Edouard Machery: When does Science go Wrong? Issues with Common Sense & Folk Ideology

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Edward, I'd like to start with
the most fundamental question.

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What is consciousness?
Oh, this is probably the most

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difficult question you might
start with, so I I.

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It's important to, when one
tries to answer this question,

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to draw distinctions.
I I I I feel if one does not

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start distinction between
different things consciousness

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might well be, then the
discussion would get muddled

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very quick.
And I I have found that the

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discussions at Net Block
introduced now 30 years ago

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between access consciousness and
phenomenal consciousness to be

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extremely helpful.
Even so, it's not.

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Nearly as clear as one might
want, maybe for the purpose of

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philosophy of science, it
remains a very useful

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distinction.
So access consciousness, as many

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of your listeners will know just
is the fact that we can get some

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information about the world and
use that information for

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rational action, rational
thinking, verbal report,

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phenomenal consciousness is
quite different.

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It's the idea that there's a
special feel.

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To maybe our passenger
experiences, right.

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Yeah, that to drink some soda.
There's a field of sugar that

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comes with it to smell.
I know it's full here.

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So to smell the leaves which are
full, which are a bit wet, comes

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with a specific smell there.
And that's his experience.

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That phenomenal consciousness is
meant to be captured the notion

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of phenomenal consciousness.
Is meant to be capturing.

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So it really depends on what
question you're asking.

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Are you talking about access
consciousness or phenomenal

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consciousness?
I think, yeah, I think it's

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great that you define those
terms because I think the main

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topic of this conversation in
general does touch on phenomenal

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consciousness.
I mean that's that people seem

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to be most concerned with when
they when they want to know that

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qualia, that qualitative
subjective experience.

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What is, what are your thoughts
on that?

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I know, I've watched the podcast
with you on Philip and Keith's

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show and you guys discussing is
this hard problem actually a

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problem.
That's right.

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Yeah, so, So that's right.
So that's when people are really

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worried about consciousness.
It's not access consciousness.

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And you're right, access
consciousness.

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You might think, well, even a
robot could have access

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consciousness just be, let's
begin the right way.

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Phenomenal consciousness, a
little bit harder to see a robot

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having phenomenal consciousness.
So it's really there that the

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action seems seems to be.
So I have I have a very pterodox

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view about phenomenal
consciousness let's say

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consciousness from that from now
on many philosophers and many

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scientists believe it's a very
difficult problem.

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In fact as the hardest problem
in the universe to to I think

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people are mistaken.
I think there is no real no no

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such thing as phenomenal
consciousness.

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I think it's.
It's an invention that our

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philosophers have created, and
of course it came with a lot of

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metaphysical issues that we're
still struggling and that

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scientists have inherited.
So that's that's in a sense my

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very heterodox view on the
matter.

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Phenomenal consciousness is is a
myth that does not really exist

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out there, and as a result, we
need not.

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Try to to to worry.
It's worth thinking.

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It's worth noting I'm not the
only one with this kind of of

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view.
Even so, my view is this from

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some of my one one second
Eduardo seems to have a

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connection area here.
Are you back?

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Fine.
One second.

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Are you back?
Can you can you see me?

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Yes, I can see you.
Yes, I sorry, I just reconnected

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to a different source, just
'cause I noticed there was a lag

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as well.
OK, very good.

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This one should work much
better.

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Yeah, so I was saying that in
some of our views, Patchurch on,

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Patricia Church on has said
similar things and so so has

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done the net.
However, their position is quite

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different from from mine in
interesting respect.

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There, at least in some of the
writings, tend to view

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consciousness as.
An expression for naive folksy

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understanding of the mind, the
things that scientists and

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philosophers have inherited.
This folksy understanding of the

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mind.
I think that's a mistake.

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I think the opposite is true.
In fact, I think phenomenal

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consciousness is not really part
of the way we grasp the world.

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You know people don't have
specific views.

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Let people non.
People who haven't really

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thought about the matter don't
really have a theory about our

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relation to our own mind, rather
the thing we are in some ways in

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the world.
We are always acting out there.

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It's rather philosophers and
following them, scientists who

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have in a sense.
Projected of relation to the

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world onto our own mind and then
they start worrying about well

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what is this qualitative
properties of the mind no and

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and I think that's that's switch
from being embedded in the

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world.
You know we always are expensing

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the objects themselves to we are
expensing something mental came.

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With the modern revolution, the
scientific revolution and the

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modern times, I think Descartes
and the new wave of philosophies

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that followed Descartes is quite
responsible in that respect for

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focusing philosopher's attention
and then in in recent decades,

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scientists, scientists
attention.

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Onto the mind itself.
So this is the the the way in

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which my take on the matter
differs from, let's say, Pat

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Churchland's and Dan Dennett's
take on the matter, at least as

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I understand them.
And and so your work in the

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philosophy of cognitive science
and science in general, From

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your work, what have you noticed
or what have you gathered over

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time that helps to solidify this
view that you have?

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Yeah, so a a few things.
So on the one hand, I'm a

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philosopher.
I'm a philosopher and and I I

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I've read quite a lot of history
of philosophy and I think it's

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really important to look at
history of philosophy boss in

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the western world also in the
non western world, you know in

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India, in in in in in China and
in all these other great

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political traditions.
If you look at the Western world

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in particular, it's quite
striking that there is no such

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thing as phenomenal
consciousness in ancient

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philosophy.
So Greek philosophers are very

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much concerned with perception.
You know, they they, they write

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a lot about perception there.
Some of them are worried about

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mistaken perception about
illusions.

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You know, the sceptics are very
worried about illusions, They're

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worried about imaginations.
Aristotle's in Dianima writes a

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lot about types of mental state,
imagination, desires,

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perceptions, reason, logos, what
he calls logos.

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But phenomenal consciousness is
never theorized.

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In these centuries of
philosophical work about the

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mind, and I find that quite
study, you know, you look at

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some of the greatest feel as of
first I've ever existed, and the

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right very perceptive things
about perception, about

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perception, about imagination,
about reason.

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But consciousness as a quote
that he feels that's supposed to

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be distinctive of our expenses,
is never commented upon, is

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never theorized.
By contrast, you move in 17th

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century after Deca's work, it
becomes a central topic.

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You know, you look at love, you
look at Hume.

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And of course, in the 19th
century and 20th century, it

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becomes a fundamental aspect of
the theories about the mind.

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OK, so here's you know if you're
thinking, what if it's so

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obvious, if it's such an obvious
aspect of the mind.

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How come all these great
philosophers for centuries have

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sort of missed it.
So that was you know in a sense

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that's what what got me started
and I think the same point could

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be made about some non western
tradition as well.

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Even so I'm much much less well
versed there so I don't want to

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to reveal my ignorance in this
respect.

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But I but from what I've read I
think similar points could be

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made about non western tradition
that in fact it has large trend

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of this non western traditions
where phenomenal consciousness

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is not really noticed or
theorized upon.

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And that got me really started
thinking.

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Then I started to really wonder,
why is that?

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That, you know, great
philosophers haven't really

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thought about what some of my
colleagues, both in the sciences

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and philosophy, think is the
most crucial aspect of our

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mental life.
And so I did some optical work.

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I'm an experimental philosopher,
so I do some.

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I do both theoretical work in
philosophy and empirical work in

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the sciences, And I did some
work with a former student of

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mine, Justin Sits Mark, who has
become an important philosopher

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on his own since then.
And the idea was to try to get a

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sense of whether lay people to
people without training in

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philosophy understand.
The mind as having phenomenal

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properties quaria.
It is a very simple set of

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studies to start with, you know,
You know, it was just the first

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time this kind of work was done.
So we started from the ground

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from, you know, very simple
things.

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And So what we did was we
described a simple robot who can

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do various things and it can
detect information about the

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world.
As many robots can do is they

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can pick up information about
the world you know, they can

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pick up information about light
they can see, one might say.

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They can pick up information
about web sounds they can hear,

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one might say.
Maybe they can have.

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Gigabytes types of of signal.
And what we ask the question is

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whether the robot can see
whether the robot can hear,

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whether the robot can be angry.
You know, for example, you you

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prevent the robot to fulfil its
goal.

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He moves away, it moves away.
It seems to have an angry

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behaviour.
Is the robot angry?

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And then we ask a question about
pen.

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Can the robot feel pen all
right?

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And what we found is that.
In contrast to SO we asked us

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about let people in
philosophers, which was a very

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important part of the of the
project.

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So philosophers get the same
kind of response for all these

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mental states.
Know the robot cannot see, know

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the robot cannot hear, know the
robot cannot be angry, Know the

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robot cannot feel pain.
And our explanation of why

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philosophers give this kind of
response is that these things

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that seeing comes with having a.
A feeling of seeing, right?

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You can't really see properly
speaking if you don't experience

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a qualitative experience.
So same for hearing, The same

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for feeling emotion.
You can't be angry if you don't

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feel anger.
So robot is too simple to feel

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anger, so it does not feel
anger.

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He's not angry and the same for
feeling pain.

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By contrast, lay people were
totally happy to assign things

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like seeing.
Hearing to the robot, Of course

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a robot can see.
Of course a robot can hear.

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And I think that's my intuition
as well.

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When it comes to anger, they
were a bit uncertain, right?

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But they were, you know,
ambivalent, one might say.

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When it comes to feeling pain,
they actually were very

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reluctant to assign pain to the
robot.

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And what it tells us is that for
the layer, for lay people,

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people without training in
philosophy, there is no unity,

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there is no such thing as
phenomenality that unifies all

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these mental states, in contrast
to philosophers for whom all

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these mental states share the
same characteristics.

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They're all phenomenal states.
So while interpretation, I'm not

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saying it's the only one.
You know we've been criticised a

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lot that people got a lot of
attention.

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But one interpretation, the one
we favour, is that for lay

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people there is no such thing as
phenomenality that's going to

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unify all this mental sense.
Seeing just is picking up some

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kind of information in the
world, light information hearing

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is picking up another type of
information in in in the world.

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And you know, there's no
phenomenality associated to

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seeing and hearing.
That's why a very simple robot

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can do it.
When it comes to feeling pain or

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explanation and Justin's mass
work following original work has

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confirmed that there is a
definitely a grain of truth

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there is that it's really good
to having the right kind of

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body.
If your body is metallic, you

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know, and not a kind of fleshy
thing.

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Has had a sensor that he is in a
way alive, you know the kind of

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right things to have pain.
So it's it's so the robot does

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not have pain because it does
not have the right mind.

