919
00:57:12,440 --> 00:57:15,480
like that.
And they go about dissecting

920
00:57:15,480 --> 00:57:20,120
this microprocessor using all of
the fancy available tools, all

921
00:57:20,120 --> 00:57:22,240
of the models that we would use
in neurosciences.

922
00:57:22,240 --> 00:57:24,360
So they measure all the
resistors and they measure all

923
00:57:24,360 --> 00:57:28,080
the synapses between all the,
you know, nodes in the

924
00:57:28,080 --> 00:57:30,440
microprocessor.
And it's a simulation

925
00:57:30,440 --> 00:57:32,800
microprocessor.
So it literally they have

926
00:57:32,800 --> 00:57:35,480
perfect access, right?
There's like no noise in the

927
00:57:35,480 --> 00:57:39,640
system.
And they do like inactivation

928
00:57:39,640 --> 00:57:42,080
experiments and they measure
like the network connectivity

929
00:57:42,080 --> 00:57:44,080
and the like the state
transitions and they do all the

930
00:57:44,080 --> 00:57:47,720
tricks.
And they still don't end up with

931
00:57:47,720 --> 00:57:51,000
an explanation for why poking
the thing in this way makes it

932
00:57:51,000 --> 00:57:55,920
unable to run Mario or why
poking the thing in this way

933
00:57:55,920 --> 00:57:59,480
versus that way has no effect on
whether Mario can hop over the

934
00:57:59,480 --> 00:58:03,520
thing or not.
So it's really like a, a kind of

935
00:58:03,520 --> 00:58:07,960
cheeky demonstration that it
really matters what you think

936
00:58:07,960 --> 00:58:10,080
you're measuring.
Like do you have perfect access

937
00:58:10,080 --> 00:58:11,880
to the system?
Do you have perfect access to

938
00:58:11,880 --> 00:58:16,160
all of the things that are
actually the, the parts of the

939
00:58:16,160 --> 00:58:17,960
system that you need to have
access to?

940
00:58:17,960 --> 00:58:20,880
And there they have access to
all the physical system, but

941
00:58:20,880 --> 00:58:23,240
they're not like reading the
software.

942
00:58:23,880 --> 00:58:27,720
And they'd have to come up with,
you know, the software in order

943
00:58:27,720 --> 00:58:31,560
to, to kind of build more of an
explanation for how the software

944
00:58:31,560 --> 00:58:33,960
and the hardware interact.
So I don't know, it's, it's a

945
00:58:33,960 --> 00:58:36,000
fun one.
If you haven't seen that paper,

946
00:58:36,520 --> 00:58:39,600
those of you who are out there
listening, I I suggest you go

947
00:58:39,600 --> 00:58:42,840
and have a look because it is.
It's fun and it's cheeky and

948
00:58:42,840 --> 00:58:46,360
it's also quite profound.
I love that concept, Megan, if

949
00:58:46,360 --> 00:58:48,160
you've got the link, please
share it with me so I can put it

950
00:58:48,160 --> 00:58:49,120
in the.
Yeah, I will.

951
00:58:50,280 --> 00:58:53,240
In your work, from all the work
you've done, what are some of

952
00:58:53,240 --> 00:58:57,440
the ground breaking things you
guys have figured out during

953
00:58:57,440 --> 00:59:00,920
this time that allow us to ask
deeper philosophical questions?

954
00:59:01,360 --> 00:59:04,600
I think that some of so some of
the things that that I am

955
00:59:04,600 --> 00:59:08,160
interested in here is as we
said, the nature of

956
00:59:08,880 --> 00:59:12,320
metacognition and subjective
experience and how those two

957
00:59:12,320 --> 00:59:15,400
interacts and metacognition
being the process and subjective

958
00:59:15,400 --> 00:59:18,720
experience potentially being
like the output of that process.

959
00:59:20,160 --> 00:59:24,880
I like this approach because it
combines, it combines

960
00:59:24,880 --> 00:59:31,000
neuroscience and behavior and
psychophysics and psychometrics

961
00:59:31,000 --> 00:59:37,000
and also computational models in
a way that tries to build like

962
00:59:37,560 --> 00:59:41,680
this piece meal.
Small, tiny explanation of why

963
00:59:41,680 --> 00:59:46,000
it is that if I change this
particular aspect of the world,

964
00:59:46,000 --> 00:59:48,360
it changes your subjective
experience in this particular

965
00:59:48,360 --> 00:59:51,200
way, and it changes your
subjective experience in a way

966
00:59:51,200 --> 00:59:55,400
that's different from changing
your ability to just interact

967
00:59:55,400 --> 01:00:01,480
with the world in a meaningful,
goal directed, kind of

968
01:00:01,480 --> 01:00:04,640
evolutionarily optimized way.
And So what I mean by that is

969
01:00:04,640 --> 01:00:12,040
that for us, when we process the
world, you can think of a lot of

970
01:00:12,040 --> 01:00:15,200
what's happening in that
processing is going on under the

971
01:00:15,200 --> 01:00:19,360
hood, so to speak.
There's a lot of heavy lifting

972
01:00:19,400 --> 01:00:22,240
that the brain does that is not
available to us.

973
01:00:22,960 --> 01:00:25,960
Consciously, subjectively,
anything like that.

974
01:00:26,640 --> 01:00:29,360
And I'm not even just talking
reflexes, I'm talking all the

975
01:00:29,360 --> 01:00:32,360
processing that gives rise to
the fact that you see the world

976
01:00:32,360 --> 01:00:35,680
in 3D.
Can you like kind of consciously

977
01:00:35,680 --> 01:00:38,320
intervene on that and say like,
no, it's, I know that it's

978
01:00:38,320 --> 01:00:40,640
actually a 2D image on my
retina.

979
01:00:41,320 --> 01:00:43,600
No, like you just see the world
in 3D.

980
01:00:44,240 --> 01:00:47,040
It just happens magically
somehow.

981
01:00:47,400 --> 01:00:51,160
And so there's a lot of this
complex processing that goes on

982
01:00:51,160 --> 01:00:53,360
under the hood.
I'm a vision scientist.

983
01:00:53,360 --> 01:00:56,920
So vision science is my my
typical workhorse here.

984
01:00:57,520 --> 01:01:00,080
But you can play this game for a
lot of other things too.

985
01:01:00,080 --> 01:01:03,600
For any way that you interact
with the world, you see a

986
01:01:03,760 --> 01:01:10,480
complex, noisy, stochastic
dynamic environment and you are

987
01:01:10,560 --> 01:01:13,280
standing like you're standing on
a sidewalk and you're deciding

988
01:01:13,280 --> 01:01:14,840
whether to cross the road or
not.

989
01:01:15,200 --> 01:01:18,240
And you hear things and you see
things and you have to decide is

990
01:01:18,240 --> 01:01:20,360
it safe?
And, and that decision is going

991
01:01:20,360 --> 01:01:23,240
to impact your ability to
survive, right.

992
01:01:23,240 --> 01:01:25,400
If you if you get it wrong, you
get hit by a car.

993
01:01:27,960 --> 01:01:32,440
But so much of that could be
said to be done potentially

994
01:01:32,920 --> 01:01:36,600
without conscious awareness.
And so a lot of the work that

995
01:01:36,600 --> 01:01:39,760
we're doing is taking all of
these tools in our tool kit and

996
01:01:39,760 --> 01:01:44,960
pointing them at trying to
dissociate the conscious

997
01:01:44,960 --> 01:01:47,760
experience or subjective
experience part from all the

998
01:01:47,760 --> 01:01:51,880
other stuff that like a Tesla
could do or a Roomba could maybe

999
01:01:51,880 --> 01:01:55,120
do a very smart Roomba.
And there's nothing that it's

1000
01:01:55,120 --> 01:01:59,640
like to be a Roomba, presumably.
So I think the favorite thing

1001
01:01:59,640 --> 01:02:02,960
that I'm doing right now that
might hopefully have some impact

1002
01:02:03,440 --> 01:02:07,000
is the conceptual and
methodological distinction

1003
01:02:07,080 --> 01:02:11,960
between understanding the
behaviors, computations and

1004
01:02:11,960 --> 01:02:16,240
neural correlates that give rise
to adaptive goal directed

1005
01:02:16,240 --> 01:02:18,240
interaction with the
environment.

1006
01:02:18,480 --> 01:02:22,960
Not dying, not stepping in front
of the car and separating that

1007
01:02:22,960 --> 01:02:25,880
from the computations and neural
circuits and neural

1008
01:02:25,880 --> 01:02:30,560
representations that are
uniquely driving or uniquely

1009
01:02:30,560 --> 01:02:32,920
correlated with the subjective
experience part.

1010
01:02:34,280 --> 01:02:38,640
And I think the reason, so I'm
not the only one who's working

1011
01:02:38,640 --> 01:02:40,760
on this, by the way, there's
like quite a lot of us who see

1012
01:02:40,760 --> 01:02:44,240
that distinction as being really
important, but there's also

1013
01:02:44,240 --> 01:02:47,760
quite a lot of people who don't.
And I would say that there are

1014
01:02:47,760 --> 01:02:50,240
some folks who are in the
artificial intelligence space,

1015
01:02:50,240 --> 01:02:54,720
for example, who conflate
intelligent behavior with

1016
01:02:55,040 --> 01:02:58,000
probability of being, of someone
being in there, of being

1017
01:02:58,000 --> 01:03:02,960
conscious, or even worse,
conflate intelligent looking

1018
01:03:02,960 --> 01:03:05,840
behavior with, you know,
subjective experience or

1019
01:03:05,840 --> 01:03:08,440
consciousness with threat.
You know, we say, oh, no,

1020
01:03:08,440 --> 01:03:10,560
Skynet's going to wake up and
it's going to kill all of us.

1021
01:03:11,440 --> 01:03:15,600
And I think that some of the
work that we're doing,

1022
01:03:15,920 --> 01:03:19,440
admittedly with very simple
stimuli and very simple models

1023
01:03:19,760 --> 01:03:23,040
will help drive at that really
important distinction that just

1024
01:03:23,040 --> 01:03:26,480
because you've got a system
that's seeming intelligent, it's

1025
01:03:26,480 --> 01:03:29,680
seeming like it can solve
problems, that doesn't mean that

1026
01:03:29,680 --> 01:03:32,000
anyone's in there, that it's
that there's anything that it's

1027
01:03:32,000 --> 01:03:34,600
like to be that system.
It also doesn't mean that it's a

1028
01:03:34,600 --> 01:03:36,560
threat.
Things can be threatening

1029
01:03:36,840 --> 01:03:39,160
without having subjective
experience and without being

1030
01:03:39,160 --> 01:03:41,880
intelligent.
And so all of those things are

1031
01:03:41,880 --> 01:03:44,720
independent.
So I think that was maybe the

1032
01:03:44,720 --> 01:03:47,760
thing that I would say is
potentially the impact of the

1033
01:03:47,760 --> 01:03:52,160
work that we're doing.
Lauren, if you had to envision a

1034
01:03:52,160 --> 01:03:55,120
philosophically informed
neuroscience infused with your

1035
01:03:55,120 --> 01:03:58,880
work regarding mechanism,
explanation, etcetera, what

1036
01:03:58,880 --> 01:04:00,280
would that look like in
practice?

1037
01:04:00,280 --> 01:04:03,280
An experiment, design, theory,
formation, or even peer review.

1038
01:04:05,840 --> 01:04:13,560
Part of what it would look like
is a kind of neuroscience that

1039
01:04:13,560 --> 01:04:17,040
we partly already see.
But part of what it would

1040
01:04:17,040 --> 01:04:21,760
highlight is clarity about the
types of causes and causal

1041
01:04:21,760 --> 01:04:26,440
systems that neuroscientists
study and that that researchers

1042
01:04:26,440 --> 01:04:32,240
are studying in this space.
One way to see this is we often

1043
01:04:32,240 --> 01:04:37,240
find the term mechanism being
used to refer loosely to any

1044
01:04:37,240 --> 01:04:42,960
kind of causal system.
Part of what my work has done is

1045
01:04:43,040 --> 01:04:46,520
specified that there are
different types of causes out in

1046
01:04:46,520 --> 01:04:50,280
the world that scientists study.
They have very different types

1047
01:04:50,320 --> 01:04:56,440
of features, and those matter
for how we study the systems.

1048
01:04:56,440 --> 01:04:58,600
They matter for the behaviors
they produce.

1049
01:04:59,120 --> 01:05:01,760
And you start to see some of
these distinctions show up

1050
01:05:01,760 --> 01:05:05,080
already when scientists talk
about causes that are

1051
01:05:05,440 --> 01:05:09,360
probabilistic versus
deterministic, causes that are

1052
01:05:09,360 --> 01:05:13,280
more or less strong, more or
less stable, or when scientists

1053
01:05:13,280 --> 01:05:17,440
use terms like referring to a
causal system as a pathway or a

1054
01:05:17,440 --> 01:05:20,880
circuit or a cascade.
There's a reference here and

1055
01:05:20,880 --> 01:05:24,440
then analogy to different types
of causal systems.

1056
01:05:24,440 --> 01:05:28,840
So part of what my work is
compatible with and can

1057
01:05:28,840 --> 01:05:35,200
encourage is far more clarity
about the types of causes that

1058
01:05:35,200 --> 01:05:40,200
are out there that we study.
We partly need words to refer to

1059
01:05:40,200 --> 01:05:44,160
the different types we have,
different features that they

1060
01:05:44,760 --> 01:05:52,240
have, and this is partly going
to inform the standards that we

1061
01:05:52,240 --> 01:05:57,480
have, basically being clear
about the standards that we have

1062
01:05:57,480 --> 01:06:00,400
for the kind of causal
information that neuroscientists

1063
01:06:00,400 --> 01:06:03,840
need to provide right now.
The standard is usually phrased

1064
01:06:03,840 --> 01:06:06,560
as a mechanism.
Scientists needs to provide

1065
01:06:06,920 --> 01:06:09,800
mechanistic information about a
system.

1066
01:06:10,280 --> 01:06:13,640
You see this in grant calls, you
see it in journal publication

1067
01:06:13,640 --> 01:06:16,680
guidelines.
In order to get funded, in order

1068
01:06:16,680 --> 01:06:20,520
to get published, A researcher
needs to identify a mechanism or

1069
01:06:20,520 --> 01:06:23,840
provide mechanistic insights.
But then the editors very

1070
01:06:23,840 --> 01:06:26,800
quickly follow up by saying that
they can't tell you what a

1071
01:06:26,800 --> 01:06:30,800
mechanism is.
And then it's often the case

1072
01:06:30,800 --> 01:06:33,280
that two or more researchers
reviewing the same paper

1073
01:06:33,280 --> 01:06:36,760
completely disagree about
whether the same paper provides

1074
01:06:36,760 --> 01:06:40,160
mechanistic insights or not.
So right now you have a causal

1075
01:06:40,160 --> 01:06:46,440
standard for the field that is
this word mechanism, and we have

1076
01:06:46,440 --> 01:06:50,400
different people defining that
term in different ways, and

1077
01:06:50,400 --> 01:06:53,120
there's no consensus on what
exactly it refers to.

1078
01:06:53,120 --> 01:06:56,680
Is it lower level cellular
details?

1079
01:06:56,680 --> 01:07:00,120
Is it higher level network
information?

1080
01:07:00,160 --> 01:07:03,480
You have researchers pointing to
both as real mechanisms.

1081
01:07:04,160 --> 01:07:07,440
Partly we need to put mechanism
aside, and when we're interested

1082
01:07:07,440 --> 01:07:09,960
in causal explanation, we just
need to talk about these as

1083
01:07:09,960 --> 01:07:13,840
causal systems, causal
relationships, the way that

1084
01:07:13,840 --> 01:07:15,960
causes are organized and
arranged.

1085
01:07:16,600 --> 01:07:20,280
How do you know you have the
right kind of causal information

1086
01:07:20,280 --> 01:07:22,440
that's explanatory, relevant to
your target?

1087
01:07:22,440 --> 01:07:29,440
So part of it is clarity on the
standards for the field and

1088
01:07:29,440 --> 01:07:34,080
getting more clarity on what we
mean by mechanism if that's the

1089
01:07:34,680 --> 01:07:37,400
current specification of the
field standard.

1090
01:07:38,440 --> 01:07:40,600
Yeah, I'm, I'm looking forward
to having both of you separately

1091
01:07:40,600 --> 01:07:43,200
on the channel so we can explore
specific aspects of both your

1092
01:07:43,200 --> 01:07:45,200
work.
But I think at this point to get

1093
01:07:45,200 --> 01:07:49,280
back to the main topic here, if
you both had to look at science

1094
01:07:49,280 --> 01:07:51,960
and philosophy and moving into
the future, bringing them both

1095
01:07:51,960 --> 01:07:55,120
together, what would this new,
what would a new picture of mind

1096
01:07:55,120 --> 01:07:58,480
would emerge from this?
Would it be something different,

1097
01:07:58,480 --> 01:08:00,760
do you think, do you think it
would change anything?

1098
01:08:01,160 --> 01:08:04,400
And what advantage does this
have for new fields specifically

1099
01:08:04,560 --> 01:08:07,200
that will arise?
I'll take that.

1100
01:08:07,200 --> 01:08:09,800
I I love that you said
advantages for new fields

1101
01:08:09,800 --> 01:08:13,920
because I think that one of the
challenges that we have in

1102
01:08:13,920 --> 01:08:16,120
neuroscience, again, I'm a
neuroscientist, so that's where

1103
01:08:16,120 --> 01:08:19,680
I'm coming from, is that this is
still a new field.

1104
01:08:20,080 --> 01:08:23,200
It's really young, especially
like the neuroscience of, you

1105
01:08:23,200 --> 01:08:24,800
know, consciousness or something
like that.

1106
01:08:24,800 --> 01:08:27,399
Like psychology, yeah.
Has been, oh, it's been around

1107
01:08:27,399 --> 01:08:31,560
for, you know, 150 years in its
present state and, and, you

1108
01:08:31,560 --> 01:08:33,960
know, quantitative computational
psychology.

1109
01:08:33,960 --> 01:08:36,479
Yeah.
But like, that's not very long.

1110
01:08:37,319 --> 01:08:41,319
That's really not very long.
Modern science is not very old

1111
01:08:41,319 --> 01:08:47,200
in general, but when it comes to
modern science, philosophy or

1112
01:08:47,479 --> 01:08:52,680
psychology and neuroscience
specifically, like our first

1113
01:08:52,680 --> 01:08:56,800
neural signatures are only about
100 and some odd years old, you

1114
01:08:56,800 --> 01:08:58,479
know, when EEG was first
invented.

1115
01:08:59,040 --> 01:09:01,200
And so this is a really young
field.

1116
01:09:01,720 --> 01:09:05,640
And so I think that new fields
and emerging fields like this is

1117
01:09:05,640 --> 01:09:10,479
where the value is.
This is where we need help at

1118
01:09:10,479 --> 01:09:15,840
getting conceptual clarity
because a lot, in a lot of cases

1119
01:09:15,840 --> 01:09:21,720
for new and emerging fields,
the, the major tool that we have

1120
01:09:21,720 --> 01:09:25,800
to say, well, where do we even
begin is something like

1121
01:09:26,560 --> 01:09:29,399
intuition.
I came up with an idea and like,

1122
01:09:29,399 --> 01:09:31,479
let's just run with it and see
what happens.

1123
01:09:32,240 --> 01:09:37,359
And as we, I think all have
probably discovered through one

1124
01:09:37,359 --> 01:09:40,439
point or another in our lives,
what you think is happening and

1125
01:09:40,439 --> 01:09:43,080
what is actually happening is
never like your first guess is

1126
01:09:43,080 --> 01:09:47,840
never the right one.
And so recognizing the value of

1127
01:09:47,840 --> 01:09:51,120
philosophy of science in young
and emerging fields and fields

1128
01:09:51,120 --> 01:09:54,520
that have yet to emerge, I think
is really powerful.

1129
01:09:54,600 --> 01:10:00,200
And as Lauren said, some, you
know, this idea that especially

1130
01:10:00,200 --> 01:10:04,400
at the beginning in a young
science, seeing the

1131
01:10:04,560 --> 01:10:09,360
commonalities in the structure
across this new emerging field

1132
01:10:09,400 --> 01:10:12,800
and maybe a more established
discipline that has kind of

1133
01:10:12,800 --> 01:10:16,280
already figured out some stuff.
So we've got a lot of really

1134
01:10:16,280 --> 01:10:20,440
precise terminology in how we
understand mechanism, whatever

1135
01:10:20,440 --> 01:10:23,800
that prestige wars is, by the
way, like, yeah, we all, we all

1136
01:10:23,800 --> 01:10:25,640
know that we want to go for a
mechanistic or causal

1137
01:10:25,640 --> 01:10:27,560
explanation and get what even is
that?

1138
01:10:28,120 --> 01:10:33,680
But there are, there are even
among the young modern science

1139
01:10:33,680 --> 01:10:36,800
fields, there are some that are
very, very young, you know,

1140
01:10:36,800 --> 01:10:38,640
they're children.
And then there are some that are

1141
01:10:38,640 --> 01:10:42,520
a little bit more middle-aged.
And so on the surface they're

1142
01:10:42,520 --> 01:10:45,040
all gonna have these extremely
different features, these

1143
01:10:45,040 --> 01:10:47,760
extremely different kind of
surface level properties of or

1144
01:10:47,760 --> 01:10:52,400
observables.
But causal and mechanistic

1145
01:10:52,400 --> 01:10:55,360
explanations are a unifying
principle.

1146
01:10:56,160 --> 01:10:59,280
And so recognizing that the
shape of the problems that we're

1147
01:10:59,280 --> 01:11:03,160
trying to solve might actually
be quite similar in this new and

1148
01:11:03,160 --> 01:11:05,640
emerging field to a more
established field.

1149
01:11:05,840 --> 01:11:08,240
But when you're a scientist and
you are reading the science

1150
01:11:08,240 --> 01:11:12,480
journals and you're kind of like
in your little your little box,

1151
01:11:12,720 --> 01:11:15,120
you don't have time to pop your
head out and go read some

1152
01:11:15,120 --> 01:11:18,120
astrophysics journal.
It's just not going to happen.

1153
01:11:18,640 --> 01:11:21,040
Or some material Science Journal
or something.

1154
01:11:21,040 --> 01:11:28,600
And so having though this target
of building explanatory models,

1155
01:11:29,080 --> 01:11:32,080
of getting conceptual clarity,
of understanding the types of

1156
01:11:32,080 --> 01:11:34,960
causal and mechanistic
explanations that we can go for

1157
01:11:35,440 --> 01:11:39,760
that can provide a bridge.
And you say, OK, well, we're

1158
01:11:39,760 --> 01:11:42,920
talking about completely
different systems, completely

1159
01:11:42,920 --> 01:11:44,800
different targets of
explanation, but the kinds of

1160
01:11:44,800 --> 01:11:47,600
explanations that we're trying
to build might actually be quite

1161
01:11:47,600 --> 01:11:51,240
similar.
And I have experiences with this

1162
01:11:51,480 --> 01:11:56,240
where I, I wrote this, this
paper with my one of my graduate

1163
01:11:56,240 --> 01:11:59,000
students and another professor
and his graduate student.

1164
01:11:59,240 --> 01:12:05,440
And he's a microbiologist.
He studies the microbiome of

1165
01:12:05,480 --> 01:12:08,960
pregnant women and how the
microbiome of pregnant women

1166
01:12:08,960 --> 01:12:11,880
impacts birth outcomes and
maternal outcomes.

1167
01:12:12,880 --> 01:12:15,920
I don't do that at all.
I have no idea even what half of

1168
01:12:15,920 --> 01:12:19,920
the vocabulary is that he says.
And yet through talking with

1169
01:12:19,920 --> 01:12:22,560
him, we discovered that the
shape of the problem that we are

1170
01:12:22,560 --> 01:12:25,480
trying to solve was actually
very similar.

1171
01:12:25,480 --> 01:12:27,800
And so we wrote a paper about
that and how like these kind of

1172
01:12:27,800 --> 01:12:30,120
modern, you know, machine
learning tools might be able to

1173
01:12:30,120 --> 01:12:33,160
help us with that.
And that's what we need in these

1174
01:12:33,160 --> 01:12:37,120
young emerging fields is to see,
well, someone else solved a

1175
01:12:37,120 --> 01:12:38,760
problem that had a similar
shape.

1176
01:12:39,680 --> 01:12:44,840
And, and if we can get that
right, it will propel the new

1177
01:12:44,840 --> 01:12:47,720
fields that we have right now
forward and emerging fields that

1178
01:12:47,720 --> 01:12:51,320
come in the future.
I think that that will be a

1179
01:12:51,880 --> 01:12:57,080
major step forward in building
better science, building more

1180
01:12:57,080 --> 01:13:08,120
coherent science that is self
perpetuating. 100% agree with

1181
01:13:08,480 --> 01:13:19,200
Megan here and.
We partly already see nice

1182
01:13:19,480 --> 01:13:24,400
features and aspects of current
work in neuroscience that show

1183
01:13:25,120 --> 01:13:29,960
this interdisciplinary aspect.
We've got lots of neuroscientist

1184
01:13:29,960 --> 01:13:33,960
philosophers who are aware of
both fields.

1185
01:13:34,160 --> 01:13:37,880
You see this in Megan's work.
You see it in the work of Anil

1186
01:13:37,880 --> 01:13:43,840
Seth, Danny Bassett, other
cognitive scientists like Nadia

1187
01:13:43,840 --> 01:13:48,040
Cherniak, Karen Walker.
There really are lots of

1188
01:13:48,840 --> 01:13:52,080
scientists and academics who are
engaged in this

1189
01:13:52,080 --> 01:13:57,200
interdisciplinary approach.
We 100% need it too.

1190
01:13:57,400 --> 01:14:01,200
For many of these challenging
questions, we have an all hands

1191
01:14:01,200 --> 01:14:04,040
on deck type situation.
We.

1192
01:14:04,040 --> 01:14:07,760
Need many different people from
many different perspectives to

1193
01:14:07,760 --> 01:14:12,920
help out with these questions.
The challenges are it can be

1194
01:14:12,920 --> 01:14:16,560
pretty uncomfortable to do this
kind of work because you're

1195
01:14:16,560 --> 01:14:19,960
never the main expert.
When I'm talking to scientists,

1196
01:14:20,640 --> 01:14:24,800
I mean, they are always so much
more of a deep expert in their

1197
01:14:24,800 --> 01:14:28,960
area of work than I than I could
ever be.

1198
01:14:29,240 --> 01:14:31,920
And I'm, it's partly, it's the
way it has to be.

1199
01:14:31,920 --> 01:14:33,840
I'm talking to social
scientists, I'm talking to

1200
01:14:33,840 --> 01:14:36,360
cognitive scientists, I'm
talking to neuroscientists.

1201
01:14:37,120 --> 01:14:40,640
It's a bit of a a stretch
sometimes, but for me, it's very

1202
01:14:40,640 --> 01:14:45,160
important for me to put myself
in their perspective.

1203
01:14:45,160 --> 01:14:47,440
What are they interested in?
Can I bring philosophy of

1204
01:14:47,440 --> 01:14:49,680
science?
That's useful and that's helpful

1205
01:14:49,960 --> 01:14:54,480
in order to figure out if it's a
person on the team or a hand on

1206
01:14:54,480 --> 01:14:56,800
your deck.
They do need to be useful and

1207
01:14:56,800 --> 01:14:59,920
they do need to be helpful.
And it's not easy for

1208
01:15:00,680 --> 01:15:03,840
philosophers to fill those shoes
sometimes with respect to

1209
01:15:03,840 --> 01:15:06,520
scientific work because it can
be uncomfortable.

1210
01:15:07,080 --> 01:15:10,440
You have to learn a lot of
science, and you're still never

1211
01:15:10,440 --> 01:15:14,160
going to know, You're never
going to have the same kind of

1212
01:15:14,360 --> 01:15:18,880
picture.
But these discussions can show

1213
01:15:18,880 --> 01:15:21,800
you types of philosophy that
will be really helpful for

1214
01:15:21,800 --> 01:15:23,240
scientists to have.
You don't.

1215
01:15:23,480 --> 01:15:25,360
We also don't want to reinvent
the wheel.

1216
01:15:25,400 --> 01:15:28,680
And we've seen this in cases
where you have researchers that

1217
01:15:28,680 --> 01:15:30,440
aren't interacting with each
other, right?

1218
01:15:30,440 --> 01:15:33,720
Someone spends a lot of their
career developing an approach

1219
01:15:34,000 --> 01:15:38,200
that someone built basically 3
decades earlier.

1220
01:15:38,200 --> 01:15:39,640
So you don't want to reinvent
the wheel.

1221
01:15:40,920 --> 01:15:44,520
You do want some pushback.
I need it from Megan.