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The robot does not have pain
because it has the right body.

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So what's crucial here is
embodiment for feeling pain.

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So all of that suggests for me a
picture of or lay understanding

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00:13:57,120 --> 00:14:01,080
of mental states or the mind
where phenomenal consciousness

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00:14:01,080 --> 00:14:02,440
has no place.
All right.

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00:14:02,440 --> 00:14:05,000
On the one hand you have
perceptual space, perceptual

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state, it's like picking up
information and then you got pen

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00:14:07,680 --> 00:14:10,160
which is related to having the
right kind of body, all right.

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So that's that's the type of
work I've done in the cognitive

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sensors.
And sorry Edward, you froze for

237
00:14:21,330 --> 00:14:35,930
a second.
What is going on?

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00:14:37,770 --> 00:14:39,330
Edward, can you hear me?
I think you.

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00:14:39,370 --> 00:14:41,690
Yes, I can hear you.
Yes, I can hear you.

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00:14:41,690 --> 00:14:43,000
Yeah.
I can hear you again.

241
00:14:43,000 --> 00:14:44,320
We seem to be freezing every
year.

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00:14:44,320 --> 00:14:45,840
I'm so sorry.
I think the connection's a bit

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00:14:46,040 --> 00:14:47,760
bad.
My weather's quite is that.

244
00:14:47,760 --> 00:14:50,920
I'm not too sure why.
Yeah that's that's that's just

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00:14:50,920 --> 00:14:52,960
not an issue.
It does it does happen when it's

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00:14:53,040 --> 00:14:54,720
when it's not zoomed that's
tricking us.

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00:14:54,720 --> 00:14:59,480
It's Internet.
I'm more than used to challenges

248
00:14:59,760 --> 00:15:02,720
with with Wi-Fi.
So, so yeah.

249
00:15:02,800 --> 00:15:04,480
So I was saying that it's work
with.

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00:15:05,120 --> 00:15:08,880
Lay people has convinced me, and
I think some of the a few other

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00:15:08,880 --> 00:15:12,040
people, that it's not an
accident that great philosophers

252
00:15:12,040 --> 00:15:15,800
for centuries in the West and
elsewhere haven't theorized

253
00:15:15,800 --> 00:15:19,320
about consciousness.
It's just not part of the way we

254
00:15:19,320 --> 00:15:22,000
grasp the real world, our mental
life.

255
00:15:22,360 --> 00:15:28,040
And I think what I want to say,
you know, the conclusion I want

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00:15:28,040 --> 00:15:31,320
to draw is that, well, it's
because it's not part of our

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00:15:31,320 --> 00:15:34,400
mental life.
That's why let people don't

258
00:15:34,400 --> 00:15:36,520
grasp it.
It's not an important feature.

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00:15:36,800 --> 00:15:39,680
It's not a feature at all I
should say of of a mental life.

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00:15:39,680 --> 00:15:41,280
So that's, that's the work I've
been doing.

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00:15:41,280 --> 00:15:43,480
So that's convinced me about
that, Edward.

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00:15:43,480 --> 00:15:47,000
At what point do you think you
could convert the layman into

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00:15:47,000 --> 00:15:48,720
thinking that?
So do you think it takes one,

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00:15:48,920 --> 00:15:52,320
like say like maybe telling them
that Mary's Mary's room

265
00:15:52,320 --> 00:15:54,600
experiment and then suddenly
they think that?

266
00:15:55,480 --> 00:15:57,480
No, that's an excellent
question.

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00:15:58,800 --> 00:16:01,600
And I usually get this kind of
push back and they say, look,

268
00:16:01,600 --> 00:16:07,840
it's true that maybe lay people
can't really on their own grasps

269
00:16:07,840 --> 00:16:11,880
the phenomena of their mind, but
you can very easily bring them

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00:16:12,240 --> 00:16:15,600
to see that.
And there I'm a little bit less

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00:16:15,600 --> 00:16:20,000
certain you can, it's, you know,
you can.

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00:16:20,840 --> 00:16:24,440
Lead them to talk the talk.
I suppose we're not sure to walk

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00:16:24,440 --> 00:16:27,040
the walk.
What What do I mean by that?

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00:16:29,200 --> 00:16:34,560
I'm inspired of this response is
is driven by what I see in the

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00:16:34,560 --> 00:16:39,320
neurosciences where some
incredibly smart neuroscientists

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00:16:40,080 --> 00:16:44,320
believe that they are addressing
the hard problem of

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00:16:44,320 --> 00:16:46,040
consciousness.
For Dev, Chalmers called the

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00:16:46,040 --> 00:16:48,280
hard problem of consciousness
and they providing an

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00:16:48,280 --> 00:16:51,840
explanation.
Of phenomenal consciousness.

280
00:16:53,200 --> 00:16:56,640
But really, they're not.
They're not even addressing the

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00:16:56,640 --> 00:16:58,840
hard problem of consciousness.
They're really talking about

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00:16:58,840 --> 00:17:01,440
what I, what I called earlier
access consciousness.

283
00:17:03,000 --> 00:17:07,920
And they they seem to be
confused about the distinction

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00:17:07,920 --> 00:17:10,240
between phenomenal consciousness
and access consciousness.

285
00:17:10,240 --> 00:17:13,280
And they don't seem to see that
providing an explanation of the

286
00:17:13,280 --> 00:17:16,640
former access consciousness is
providing an explanation of the

287
00:17:16,839 --> 00:17:18,720
is not providing an explanation
of the letter.

288
00:17:19,200 --> 00:17:22,119
Phenomenal consciousness.
And So what it does suggest to

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00:17:22,119 --> 00:17:25,319
me is that the fact that very
smart people, you know, very

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00:17:25,319 --> 00:17:29,560
serious scientists obviously,
who know that craft, they're so

291
00:17:29,600 --> 00:17:32,400
very hard about how to do
science and they know much of

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00:17:32,400 --> 00:17:36,120
neuroscience, they're still not
getting the notion of phenomenal

293
00:17:36,120 --> 00:17:40,080
consciousness quite right.
Now that does suggest to me that

294
00:17:40,080 --> 00:17:43,960
when let people come to say
things, that seems to be in line

295
00:17:43,960 --> 00:17:47,560
with what Chalmers would want to
say.

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00:17:48,200 --> 00:17:51,240
They're not quite understanding
what phenomenal consciousness

297
00:17:51,240 --> 00:17:54,520
is, right?
So I think we can get LED people

298
00:17:54,520 --> 00:17:59,960
to somehow say things that
suggest that they grasp the

299
00:17:59,960 --> 00:18:02,520
phenomenality of consciousness
or what philosophers think is a

300
00:18:02,520 --> 00:18:06,720
phenomenality of consciousness.
But I'm a bit sceptical that

301
00:18:06,720 --> 00:18:10,840
they are really understanding
what Chalmers think they should

302
00:18:10,840 --> 00:18:13,120
be understanding.
And I'm picking up on Chalmers

303
00:18:13,120 --> 00:18:14,440
here, mentioning Chalmers not to
pick.

304
00:18:15,080 --> 00:18:17,440
Pick on him.
But just to mention, as someone

305
00:18:17,440 --> 00:18:20,440
who's been very clear in what he
thinks phenomenal consciousness

306
00:18:20,680 --> 00:18:22,120
is.
So that's my response, right?

307
00:18:22,120 --> 00:18:26,120
I I'm not quite sure we can so
easily get people to really

308
00:18:26,120 --> 00:18:30,680
understand what Chalmers wants
them to understand, rather than

309
00:18:30,680 --> 00:18:33,400
just saying the kind of things
are somewhat in line with what

310
00:18:33,400 --> 00:18:36,200
Chalmers want, wants, wants,
wants to say.

311
00:18:37,520 --> 00:18:41,360
So another question that arises
is you once wrote a paper, you

312
00:18:41,360 --> 00:18:44,840
wrote an article called Double
check that common sense is not a

313
00:18:44,840 --> 00:18:47,120
good guide to reality.
Yeah, that's right.

314
00:18:47,240 --> 00:18:50,840
Yeah, so should we then take
these common sense responses as

315
00:18:50,840 --> 00:18:53,240
seriously as you are taking?
This is very good.

316
00:18:53,240 --> 00:18:54,920
This is this is a very good
point.

317
00:18:54,920 --> 00:19:02,240
So I'm part of my work has been
quite critical of the idea that

318
00:19:02,640 --> 00:19:04,760
we can't.
We philosophers should start

319
00:19:04,760 --> 00:19:10,560
with common sensical intuitions
and views about about the world.

320
00:19:11,240 --> 00:19:17,520
And when we theorize about bias,
both scientific but also

321
00:19:17,520 --> 00:19:20,040
metaphysical or philosophical
topics.

322
00:19:20,280 --> 00:19:24,160
All right, so I'm for example,
I'm I'm I don't believe that if

323
00:19:24,160 --> 00:19:27,200
you want to do good work about
meaning, you should start with

324
00:19:27,240 --> 00:19:31,080
lay intuitions about meaning.
For example, I've I've been

325
00:19:31,080 --> 00:19:33,440
quite critical of that type of
research.

326
00:19:34,640 --> 00:19:39,800
The same is true for metaphysics
as well, on the other hand, in

327
00:19:39,800 --> 00:19:42,600
some SO.
In these other areas, what

328
00:19:42,600 --> 00:19:45,560
should you do when you think
about somehow some of the

329
00:19:45,560 --> 00:19:50,400
problems that arise and often
these problems might be driven

330
00:19:50,400 --> 00:19:53,520
by the sciences.
So I think often, you know, I'm

331
00:19:54,080 --> 00:19:56,920
one might have a scientific
philosopher in some way.

332
00:19:57,360 --> 00:20:00,240
In some ways, one might think
that sciences often give us a

333
00:20:00,240 --> 00:20:06,920
right problem to be focusing on,
and so this these are the places

334
00:20:06,920 --> 00:20:09,080
where we should where we should
drive.