1222
01:15:44,600 --> 01:15:49,360
I try to give it to her too.
I think the, the standard thing

1223
01:15:49,360 --> 01:15:52,000
you'll probably hear scientists
say about philosophers is

1224
01:15:52,000 --> 01:15:55,000
they're sort of the one asking
that question of, well, what do

1225
01:15:55,000 --> 01:15:59,360
you mean by mechanism?
You know, And then you give an

1226
01:15:59,360 --> 01:16:01,800
answer and then we think of
counter examples and it's like,

1227
01:16:01,800 --> 01:16:04,920
well, if that's what you mean,
then there's a problem that

1228
01:16:04,920 --> 01:16:06,680
shows up.
Or if that's what you mean by

1229
01:16:06,680 --> 01:16:09,600
explanation, you're including
all these cases that you don't

1230
01:16:09,600 --> 01:16:12,960
want to include.
So we are trained to think

1231
01:16:13,640 --> 01:16:18,400
abstractly and we are trained to
kind of want that precision.

1232
01:16:18,400 --> 01:16:21,560
And so that is something that we
can attribute.

1233
01:16:21,720 --> 01:16:28,680
And there are scientists who
lean into this interdisciplinary

1234
01:16:28,680 --> 01:16:30,840
approach by bringing
philosophers on board, but of

1235
01:16:30,840 --> 01:16:33,480
course scientists from all sorts
of other domains.

1236
01:16:34,200 --> 01:16:38,320
There's interesting examples
where philosophy can suggest

1237
01:16:38,320 --> 01:16:41,720
ideas that scientists go on to
study in their empirical work

1238
01:16:42,280 --> 01:16:46,720
that they might not have thought
of originally or as quickly,

1239
01:16:46,720 --> 01:16:49,920
because it's a little easier to
see them in some frameworks.

1240
01:16:49,920 --> 01:16:53,200
We see this in Cogsai with
studies of different types of

1241
01:16:53,280 --> 01:16:58,920
causal relationships, things
like stability and strength, for

1242
01:16:58,920 --> 01:17:03,240
example.
But yeah, I think part of what

1243
01:17:03,240 --> 01:17:09,840
we, part of what I envision for
a kind of future here, and the

1244
01:17:09,840 --> 01:17:14,320
advantages come from this
interdisciplinary work.

1245
01:17:15,760 --> 01:17:19,480
I also think part of what would
be helpful is for scientists to

1246
01:17:19,480 --> 01:17:26,320
have a little bit more time and
space to to do theorizing right.

1247
01:17:26,560 --> 01:17:33,080
So, yeah, so they're the, you
really start to appreciate the

1248
01:17:33,080 --> 01:17:38,200
challenges of the scientific
work when you look at the sense

1249
01:17:38,200 --> 01:17:41,840
in which they're trying to
tackle new problem spaces.

1250
01:17:43,160 --> 01:17:46,840
You, you know, often the
funding, the funding incentives

1251
01:17:46,840 --> 01:17:49,200
are for this tried and true
method.

1252
01:17:49,200 --> 01:17:51,560
And if you kind of already know
it works, you can do a lot of

1253
01:17:51,560 --> 01:17:53,560
that.
If you're expected to publish a

1254
01:17:53,560 --> 01:17:57,080
lot, that doesn't always
incentivize taking the time to

1255
01:17:57,080 --> 01:18:02,600
think about all these different
routes you could take and being

1256
01:18:02,600 --> 01:18:06,680
able to discuss which one, which
ones you should follow.

1257
01:18:06,680 --> 01:18:10,560
So I think having a little bit
more space for scientists to

1258
01:18:10,560 --> 01:18:14,560
have the time, like Megan
mentioned in philosophy, we have

1259
01:18:14,680 --> 01:18:17,680
a little less of the pressures
that they have.

1260
01:18:19,720 --> 01:18:26,640
But part of it is in having the
kind of time and and incentives

1261
01:18:26,720 --> 01:18:32,000
to take advantage of
interdisciplinary connections in

1262
01:18:32,000 --> 01:18:33,880
work.
And that's not always easy for

1263
01:18:33,880 --> 01:18:37,160
scientists to do, given the
constraints that they have.

1264
01:18:38,760 --> 01:18:41,480
You know, this, this question of
time and, and you know,

1265
01:18:41,480 --> 01:18:45,000
publisher perish mentality,
there's a a lot of people who

1266
01:18:45,000 --> 01:18:46,840
are probably out there listening
right now.

1267
01:18:46,840 --> 01:18:49,120
We say like, why do we even care
that you're publishing papers?

1268
01:18:49,120 --> 01:18:53,880
Who, who reads those papers?
And to a certain extent, you're

1269
01:18:53,880 --> 01:18:56,640
absolutely right.
Like we, you know, the metric of

1270
01:18:56,640 --> 01:19:00,120
our success and the thing that
allows us as academics to

1271
01:19:00,120 --> 01:19:04,160
proceed through the ranks and
get promoted and, you know, do

1272
01:19:04,160 --> 01:19:08,240
our jobs well and so on is to
get grants and to publish

1273
01:19:08,240 --> 01:19:11,120
papers.
And it feels very insular.

1274
01:19:11,120 --> 01:19:14,240
It feels very much like you're
kind of in a little echo

1275
01:19:14,240 --> 01:19:19,040
chamber.
And I think that that's that's a

1276
01:19:19,160 --> 01:19:22,200
correct way of looking at this,
that this is an old school way

1277
01:19:22,200 --> 01:19:28,560
of thinking about how we should
go about the enterprise of doing

1278
01:19:28,560 --> 01:19:31,920
science.
And it shouldn't be contrasted

1279
01:19:31,920 --> 01:19:35,320
with the way that industry
professionals are doing science,

1280
01:19:35,320 --> 01:19:40,160
which is to produce products and
to do to engage in activities

1281
01:19:40,160 --> 01:19:43,480
that have the potential for
clinical or societal benefit,

1282
01:19:44,360 --> 01:19:46,440
basic science and foundational
science.

1283
01:19:46,440 --> 01:19:49,240
And it has to be there in order
for those those kind of more

1284
01:19:49,240 --> 01:19:52,640
applied approaches to have legs
to have a foundation to stand

1285
01:19:52,640 --> 01:19:55,000
on.
But I do think that the model of

1286
01:19:55,720 --> 01:19:58,000
do a thing and then write a
paper and then get a grant to

1287
01:19:58,000 --> 01:20:01,360
continue doing the thing and
then writing another paper is,

1288
01:20:01,760 --> 01:20:05,760
is doomed.
Ultimately, to put it bluntly,

1289
01:20:06,200 --> 01:20:10,920
that it is striking to me that
in 2025 we are still doing

1290
01:20:10,920 --> 01:20:15,680
science the way we did in the
1800s, that we've got scientists

1291
01:20:15,680 --> 01:20:19,280
who are doing.
Science and then writing a

1292
01:20:19,280 --> 01:20:21,760
little paper that other
scientists will read and that

1293
01:20:21,760 --> 01:20:25,560
maybe makes a big splash and has
some sort of impact on some, you

1294
01:20:25,560 --> 01:20:29,800
know, applied science later.
The basic science has to be done

1295
01:20:29,880 --> 01:20:31,240
right.
The reason that we have

1296
01:20:31,240 --> 01:20:34,840
technologies like GPS, for
example, is because someone at

1297
01:20:34,840 --> 01:20:37,280
some point was like, huh, I
wonder if we can do that.

1298
01:20:37,680 --> 01:20:41,160
And so they figured out how to
do the technological basis, the

1299
01:20:41,160 --> 01:20:45,640
foundation that became GPS.
And it wasn't because they went

1300
01:20:45,640 --> 01:20:49,240
about trying to invent GPS from
the beginning and an applied

1301
01:20:49,320 --> 01:20:51,480
technology.
It's because they did the basic

1302
01:20:51,480 --> 01:20:55,240
science work first.
But this practice of just

1303
01:20:55,560 --> 01:20:58,360
writing a little paper and then
like, you know, packaging it and

1304
01:20:58,360 --> 01:21:00,520
tying it up with a nice little
bow and sending it to a journal

1305
01:21:00,520 --> 01:21:03,480
and paying thousands of dollars
to publish it and then having it

1306
01:21:03,480 --> 01:21:07,400
be locked behind a paintball.
This is a rant, but it's also, I

1307
01:21:07,400 --> 01:21:12,760
think, a recognition that in
order to realize the future that

1308
01:21:12,760 --> 01:21:16,560
Lauren and I have been really
talking about, we need to change

1309
01:21:16,560 --> 01:21:20,480
this.
Because it's not just a time

1310
01:21:20,480 --> 01:21:25,160
constraint, it's a societal and
like expectation constraint on

1311
01:21:25,160 --> 01:21:29,480
the way that we as basic
scientists and academics are

1312
01:21:29,480 --> 01:21:33,240
engaging this enterprise.
It's hamstringing us.

1313
01:21:33,720 --> 01:21:36,840
It's preventing us from engaging
in this future that Lauren and

1314
01:21:36,840 --> 01:21:40,960
I, I think have laid out and
that we're both very excited

1315
01:21:40,960 --> 01:21:43,080
about and I think that others
are excited about too.

1316
01:21:43,800 --> 01:21:46,840
That we need to find a way to be
more interconnected, to

1317
01:21:46,840 --> 01:21:52,480
capitalize on the fact that we
do have a global scientific

1318
01:21:52,480 --> 01:21:57,200
community that doesn't need to
wait for a paper to get

1319
01:21:57,200 --> 01:21:59,680
published in order to learn
about some new scientific

1320
01:21:59,680 --> 01:22:01,160
finding.
There's got to be a better way.

1321
01:22:01,160 --> 01:22:06,240
And it isn't social media.
We need something in between and

1322
01:22:06,680 --> 01:22:10,160
so, and it's not, you know,
conferences only.

1323
01:22:10,160 --> 01:22:12,480
I think that there's got to be a
better way to do this.

1324
01:22:13,000 --> 01:22:17,160
And I don't know exactly what it
looks like, but there's a call

1325
01:22:17,160 --> 01:22:21,120
to action for the folks
listening in here that if you

1326
01:22:21,120 --> 01:22:24,520
think that this future sounds
cool and exciting and powerful,

1327
01:22:25,080 --> 01:22:27,000
think about how to make it a
reality.

1328
01:22:27,000 --> 01:22:28,680
And this is something that I
think about a lot.

1329
01:22:29,280 --> 01:22:32,120
And then some of the activities
I'm engaged in are trying to do,

1330
01:22:32,120 --> 01:22:34,720
but, but I think we need more
people.

1331
01:22:34,840 --> 01:22:38,520
So there, that's my my plea to
get involved in making this

1332
01:22:38,520 --> 01:22:42,600
future a reality.
Let's get back to the this idea

1333
01:22:42,600 --> 01:22:44,480
of consciousness, computation,
and causation.

1334
01:22:46,240 --> 01:22:49,000
Megan, you've described the
brain as a probabilistic machine

1335
01:22:49,000 --> 01:22:52,960
navigating uncertainty.
Would you describe consciousness

1336
01:22:52,960 --> 01:22:56,720
as a byproduct of computation or
an adaptive feature of it?

1337
01:22:58,800 --> 01:23:01,920
Yeah, I, I don't know if I want
to weigh in on that and, and

1338
01:23:01,920 --> 01:23:04,800
pick a hill to die on.
This is a big question.

1339
01:23:04,800 --> 01:23:07,720
Is consciousness in every
phenomenon, is it just kind of

1340
01:23:07,720 --> 01:23:13,040
there as a by product or does it
serve some kind of meaningful

1341
01:23:13,040 --> 01:23:17,880
function in our ability to, you
know, from an evolutionarily

1342
01:23:18,160 --> 01:23:21,880
evolutionary perspective, stay,
stay alive, engage, procreate,

1343
01:23:22,200 --> 01:23:24,840
that kind of thing.
So I think an important

1344
01:23:25,200 --> 01:23:30,200
component of this question is to
differentiate among a, a

1345
01:23:30,200 --> 01:23:34,160
potential function of
consciousness versus a potential

1346
01:23:34,160 --> 01:23:37,680
function for consciousness
versus functions associated with

1347
01:23:37,680 --> 01:23:41,360
consciousness.
So there's you're asking, is

1348
01:23:41,360 --> 01:23:43,560
consciousness an epiphenomenon?
That would be there is no

1349
01:23:43,560 --> 01:23:46,040
function at all.
It's just kind of it happens

1350
01:23:46,040 --> 01:23:49,880
because you know, that just is
with the way the universe is set

1351
01:23:49,880 --> 01:23:52,320
up.
I, I personally think that it's

1352
01:23:52,560 --> 01:23:55,840
probably the case that it's not
totally an epiphenomenon that it

1353
01:23:55,880 --> 01:24:00,120
is emerges as a component in a
giant functional system that

1354
01:24:00,120 --> 01:24:02,880
probably was evolutionarily
optimized in some way.

1355
01:24:03,400 --> 01:24:06,480
So I think that there is a
function of consciousness it, it

1356
01:24:06,480 --> 01:24:11,160
has a purpose, there is
something that it does that is

1357
01:24:11,360 --> 01:24:15,560
adaptive and facilitatory for
the Organism that possesses it.

1358
01:24:16,320 --> 01:24:20,520
It allows you to bring
information into a global

1359
01:24:20,520 --> 01:24:23,040
workspace so that you can
manipulate it in a kind of a

1360
01:24:23,040 --> 01:24:28,240
domain general way, or it allows
you to differentiate between

1361
01:24:28,400 --> 01:24:31,280
something that is real out there
in the world and something that

1362
01:24:31,280 --> 01:24:33,840
you just kind of hallucinated or
made-up in your head or just

1363
01:24:33,840 --> 01:24:35,320
noise.
So this is sometimes called

1364
01:24:35,320 --> 01:24:38,960
reality monitoring.
And so the, the presence of

1365
01:24:38,960 --> 01:24:42,840
phenomenal experience is the
result of some reality

1366
01:24:42,840 --> 01:24:46,200
monitoring tagging system that
says these are the components of

1367
01:24:46,200 --> 01:24:47,800
the world that are probably
real.

1368
01:24:47,800 --> 01:24:50,240
And these are the components of
your internal representation

1369
01:24:50,240 --> 01:24:52,960
that are probably just noise or
you just made it up.

1370
01:24:55,040 --> 01:24:57,440
And then then there's a
function, you know, for

1371
01:24:57,440 --> 01:25:02,360
consciousness that is the
internal machinations that gave

1372
01:25:02,360 --> 01:25:05,640
rise to the the conscious
experience that's very different

1373
01:25:05,640 --> 01:25:09,040
than the reason that we have it.
And then there would be all the

1374
01:25:09,040 --> 01:25:13,240
other things that go along with
consciousness in us anyway, like

1375
01:25:13,240 --> 01:25:15,720
language and executive
functioning and reasoning and

1376
01:25:15,720 --> 01:25:18,800
problem solving and, you know,
stuff like that, that seem to be

1377
01:25:18,800 --> 01:25:21,440
present when you are conscious
and seem to be absent when

1378
01:25:21,440 --> 01:25:26,280
you're not, or seem to be
present when you are conscious

1379
01:25:26,280 --> 01:25:28,760
of a particular piece of
information and absent when

1380
01:25:28,760 --> 01:25:30,560
you're not.
So there was a big debate for a

1381
01:25:30,560 --> 01:25:32,920
while about can you do math
unconsciously?

1382
01:25:32,920 --> 01:25:35,520
Can you do arithmetic or
addition unconsciously, that

1383
01:25:35,520 --> 01:25:38,880
kind of thing.
So the truth is we don't know if

1384
01:25:38,880 --> 01:25:43,040
consciousness has a function.
I think that something like the

1385
01:25:43,040 --> 01:25:47,920
ability to decide when to update
your model that you've built of

1386
01:25:47,920 --> 01:25:52,400
the world based on new incoming
information, that seems like a

1387
01:25:52,400 --> 01:25:56,320
useful thing for a reality
monitoring or similar mechanism

1388
01:25:56,320 --> 01:25:58,800
to do.
I don't know that phenomenal

1389
01:25:58,800 --> 01:26:03,040
experience per SE is the
component that has the

1390
01:26:03,040 --> 01:26:07,440
functional, that is the
functional or like kind of

1391
01:26:07,440 --> 01:26:10,360
causally efficacious knob in the
system.

1392
01:26:11,240 --> 01:26:18,280
But all indications seem to
point to in in my mind that

1393
01:26:18,720 --> 01:26:24,680
without phenomenal consciousness
you cannot do some things that

1394
01:26:24,680 --> 01:26:29,080
it does have some sort of
facilitatory function for us.

1395
01:26:29,080 --> 01:26:30,640
So I think that there is a
function.

1396
01:26:31,200 --> 01:26:34,440
It probably has to do with
learning adaptive behavior,

1397
01:26:34,440 --> 01:26:39,560
updating of world models.
Pretty hand WAVY answer, but I

1398
01:26:39,560 --> 01:26:40,880
don't think it's an EPI
phenomenon.

1399
01:26:40,880 --> 01:26:42,920
I think that there's probably a
reason that it's there.

1400
01:26:44,000 --> 01:26:47,360
Lauren, when it comes to the
philosophy side of this and the

1401
01:26:47,360 --> 01:26:50,080
question of what is
consciousness, are we even

1402
01:26:50,080 --> 01:26:58,520
asking the right question?
I think that there are many

1403
01:26:58,520 --> 01:27:01,720
questions that are being asked
right now in this space.

1404
01:27:02,080 --> 01:27:06,000
It's, it's a mistake, I would
say, to think that there is one

1405
01:27:06,400 --> 01:27:12,200
question.
And it's helpful to consider the

1406
01:27:12,200 --> 01:27:16,080
sense in which we're trying to
figure out, even if there are

1407
01:27:16,080 --> 01:27:20,520
many questions that we're
asking, that any given question

1408
01:27:20,800 --> 01:27:24,640
involves, there's a lot of boxes
that need to be checked to make

1409
01:27:24,640 --> 01:27:31,520
sure that it's well defined.
And so there are as, as Megan

1410
01:27:31,520 --> 01:27:36,600
has suggested and as we see from
a cursory understanding of

1411
01:27:36,600 --> 01:27:39,880
research in this space, there
are really different types of

1412
01:27:40,160 --> 01:27:43,480
topics of interest that
consciousness researchers are

1413
01:27:43,600 --> 01:27:47,480
focused on.
One helpful thing we can do is

1414
01:27:47,480 --> 01:27:53,000
to separate out those questions.
It would be unhelpful to think

1415
01:27:53,000 --> 01:27:57,320
that there's one.
I'm also skeptical about the

1416
01:27:57,320 --> 01:28:04,280
need for some unifying theory
that they all need to strictly

1417
01:28:04,320 --> 01:28:11,480
fall under, although that might
take and require a longer set of

1418
01:28:11,480 --> 01:28:13,800
discussions.
I think there is some kind of

1419
01:28:13,800 --> 01:28:17,400
unification that's helpful, but
it's somewhat loose.

1420
01:28:18,240 --> 01:28:23,200
What we do want are very
principled, clear questions.

1421
01:28:23,200 --> 01:28:26,840
And so we don't have this
anything goes, you know, ask

1422
01:28:27,280 --> 01:28:29,560
whatever question you want.
There's all these different

1423
01:28:29,560 --> 01:28:32,040
facets.
No, the questions that we ask in

1424
01:28:32,040 --> 01:28:38,160
this space need to be so precise
that one of the main challenges

1425
01:28:38,160 --> 01:28:39,840
is asking the right question,
right?

1426
01:28:39,840 --> 01:28:43,160
That's something that's been
showing up repeatedly in this

1427
01:28:43,160 --> 01:28:46,920
discussion.
It reminds me of, there's this

1428
01:28:46,920 --> 01:28:52,440
great quote, I think it's from
the band U2, which is we thought

1429
01:28:52,440 --> 01:28:55,560
we knew the answers, it was the
questions we had wrong.

1430
01:28:56,520 --> 01:29:02,080
And so a big challenge in
scientific space is asking the

1431
01:29:02,080 --> 01:29:05,760
right questions.
And we often think of that as

1432
01:29:05,760 --> 01:29:08,280
the starting point for giving an
explanation.

1433
01:29:08,920 --> 01:29:11,480
I can't give you an explanation
for something until you first

1434
01:29:11,480 --> 01:29:13,840
tell me exactly what it is you
want explained.

1435
01:29:14,320 --> 01:29:17,120
And we sometimes start on that
path and we get stuck at the

1436
01:29:17,120 --> 01:29:20,600
1st, that first step, specifying
the target.

1437
01:29:21,000 --> 01:29:24,920
And that's where a lot of
discussion is in this space.

1438
01:29:25,360 --> 01:29:29,320
It would be silly to think you
could give the explanation if

1439
01:29:29,320 --> 01:29:33,160
the target isn't sufficiently
precise yet.

1440
01:29:33,240 --> 01:29:37,520
There are different targets of
interest, that's just fine.

1441
01:29:38,080 --> 01:29:42,280
I can't think of many scientific
spaces where that's not the

1442
01:29:42,280 --> 01:29:45,040
standard for any kind of system.
There's so many different

1443
01:29:45,040 --> 01:29:47,680
questions you could ask.
There's some that we might want

1444
01:29:47,680 --> 01:29:50,640
to put outside the space of an
interest of a consciousness

1445
01:29:50,640 --> 01:29:53,960
researcher.
So that's up for debate too.

1446
01:29:53,960 --> 01:29:57,360
What's the, what are the bounds
on the space of explanatory why

1447
01:29:57,360 --> 01:30:00,360
questions here for consciousness
research?

1448
01:30:00,360 --> 01:30:01,840
We're interested in
consciousness.

1449
01:30:01,840 --> 01:30:06,040
What are we, what are we
interested in explaining?

1450
01:30:06,600 --> 01:30:15,120
So I think it's helpful to think
that an important part of

1451
01:30:15,120 --> 01:30:18,720
scientific work is asking the
right questions.

1452
01:30:19,160 --> 01:30:27,240
And I don't think that in this
space there's a lot of fixed

1453
01:30:28,960 --> 01:30:31,840
consensus on exactly what those
are.

1454
01:30:32,320 --> 01:30:34,200
But that's the way science
works.

1455
01:30:34,240 --> 01:30:38,680
And it's helpful to think that
that's the first step that you

1456
01:30:38,680 --> 01:30:42,920
need to accomplish before you
can get the proper answer.

1457
01:30:43,120 --> 01:30:45,880
So if you want to skip that step
and start looking for the

1458
01:30:45,880 --> 01:30:51,160
answer, you're going to be
wading through a mess of stuff

1459
01:30:51,200 --> 01:30:53,120
and you just won't have the
right guidelines because you

1460
01:30:53,120 --> 01:30:54,920
don't yet know what you're
looking for.

1461
01:30:54,920 --> 01:30:58,320
And sometimes in science, we
start with a rough question and

1462
01:30:58,320 --> 01:31:01,480
we go and we look for the causes
and based on what we find, we go

1463
01:31:01,480 --> 01:31:05,400
back and we refine the question.
You see this happen in medicine,

1464
01:31:05,400 --> 01:31:07,440
psychiatric medicine, right?
We start with the disease

1465
01:31:07,440 --> 01:31:10,040
category.
We think we've got the right and

1466
01:31:10,040 --> 01:31:12,760
then we go and we look for what
the causes are.

1467
01:31:13,200 --> 01:31:16,600
We might re describe the target
on the basis of what we find.

1468
01:31:16,880 --> 01:31:20,080
That's a kind of brick.
It's a very smart strategy that

1469
01:31:20,080 --> 01:31:22,280
scientists use to get order in
the world.

1470
01:31:22,280 --> 01:31:29,200
So I don't think we're there
yet, but it's and I don't think

1471
01:31:29,200 --> 01:31:32,520
there's one question in that
space, but a lot of the research

1472
01:31:32,520 --> 01:31:35,120
is focused there as I think it
should be.

1473
01:31:36,800 --> 01:31:38,920
Megan, when it comes to
consciousness, it's almost

1474
01:31:38,920 --> 01:31:41,560
impossible to nowadays have a
conversation about it without

1475
01:31:41,560 --> 01:31:45,680
mentioning AI.
So I feel like we have to touch

1476
01:31:45,680 --> 01:31:48,640
on this.
So can AI systems or large

1477
01:31:48,640 --> 01:31:52,280
language models ever genuinely
experience uncertainty, or will

1478
01:31:52,280 --> 01:31:55,640
there always be simulations
without subjectivity?

1479
01:31:57,480 --> 01:31:59,800
You really want a definitive
answer to this, don't you?

1480
01:32:02,520 --> 01:32:06,800
I so I there's two big, there's
two big camps in the

1481
01:32:06,800 --> 01:32:08,640
consciousness science field
about this and you've

1482
01:32:08,800 --> 01:32:13,640
articulated them very nicely. 1
is that artificial systems have

1483
01:32:13,640 --> 01:32:16,520
the potential.
I think most people would agree

1484
01:32:16,520 --> 01:32:19,040
that they don't now have some
sort of consciousness, but that

1485
01:32:19,040 --> 01:32:23,640
in the future they have the
potential to manifest subjective

1486
01:32:23,640 --> 01:32:27,280
experience or phenomenal
consciousness or whatever

1487
01:32:27,520 --> 01:32:30,240
terminology you want to use for
someone being in there, the

1488
01:32:30,240 --> 01:32:33,480
lights being on, etcetera.
And then there's the other camp,

1489
01:32:33,480 --> 01:32:35,880
which is kind of the more
biological naturalism camp,

1490
01:32:35,880 --> 01:32:38,280
which says like, no, there's
really something very special

1491
01:32:38,280 --> 01:32:43,200
about biology and silicon based
systems or something.

1492
01:32:43,240 --> 01:32:46,320
Something that is not biological
is never going to be able to

1493
01:32:46,320 --> 01:32:49,320
instantiate this type of this
type of thing.

1494
01:32:49,320 --> 01:32:53,120
And you have really smart people
on both sides arguing both

1495
01:32:53,120 --> 01:32:55,480
camps.
So, you know, Anil Seth has just

1496
01:32:55,480 --> 01:33:00,160
written a piece in Behavioral
Brain Sciences that's one of

1497
01:33:00,160 --> 01:33:02,520
those kind of target article.
And then there's a bunch of

1498
01:33:02,520 --> 01:33:06,400
commentaries that come out
associated with it that will say

1499
01:33:06,400 --> 01:33:12,240
things like, so Anil's piece
says it argues for the point

1500
01:33:12,240 --> 01:33:14,880
that, you know, there is
something special about, as he

1501
01:33:14,880 --> 01:33:18,120
puts it, being a beast machine,
that biology does have

1502
01:33:18,440 --> 01:33:21,760
components that allow it to
maybe manifest the types of

1503
01:33:21,760 --> 01:33:24,960
computations that are necessary
in order to instantiate

1504
01:33:24,960 --> 01:33:27,080
consciousness.
But he actually issues the idea

1505
01:33:27,080 --> 01:33:30,520
of computational functionalism
in general and says it's not a

1506
01:33:30,520 --> 01:33:33,720
function that there really is
something special about, you

1507
01:33:33,720 --> 01:33:36,560
know, synapses and biology and
the squishy piece of wetware.

1508
01:33:37,640 --> 01:33:40,640
And the philosopher Ned Block
has, you know, written a

1509
01:33:40,640 --> 01:33:42,720
commentary that kind of agrees
with him that says there's

1510
01:33:42,720 --> 01:33:45,120
something that, you know, might
be, although I don't want to

1511
01:33:45,120 --> 01:33:47,720
mischaracterize Ned.
But then there's other

1512
01:33:47,720 --> 01:33:50,440
philosophers who and scientists
who have argued against this.

1513
01:33:50,440 --> 01:33:53,400
And I tend to be more in the
more functionalism camp.

1514
01:33:53,800 --> 01:33:57,960
So Matthias, Michelle also
argues that, yeah, we can say

1515
01:33:57,960 --> 01:34:02,000
that there is something special
about biology, but the special

1516
01:34:02,000 --> 01:34:05,120
thing about biology might be
that it has the particular, it's

1517
01:34:05,160 --> 01:34:07,640
the, it's the only kind of
substrate that can instantiate

1518
01:34:07,640 --> 01:34:09,640
that function.
But the function is the key

1519
01:34:09,640 --> 01:34:12,920
component.
The function or the computation

1520
01:34:12,920 --> 01:34:15,840
is the key component that gives
rise to consciousness.

1521
01:34:15,840 --> 01:34:21,920
And so in the future, it is
possible that maybe we figure

1522
01:34:21,920 --> 01:34:24,960
out what it is that might have
been special about biology and

1523
01:34:24,960 --> 01:34:27,360
we actually build an artificial
system that has all those

1524
01:34:27,360 --> 01:34:30,840
special components and now it
can instantiate consciousness as

1525
01:34:30,840 --> 01:34:33,840
well.
So that's a very tight view.