335
00:20:09,560 --> 00:20:13,760
The the questions we are working
on, device options we are

336
00:20:13,760 --> 00:20:17,720
concerned with, and the concepts
we are trying to elucidate, and

337
00:20:17,720 --> 00:20:20,600
in that respect, starting with
common sense, is actually, I

338
00:20:20,600 --> 00:20:24,520
think, often a dead end.
Now consciousness is

339
00:20:24,520 --> 00:20:26,480
interesting.
Phenomenal consciousness is

340
00:20:26,480 --> 00:20:30,400
interesting because I'm not
quite sure that it belongs to

341
00:20:30,400 --> 00:20:38,080
the sciences.
In fact, I think scientists work

342
00:20:38,080 --> 00:20:44,840
on consciousness are inspired by
philosophy, you know, so, So

343
00:20:44,840 --> 00:20:50,520
that's a place where if you
dismiss common sense as I do or

344
00:20:50,520 --> 00:20:53,880
if you're quite sceptical of
common sense as I do, you might

345
00:20:53,880 --> 00:20:58,400
say you know someone like for
example standard hand or or some

346
00:20:58,400 --> 00:21:02,320
people working on consciousness
from other scientific traditions

347
00:21:02,320 --> 00:21:09,400
like Aqua low for example, might
say that look, forget about

348
00:21:09,560 --> 00:21:11,200
about common sense.
Maybe it's not.

349
00:21:11,320 --> 00:21:13,720
It's not part of a common sense
understanding of the of our

350
00:21:13,720 --> 00:21:16,840
mental life.
But still there's a science of

351
00:21:16,840 --> 00:21:20,160
phenomenal consciousness out
there and you should take that

352
00:21:20,160 --> 00:21:21,960
very seriously.
After all, you take sounds very

353
00:21:21,960 --> 00:21:23,880
seriously.
Eduard, why don't you take that

354
00:21:23,880 --> 00:21:26,480
very seriously?
And and and there.

355
00:21:26,680 --> 00:21:29,600
I think much of the science
related to phenomenal

356
00:21:29,600 --> 00:21:33,840
consciousness is grounded in
this philosophy, which I'm very

357
00:21:33,840 --> 00:21:37,480
sceptical of.
I'm not quite sure there's much

358
00:21:37,760 --> 00:21:42,200
reason to work on phenomenal
consciousness, except if you've

359
00:21:42,600 --> 00:21:46,920
read that Dev Chalmers and his
philosophers and thinks there's

360
00:21:46,920 --> 00:21:50,120
a really deep puzzle there to be
solved.

361
00:21:51,720 --> 00:21:54,920
I would not say the same, but
access consciousness, I would

362
00:21:54,920 --> 00:21:59,600
think that there's a really
important question about how we

363
00:21:59,600 --> 00:22:04,240
are able to pick up information
about the world of various types

364
00:22:04,240 --> 00:22:08,320
in various modalities and use
this information for rational

365
00:22:08,320 --> 00:22:12,440
action and rational thinking.
And I would say, you know, this

366
00:22:12,440 --> 00:22:15,360
is probably one of the most
important challenges we have to

367
00:22:15,360 --> 00:22:18,520
solve and understand.
So that's a problem I would be

368
00:22:18,520 --> 00:22:21,640
taking very seriously.
It's a problem that I think AI

369
00:22:22,000 --> 00:22:27,200
is really making very salient
these days, because somehow AI

370
00:22:27,200 --> 00:22:29,800
seems to have, recently LLM
seems to have solved that

371
00:22:29,800 --> 00:22:34,240
problem, maybe, but at least
suggest that it might be

372
00:22:34,240 --> 00:22:38,520
solvable.
By contrast, phenomenal

373
00:22:38,520 --> 00:22:41,960
consciousness, if it's not
common sense, and I'm not quite

374
00:22:41,960 --> 00:22:45,200
sure why, we should be worried
about that problem.

375
00:22:45,520 --> 00:22:47,160
And maybe an analogy here might
help.

376
00:22:48,520 --> 00:22:52,160
So I'm I'm a materialist.
I think there's only one

377
00:22:52,160 --> 00:22:53,760
substance.
I'm not a dualist.

378
00:22:55,120 --> 00:22:59,720
I I probably even would describe
myself as a physicalist.

379
00:22:59,720 --> 00:23:02,360
I don't want to get into the
type of physicalism I'm

380
00:23:02,360 --> 00:23:10,280
embracing, but a century ago
there were some very serious

381
00:23:10,280 --> 00:23:13,240
thinkers, some scientists even,
who were dualists.

382
00:23:13,280 --> 00:23:16,800
And indeed they asked even 50
years ago, 17 years ago, John

383
00:23:16,800 --> 00:23:19,600
Echols, I think Echols, I'm not
sure about his first name, you

384
00:23:19,600 --> 00:23:23,360
know, who was a very important
neuroscientist, was a dualist

385
00:23:23,880 --> 00:23:27,720
about the relation between the
mind and and and and the brain

386
00:23:27,720 --> 00:23:33,880
or the mind and the body.
But I don't think there's much

387
00:23:33,880 --> 00:23:41,360
of A motivation to be a dualist
7070 years ago, or 100 no, 200

388
00:23:41,360 --> 00:23:45,200
years ago, the 19th century,
except for common sense, equal

389
00:23:45,200 --> 00:23:49,400
foxy reason, folk dualism or
religious reasons, right?

390
00:23:49,400 --> 00:23:52,560
So.
So for me, yes, you might find

391
00:23:52,760 --> 00:23:57,120
traces of dualism in the 19th
century, in the 1970s, nineteen

392
00:23:57,120 --> 00:24:01,320
50s, Of course, much worries
about dualism in the census in

393
00:24:01,320 --> 00:24:05,480
the 19th century.
But that's just not a reason for

394
00:24:05,480 --> 00:24:08,920
me to be a journalist, because I
think the origins of these

395
00:24:09,400 --> 00:24:12,680
scientific concerns are common
sense or or.

396
00:24:13,600 --> 00:24:15,880
And in the case of phenomenal
consciousness, I think the kind

397
00:24:15,880 --> 00:24:17,920
of philosophy I'm rejecting.
Right.

398
00:24:18,920 --> 00:24:21,120
So that's that's the reason why
I'm actually.

399
00:24:21,600 --> 00:24:24,400
I can try to be consistent
between my between my views

400
00:24:24,400 --> 00:24:26,800
there.
I'm not sure if the data is

401
00:24:26,800 --> 00:24:29,600
still the same, but I remember
once reading a paper that showed

402
00:24:29,600 --> 00:24:31,760
that even today if you ask the
lay.

403
00:24:32,440 --> 00:24:34,480
Population About their view on
consciousness.

404
00:24:34,520 --> 00:24:37,040
Most of their answers seem to be
duelist in nature.

405
00:24:37,800 --> 00:24:39,560
Yeah.
So it's it's it's a very

406
00:24:39,560 --> 00:24:42,880
successful it's really
interesting work in psychology

407
00:24:43,000 --> 00:24:47,680
on folk dualism.
Paul Bloom has written a bit a

408
00:24:47,720 --> 00:24:53,200
bit about that matter, and and I
think some of it is quite

409
00:24:53,200 --> 00:24:58,520
compelling, that there seems to
be a tendency to at the very

410
00:24:58,520 --> 00:25:03,560
least views the mind and the
body as obeying different laws

411
00:25:03,560 --> 00:25:08,840
or different principles.
And I think this is reasonably

412
00:25:08,840 --> 00:25:12,560
well established.
The slightly stronger claims

413
00:25:12,560 --> 00:25:16,120
that lay people tend to view the
mind and the body as different

414
00:25:16,120 --> 00:25:18,680
substances.
You know what we philosophers

415
00:25:18,680 --> 00:25:20,880
would be calling properly
dualism.

416
00:25:20,880 --> 00:25:25,640
You know, following the caste
dualistic traditions, that is

417
00:25:25,640 --> 00:25:28,040
actually a little bit less
clear.

418
00:25:28,200 --> 00:25:33,160
I think it's it's more of a
reading that Paul Bloom and and

419
00:25:33,160 --> 00:25:35,360
maybe having pose.
And I'm not quite sure Paul

420
00:25:35,360 --> 00:25:38,080
Bloom is really.
When Paul Bloom talks about folk

421
00:25:38,080 --> 00:25:42,560
dualism, he really means that
people are committed to the

422
00:25:42,560 --> 00:25:46,520
sophisticated views, that there
are two substances that somehow

423
00:25:46,520 --> 00:25:49,600
must interact or must work in
parallel.

424
00:25:50,320 --> 00:25:53,160
So I'm not quite sure this is
exactly what what blue means,

425
00:25:53,400 --> 00:25:57,360
and I'm less convinced that this
is a universal aspect of of the

426
00:25:57,360 --> 00:25:59,560
mind.
It strikes me as very

427
00:25:59,560 --> 00:26:04,240
philosophical, and I'm a little
bit sceptical that people all

428
00:26:04,240 --> 00:26:07,440
over the world would have
developed such a philosophical,

429
00:26:07,440 --> 00:26:09,200
such a sophisticated physical
views.

430
00:26:09,680 --> 00:26:15,160
What is more plausible is that
let people spontaneously develop

431
00:26:15,160 --> 00:26:19,800
a view where the body works one
way, obeys a specific type of of

432
00:26:19,800 --> 00:26:23,160
causal principles, the mind
works another way, obeys the

433
00:26:23,160 --> 00:26:26,040
different types of causal
principles, and that we can't

434
00:26:26,040 --> 00:26:29,360
really explain the way the mind
works by appealing to the

435
00:26:29,360 --> 00:26:32,720
principles that explain how the
body works and vice versa.

436
00:26:33,280 --> 00:26:36,280
And I think it's also plausible
that this common sensical view

437
00:26:36,840 --> 00:26:39,160
has inspired religious
traditions.

438
00:26:39,160 --> 00:26:43,160
You know, sophisticated explicit
religious traditions that have

439
00:26:43,160 --> 00:26:47,480
interpreted this common sensical
dualism. 1 might say I expanded

440
00:26:47,480 --> 00:26:51,840
with dualism into a substantial
dualism whereas 2 substances you

441
00:26:51,840 --> 00:26:54,240
know.
It's very clear for example that

442
00:26:55,200 --> 00:26:59,480
the Christian tradition which
which are most familiar is

443
00:26:59,480 --> 00:27:02,160
committed to something like a
substance dualism.

444
00:27:02,600 --> 00:27:08,240
It's also clear that non
Christian like Platinus and the

445
00:27:08,240 --> 00:27:13,160
Neo, the neo Platonist tradition
in the ancient Greek philosophy

446
00:27:13,440 --> 00:27:18,600
also were committed to a form of
dualism between the mind and the

447
00:27:18,600 --> 00:27:21,200
body.
And I think a substance dualism

448
00:27:21,200 --> 00:27:23,680
properly substance dualism and I
think where it where it comes

449
00:27:23,680 --> 00:27:28,760
from here is this explanatory
dualism that's part of our

450
00:27:28,800 --> 00:27:32,120
universal common sense.
But notice one more one small

451
00:27:32,160 --> 00:27:34,120
thing here.
It's interesting the contrast

452
00:27:34,120 --> 00:27:38,120
here between phenomenal
consciousness and folk and folk

453
00:27:38,120 --> 00:27:41,000
dualism.
So folk dualism is pretty much

454
00:27:41,000 --> 00:27:47,080
universal and it's it manifests
itself in in in theories in all

455
00:27:47,080 --> 00:27:50,560
types of philosophical works.
In the ancient time I mentioned

456
00:27:50,560 --> 00:27:54,440
Plateau and Platinus and all the
Neoplatonist tradition.

457
00:27:54,440 --> 00:27:58,520
All right.
In modern time with Christianity

458
00:27:58,520 --> 00:28:02,240
and of course all the Christian
philosophers and I think in non

459
00:28:02,240 --> 00:28:08,080
Western tradition as well.
But by contrast you don't find

460
00:28:08,080 --> 00:28:10,480
the same thing for phenomenal
consciousness as I as I

461
00:28:10,480 --> 00:28:11,760
mentioned earlier.
So I think there's really

462
00:28:11,760 --> 00:28:14,920
interesting contrast here where
philosophers have picked on

463
00:28:14,920 --> 00:28:17,560
something that's very common,
sensical, and really just

464
00:28:17,560 --> 00:28:21,640
people, you know, theology and
and and, but not so for

465
00:28:21,640 --> 00:28:25,960
phenomenal consciousness.
So the mind body problem in

466
00:28:25,960 --> 00:28:28,440
general very fascinating and
that's what this podcast is

467
00:28:28,440 --> 00:28:30,200
about.
Mind Body solution trying to

468
00:28:30,200 --> 00:28:33,320
figure out this.
The infamous mind body problem

469
00:28:33,920 --> 00:28:35,640
and that ties in often with free
will.

470
00:28:35,640 --> 00:28:37,720
You've done some fascinating
work on this and I think you

471
00:28:37,720 --> 00:28:40,800
show the cultural differences in
how we perceive these problems.

472
00:28:41,080 --> 00:28:44,840
Let's start with that.
I think that it's a great way to

473
00:28:45,000 --> 00:28:48,400
to showcase how differently we
think from different parts of

474
00:28:48,400 --> 00:28:50,160
the planet.
On the question of free will,

475
00:28:51,320 --> 00:28:55,280
absolutely yes.
So of free will is one of those

476
00:28:55,280 --> 00:28:57,880
concepts that might well be
universal.

477
00:28:58,320 --> 00:29:02,760
I think it's related in the way
we view ourself as agent, right.

478
00:29:02,760 --> 00:29:05,600
So we view ourself as the future
is open.

479
00:29:06,080 --> 00:29:09,400
I think it's really essential to
our self conception as an agent

480
00:29:09,400 --> 00:29:14,160
that what we do is not
predetermined and rather we are

481
00:29:14,160 --> 00:29:17,760
the source of what we do.
So I think that broadly

482
00:29:17,760 --> 00:29:20,440
understood in those terms.
I think something like free will

483
00:29:21,520 --> 00:29:26,640
and having control of our own
action is probably a universal

484
00:29:26,640 --> 00:29:29,600
concept.
That does not mean that that's

485
00:29:29,600 --> 00:29:34,360
very concept is not understood
in interestingly different ways

486
00:29:34,360 --> 00:29:38,360
and sometimes it's quite
different ways across different

487
00:29:38,520 --> 00:29:42,400
countries or different cultures.
And I think the two are often

488
00:29:42,400 --> 00:29:43,840
the case, right?
There's something, there's some

489
00:29:43,840 --> 00:29:47,600
form of universality, you know,
it's part of our self

490
00:29:47,600 --> 00:29:50,040
understanding that we are in
control of our own actions.

491
00:29:50,040 --> 00:29:53,680
The future is open, but there's
variation in the way control

492
00:29:53,680 --> 00:29:56,560
gets to be understood.
And So what we did with some

493
00:29:56,720 --> 00:29:59,680
colleagues, it was a very large
project that involved many

494
00:29:59,680 --> 00:30:03,040
different countries and many
different collaborators all over

495
00:30:03,040 --> 00:30:09,160
the world, was to examine
whether people take into account

496
00:30:09,400 --> 00:30:11,920
their environment in the same
way.

497
00:30:13,240 --> 00:30:20,400
And and the idea here is that in
some culture the role of the

498
00:30:20,400 --> 00:30:27,280
environment is going to be
leading you to view yourself as

499
00:30:27,280 --> 00:30:32,480
actually having less freedom.
So and I think it comes with a

500
00:30:32,480 --> 00:30:38,520
lot of work in psychology that
suggests that in some cultures a

501
00:30:38,520 --> 00:30:42,920
self is a bit metaphorical, but
bear with me is extended, right.

502
00:30:43,240 --> 00:30:48,320
While in other culture the self
is very much inside the

503
00:30:48,320 --> 00:30:53,760
individual, so Western cultures,
you know, it's maybe a bit of a

504
00:30:53,760 --> 00:30:58,160
caricature, I I suspect it is,
but there might be a grain of

505
00:30:58,160 --> 00:31:01,400
truth there.
Western cultures, and as maybe

506
00:31:01,400 --> 00:31:04,560
some other parts of the world,
tend to conceive of the self as

507
00:31:04,560 --> 00:31:09,240
being bound to the individual
and draws a very sharp contrast

508
00:31:09,240 --> 00:31:12,560
between the self and their
environment, his or her

509
00:31:12,560 --> 00:31:19,840
environment, by contrast, in
South Asian and East Asian

510
00:31:19,880 --> 00:31:24,000
traditions, So self is usually
thought to be extended.

511
00:31:24,160 --> 00:31:27,520
And So what happened to me
depends to some extent on what

512
00:31:27,760 --> 00:31:30,800
what happens to my environment,
including my personal relations.

513
00:31:32,320 --> 00:31:35,080
And so we that was part of the
beginning of the project.

514
00:31:35,440 --> 00:31:38,680
And then we thought, well, if
that's true, then people should

515
00:31:38,680 --> 00:31:42,280
view control in a very different
manner, right?

516
00:31:42,640 --> 00:31:47,200
So if that's true, if you're a
Westerner and maybe in some of

517
00:31:47,200 --> 00:31:51,080
the parts of the world you know,
whether you're in control of

518
00:31:51,080 --> 00:31:55,600
your action just depends on what
you do, not on your environment.

519
00:31:55,600 --> 00:32:00,360
Your environment can change.
It has very little impact on on

520
00:32:00,360 --> 00:32:02,400
whether you have control on your
action.

521
00:32:02,800 --> 00:32:10,840
By contrast, in some of the East
Asian cultures and South Asian

522
00:32:10,840 --> 00:32:13,920
culture, but we mostly focus on
East Asian culture, China, Japan

523
00:32:13,920 --> 00:32:19,640
and Korea.
More precisely, we observed we

524
00:32:19,640 --> 00:32:24,120
we predicted that change in the
environment would actually be

525
00:32:24,120 --> 00:32:26,920
reflected in a change in
control.

526
00:32:28,440 --> 00:32:31,840
So you know in some situation
people should feel that the

527
00:32:31,840 --> 00:32:37,200
agent has a very little control
over her action because the

528
00:32:37,200 --> 00:32:39,520
environment has changed in some
way.

529
00:32:40,520 --> 00:32:42,280
OK, so that was a basic idea,
right.

530
00:32:42,280 --> 00:32:46,080
Because the self might be have a
different in a sense extent

531
00:32:46,080 --> 00:32:49,360
being very narrow or being
extended control itself should

532
00:32:49,360 --> 00:32:52,800
be conceptualized in different
ways in different cultures.

533
00:32:52,880 --> 00:32:54,480
That was the inspiration of the
work.

534
00:32:54,920 --> 00:32:58,320
And So what we did, we use this,
we use various cases, but the

535
00:32:58,440 --> 00:33:01,960
crucial case was is what is
known as the Frankfurt case.

536
00:33:02,640 --> 00:33:05,400
And the Frankfurt case has this
very weird story.

537
00:33:05,400 --> 00:33:12,040
It's a very weird background
story where an agent wants to do

538
00:33:12,040 --> 00:33:14,320
some.
So imagine a situation where an

539
00:33:14,320 --> 00:33:18,120
agent has to make a choice.
So for example, an agent has to

540
00:33:18,120 --> 00:33:25,360
vote between let's say Trump and
Biden in 2020, two 1020 at the

541
00:33:25,360 --> 00:33:28,600
last election.
And then there's another agent

542
00:33:28,680 --> 00:33:30,160
with the neuroscientist, let's
say.

543
00:33:30,600 --> 00:33:34,760
And this neuroscientist has
tempered a little bit with the

544
00:33:34,760 --> 00:33:41,200
brain of the first agent, such
that if the first agent on his

545
00:33:41,200 --> 00:33:45,920
own or on her own vote for
Biden, nothing happens.

546
00:33:47,000 --> 00:33:54,040
However, if the agent intends to
vote for Trump, then there's a

547
00:33:54,040 --> 00:33:58,560
switch in the brain such that
the agent ends up voting for

548
00:33:58,560 --> 00:34:01,760
Biden.
So in any case, the agent will

549
00:34:01,760 --> 00:34:10,600
vote for Biden all right.
And in 2020 or voter or agent

550
00:34:10,600 --> 00:34:16,239
goes to the poll on N7 and on
her own vote for Biden.

551
00:34:17,880 --> 00:34:20,560
So nothing happened.
You know, the tempering of the

552
00:34:20,560 --> 00:34:23,520
brand.
You know the the, the chip that

553
00:34:23,520 --> 00:34:27,800
was put in the brand does not
intervene and and at the end of

554
00:34:27,800 --> 00:34:32,000
the day the agent votes, so to
speak, on her own for for Biden.

555
00:34:32,280 --> 00:34:35,600
It's an interesting case for for
a philosopher working on free

556
00:34:35,600 --> 00:34:40,120
will, because the agent could
not have done otherwise.

557
00:34:40,239 --> 00:34:43,280
At least it seems on some on
some readings that the agent

558
00:34:43,280 --> 00:34:46,880
could not have done otherwise.
If on her own she was going to

559
00:34:46,880 --> 00:34:49,000
vote for Biden, she would have
voted for Biden.