1526
01:34:34,080 --> 01:34:36,800
There's also a more general view
that says, oh, well, maybe

1527
01:34:37,880 --> 01:34:41,720
neuromorphic systems might be
able to instantiate

1528
01:34:41,720 --> 01:34:44,480
consciousness.
Neuromorphic really just is a

1529
01:34:44,480 --> 01:34:48,920
fancy word for brain inspired
and it can mean it either

1530
01:34:48,920 --> 01:34:54,040
instantiates the algorithms that
we are discovering in the brain

1531
01:34:54,920 --> 01:34:58,440
or more likely neuromorphic
refers to something hardware

1532
01:34:58,440 --> 01:35:01,240
based that there's this
particular kind of spiking

1533
01:35:01,240 --> 01:35:05,440
neural network that is in that
is manifested or instantiated on

1534
01:35:05,440 --> 01:35:08,200
a particular kind of hardware.
Where we did some material

1535
01:35:08,200 --> 01:35:11,080
science to come up with the
resistors and stuff that would

1536
01:35:11,080 --> 01:35:15,720
actually like look a little bit
more like brain as opposed to

1537
01:35:16,200 --> 01:35:19,120
traditional.
You know, when you think vacuum

1538
01:35:19,120 --> 01:35:24,240
tubes style 1960s computers,
memory is over here and

1539
01:35:24,240 --> 01:35:27,760
computation is over here.
And so then you move information

1540
01:35:27,760 --> 01:35:30,280
between memory and computation
and then you put it back in

1541
01:35:30,280 --> 01:35:33,360
memory.
And so there's, when we talk

1542
01:35:33,360 --> 01:35:37,720
about artificial intelligence,
anything that is not biology is

1543
01:35:37,720 --> 01:35:41,800
in this big pile, but we have to
think about differentiating it a

1544
01:35:41,800 --> 01:35:45,320
little bit more.
And then the very abstract

1545
01:35:45,320 --> 01:35:48,320
version of this is it doesn't
matter what the substrate is.

1546
01:35:48,320 --> 01:35:52,800
It could be a traditional, it
could be a neuromorphic system.

1547
01:35:52,800 --> 01:35:55,000
It could be a von Neumann
architecture, which is like

1548
01:35:55,000 --> 01:35:56,400
this.
You know, memory is over here

1549
01:35:56,400 --> 01:35:59,280
and compute is over here.
It could be your laptop.

1550
01:35:59,520 --> 01:36:03,640
It could be some technology that
we haven't come up with yet, all

1551
01:36:03,640 --> 01:36:05,280
of those.
It could be a large language

1552
01:36:05,280 --> 01:36:07,000
model that runs on a server
farm.

1553
01:36:07,000 --> 01:36:10,440
It could be kind of anything.
And it's the computations that

1554
01:36:10,440 --> 01:36:12,440
matter.
It it doesn't matter what the

1555
01:36:12,440 --> 01:36:15,360
hardware is at all.
It's just the computations and

1556
01:36:15,360 --> 01:36:18,400
the type of like representations
that the system can have.

1557
01:36:19,400 --> 01:36:22,840
And so from that perspective,
maybe large language models are

1558
01:36:22,840 --> 01:36:27,160
like this close to waking up.
I tend to be more on the

1559
01:36:27,160 --> 01:36:28,880
computational functionalist
side.

1560
01:36:29,040 --> 01:36:31,280
So that was a long winded way of
saying I think it's the

1561
01:36:31,280 --> 01:36:33,560
computations that matter.
I don't think that there is

1562
01:36:33,560 --> 01:36:39,920
anything particularly magical or
special about biology, except

1563
01:36:39,920 --> 01:36:44,000
perhaps that it can instantiate
certain kinds of computations

1564
01:36:44,000 --> 01:36:47,160
that we don't yet know how to do
or that might end up being

1565
01:36:47,160 --> 01:36:51,720
impossible to do in certain
kinds of non biological systems.

1566
01:36:53,520 --> 01:36:58,280
So from that perspective, I
would say yeah, probably in the

1567
01:36:58,280 --> 01:37:01,240
future artificial systems could
wake up.

1568
01:37:02,040 --> 01:37:04,480
Is it around the corner?
Probably not.

1569
01:37:05,520 --> 01:37:12,000
Don't think that GPT 5 is on the
cusp of having subjective

1570
01:37:12,000 --> 01:37:18,480
experiences and maybe this is
not the place to go into this

1571
01:37:18,480 --> 01:37:21,560
necessarily.
But let's say that you disagree

1572
01:37:21,560 --> 01:37:26,080
with me and you say no, it does.
How would you test for that?

1573
01:37:26,680 --> 01:37:31,440
How would you know?
That's like a whole other whole

1574
01:37:31,440 --> 01:37:35,560
other conversation that maybe we
can get into it at another time.

1575
01:37:35,560 --> 01:37:41,720
But this idea that we have ways
of evaluating whether someone is

1576
01:37:41,720 --> 01:37:48,960
in there or not for us, for, you
know, neurotypical awake

1577
01:37:48,960 --> 01:37:51,960
behaving human versus a
neurotypical asleep human who is

1578
01:37:51,960 --> 01:37:57,520
not behaving or a human who is
in a coma or that kind of thing.

1579
01:37:57,520 --> 01:38:00,880
Like maybe those tests work
pretty well for a clinical and

1580
01:38:00,880 --> 01:38:02,960
bedside.
But as soon as you get outside

1581
01:38:02,960 --> 01:38:07,600
of the population on which
they've been validated, like

1582
01:38:07,600 --> 01:38:09,720
what do you do?
You can't apply them to the

1583
01:38:09,720 --> 01:38:12,280
artificial systems.
You fall back on tests of

1584
01:38:12,280 --> 01:38:15,200
intelligence, which is, as we've
discussed, not the same thing.

1585
01:38:15,960 --> 01:38:20,760
So I think it's very possible
that artificial systems will be

1586
01:38:20,760 --> 01:38:23,240
able to have subjective
experiences in the future.

1587
01:38:23,680 --> 01:38:25,400
It is not a hill that I'm going
to die on.

1588
01:38:25,880 --> 01:38:32,480
And the the way of answering.
Has that happened yet or at some

1589
01:38:32,480 --> 01:38:37,040
point in the future, When does
it happen is really, really

1590
01:38:37,040 --> 01:38:40,000
hard.
It's really hard to answer that.

1591
01:38:41,400 --> 01:38:43,080
Lauren, do you do you have
anything to add to that?

1592
01:38:44,560 --> 01:38:50,920
I do, I think part of what can
be helpful in terms of looking

1593
01:38:50,920 --> 01:38:56,680
at progress explanations and
work in this space is that this

1594
01:38:56,680 --> 01:39:01,920
is an explanatory target that is
so much different from many

1595
01:39:01,920 --> 01:39:04,800
others that we're interested in
in science.

1596
01:39:05,000 --> 01:39:06,760
And that's part of the
challenge.

1597
01:39:06,880 --> 01:39:14,400
And that can partly explain why
we we don't yet have an answer,

1598
01:39:14,400 --> 01:39:17,200
but also have specifying the
standards is difficult.

1599
01:39:17,880 --> 01:39:21,560
So this is a type of thing we
want to explain that is

1600
01:39:21,560 --> 01:39:24,640
different from other types of
things we want to explain in

1601
01:39:24,640 --> 01:39:26,080
science.
And then we have explained.

1602
01:39:26,320 --> 01:39:30,400
And so we partly need to figure
out what those differences are.

1603
01:39:30,800 --> 01:39:34,800
And then the second is this
interesting feature where for

1604
01:39:34,800 --> 01:39:38,040
the types of targets that we do
see across different life

1605
01:39:38,040 --> 01:39:40,720
sciences that we are interested
in explaining, we give

1606
01:39:40,720 --> 01:39:46,600
explanations for.
There is often a set of

1607
01:39:46,600 --> 01:39:49,640
challenges that show up with
respect to how much detail you

1608
01:39:49,640 --> 01:39:52,520
need to cite to give an
explanation.

1609
01:39:52,840 --> 01:39:55,760
And one thing I find is that
there's sometimes a kind of

1610
01:39:55,760 --> 01:40:03,160
confusion between stuff in the
system or stuff that's necessary

1611
01:40:03,440 --> 01:40:07,360
and stuff that's explanatory.
And this partly relates to

1612
01:40:07,360 --> 01:40:10,320
reduction and just figuring out
what details.

1613
01:40:10,840 --> 01:40:13,800
That a scientist needs to cite
and should cite in their

1614
01:40:13,800 --> 01:40:15,600
explanations.
And this is where we find

1615
01:40:15,600 --> 01:40:22,320
various interesting, confusing
things that show up when we're

1616
01:40:22,320 --> 01:40:23,800
interested in giving
explanation.

1617
01:40:23,800 --> 01:40:32,400
So how, how low do we need to go
in giving an explanation?

1618
01:40:32,640 --> 01:40:36,440
And how far back in the causal
history of something do we need

1619
01:40:36,440 --> 01:40:38,920
to go?
Is another question that shows

1620
01:40:38,920 --> 01:40:41,640
up.
Explanations are selective, they

1621
01:40:41,640 --> 01:40:45,320
are choosy and they pick some of
those details, not all of them.

1622
01:40:45,920 --> 01:40:50,920
One confusion, confusion that
can show up is you can admit a

1623
01:40:50,920 --> 01:40:55,640
kind of physicalist position for
a biological system, a neural

1624
01:40:55,640 --> 01:40:59,560
system, and agree that there's
physical stuff at lower scales,

1625
01:41:00,520 --> 01:41:02,240
but that doesn't mean it's
explanatory.

1626
01:41:03,240 --> 01:41:07,160
And when someone is referring to
factors at a higher scale is

1627
01:41:07,160 --> 01:41:10,800
explanatory, they're not denying
that physicalist picture.

1628
01:41:10,800 --> 01:41:12,680
And sometimes those get
confused.

1629
01:41:13,360 --> 01:41:16,880
And so we need to separate
explanatory relevance from

1630
01:41:17,440 --> 01:41:19,400
physicalism because they're very
different.

1631
01:41:19,760 --> 01:41:23,000
I mean, if we needed to cite all
of that physical stuff, we would

1632
01:41:23,000 --> 01:41:25,640
almost never be able to give an
explanation, but we also don't

1633
01:41:25,960 --> 01:41:28,640
need to.
And so the the way I think about

1634
01:41:28,640 --> 01:41:32,560
many of our causal explanations
here is that a causal

1635
01:41:32,560 --> 01:41:36,960
explanation isn't a game of how
low can you go, but a game of

1636
01:41:36,960 --> 01:41:40,120
what gives you control.
And depending on your

1637
01:41:40,120 --> 01:41:43,120
explanatory target of interest,
the factors that give you

1638
01:41:43,120 --> 01:41:44,920
control might be at a higher
scale.

1639
01:41:45,800 --> 01:41:51,040
And so this is partly where we
need to kind of make these

1640
01:41:51,120 --> 01:41:57,000
helpful distinctions to solve
these kinds of things that can

1641
01:41:57,000 --> 01:42:01,680
get tricky, where a scientist
might think that if you include

1642
01:42:01,680 --> 01:42:04,040
more and more lower level
detail, you're always giving a

1643
01:42:04,040 --> 01:42:06,840
better explanation.
Or that network neuroscientists

1644
01:42:06,840 --> 01:42:11,240
deny physicalism when that's not
what they're doing.

1645
01:42:11,240 --> 01:42:12,920
If they're making an explanatory
claim.

1646
01:42:12,920 --> 01:42:18,560
Or there's a puzzle that that
philosophers sometimes run into

1647
01:42:18,560 --> 01:42:21,960
where they think The Big Bang,
since it's in the causal history

1648
01:42:21,960 --> 01:42:26,120
of of everything, that it's
something you should cite in

1649
01:42:26,120 --> 01:42:28,880
your explanation.
So do you need to cite The Big

1650
01:42:28,880 --> 01:42:32,840
Bang in explaining why we're all
here today or why a patient has

1651
01:42:32,840 --> 01:42:34,960
a disease?
That sounds so silly to us.

1652
01:42:36,440 --> 01:42:40,120
A philosopher's job is partly to
say why that's silly and why

1653
01:42:40,120 --> 01:42:43,240
that's not explanatory.
But we get stuck on those cases.

1654
01:42:43,480 --> 01:42:47,800
So we get stuck on reductionism
and we get stuck on the entire

1655
01:42:47,800 --> 01:42:51,720
causal history and sometimes
distinctions like physicalism

1656
01:42:51,720 --> 01:42:54,960
and explanatory relevance and
necessity too.

1657
01:42:55,320 --> 01:42:58,480
Something can be necessary for
an outcome doesn't mean it

1658
01:42:58,480 --> 01:43:03,400
explains it, right?
The Big Bang is necessary for my

1659
01:43:03,400 --> 01:43:06,880
having asthma, but it doesn't
explain why I have it.

1660
01:43:06,880 --> 01:43:10,160
If I went into the position and
they started and I asked, you

1661
01:43:10,160 --> 01:43:12,960
know, why do I have asthma and
The Big Bang is that what's that

1662
01:43:12,960 --> 01:43:19,000
doesn't sound right.
So part of what we see in these

1663
01:43:19,200 --> 01:43:26,040
spaces are really important
questions about how to how

1664
01:43:26,040 --> 01:43:29,280
scientists are making are making
progress, the types of

1665
01:43:29,280 --> 01:43:32,520
explanatory targets they have
and important distinctions we

1666
01:43:32,520 --> 01:43:38,720
need to make to get over these
puzzles that that show up that

1667
01:43:38,720 --> 01:43:43,440
can kind of lead us astray and
that don't capture the rationale

1668
01:43:43,440 --> 01:43:45,640
that does underlie our
explanation.

1669
01:43:45,640 --> 01:43:47,520
I mean, you partly see it with
control, right?

1670
01:43:47,520 --> 01:43:50,720
The Big Bang isn't something, if
you were to hypothetically

1671
01:43:50,720 --> 01:43:54,520
manipulate it, it doesn't
control whether a patient has

1672
01:43:54,520 --> 01:43:57,200
measles or not.
So it doesn't explain that

1673
01:43:57,200 --> 01:43:59,120
outcome.
So, so scientists.

1674
01:44:00,200 --> 01:44:04,160
Sorry, sure.
Are you sure?

1675
01:44:04,160 --> 01:44:06,360
It doesn't explain why they have
measles?

1676
01:44:07,000 --> 01:44:09,800
I'm just being cheeky.
I mean in terms of what's

1677
01:44:09,920 --> 01:44:12,800
currently on offer in.
Fair enough.

1678
01:44:14,640 --> 01:44:18,040
But but part of what philosophy
of science, when it's at its

1679
01:44:18,040 --> 01:44:21,840
best, it can help with a bit of
this science communication

1680
01:44:21,840 --> 01:44:27,480
element, which is what is the
justification for why physicians

1681
01:44:27,480 --> 01:44:30,840
say that there's a virus that
causes measles and not

1682
01:44:30,840 --> 01:44:36,120
fundamental physics or not The
Big Bang or, Yeah, why

1683
01:44:36,120 --> 01:44:41,000
neuroscientists are working so
hard to explain something like

1684
01:44:41,480 --> 01:44:45,680
consciousness and why this is
actually more difficult than

1685
01:44:45,680 --> 01:44:49,840
explaining just any kind of
trait in biology.

1686
01:44:51,480 --> 01:44:57,880
So yeah, just a bit of a follow
up there and support of various

1687
01:44:57,880 --> 01:45:03,920
things, Megan said.
Megan, I asked Lauren about what

1688
01:45:04,080 --> 01:45:06,520
a philosophically informed
neuroscience would look like, So

1689
01:45:06,520 --> 01:45:08,160
I'm curious to know from your
side, what would a

1690
01:45:08,160 --> 01:45:12,480
neuroscientifically informed
philosophy of mind look like in

1691
01:45:12,480 --> 01:45:22,880
practice for you?
I think I will go back to

1692
01:45:23,360 --> 01:45:25,960
something that Lawrence said
actually very much at the

1693
01:45:25,960 --> 01:45:31,560
beginning, which is this
recognition of the complexity of

1694
01:45:31,560 --> 01:45:35,320
the system that we're trying to
understand, that we're trying to

1695
01:45:35,320 --> 01:45:42,280
explain that in some cases toy
examples and and simplified

1696
01:45:42,280 --> 01:45:46,760
models are really the only thing
that we have available to us.

1697
01:45:47,240 --> 01:45:51,360
And they can be very powerful.
And sometimes a really highly

1698
01:45:51,360 --> 01:45:55,240
oversimplified explanation or
model or description of what's

1699
01:45:55,240 --> 01:45:58,240
going on is surprisingly
powerful.

1700
01:45:59,200 --> 01:46:03,320
It's it's really kind of
remarkable how something as

1701
01:46:03,320 --> 01:46:07,600
simple as, well, I'll use an
example from my own field,

1702
01:46:07,720 --> 01:46:11,240
Signal detection theory can
actually do a remarkable job at

1703
01:46:11,240 --> 01:46:15,840
explaining how, or at least
describing, maybe I shouldn't

1704
01:46:15,840 --> 01:46:19,760
use the word explanation, but
describing how an observer like

1705
01:46:19,760 --> 01:46:24,280
you or me is going to deal with
noise in our environment or in

1706
01:46:24,280 --> 01:46:26,760
our own minds.
And signal detection theory, it

1707
01:46:26,760 --> 01:46:28,680
turns out, was not even
developed for psychology.

1708
01:46:28,680 --> 01:46:31,480
It was developed to understand
and characterize the noise in

1709
01:46:31,480 --> 01:46:33,880
electrical circuits in like the
1950s.

1710
01:46:34,960 --> 01:46:36,240
Yeah.
How do you find the signal in

1711
01:46:36,240 --> 01:46:37,800
the noise?
That's basically what it's

1712
01:46:37,800 --> 01:46:41,200
trying to do, really.
Almost stupidly simple

1713
01:46:41,200 --> 01:46:45,280
explanation.
Stupidly simple system does a

1714
01:46:45,280 --> 01:46:52,880
pretty good job at targeting how
and maybe why certain kinds of

1715
01:46:52,880 --> 01:46:56,880
behaviors emerge in certain
kinds of situations from, you

1716
01:46:56,880 --> 01:46:59,520
know, a human or or animal
observer model.

1717
01:47:00,000 --> 01:47:04,520
And yet ultimately the thing
that we are trying to capture to

1718
01:47:04,520 --> 01:47:10,920
explain is things that we know
exists.

1719
01:47:10,920 --> 01:47:13,440
It's one of the most complex
things on this planet.

1720
01:47:14,040 --> 01:47:17,360
Brains are really hard.
They're really highly non linear

1721
01:47:17,360 --> 01:47:19,520
dynamical systems.
There's a lot of components that

1722
01:47:19,520 --> 01:47:23,080
we have no visibility into.
There's a lot of stuff that we

1723
01:47:23,080 --> 01:47:27,240
are still kind of floundering
around in the dark to try to

1724
01:47:27,240 --> 01:47:34,280
build even just a just so post
hoc story of why the system did

1725
01:47:34,280 --> 01:47:35,560
what it did.
What are the kinds of

1726
01:47:35,560 --> 01:47:37,600
informational structures that
are present?

1727
01:47:38,200 --> 01:47:40,240
What even could the software
look like?

1728
01:47:40,240 --> 01:47:44,640
Is it software are we like, what
are we even doing here, man?

1729
01:47:45,320 --> 01:47:53,040
And so the recognition of just
the sheer mind boggling,

1730
01:47:53,160 --> 01:47:57,280
unfathomable complexity of what
it is that we're trying to

1731
01:47:57,280 --> 01:48:01,120
reverse engineer.
I think that and, and the gulf

1732
01:48:01,160 --> 01:48:05,400
between that and billiard balls
on the table, which is a causal

1733
01:48:05,400 --> 01:48:07,720
explanation of why this ball
went into the pocket or didn't

1734
01:48:07,720 --> 01:48:12,360
go into the pocket or something
that I think would be we would,

1735
01:48:12,360 --> 01:48:17,200
we would all do very well to to
recognize the size of that gulf

1736
01:48:17,600 --> 01:48:20,880
and to try to try to shrink it a
little bit.

1737
01:48:22,800 --> 01:48:25,480
So for young researchers who
feel pressure to pick a side,

1738
01:48:25,600 --> 01:48:28,440
scientist or philosopher, what
would both of you tell them

1739
01:48:28,440 --> 01:48:30,960
about integrating both parts
meaningfully?

1740
01:48:32,760 --> 01:48:37,240
Anyone can start.
Don't pick a side.

1741
01:48:37,400 --> 01:48:39,240
Look at me and Lauren.
We didn't pick a side.

1742
01:48:39,240 --> 01:48:43,760
And maybe this discussion is
also highlighted the, the

1743
01:48:43,760 --> 01:48:47,360
extraordinary value of not
picking a side of not burying

1744
01:48:47,360 --> 01:48:51,240
your nose in the sand and just
kind of doing the one thing.

1745
01:48:51,240 --> 01:48:55,120
And that, yeah, it's
uncomfortable, as Lauren said,

1746
01:48:55,120 --> 01:48:57,680
to maybe not always be the
expert in the room.

1747
01:48:58,080 --> 01:49:01,480
I'm certainly no, not the expert
in the room in a lot of ways

1748
01:49:02,080 --> 01:49:05,000
that there's a lot of things
that I, I want to have my

1749
01:49:05,000 --> 01:49:07,840
fingers in a lot of pies.
I want to understand a little

1750
01:49:07,840 --> 01:49:10,400
bit about a lot of things.
And I do have deep expertise in

1751
01:49:10,400 --> 01:49:14,000
a couple areas, but there are a
lot of spaces that I have been

1752
01:49:14,000 --> 01:49:19,560
in where the folks around me
know way more about a particular

1753
01:49:20,280 --> 01:49:24,560
than I do.
And that direction that that can

1754
01:49:24,560 --> 01:49:27,720
be the norm and that that's OK.
And that a lot of other people

1755
01:49:27,720 --> 01:49:31,640
in the room might seem like they
are topic matter experts in

1756
01:49:31,640 --> 01:49:34,800
something that you understand.
And they are, but you're also a

1757
01:49:34,800 --> 01:49:37,400
topic matter expert in something
that they're not and you see

1758
01:49:37,400 --> 01:49:39,600
things that they're not able to
see.

1759
01:49:40,200 --> 01:49:45,040
And there's a one example of
this from my own life is that,

1760
01:49:45,080 --> 01:49:47,560
you know, I sometimes go to
these, these conferences or

1761
01:49:47,560 --> 01:49:51,840
workshops that are really
focused on computational and

1762
01:49:51,840 --> 01:49:54,880
theoretical neuroscience and,
and even neurotechnology.

1763
01:49:55,040 --> 01:49:59,440
I'm not a neurotechnologist.
I know things about that, but I

1764
01:49:59,440 --> 01:50:04,120
definitely am not that person.
And there are things that I can

1765
01:50:04,120 --> 01:50:06,560
bring to the table as someone
who's a little bit more of a

1766
01:50:06,560 --> 01:50:12,440
generalist, like that's really
like, like bringing in.

1767
01:50:12,440 --> 01:50:15,120
I, I remember recently I brought
in actually some of Lauren's

1768
01:50:15,120 --> 01:50:17,080
work.
I said, what you're doing is

1769
01:50:17,080 --> 01:50:20,160
trying to build an explanation
of, you know, how the brain does

1770
01:50:20,160 --> 01:50:24,080
something in order to drive like
a neuroprosthetic, for example.

1771
01:50:25,400 --> 01:50:27,640
And it would it, you really
don't want to just drive the

1772
01:50:27,640 --> 01:50:31,880
neuroprosthetic, which we can do
already using neural recordings.

1773
01:50:32,440 --> 01:50:34,720
But in order to optimize that,
it would be really great if you

1774
01:50:34,720 --> 01:50:37,920
could understand why that kind
of model is working better than

1775
01:50:37,920 --> 01:50:42,920
this other kind of model, or why
one type of model is more or

1776
01:50:42,920 --> 01:50:44,720
less susceptible to neural
drift.

1777
01:50:44,720 --> 01:50:47,200
Like once you put the implant in
and you train the model, you

1778
01:50:47,200 --> 01:50:48,920
come back next week, it doesn't
work anymore.

1779
01:50:48,920 --> 01:50:51,480
Why?
Why did that model fail and this

1780
01:50:51,480 --> 01:50:55,640
other model might not fail?
Like those kinds of explanatory,

1781
01:50:56,080 --> 01:50:58,360
those kinds of explanations
could be really useful from a

1782
01:50:58,360 --> 01:51:00,800
practical perspective.
And a lot of the folks in

1783
01:51:00,800 --> 01:51:03,240
neurotechnology do not think
about explanation.

1784
01:51:03,760 --> 01:51:08,520
They don't prediction ability to
capture variance in a system

1785
01:51:08,920 --> 01:51:12,120
that is the target and that is
the thing that matters to them.

1786
01:51:13,080 --> 01:51:16,320
And so differentiating between
prediction and explanation and

1787
01:51:16,320 --> 01:51:20,760
differentiating between, you
know, models and targets of

1788
01:51:20,760 --> 01:51:24,080
different levels of complexity
is something that I can bring to

1789
01:51:24,080 --> 01:51:27,280
the table.
And I can't help them optimize

1790
01:51:27,320 --> 01:51:31,560
their neural implant, but they
can inform me about what they're

1791
01:51:31,560 --> 01:51:33,840
doing and I can inform them
about what what I'm doing.

1792
01:51:33,840 --> 01:51:37,760
And so I guess learning to build
calluses and tolerate that

1793
01:51:37,760 --> 01:51:40,320
uncertainty and that discomfort
of not being the expert in the

1794
01:51:40,320 --> 01:51:42,920
room.
No one is the expert in

1795
01:51:42,920 --> 01:51:45,440
everything though.
And so like to a certain extent,

1796
01:51:45,440 --> 01:51:48,720
even if you build deep expertise
in one area, you're going to

1797
01:51:48,720 --> 01:51:51,320
have to navigate spaces where
you're not the expert anyway.

1798
01:51:51,320 --> 01:51:52,600
So you might as well get used to
it now.

1799
01:51:56,840 --> 01:51:57,880
Lauren, anything you want to add
there?

1800
01:52:01,000 --> 01:52:04,040
Yeah, there's a few things I
would add.

1801
01:52:04,840 --> 01:52:13,240
I think that finding work that
you like, finding people and

1802
01:52:13,240 --> 01:52:17,280
researchers that are doing work
that you're interested in, and

1803
01:52:17,280 --> 01:52:22,720
as Megan says already may be
interested in science and

1804
01:52:22,720 --> 01:52:26,840
philosophy is helpful.
These are academic fields.

1805
01:52:26,840 --> 01:52:33,560
I mean, academia is still pretty
siloed, so I don't always get

1806
01:52:35,240 --> 01:52:40,240
easy access to scientists and
I'm not always credited for

1807
01:52:40,320 --> 01:52:45,520
working with them or taking the
time to talk to them or even

1808
01:52:45,520 --> 01:52:49,720
writing in writing publications
that get published in scientific

1809
01:52:49,720 --> 01:52:52,480
journals.
So there are interesting

1810
01:52:52,480 --> 01:52:55,160
standards of my field
philosophy, philosophy of

1811
01:52:55,160 --> 01:52:57,080
science, that are quite
different from various

1812
01:52:57,080 --> 01:53:00,200
scientific fields where, I mean,
they also might not get credit

1813
01:53:00,200 --> 01:53:02,600
for talking to a philosopher or
writing with one.

1814
01:53:03,040 --> 01:53:06,960
In really different scientific
fields value philosophy very

1815
01:53:06,960 --> 01:53:09,840
differently.
One of the advantages of talking

1816
01:53:09,840 --> 01:53:15,960
to neuroscientists is they
already value philosophy a bit

1817
01:53:15,960 --> 01:53:19,400
and they're already more aware
of it than other scientific

1818
01:53:19,400 --> 01:53:21,880
fields.
So when I talk to a biologist, I

1819
01:53:21,880 --> 01:53:25,320
might have to do a little bit
more legwork to tell them what I

1820
01:53:25,320 --> 01:53:30,320
do and to persuade them that I'm
someone useful to be in the room

1821
01:53:30,320 --> 01:53:33,680
in the first place.
That's not the case with many

1822
01:53:33,680 --> 01:53:38,040
neuroscientists, cognitive
scientists, same kind of thing.

1823
01:53:38,400 --> 01:53:40,640
You know, cogs size, a field
that views itself as

1824
01:53:40,640 --> 01:53:44,280
interdisciplinary, and one of
its areas is philosophy,

1825
01:53:44,280 --> 01:53:47,440
computer science, psychology.
So it really does depend on the

1826
01:53:47,440 --> 01:53:51,960
scientific field and that you're
interested in.