560
00:34:49,440 --> 00:34:52,600
If she intended to vote for
Trump, she still would have

561
00:34:52,600 --> 00:34:54,760
voted for Biden.
So she could not have done

562
00:34:54,760 --> 00:34:59,400
otherwise.
And but on the other hand, the

563
00:34:59,400 --> 00:35:03,880
agent seems to express, when she
votes for Biden, her own

564
00:35:03,880 --> 00:35:06,440
commitment, right.
She really means to vote for

565
00:35:06,440 --> 00:35:08,160
Biden, and she does vote for
Biden.

566
00:35:08,440 --> 00:35:12,800
So that's a contrast where the
agent's own commitment is

567
00:35:12,800 --> 00:35:15,960
expressed by her, her action.
She meant to vote for Biden.

568
00:35:15,960 --> 00:35:18,960
She votes for Biden.
But she does not have this

569
00:35:18,960 --> 00:35:22,000
counterfactual possibility of
having acted otherwise.

570
00:35:22,480 --> 00:35:25,360
So there's a cue seems to be
intention in that interesting

571
00:35:25,360 --> 00:35:29,600
structure.
And what we found when we gave

572
00:35:29,600 --> 00:35:33,280
that case to many people all
over the world is that most

573
00:35:33,280 --> 00:35:38,640
people in the world seem to say
that the agent is free, in

574
00:35:38,640 --> 00:35:41,920
control of her action and
responsible.

575
00:35:42,480 --> 00:35:44,280
And particularly in the US,
that's what they say in the

576
00:35:44,280 --> 00:35:46,360
Western world.
And that makes a lot of sense.

577
00:35:46,920 --> 00:35:49,600
If you think control depends on
who you are and you have this

578
00:35:49,600 --> 00:35:53,160
very narrow individuality, makes
a lot of sense because you

579
00:35:53,160 --> 00:35:55,080
express your preferences, your
commitment.

580
00:35:55,240 --> 00:35:57,440
You're committed for Biden.
She's committed for Biden, she

581
00:35:57,440 --> 00:35:59,640
votes for Biden, makes total
sense.

582
00:35:59,640 --> 00:36:01,000
So she's free and she's in
control.

583
00:36:01,760 --> 00:36:06,120
However, when we look at what
happened in Asia, it's mostly in

584
00:36:06,120 --> 00:36:13,520
Korea, Japan and China, but also
I believe in Indonesia.

585
00:36:13,800 --> 00:36:17,120
You know, I haven't reread the
paper recently and I don't quite

586
00:36:17,120 --> 00:36:20,520
remember about India, but I
think India is along the line of

587
00:36:20,600 --> 00:36:24,080
of of of China and and and and
Korea.

588
00:36:24,080 --> 00:36:26,720
But don't you know it's just my
memory.

589
00:36:26,720 --> 00:36:29,080
I just wanna add, I don't have
the paper right in front of me.

590
00:36:29,520 --> 00:36:33,520
What we found at this in in East
Asia is that people are much

591
00:36:33,520 --> 00:36:36,680
less likely to say that the
agent is free and in control.

592
00:36:37,080 --> 00:36:39,920
So, so in that, and I think the
explanation is the one we gave

593
00:36:39,920 --> 00:36:43,800
earlier, you and your control is
just not a matter of what's

594
00:36:43,800 --> 00:36:46,240
inside you.
And you know you might be

595
00:36:46,240 --> 00:36:50,640
committed, but your broader
environment matters for

596
00:36:50,640 --> 00:36:55,040
understanding control and for
understanding you know the

597
00:36:55,040 --> 00:36:57,960
expression of the self.
So the extension of the self.

598
00:36:57,960 --> 00:37:01,440
So you know, the fact that the
self is in a sense extended in

599
00:37:01,440 --> 00:37:05,440
this culture I think has an
impact on the way they think of

600
00:37:05,440 --> 00:37:09,160
control and and and free will.
So that's really a sort of, it

601
00:37:09,160 --> 00:37:13,720
was a totally unexpected but
sort of predicted result.

602
00:37:13,960 --> 00:37:17,360
I think, you know, that's a
really striking finding, that

603
00:37:17,560 --> 00:37:21,000
people might conceptualise
control and free will in very

604
00:37:21,000 --> 00:37:24,760
different ways, perhaps because
he understands itself in very

605
00:37:24,760 --> 00:37:26,800
different ways.
Yeah, I think it's very

606
00:37:26,800 --> 00:37:29,360
fascinating because this whole
concept of trying to understand

607
00:37:29,360 --> 00:37:31,560
free will.
And its impact on moral

608
00:37:31,560 --> 00:37:34,200
responsibility, I mean, these
two are fundamentally into

609
00:37:34,240 --> 00:37:36,000
intertwined.
I mean, how do we even set?

610
00:37:37,200 --> 00:37:40,000
Yeah, no, I couldn't agree more.
Well, at this point, from all

611
00:37:40,000 --> 00:37:42,000
the research you've done, where
do you stand on free world?

612
00:37:42,000 --> 00:37:43,680
Do you think it's compatible
with determinism?

613
00:37:43,680 --> 00:37:46,880
Do you think it's incompatible?
Do you have a stance in terms of

614
00:37:46,880 --> 00:37:50,560
giving a philosophical view?
I tend to be.

615
00:37:51,120 --> 00:37:55,280
I mean, I don't work really on
the metaphysics of of of free

616
00:37:55,280 --> 00:37:59,760
wheels, so I haven't given
nearly as much thought as I I

617
00:37:59,760 --> 00:38:04,160
should have.
My inclination is a little bit

618
00:38:04,200 --> 00:38:11,600
of a deflationary one.
I I do believe that the notion

619
00:38:11,600 --> 00:38:17,880
of free will is quite ambiguous
and and I do believe that the

620
00:38:17,880 --> 00:38:22,560
debate between, let's say, the
compatibilist and

621
00:38:23,840 --> 00:38:27,200
noncompatibilist and
incompatibilities is to a large

622
00:38:27,200 --> 00:38:31,040
extent of verbal debate.
So it's not a substantial

623
00:38:31,040 --> 00:38:35,520
debate, as I think there's a
very clear sense in which

624
00:38:36,920 --> 00:38:42,880
freewheel is compatible with
determinism, and there's also a

625
00:38:42,880 --> 00:38:46,640
very clear sense in which
freewheel is not compatible with

626
00:38:46,880 --> 00:38:50,360
determinism.
And I do think there's not much

627
00:38:50,360 --> 00:38:56,040
more to be said than than that,
because I think the word free

628
00:38:56,040 --> 00:39:01,840
wheels or the ideas around
control and freewheel are in

629
00:39:01,840 --> 00:39:05,360
fact polysemos.
You know, there's not one notion

630
00:39:05,360 --> 00:39:08,480
of free wheels, in fact many
notions of free will and people

631
00:39:08,480 --> 00:39:11,520
are often moving back and forth
and somewhat not.

632
00:39:11,520 --> 00:39:15,160
I mean let people in a confused
manner between this notion.

633
00:39:15,880 --> 00:39:19,640
So you can't really sort out
what is the meaning of the

634
00:39:19,640 --> 00:39:24,880
expression free will such that
you can get a univocal answer to

635
00:39:24,880 --> 00:39:28,600
the question, is free will
compatible with determinism?

636
00:39:28,760 --> 00:39:31,800
So that's a little bit in some
ways a differentiary attitude.

637
00:39:32,280 --> 00:39:36,400
There was a whole literature on
on free will and determinism.

638
00:39:36,640 --> 00:39:39,320
It's a little bit of a
disappointing conclusion in some

639
00:39:39,320 --> 00:39:42,680
ways because you know, you're
not taking a fighting stand with

640
00:39:42,680 --> 00:39:45,320
respect to one of the debate but
everything.

641
00:39:45,320 --> 00:39:47,800
There's really a lot of reason
to to undo that view.

642
00:39:47,800 --> 00:39:49,760
And I think so.
You know, when you look a little

643
00:39:49,760 --> 00:39:53,560
bit about how people use notions
such as control, responsibility,

644
00:39:53,560 --> 00:39:57,880
free will, you can really see a
great police in me in the way

645
00:39:58,040 --> 00:40:02,360
this notion happened to be used.
And so I I I've always found a

646
00:40:02,360 --> 00:40:06,640
metaphysical debate a little
bit, and I apologize to my dear

647
00:40:06,640 --> 00:40:10,560
colleagues underwhelming.
And I've never felt a great

648
00:40:10,560 --> 00:40:13,320
motivation to engage in it,
because it's always seems to me

649
00:40:13,320 --> 00:40:18,360
that people are talking across
each other past one another in

650
00:40:18,360 --> 00:40:20,560
that debate.
I'm not the only one to say

651
00:40:20,600 --> 00:40:23,520
that, of course.
The Chalmers, in a beautiful

652
00:40:23,520 --> 00:40:27,480
paper called I Think Verbal
Disputes published nearly ten

653
00:40:27,480 --> 00:40:30,840
years ago, has really also
expressed a very similar type of

654
00:40:30,840 --> 00:40:33,640
view, and independently of him.
But I've been very also

655
00:40:33,640 --> 00:40:38,840
convinced by the way he friends,
he friends at a position about

656
00:40:38,840 --> 00:40:41,760
the free will debate.
I find, I mean what you spoke

657
00:40:41,760 --> 00:40:43,840
about earlier, what I'd like to
unpack that a bit more because I

658
00:40:43,840 --> 00:40:46,520
find this, this whole concept of
personal identity very

659
00:40:46,520 --> 00:40:48,600
fascinating.
I mean we've got the East and

660
00:40:48,600 --> 00:40:52,960
the West both seeing themselves
in a very different way.

661
00:40:53,680 --> 00:40:55,480
Excuse me, sorry about that.
And.

662
00:40:56,120 --> 00:40:58,440
So how do you perceive personal
identity at this point do you

663
00:40:58,440 --> 00:41:01,560
think Like, because often
someone can make the case you're

664
00:41:02,360 --> 00:41:05,200
let's say, 30 trillion human
cells, 39 trillion bacterial

665
00:41:05,200 --> 00:41:06,560
cells.
Are you bacteria?

666
00:41:06,640 --> 00:41:09,080
Are you human?
I mean, how do we conceive of

667
00:41:09,080 --> 00:41:12,960
this idea of who the self is?
I I totally agree.

668
00:41:12,960 --> 00:41:17,480
So I so I I think there's a it's
a question of identity has

669
00:41:17,480 --> 00:41:22,840
become increasingly more
puzzling in recent decades, both

670
00:41:22,840 --> 00:41:27,840
for metaphysical reason.
I think Pathet's work in 1984,

671
00:41:27,840 --> 00:41:32,520
in his famous book, has really
raised so many puzzles about

672
00:41:32,520 --> 00:41:37,240
what it means to be the same
person across times and across

673
00:41:37,240 --> 00:41:39,680
possibilities.
But there's also that you

674
00:41:39,680 --> 00:41:43,640
alluded to right now the recent
discoveries about, you know,

675
00:41:44,200 --> 00:41:48,800
what leaves in me and the fact
that a large part of me is

676
00:41:49,200 --> 00:41:53,000
things that in some ways are not
me or as they or on they.

677
00:41:53,000 --> 00:41:56,520
And I think it has raised a lot
of, I think, deep metaphysical

678
00:41:56,520 --> 00:42:00,840
puzzles about what it means to
be oneself, what it means to be

679
00:42:00,840 --> 00:42:05,520
a single Organism, and what it
means to remain the same across

680
00:42:05,520 --> 00:42:09,880
time, both psychologically and
also just physiologically.

681
00:42:10,200 --> 00:42:15,080
And in fact, I think so.
Here's one thing I'm I'm

682
00:42:15,200 --> 00:42:21,720
sometimes tempted to say is that
our notion of oneness and

683
00:42:21,720 --> 00:42:28,040
identity are hard to reconcile
with the complexity of the world

684
00:42:28,040 --> 00:42:32,840
with we're dealing with you know
so we have this understanding of

685
00:42:32,840 --> 00:42:37,000
ourselves as a one person as as
as a unique.

686
00:42:37,160 --> 00:42:39,640
Now there is a variation as I
mentioned across culture about

687
00:42:39,640 --> 00:42:42,080
what that means to be to be to
be one.

688
00:42:42,560 --> 00:42:45,800
And I think some cultures maybe
put less emphasis on unity and

689
00:42:46,520 --> 00:42:50,640
you know from my understanding
Indian philosophical traditions

690
00:42:50,880 --> 00:42:54,520
have put less emphasis on the
unity or understanding in

691
00:42:54,520 --> 00:42:56,720
different ways.
But again I'm I'm I'm not not an

692
00:42:56,720 --> 00:43:02,120
experience there but still I
think it's it's often but is

693
00:43:02,120 --> 00:43:05,680
there something there that we we
are one agent and that's part

694
00:43:05,680 --> 00:43:07,840
again of a common sense for
understanding of the world.

695
00:43:07,840 --> 00:43:11,320
It's an important lay concept.
But I think this lay concept is

696
00:43:11,320 --> 00:43:16,960
not quite up to the task to make
sense of both of psychology

697
00:43:17,320 --> 00:43:21,760
where I think the idea that we
are one is wrong.

698
00:43:21,840 --> 00:43:24,400
We're not one.
The mind is not one.

699
00:43:24,400 --> 00:43:28,360
The mind is many in many ways in
many different things at the

700
00:43:28,360 --> 00:43:31,440
same time and the body is not
one.

701
00:43:31,440 --> 00:43:38,960
And in fact the puzzle here come
where when we import this common

702
00:43:38,960 --> 00:43:45,240
sense equal notion of identity
and we try to fit the reality to

703
00:43:45,240 --> 00:43:50,640
them or to tailor them to the
reality and and I think this is

704
00:43:50,960 --> 00:43:54,040
a losing proposition.
I think the right things that

705
00:43:54,040 --> 00:44:00,240
we're just not one we are we are
many and I think the idea to try

706
00:44:00,240 --> 00:44:06,040
to breed identity was at a
physiological level and at at a

707
00:44:06,040 --> 00:44:09,800
psychological level is is very
difficult to to it's very

708
00:44:09,800 --> 00:44:13,200
unlikely to succeed.
And I think a a much more

709
00:44:13,200 --> 00:44:17,440
interesting view rather than try
to either change the concept of

710
00:44:17,440 --> 00:44:21,680
identity or change the concept
of oneness and our self

711
00:44:22,360 --> 00:44:27,040
permanence is actually embrace
the reality and say actually I'm

712
00:44:27,040 --> 00:44:29,800
not one of many what does that
exactly mean.

713
00:44:31,240 --> 00:44:34,480
And I think the same is true
both for for biology and and for

714
00:44:34,680 --> 00:44:36,720
just an interesting question
about what it means to be an

715
00:44:36,720 --> 00:44:39,520
Organism.
How do you distinguish you know

716
00:44:39,560 --> 00:44:42,280
there's still a unity in
Organism.

717
00:44:43,120 --> 00:44:46,040
You know, there's a there's
processes that maintain a

718
00:44:46,040 --> 00:44:49,440
boundary between myself and the
other processes that allows me

719
00:44:49,440 --> 00:44:53,760
to in some ways remain, you
know, them.

720
00:44:53,840 --> 00:44:59,840
Yeah, be continuous across time.
So there's there's still a lot

721
00:44:59,840 --> 00:45:02,360
of interesting things to say,
even if you recognize that

722
00:45:02,480 --> 00:45:05,120
common sense equal notion of
identity are just not up to the

723
00:45:05,120 --> 00:45:08,440
task.
Yes, I prefer saying like I am a

724
00:45:08,440 --> 00:45:11,880
process.
Yeah, rather than that.

725
00:45:12,280 --> 00:45:15,480
That's right.
So yeah, John Dupree which who

726
00:45:15,480 --> 00:45:18,320
you you, you, you might know is
a Philip for biology at the at

727
00:45:18,320 --> 00:45:22,200
the University of Exeter has put
a lot of emphasis on the idea of

728
00:45:22,200 --> 00:45:25,800
of process and I do think it's
it's much more compatible.

729
00:45:25,800 --> 00:45:28,720
You know processes of course
have a form of unity, right?

730
00:45:28,720 --> 00:45:31,800
The same process in some way,
but a form of unity that's quite

731
00:45:31,800 --> 00:45:36,080
different from layer
understanding of things.

732
00:45:36,280 --> 00:45:39,760
Yes, yes.
Tell me, Edward, when from your

733
00:45:39,760 --> 00:45:41,520
work, I mean from when you think
about?

734
00:45:42,000 --> 00:45:44,480
The cultural differences from
the East and the West, moral

735
00:45:44,480 --> 00:45:46,720
responsibility.
How do you think these views on

736
00:45:46,720 --> 00:45:50,360
free world do impact moral
responsibility and implications

737
00:45:50,640 --> 00:45:52,760
moving forward?
So I know you spoke about the

738
00:45:52,760 --> 00:45:54,320
trolley experiment.
There's a lot of work that

739
00:45:54,320 --> 00:45:56,760
you've spoken about in general.
Do you want to touch on some of

740
00:45:56,760 --> 00:46:00,280
those aspects of how we apply
this to moral responsibility?

741
00:46:01,160 --> 00:46:03,440
Yes, of course.
A deep connection, I think an

742
00:46:03,440 --> 00:46:08,040
intuitively deep connection
between moral responsibility and

743
00:46:08,840 --> 00:46:16,880
being a free, a free agent.
Excuses often are given to

744
00:46:16,880 --> 00:46:19,760
people.
We excuse people's actions when

745
00:46:19,760 --> 00:46:24,880
we realize they were in some
sense are compelled to to act

746
00:46:24,880 --> 00:46:28,360
one way or the other.
So there's obviously some kind

747
00:46:28,360 --> 00:46:32,000
of connection here between
notions such as control, by

748
00:46:32,000 --> 00:46:35,000
contrast, notion, being
compelled to do something and

749
00:46:35,480 --> 00:46:38,400
being held responsible for for
what has done.

750
00:46:39,640 --> 00:46:44,200
I think it's fascinating
question about how variation in

751
00:46:44,200 --> 00:46:49,120
understanding about control
impacts our understanding of of

752
00:46:49,120 --> 00:46:53,000
responsibility.
Now it's it's a tricky question

753
00:46:53,000 --> 00:46:56,960
because it's obviously not the
case that it's a necessary

754
00:46:56,960 --> 00:47:02,000
condition for me for people to
be responsible for something

755
00:47:02,480 --> 00:47:06,160
that they even have done it one
of my things as such a thing as

756
00:47:06,400 --> 00:47:12,360
collective responsibility, you
might inherit responsibility for

757
00:47:12,400 --> 00:47:15,440
things you haven't done.
It's often, for example,

758
00:47:15,440 --> 00:47:17,960
discussed in the context of
genocide.

759
00:47:18,000 --> 00:47:22,760
For example, you know the show
as murders of the Jews in Europe

760
00:47:23,240 --> 00:47:28,840
in the 1940s.
Like in Germany, you know,

761
00:47:28,840 --> 00:47:31,760
there's been a lot, a lot of
discussion about whether or not

762
00:47:31,760 --> 00:47:33,800
there's collective
responsibilities that might be

763
00:47:33,800 --> 00:47:37,120
inherited across generations.
But of course, murder and German

764
00:47:37,120 --> 00:47:41,520
are not, haven't done anything
that didn't 'cause the murders.

765
00:47:41,520 --> 00:47:43,640
And their parents or
grandparents might have done

766
00:47:43,640 --> 00:47:46,560
something for French who
collaborated with the German,

767
00:47:46,600 --> 00:47:49,840
right.
You know, you know, I don't

768
00:47:49,840 --> 00:47:53,120
think Manchester did anything,
but supposing they did, I didn't

769
00:47:53,120 --> 00:47:57,480
do anything but one of my things
as a form of responsibility that

770
00:47:57,600 --> 00:48:01,480
that's that's inherited.
So what it does suggest here is

771
00:48:01,480 --> 00:48:05,200
that the notion of
responsibility, why it is

772
00:48:05,200 --> 00:48:09,480
connected to notion of control,
You know, that's a case of how

773
00:48:09,480 --> 00:48:11,920
do we get excused for what we've
done?

774
00:48:11,920 --> 00:48:15,120
Well, sometimes I'm compelled to
do something by external

775
00:48:15,120 --> 00:48:17,520
circumstances, so I'm not
responsible for what I do.