1827
01:53:52,560 --> 01:53:55,560
And it helps to talk to people
who work in that space because

1828
01:53:55,560 --> 01:53:58,840
they know a bit about the norms
in the field and the

1829
01:53:58,840 --> 01:54:02,320
expectations.
You know, Megan has different

1830
01:54:02,320 --> 01:54:06,880
expectations on her than I do in
the field of philosophy.

1831
01:54:07,640 --> 01:54:12,200
We're both probably doing more
than the standard person in the

1832
01:54:12,200 --> 01:54:15,800
sense that, you know, people
aren't expecting me to get

1833
01:54:15,800 --> 01:54:17,520
grants.
They're not expecting me to work

1834
01:54:17,520 --> 01:54:19,880
with neuroscientists.
But I care about that work, and

1835
01:54:19,880 --> 01:54:22,760
it's important.
One thing I sometimes say is

1836
01:54:22,760 --> 01:54:25,480
that being a philosopher of
science is a bit odd because you

1837
01:54:25,480 --> 01:54:28,400
sometimes feel like you're
telling scientists why

1838
01:54:28,400 --> 01:54:32,120
philosophy matters and
philosophers why science

1839
01:54:32,120 --> 01:54:35,840
matters.
And so there's also philosophers

1840
01:54:36,200 --> 01:54:42,240
who I'm talking to, and they do
not think that the way to

1841
01:54:42,240 --> 01:54:46,960
understand the fundamental
causal structure of the world is

1842
01:54:46,960 --> 01:54:49,440
to look at anything scientists
are doing.

1843
01:54:49,760 --> 01:54:52,600
Why would you do that?
Why would you?

1844
01:54:52,600 --> 01:54:59,680
So not only do I, you know, not
get credit for interdisciplinary

1845
01:54:59,680 --> 01:55:03,880
work in that sense, but they
don't see why they should care

1846
01:55:03,880 --> 01:55:09,240
about science if they're
interested in causation or

1847
01:55:09,240 --> 01:55:12,360
explanation in some cases or
understanding the world.

1848
01:55:12,600 --> 01:55:18,360
So in in all of our fields,
there are different groups of

1849
01:55:18,360 --> 01:55:21,120
people who are approaching
problems in different ways.

1850
01:55:21,120 --> 01:55:26,680
It's helpful to find the work
that speaks to you, the

1851
01:55:26,680 --> 01:55:29,440
researchers who are doing things
you're interested in.

1852
01:55:29,960 --> 01:55:32,520
Also to look more pragmatically
at.

1853
01:55:33,120 --> 01:55:36,440
I mean, it's one thing to study
philosophy and to study

1854
01:55:36,600 --> 01:55:41,720
neuroscience as more of a hobby,
but in terms of going into it as

1855
01:55:41,840 --> 01:55:46,920
a APHD student or a professor,
you know, there's certain types

1856
01:55:46,920 --> 01:55:51,400
of aspects of the, of those
cultures that it's helpful to

1857
01:55:51,400 --> 01:55:53,720
learn a bit about.
And there's also differences,

1858
01:55:53,720 --> 01:55:55,400
right, in terms of different
types of people.

1859
01:55:55,840 --> 01:55:59,720
But it is fascinating the
differences across fields.

1860
01:55:59,720 --> 01:56:03,600
But I have the advantage of, I
mean, Megan started studying

1861
01:56:03,600 --> 01:56:08,280
philosophy before I did, you
know, I started studying

1862
01:56:08,280 --> 01:56:10,640
philosophy.
I took my first class was

1863
01:56:10,640 --> 01:56:13,960
basically at the end of
undergrad, and then it shows up

1864
01:56:14,280 --> 01:56:20,280
a lot later.
So I don't have to do as much

1865
01:56:20,280 --> 01:56:22,560
legwork when I'm talking to
Megan.

1866
01:56:23,120 --> 01:56:25,720
And.
But when I am working with

1867
01:56:25,720 --> 01:56:29,720
scientists, a main goal is to
bring the philosophy that's

1868
01:56:29,720 --> 01:56:32,040
useful for what they're
interested in.

1869
01:56:32,280 --> 01:56:34,520
If they want to get pulled into
some of the philosophical

1870
01:56:34,520 --> 01:56:38,280
debates, we can do that too.
There's jargon that we're using

1871
01:56:38,280 --> 01:56:42,440
that.
Yeah, You know, I don't that I

1872
01:56:42,440 --> 01:56:46,040
don't want to kind of burden
people with, but part of these

1873
01:56:46,040 --> 01:56:48,720
interdisciplinary connections is
learning how to speak to people

1874
01:56:48,840 --> 01:56:50,800
who use very different
vocabularies.

1875
01:56:53,720 --> 01:56:56,320
When you have someone that knows
a bit of the philosophy already,

1876
01:56:56,320 --> 01:56:58,880
they already know the
vocabulary.

1877
01:56:59,120 --> 01:57:03,000
And then, you know, I've trained
in medicine, so I know a bit of

1878
01:57:03,000 --> 01:57:07,400
theirs too.
But there is still this needing

1879
01:57:07,400 --> 01:57:10,680
to be comfortable in an
uncomfortable situation where

1880
01:57:10,680 --> 01:57:17,080
you're not the main expert and
you're leaning on other people

1881
01:57:17,160 --> 01:57:21,080
and looking for their input too.
But once you start to see the

1882
01:57:21,080 --> 01:57:25,840
value of that discomfort and
that approach, and you're you're

1883
01:57:25,840 --> 01:57:30,960
among academics who have the,
the, you know, ideal disposition

1884
01:57:30,960 --> 01:57:35,440
of being open to being wrong, to
pursuing big ideas and taking

1885
01:57:35,800 --> 01:57:40,120
risks, but also reorienting the
Sky's the limit.

1886
01:57:40,200 --> 01:57:45,800
And then you do have a kind of
team in a kind of group that can

1887
01:57:45,800 --> 01:57:48,960
start to ask the right kinds of
questions so that we can

1888
01:57:49,080 --> 01:57:54,160
ultimately get helpful answers.
But you know, it's very

1889
01:57:54,160 --> 01:57:56,920
interesting to think of the
differences across fields.

1890
01:57:56,920 --> 01:58:04,240
And as a philosopher of science,
it's non trivial to convey to

1891
01:58:04,240 --> 01:58:08,160
different types of scientists
what it is that I do, how it

1892
01:58:08,160 --> 01:58:10,640
might be useful.
And the same goes for the public

1893
01:58:10,720 --> 01:58:13,520
or any kind of audience.
But part of what those

1894
01:58:13,520 --> 01:58:18,240
interdisciplinary connections
help you learn is just, is doing

1895
01:58:18,240 --> 01:58:23,680
just that, you know, speaking to
different audiences and and

1896
01:58:23,680 --> 01:58:25,880
working to do that effectively
or well.

1897
01:58:28,320 --> 01:58:32,400
I, I think you know, something
as you're talking, Lauren, I, I

1898
01:58:32,400 --> 01:58:34,960
feel like something's really
just crystallized in my mind

1899
01:58:34,960 --> 01:58:40,680
that in this type of discussion,
we really say, well, we're, you

1900
01:58:40,680 --> 01:58:42,640
know, if you're a
philosophically informed

1901
01:58:42,640 --> 01:58:46,240
scientist or vice versa, you're
the bridge between the, you

1902
01:58:46,240 --> 01:58:48,480
know, potentially domain matter
experts.

1903
01:58:49,560 --> 01:58:52,640
And so maybe you're not the
expert in the room on, you know,

1904
01:58:52,680 --> 01:58:55,880
one of whatever it is that's,
that's being spoken about, but

1905
01:58:55,880 --> 01:58:57,480
you know what?
You are the expert in the room

1906
01:58:57,480 --> 01:59:02,000
on making bridges, on finding
those connections like that is

1907
01:59:02,000 --> 01:59:05,480
your expertise.
You're not an expert in, you

1908
01:59:05,480 --> 01:59:11,600
know, the, the measles or
whatever, right, But you are an

1909
01:59:11,600 --> 01:59:14,640
expert at, at finding the shape
of the problem and, and building

1910
01:59:14,640 --> 01:59:17,880
those bridges and this science
communication, this, this

1911
01:59:17,880 --> 01:59:21,800
ability to translate between
specialized vocabularies.

1912
01:59:22,280 --> 01:59:29,920
That itself is an expertise area
and it's valuable not only in

1913
01:59:30,200 --> 01:59:34,080
academic or scientific or even
industry spaces, that kind of

1914
01:59:34,080 --> 01:59:36,680
thing.
It's also valuable in, as you

1915
01:59:36,680 --> 01:59:42,880
said, communication to a broader
audience to translating to make

1916
01:59:42,880 --> 01:59:46,160
sure that the people that you're
listening to and the people that

1917
01:59:46,160 --> 01:59:48,400
you're speaking to can actually
understand each other.

1918
01:59:48,400 --> 01:59:52,440
You're a translator, you're a, a
bridge between disciplines.

1919
01:59:52,880 --> 01:59:57,520
You're a holistic trees level or
sorry, forest level, not trees

1920
01:59:57,520 --> 02:00:01,040
level kind of perspective.
That is the domain expertise

1921
02:00:01,040 --> 02:00:03,560
that someone who wants to occupy
this space will bring.

1922
02:00:04,480 --> 02:00:10,560
And, and it brings with it the,
the requirement of developing

1923
02:00:10,560 --> 02:00:13,440
another skill too, which is not
just talking, but also

1924
02:00:13,440 --> 02:00:16,760
listening.
And I think that as a lot of

1925
02:00:16,760 --> 02:00:20,600
domain matter experts like we,
we tend to want to talk a lot.

1926
02:00:20,600 --> 02:00:25,640
We tend to want to, you know,
come up with our own description

1927
02:00:25,640 --> 02:00:28,640
or explanation for what's
happening and and push on that.

1928
02:00:29,120 --> 02:00:32,040
But it's harder to learn how to
listen, especially when you

1929
02:00:32,040 --> 02:00:35,920
don't really speak the language.
And so having essentially a

1930
02:00:35,920 --> 02:00:38,920
translator in the room is such a
valuable asset.

1931
02:00:38,920 --> 02:00:43,520
And being that expert, can be
can be the difference between a

1932
02:00:43,520 --> 02:00:46,360
breakthrough or just kind of
continuing on in parallel with

1933
02:00:46,360 --> 02:00:48,160
our blinders on and reinventing
the wheel.

1934
02:00:50,560 --> 02:00:51,680
Yeah, I think that's.
Interesting.

1935
02:00:52,280 --> 02:00:56,640
Oh, sorry.
There's something you have said

1936
02:00:56,640 --> 02:01:03,040
before to Megan about a
researcher showing as opposed to

1937
02:01:03,040 --> 02:01:05,240
just saying they're doing
something.

1938
02:01:06,320 --> 02:01:07,880
What was that?
Do you remember that expression?

1939
02:01:08,480 --> 02:01:10,560
Yeah.
Like show don't tell, you know,

1940
02:01:11,120 --> 02:01:13,680
like don't tell us that you
found the explanation for

1941
02:01:13,680 --> 02:01:16,680
something.
Show us what that explanation is

1942
02:01:16,680 --> 02:01:18,720
and how you're writing about it
and the story that you're

1943
02:01:18,720 --> 02:01:20,800
telling and the narrative that
you're constructing.

1944
02:01:21,080 --> 02:01:23,400
You know, you want to, you want
to take the listener or the

1945
02:01:23,400 --> 02:01:26,720
reader and guide them by the
hand so that they have that aha

1946
02:01:26,720 --> 02:01:30,880
moment along with you.
This is, you know, this is what

1947
02:01:30,880 --> 02:01:33,160
you want to do in storytelling
and narrative buildings, what

1948
02:01:33,160 --> 02:01:35,200
you want to do in film and
media, right?

1949
02:01:35,200 --> 02:01:37,800
You want to show the audience,
don't tell them.

1950
02:01:38,160 --> 02:01:40,960
No one wants to read a a story
about that's a list of

1951
02:01:40,960 --> 02:01:43,040
accomplishments.
They want to take the journey

1952
02:01:43,040 --> 02:01:45,360
with you.
So this is the same kind of

1953
02:01:45,360 --> 02:01:45,920
thing.
Yeah.

1954
02:01:46,760 --> 02:01:49,720
So I wonder if in terms of
talking about this

1955
02:01:49,720 --> 02:01:53,480
interdisciplinary approach and
perspective and an academic who

1956
02:01:53,480 --> 02:01:58,280
does this and does it well,
picking up on what you said, one

1957
02:01:58,280 --> 02:02:01,400
element of it is being a
listener in part.

1958
02:02:02,480 --> 02:02:06,440
And then another element of it,
I would add is this sort of,

1959
02:02:06,520 --> 02:02:08,920
you're open.
I mean, when you think

1960
02:02:08,920 --> 02:02:11,520
something's right, you really
stand by it, but you're also

1961
02:02:11,520 --> 02:02:14,360
open to being wrong.
And one of the challenges of

1962
02:02:14,680 --> 02:02:17,800
some work and philosophy is
someone becomes known for a view

1963
02:02:18,360 --> 02:02:21,400
and then they don't want to
change it because they're sort

1964
02:02:21,400 --> 02:02:23,800
of known for it.
So they're not really open to

1965
02:02:23,800 --> 02:02:28,160
modifying it or being wrong.
And some of the most impressive

1966
02:02:28,160 --> 02:02:31,920
academics I know are truly open
to that.

1967
02:02:31,920 --> 02:02:35,880
And it allows them to reach
certain types of peaks that they

1968
02:02:35,880 --> 02:02:39,400
wouldn't have had access to.
So listening, being open, being

1969
02:02:39,400 --> 02:02:42,560
open to considering new ideas,
maybe even being wrong.

1970
02:02:42,800 --> 02:02:46,480
But then also there's this
interesting piece where you do

1971
02:02:46,480 --> 02:02:50,640
have to pitch things and you do
have to tell a story and getting

1972
02:02:50,640 --> 02:02:54,960
a grant, I mean, Megan's more of
the expert here for sure.

1973
02:02:55,400 --> 02:02:59,080
But, but also, I mean, when we
write papers, you are pitching

1974
02:02:59,080 --> 02:03:01,360
an idea.
When we're writing arguments,

1975
02:03:01,360 --> 02:03:05,920
I'm trying to persuade someone
I'm in in similar with a grant

1976
02:03:05,920 --> 02:03:09,840
or in any kind of communication,
science communication, there is

1977
02:03:09,840 --> 02:03:15,960
a lot to the story that you
tell, but the best academics,

1978
02:03:16,200 --> 02:03:19,160
they can back it up.
And it isn't just a tell me,

1979
02:03:19,160 --> 02:03:21,880
it's also a show me.
So they can do both.