776
00:48:18,160 --> 00:48:21,320
It's relation with control is
actually quite complicated,

777
00:48:21,920 --> 00:48:26,560
right, Because I I clearly did
not have any control with what

778
00:48:26,560 --> 00:48:29,320
my grandfather did and nor did
modern Germany was that

779
00:48:29,320 --> 00:48:32,160
grandfather did.
But they might have in a sense,

780
00:48:32,160 --> 00:48:34,480
responsibility.
So what it does suggest here

781
00:48:34,480 --> 00:48:37,800
again, is that, as is often the
case, so when we take a folk

782
00:48:37,800 --> 00:48:40,520
notion, the one of
responsibility, there's a lot of

783
00:48:40,520 --> 00:48:46,040
flexibility here in the way it
relates to other notions, which

784
00:48:46,040 --> 00:48:47,400
is in many ways a very good
thing.

785
00:48:47,400 --> 00:48:50,160
If you're a philosopher, right
If you if, as soon as you

786
00:48:50,160 --> 00:48:54,280
understand that lay notions,
they have a a form of of,

787
00:48:54,400 --> 00:48:57,680
they're quite malleable and
they're quite used in many

788
00:48:57,680 --> 00:49:00,960
different ways depending on
various circumstances.

789
00:49:01,560 --> 00:49:05,360
It's a resource for a
philosopher because then you

790
00:49:05,360 --> 00:49:10,600
might want to recast the notion
of responsibility in a way that

791
00:49:10,600 --> 00:49:15,120
may be less connected to not
necessarily control, but to some

792
00:49:15,120 --> 00:49:18,840
form of control, to metaphysical
notion of control, or maybe to

793
00:49:18,840 --> 00:49:21,040
very individualistic notion of
control.

794
00:49:21,480 --> 00:49:25,840
So you might have broader notion
of responsibility that allow for

795
00:49:26,280 --> 00:49:30,600
forms of control that are not
really or less control or no

796
00:49:30,600 --> 00:49:33,840
control at all.
So that's in a sense, where I'm

797
00:49:33,840 --> 00:49:37,880
inclined it's which is because
leg concepts have this

798
00:49:38,040 --> 00:49:41,400
flexibility, we philosopher
should take advantage of that to

799
00:49:41,400 --> 00:49:46,440
retool them, to redefine them,
to to engineer a new concept of

800
00:49:46,440 --> 00:49:49,400
responsibility.
That's that's a way I I tend to

801
00:49:49,400 --> 00:49:52,920
think about my my not
necessarily objective work in

802
00:49:52,920 --> 00:49:56,440
this area, but my more normative
take about what we, philosopher

803
00:49:56,440 --> 00:49:59,160
should be doing when it comes to
responsibility.

804
00:49:59,920 --> 00:50:02,320
Have you Have you read the new
book by Robert Sapolsky?

805
00:50:02,600 --> 00:50:04,680
Determined.
No, I haven't.

806
00:50:04,680 --> 00:50:06,480
I haven't.
I haven't yet read it yet.

807
00:50:06,960 --> 00:50:09,880
It has just come, come, come,
come my way.

808
00:50:10,080 --> 00:50:12,440
I will definitively have a look
at it.

809
00:50:14,240 --> 00:50:16,280
Before reading it, do you think
that you're going to sort of

810
00:50:16,280 --> 00:50:19,560
agree with this view or I I'm
almost from what I've read.

811
00:50:19,560 --> 00:50:25,200
I'm almost certain I will.
I will disagree with the view it

812
00:50:25,200 --> 00:50:29,000
seems to be doing, I think, what
many scientists have done, which

813
00:50:29,000 --> 00:50:35,240
is being very impressed by the
causal network in which we're

814
00:50:35,240 --> 00:50:40,400
embedded and which is undeniable
because we are embedded in a

815
00:50:40,400 --> 00:50:45,720
complex causal network and I
think a bit too quickly jumping

816
00:50:45,720 --> 00:50:50,840
to denying free will.
As I said, I'm not, I'm not a

817
00:50:50,840 --> 00:50:55,000
compatibilist because I'm a
compatibilist of a sort because

818
00:50:55,000 --> 00:50:56,840
I believe it's at the end of the
day a verbal dispute.

819
00:50:57,320 --> 00:51:01,600
But I do my quick understanding
from the quotes I've read, from

820
00:51:01,600 --> 00:51:05,120
the reviews I've read, and
again, it's second hand, so bear

821
00:51:05,120 --> 00:51:09,240
with me.
But I think he he is

822
00:51:09,240 --> 00:51:13,360
underestimating the
sophistication is that

823
00:51:13,360 --> 00:51:19,000
compatibilities have put forward
to understand how freedom is

824
00:51:19,280 --> 00:51:24,320
compatible with determinism.
And I think you know a very

825
00:51:24,320 --> 00:51:26,720
classical position, the one
which I've always found,

826
00:51:27,200 --> 00:51:31,200
probably one of the most
interesting one, is thinking of

827
00:51:31,360 --> 00:51:36,880
of a free action as one that
expresses deep commitment of an

828
00:51:36,880 --> 00:51:40,720
agent.
So being free, which which of

829
00:51:40,720 --> 00:51:43,560
our actions are free?
Where's the one that expresses

830
00:51:43,560 --> 00:51:47,280
who we are at that time?
You know, that's why in the

831
00:51:47,280 --> 00:51:50,880
Frankfurt case, one might say,
well, the agents act, act freely

832
00:51:50,880 --> 00:51:55,040
in that circumstances because
her action reflects who she is.

833
00:51:55,040 --> 00:51:57,200
You know, she she wants to vote
for Biden.

834
00:51:57,200 --> 00:51:59,240
She's a Democrat.
She does not want Trump to be

835
00:51:59,240 --> 00:52:03,080
elected.
And and that a free action and

836
00:52:03,200 --> 00:52:06,560
that view is remarkably
compatible with determinism,

837
00:52:06,560 --> 00:52:09,920
right.
You know who I am is, of course,

838
00:52:10,040 --> 00:52:14,160
caused by my environment.
You know, You know, it's I'm.

839
00:52:14,160 --> 00:52:17,200
I'm part of the next use of
causes that has made who the

840
00:52:17,600 --> 00:52:20,840
individual I am.
But there's still someone I am,

841
00:52:21,880 --> 00:52:26,000
and some of my actions express
who I am, others don't.

842
00:52:26,240 --> 00:52:32,320
So you take my hand and you
compel me to hold that pen or to

843
00:52:32,360 --> 00:52:35,520
to to let that pen fall.
Well, that action does not

844
00:52:35,520 --> 00:52:37,560
express who I am.
You just compelled me.

845
00:52:37,560 --> 00:52:40,440
So it's not a free action.
But what is?

846
00:52:40,800 --> 00:52:44,680
On this view, determinism is a
little bit of a red herring for

847
00:52:44,680 --> 00:52:47,600
thinking about free will.
What matters is your values,

848
00:52:47,600 --> 00:52:49,880
your commitments.
That's really is a kind of thing

849
00:52:49,880 --> 00:52:52,640
that seems to be important.
So I think this is the type of

850
00:52:52,680 --> 00:52:57,800
of view that that one might
think anywhere are very

851
00:52:57,800 --> 00:53:01,040
attractive and are compatible
with determinism, entirely

852
00:53:01,040 --> 00:53:03,920
compatible with determinism.
I think the kind of resources

853
00:53:03,960 --> 00:53:07,360
are like that someone like the
police teacher seems to be just

854
00:53:07,760 --> 00:53:13,440
not not really giving them due.
Yeah, it doesn't seem to be

855
00:53:13,560 --> 00:53:15,000
taking them sufficiently into
account.

856
00:53:15,160 --> 00:53:17,080
But I haven't read the book.
Maybe he does.

857
00:53:17,320 --> 00:53:20,000
Maybe he has extremely powerful
objections.

858
00:53:20,000 --> 00:53:22,200
So I do plan to read the book in
the future.

859
00:53:23,160 --> 00:53:25,920
At this point, Edward, in terms
of your views on consciousness,

860
00:53:25,920 --> 00:53:28,120
you know, I mean, I know you're
a materialist at heart.

861
00:53:28,200 --> 00:53:32,800
And does your materialism seem
to align along with those like

862
00:53:32,800 --> 00:53:34,920
Dennett?
Frankie Sure.

863
00:53:34,920 --> 00:53:37,520
Does it go along more like the
lines of Philip Goff?

864
00:53:37,600 --> 00:53:38,960
Is it more of a pan psychic's
view?

865
00:53:38,960 --> 00:53:42,200
We, we, oh, I'm definitely not a
Pan, a Pan psychist.

866
00:53:42,440 --> 00:53:43,800
I'm definitely not a Pan
psychic.

867
00:53:43,840 --> 00:53:47,840
I think there's, I think Pan
psychism wants to explain

868
00:53:47,840 --> 00:53:52,320
mystery by more mystery.
And and I've always, I've always

869
00:53:52,320 --> 00:53:56,840
found that not quite the way to
provide good explanations.

870
00:53:57,040 --> 00:53:59,920
You know, postulating mysterious
things is not the way to provide

871
00:53:59,920 --> 00:54:02,760
an explanation.
In fact, it's actually the

872
00:54:02,760 --> 00:54:05,280
opposite or providing a good
explanation.

873
00:54:05,560 --> 00:54:08,240
Good explanation has those
features that we explain the

874
00:54:08,240 --> 00:54:10,880
mysterious by things that are
less mysterious.

875
00:54:11,200 --> 00:54:14,480
So we need to or the things we
understand to increase our

876
00:54:14,480 --> 00:54:16,400
understanding of what needs to
be explained.

877
00:54:16,480 --> 00:54:18,400
So that's the character.
That's the fundamental,

878
00:54:18,600 --> 00:54:22,920
essential characteristic of a
good explanation on psychics.

879
00:54:23,480 --> 00:54:26,240
Violate this requirement on
explanation.

880
00:54:26,240 --> 00:54:29,880
Suppose we let mysterious things
in order to explain things take

881
00:54:29,880 --> 00:54:31,920
to be mysterious, and this is
just not the way good

882
00:54:31,920 --> 00:54:35,440
explanations work.
So I've been, I'm, I'm, I'm

883
00:54:35,440 --> 00:54:39,840
definitely not a porn psychist.
I've grown very fond of of Dan

884
00:54:39,840 --> 00:54:43,320
Dannette over the years.
Surprisingly, you know, I

885
00:54:43,320 --> 00:54:46,480
started by being quite sceptical
of Dannette's philosophical

886
00:54:46,480 --> 00:54:50,080
positions.
While he's a materialist, I've

887
00:54:50,120 --> 00:54:52,800
I've always found when I was
younger, when might say when I

888
00:54:52,800 --> 00:54:58,520
was younger, his views about the
mind, unsatisfying, vague.