1980
02:03:21,880 --> 02:03:25,400
And maybe they don't even put
that story together until they

1981
02:03:25,400 --> 02:03:29,000
know that they could show you.
And so sometimes you see, I

1982
02:03:29,000 --> 02:03:34,080
mean, scientists are engaged in
a social, you know, this is a

1983
02:03:34,200 --> 02:03:37,080
this is a social space.
If I tell you I've got a

1984
02:03:37,080 --> 02:03:40,640
mechanism and I tell you I've
got an explanation, and I'm

1985
02:03:40,640 --> 02:03:45,000
coming from a fancy university
and I've done a couple things, I

1986
02:03:45,000 --> 02:03:47,480
can, you know, that might go a
long way.

1987
02:03:47,480 --> 02:03:50,360
And, and we do need to be able
to communicate well and some

1988
02:03:50,360 --> 02:03:54,320
people can check that box.
But if you really want to do the

1989
02:03:54,320 --> 02:03:58,240
best work, it's not just being a
communicator, you've got to back

1990
02:03:58,240 --> 02:04:00,840
it up.
And so then when someone asks

1991
02:04:00,840 --> 02:04:04,640
you, what do you mean that you
say you have an explanation, how

1992
02:04:04,640 --> 02:04:07,040
is how is this explanatorily
relevant?

1993
02:04:07,040 --> 02:04:10,280
What's your guiding principle?
You need to have an answer.

1994
02:04:10,600 --> 02:04:14,320
Or when they say, what do you
mean by causation here?

1995
02:04:14,720 --> 02:04:16,640
How is this a call?
What do you mean by mechanism?

1996
02:04:17,280 --> 02:04:19,040
Right?
They need to have an answer.

1997
02:04:19,040 --> 02:04:22,280
And so we have these buzzwords,
they're status terms.

1998
02:04:22,760 --> 02:04:28,320
And part of playing the game
well is knowing how to use words

1999
02:04:28,440 --> 02:04:34,000
that that gain some traction.
But if you want to play the game

2000
02:04:34,080 --> 02:04:36,520
the best, you just have to back
that up.

2001
02:04:36,520 --> 02:04:39,800
And really science should be
something that we can back up in

2002
02:04:39,800 --> 02:04:42,560
that way.
So that's that's a tall order

2003
02:04:42,880 --> 02:04:46,520
for a scientist or a researcher,
but it shows you how they're

2004
02:04:46,520 --> 02:04:51,880
willing to adapt and that they
can really tell you the value of

2005
02:04:51,880 --> 02:04:54,800
their work and the justification
for it.

2006
02:04:55,080 --> 02:04:58,400
But you start to see the kind of
theorizing that a philosopher

2007
02:04:59,160 --> 02:05:03,400
might do and that scientists are
doing with the scientific

2008
02:05:03,400 --> 02:05:06,440
practice, and then this
interesting aspect, which is

2009
02:05:06,920 --> 02:05:10,240
their need to pitch this work
right, to communicate it to

2010
02:05:10,240 --> 02:05:14,040
other people in papers, grants
and so on.

2011
02:05:15,120 --> 02:05:16,760
Yeah.
So if you wanna, you wanna do

2012
02:05:16,760 --> 02:05:19,920
that communication, well that
storytelling, well what better

2013
02:05:19,920 --> 02:05:22,840
way than to wear 2 hats?
Philosopher and scientist.

2014
02:05:23,760 --> 02:05:27,480
Yeah, I think you both are
excellent in in both fields and

2015
02:05:27,480 --> 02:05:30,040
and that skill you were talking
about Megan, that the fact that

2016
02:05:30,040 --> 02:05:32,200
Lauren has that skill, I think
you both technically do.

2017
02:05:32,200 --> 02:05:36,120
You both are these translators
in both fields and, and, and I

2018
02:05:36,120 --> 02:05:39,840
think you can see this becoming
a thing where most up and coming

2019
02:05:39,840 --> 02:05:42,960
scientists, researchers are
trying to make sure that they

2020
02:05:42,960 --> 02:05:45,120
understand both, both sides
nowadays.

2021
02:05:45,120 --> 02:05:47,840
So when you do look at young
researchers, they're, they're

2022
02:05:47,840 --> 02:05:51,200
ingrained into multidisciplinary
fields like never before.

2023
02:05:51,560 --> 02:05:54,360
You'll see someone doing
mathematics, AI, consciousness

2024
02:05:54,360 --> 02:05:56,360
research all in one go.
And, and it's kind of

2025
02:05:56,360 --> 02:05:59,000
surprising, but but super
exciting as well because it

2026
02:05:59,000 --> 02:06:01,200
means that the future is kind of
bright in that regard.

2027
02:06:01,920 --> 02:06:05,040
What do you think that we should
close off with?

2028
02:06:05,080 --> 02:06:06,680
Anything that you feel you
haven't said?

2029
02:06:06,680 --> 02:06:09,280
Is there anything about this
conversation, why science and

2030
02:06:09,280 --> 02:06:12,560
philosophy need each other, that
you feel you'd like to just hone

2031
02:06:12,560 --> 02:06:14,560
in on A drive home before we
close for me?

2032
02:06:15,320 --> 02:06:20,280
I think we've covered quite a
lot of ground here, but one

2033
02:06:20,280 --> 02:06:25,120
theme that maybe has been a
common thread throughout this

2034
02:06:25,120 --> 02:06:30,120
is, is the need for recognizing
that whatever you're doing,

2035
02:06:30,120 --> 02:06:33,160
whether you're a scientist or a
philosopher or some, you know,

2036
02:06:33,160 --> 02:06:35,400
blend of both, you're not doing
it in a vacuum.

2037
02:06:35,760 --> 02:06:38,080
There's all these other folks
around you and that, you know,

2038
02:06:38,120 --> 02:06:44,000
doing good science and good
philosophy is it's a social and

2039
02:06:44,000 --> 02:06:50,040
it's a, a networked enterprise
and that no one researcher, no

2040
02:06:50,040 --> 02:06:53,800
one expert is an island.
And this isn't just you gotta

2041
02:06:53,800 --> 02:06:55,640
read stuff.
Everybody knows you have to read

2042
02:06:55,640 --> 02:06:59,000
the literature and it's gobs
and, you know, piles of, of

2043
02:06:59,040 --> 02:07:01,800
literature all the time.
And if you're especially in like

2044
02:07:02,040 --> 02:07:04,600
artificial intelligence or
machine learning, like good luck

2045
02:07:04,600 --> 02:07:06,600
keeping up with archive, good
luck.

2046
02:07:07,280 --> 02:07:10,480
But it's not just that.
It's not just reading and, and

2047
02:07:10,480 --> 02:07:13,200
thinking and making connections
yourself and working with your,

2048
02:07:13,440 --> 02:07:15,320
your local research group and so
on.

2049
02:07:15,320 --> 02:07:19,880
It's, I think really trying to
get out and make your network as

2050
02:07:19,880 --> 02:07:22,440
big and as interdisciplinary as
possible.

2051
02:07:23,160 --> 02:07:27,040
You don't necessarily have to be
the true bridge.

2052
02:07:27,040 --> 02:07:29,440
If that's not your bag, that's
fine.

2053
02:07:30,080 --> 02:07:34,200
But recognizing the value of all
these different kinds of

2054
02:07:34,200 --> 02:07:39,200
approaches and kinds of ways of
doing science as a community,

2055
02:07:39,200 --> 02:07:44,480
rather than as a collection of
individuals, that there's,

2056
02:07:44,480 --> 02:07:47,280
there's an emergent property
that we should be going for

2057
02:07:47,280 --> 02:07:52,080
here.
And the, the way to do that is

2058
02:07:52,080 --> 02:07:57,280
to recognize value and, and
really celebrate the different

2059
02:07:57,280 --> 02:07:59,200
kinds of expertise that we can
all bring to the table.

2060
02:07:59,200 --> 02:08:01,560
So the community aspect, I think
is something that's been a

2061
02:08:01,560 --> 02:08:05,680
thread throughout all of this
that maybe I'll just bring to

2062
02:08:05,680 --> 02:08:08,880
the forefront at the, the end is
that you too, all of you

2063
02:08:08,880 --> 02:08:11,080
listeners, you can also be part
of this community.

2064
02:08:11,080 --> 02:08:12,320
And I'm sure that you already
are.

2065
02:08:15,520 --> 02:08:17,920
Lauren you.
Great.

2066
02:08:17,920 --> 02:08:25,720
Yeah, just building on that and
adding to that the type.

2067
02:08:25,840 --> 02:08:30,120
So why do science and philosophy
need each other?

2068
02:08:30,120 --> 02:08:36,040
Part of the answer is that the
projects that are involved in

2069
02:08:36,480 --> 02:08:41,880
both are intimately related.
Many scientists I know are doing

2070
02:08:42,440 --> 02:08:48,600
theorizing and theoretical work
that is similar to the kinds of

2071
02:08:48,600 --> 02:08:52,080
philosophy of science that I'm
engaged in and that other

2072
02:08:52,080 --> 02:08:55,680
philosophers are engaged in.
So there's a sense in which it's

2073
02:08:55,680 --> 02:09:00,280
hard to separate them if you're
looking at scientific research

2074
02:09:00,280 --> 02:09:02,720
and if you're looking at
scientifically informed

2075
02:09:02,920 --> 02:09:06,080
philosophy.
I think if we're looking at

2076
02:09:07,960 --> 02:09:11,480
current research that scientists
are doing, where they're

2077
02:09:11,480 --> 02:09:16,240
interested in big questions and
they're at the forefront and

2078
02:09:16,240 --> 02:09:22,240
they're trying to uncover and
understand new things that we

2079
02:09:22,240 --> 02:09:25,960
don't yet understand.
If you're looking at those open

2080
02:09:25,960 --> 02:09:29,160
questions in the sort of cutting
edge of science, or if you're

2081
02:09:29,160 --> 02:09:35,480
looking at justifying scientific
practice as it's taken place for

2082
02:09:35,640 --> 02:09:39,320
decades and centuries,
philosophy of science is very

2083
02:09:39,360 --> 02:09:41,520
useful for both of those
projects.

2084
02:09:42,240 --> 02:09:45,680
Philosophy of science here is a
kind of work that's focused on

2085
02:09:46,000 --> 02:09:50,920
foundations of science,
precision in the concepts and

2086
02:09:50,920 --> 02:09:54,000
the methods that scientists use,
the principles that guide their

2087
02:09:54,000 --> 02:09:59,360
research and how it how it is
that it works, the success that

2088
02:09:59,360 --> 02:10:01,920
they get, how they reach the
goals that they have.

2089
02:10:02,000 --> 02:10:06,240
And so this isn't something that
a philosopher can do in a

2090
02:10:06,240 --> 02:10:09,720
vacuum, right?
We're studying and hopefully

2091
02:10:09,720 --> 02:10:15,800
working with scientists to get
that precision principles and

2092
02:10:15,800 --> 02:10:19,720
those kinds of goals to show,
you know, how they actually

2093
02:10:19,720 --> 02:10:22,080
work.
And that's a, a kind of

2094
02:10:22,080 --> 02:10:25,600
philosophy that scientists do,
that philosophers of science do.

2095
02:10:25,600 --> 02:10:29,960
And it's helpful for both being
able to justify the scientific

2096
02:10:29,960 --> 02:10:34,360
method, how science gives us our
best understanding of the world,

2097
02:10:34,360 --> 02:10:37,960
but also when scientists are
tackling these big questions, it

2098
02:10:37,960 --> 02:10:45,160
helps to see and to look at with
a clear lens scientific practice

2099
02:10:45,160 --> 02:10:50,240
and all of these domains in the
principles that you find across

2100
02:10:50,240 --> 02:10:53,360
those contexts and across those
domains.

2101
02:10:53,520 --> 02:11:01,080
So, yeah, very much fields that
in some sense can be continuous.

2102
02:11:01,560 --> 02:11:05,160
And I think it's very much the
case that you find many

2103
02:11:05,160 --> 02:11:11,800
scientists engaged in theorizing
that we can think of and in many

2104
02:11:11,800 --> 02:11:15,280
cases should think of as
philosophical.

2105
02:11:16,080 --> 02:11:20,040
But of course it's going to
depend on what we mean by

2106
02:11:20,160 --> 02:11:23,160
philosophy.
And that's maybe also one point

2107
02:11:23,160 --> 02:11:27,560
of our discussions is that
philosophy, philosophical work,

2108
02:11:27,560 --> 02:11:30,200
philosophical thinking can mean
very different things in

2109
02:11:30,200 --> 02:11:33,400
different contexts.
But here it's focused on

2110
02:11:33,880 --> 02:11:38,080
critical thinking,
argumentation, and in particular

2111
02:11:38,360 --> 02:11:43,280
kind of foundations of of
science and how scientific

2112
02:11:43,280 --> 02:11:46,680
thinking, reasoning and
explanations work and how

2113
02:11:46,680 --> 02:11:51,000
they're so successful.
Well, I just want to say thank

2114
02:11:51,000 --> 02:11:53,200
you both for this wonderful
conversation.

2115
02:11:53,200 --> 02:11:55,080
You both are definitely experts
in the field.

2116
02:11:55,080 --> 02:11:57,840
I can't wait to dissect your
work individually as well,

2117
02:11:58,120 --> 02:11:59,960
showcase it highlights as much
as possible.

2118
02:11:59,960 --> 02:12:02,040
It's a true privilege and honor
to have you both.

2119
02:12:02,040 --> 02:12:04,480
And yeah, thank you so much.
This is a wonderful discussion

2120
02:12:04,480 --> 02:12:08,640
and I really enjoyed it.
Have thank you so much for

2121
02:12:08,640 --> 02:12:10,600
having us.
This has been really, really fun

2122
02:12:10,600 --> 02:12:12,400
and engaging.
Looking forward to the next

2123
02:12:12,400 --> 02:12:14,400
time.
And it's always fun to hang out

2124
02:12:14,400 --> 02:12:16,640
with Lauren and talk about
science and philosophy.

2125
02:12:16,640 --> 02:12:21,000
It's one of my favorite things.
Oh yeah, always, always fun to

2126
02:12:21,440 --> 02:12:23,520
talk more, learn more from Megan
and Ted.

2127
02:12:23,760 --> 02:12:26,680
Yeah, Thank you so much.
Great to be here and looking

2128
02:12:26,680 --> 02:12:27,320
forward to more.