889
00:54:59,240 --> 00:55:03,160
You know, he has his views that
mental states are ascribed,

890
00:55:03,160 --> 00:55:07,280
they're part of the of a stance.
We take a stance when we assign

891
00:55:07,280 --> 00:55:09,960
mental states.
And I've never quite understood

892
00:55:09,960 --> 00:55:13,440
what that really mean.
And I've always found that as a

893
00:55:13,480 --> 00:55:17,280
very deflationary understanding
of the nature of of the status

894
00:55:17,280 --> 00:55:19,240
of the mental, of the ontology
of the mental.

895
00:55:19,600 --> 00:55:22,600
So I've always been more, at
least in the past, more

896
00:55:22,600 --> 00:55:26,520
attracted to views at tech, to
be mental states, to be real and

897
00:55:26,520 --> 00:55:30,560
to be identical to physical
states, either as a either as

898
00:55:30,560 --> 00:55:34,520
types or as token, right, If
you're not with reductionist,

899
00:55:34,680 --> 00:55:37,680
physicalist.
And so that was my my, my views

900
00:55:37,680 --> 00:55:39,520
for a very long time.
The type of views that Jerry

901
00:55:39,520 --> 00:55:44,120
Fodder for example, has, has has
developed in recent years,

902
00:55:44,120 --> 00:55:49,760
however, and mostly because I
find it very hard to bring my

903
00:55:50,120 --> 00:55:52,440
understanding of neuroscience
with my understanding of

904
00:55:52,440 --> 00:55:56,680
psychology, and I find the two
don't really mesh that well.

905
00:55:57,000 --> 00:56:00,760
And I and I've always found
attempts that OK, here are some

906
00:56:00,840 --> 00:56:05,360
a set of mental states I used to
explain behaviour either in lay

907
00:56:05,360 --> 00:56:07,680
explanation or scientific
explanation in cognitive

908
00:56:07,680 --> 00:56:10,200
science.
And then people looking at the

909
00:56:10,200 --> 00:56:13,400
brand and trying to look where
in the brand those could be

910
00:56:13,600 --> 00:56:15,360
trying to feed them in the
brand.

911
00:56:16,400 --> 00:56:20,800
I found this project has not
been very successful over the

912
00:56:20,800 --> 00:56:23,800
last 20 years.
You know, I I think it's very

913
00:56:23,800 --> 00:56:30,480
hard to just really identify any
mental state in the brain or no

914
00:56:30,480 --> 00:56:33,000
in the brain and the body.
If you're an embodied type of

915
00:56:33,000 --> 00:56:36,680
person.
And I've I've become much more

916
00:56:36,680 --> 00:56:38,680
sensitive.
Maybe, said Dandennett got

917
00:56:38,680 --> 00:56:43,240
something right.
So maybe, maybe it's a mistake

918
00:56:43,240 --> 00:56:46,520
to try to say, oh look, here's a
belief.

919
00:56:46,520 --> 00:56:50,040
Or here is a scientific mental
state that's Permu scientists

920
00:56:50,040 --> 00:56:54,120
postulate to expand behaviour
and here's a brand state, and

921
00:56:54,120 --> 00:56:57,200
the two are identical.
That's in a sense what I was

922
00:56:57,200 --> 00:57:00,000
hoping that we would at this
point, that we would be there.

923
00:57:02,160 --> 00:57:04,640
But we're not there at all.
Not at all.

924
00:57:05,600 --> 00:57:10,920
And it might be that the
relation between the the, the,

925
00:57:11,040 --> 00:57:14,600
the the mind, mental states,
psychological explanation and

926
00:57:14,600 --> 00:57:17,160
the brand neural expression is
not of that kind.

927
00:57:17,240 --> 00:57:22,360
It's actually of a different
type, and maybe Dandinet's views

928
00:57:22,360 --> 00:57:24,760
that mental states are more part
of a stance that gets to be

929
00:57:24,760 --> 00:57:28,520
assigned and neurosciences are
of different stance.

930
00:57:28,840 --> 00:57:32,920
And the two we should should not
be understood in terms of of

931
00:57:33,520 --> 00:57:36,360
identification.
But in fact we should have

932
00:57:36,360 --> 00:57:38,800
another way of thinking about
the relation between mental

933
00:57:38,800 --> 00:57:43,440
States and brain state.
I've grown very attracted to

934
00:57:43,440 --> 00:57:46,240
that view in recent years,
surprisingly.

935
00:57:46,240 --> 00:57:49,040
Perhaps it's because of my
greater acquaintance with

936
00:57:49,040 --> 00:57:54,840
philosophy of physics, where in
philosophy of physics at least,

937
00:57:54,880 --> 00:57:59,600
many people and some of my
favorite colleagues don't have

938
00:57:59,600 --> 00:58:05,120
the view that we should identify
physical state at a higher level

939
00:58:05,680 --> 00:58:07,560
with physical state at a lower
level.

940
00:58:07,800 --> 00:58:10,480
Just, you know, there's no real
very simple match.

941
00:58:11,360 --> 00:58:15,320
Yeah it's much more complex
relation and I think the same

942
00:58:15,320 --> 00:58:17,640
might well be true about the
mind and the brain.

943
00:58:18,200 --> 00:58:21,920
So anyway so it's it's my next
book might actually be about

944
00:58:21,920 --> 00:58:24,880
exactly that topic.
So I'm thinking I need to write

945
00:58:24,880 --> 00:58:28,400
a book on this very complicated
question, and because I'm I'm

946
00:58:28,400 --> 00:58:31,280
rethinking some of my former
commitments about relations

947
00:58:31,280 --> 00:58:34,400
between the mind and the brain
and going back to Dennett a

948
00:58:34,400 --> 00:58:36,640
little bit, trying to to
understand what he might have

949
00:58:36,640 --> 00:58:39,000
had in mind and trying to
elaborate on some of his views.

950
00:58:39,320 --> 00:58:41,240
You must check out some of the
work also done by Nicholas

951
00:58:41,240 --> 00:58:43,360
Humphrey.
Sentience is his latest book.

952
00:58:43,800 --> 00:58:47,880
I'll check that out.
Yeah, it's another great way

953
00:58:47,880 --> 00:58:50,360
because he follows along the
same lines as Dennett, except he

954
00:58:50,360 --> 00:58:54,240
calls it phenomenal surrealism.
Even though it's something that

955
00:58:54,240 --> 00:58:57,480
we're sort of inventing, it is
still considered to be more real

956
00:58:57,480 --> 00:59:00,560
than real.
Our experience of Red is

957
00:59:00,560 --> 00:59:04,240
actually more real than Red
within itself, but it's a it's a

958
00:59:04,240 --> 00:59:06,240
view that you should actually
read in and see if you.

959
00:59:06,240 --> 00:59:07,560
I will.
I will definitely check it out.

960
00:59:07,560 --> 00:59:09,720
I mean, I know of the book, I
just haven't had time to read it

961
00:59:09,720 --> 00:59:10,440
just yet.
I will.

962
00:59:10,480 --> 00:59:11,760
I will definitely check it out
at.

963
00:59:12,000 --> 00:59:13,640
This at this point in your
career, What?

964
00:59:13,720 --> 00:59:15,440
What?
What aspects of philosophy of

965
00:59:15,440 --> 00:59:19,320
science, cognitive science,
physics intrigues you the most

966
00:59:19,320 --> 00:59:21,800
and and where's your head at at
this point.

967
00:59:22,240 --> 00:59:24,640
So I'm finishing a book right
now and I'm.

968
00:59:24,680 --> 00:59:28,800
I've been really so I've been
working on it for seven years

969
00:59:29,640 --> 00:59:31,840
and it's a book about when
science goes wrong.

970
00:59:31,880 --> 00:59:35,800
It's about, it's a book about
scientific failure and I've been

971
00:59:35,800 --> 00:59:40,440
really excited by that, mostly
because of course we've learned

972
00:59:40,640 --> 00:59:44,880
a lot in for the last 15 years
about scientific failures with

973
00:59:44,880 --> 00:59:49,040
the replication crisis in
psychology in other fields like

974
00:59:49,040 --> 00:59:53,920
the biomedical sciences.
Also with the the discoveries

975
00:59:53,920 --> 00:59:57,120
that fraud in science is
actually not that rare.

976
00:59:57,120 --> 01:00:01,560
It's rare, but not that rare.
And I think as soon as you start

977
01:00:01,560 --> 01:00:03,720
reading a bit of a history of
science and in history and in

978
01:00:03,720 --> 01:00:07,040
Philosopher of science.
You do realize that failure is

979
01:00:07,040 --> 01:00:10,600
extremely common in science?
It's actually the rule of the

980
01:00:10,600 --> 01:00:13,360
game.
Science fails much more often

981
01:00:13,360 --> 01:00:19,000
than it succeeds.
And and for me it has raised, it

982
01:00:19,000 --> 01:00:22,160
has raised a lot of question
about how science work and about

983
01:00:22,160 --> 01:00:25,000
our relation science, about
whether we should trust science.

984
01:00:25,600 --> 01:00:29,080
If we should not trust science,
what should be our relation to

985
01:00:29,080 --> 01:00:32,080
science?
How can science be successful if

986
01:00:32,080 --> 01:00:35,800
it fails more often than not Is
it just a matter of luck?

987
01:00:36,120 --> 01:00:40,600
What kind of luck?
So so that's the kind of of of

988
01:00:40,600 --> 01:00:45,440
concerns that have been really
keeping me up at night for now a

989
01:00:45,520 --> 01:00:48,240
a few years.
You know when I was younger

990
01:00:48,280 --> 01:00:53,800
again I I I was very much
trusting science.

991
01:00:53,800 --> 01:00:56,760
I was a science booster.
I had a fairly naive

992
01:00:56,760 --> 01:01:00,240
understanding of how science
works, and I saw that I I

993
01:01:00,240 --> 01:01:04,120
related sounds a bit like as an
Oracle science SP.

994
01:01:04,920 --> 01:01:09,120
And in in recent years I've
actually lost entirely this,

995
01:01:09,360 --> 01:01:13,560
this attitude.
Now I'm I'm I've become quite

996
01:01:13,560 --> 01:01:17,520
sceptical of of science, not
sceptical of science as as a

997
01:01:17,520 --> 01:01:19,960
whole.
As a very successful epistemic

998
01:01:19,960 --> 01:01:22,480
enterprise.
I do believe science works and

999
01:01:22,480 --> 01:01:26,040
is is, you know, there's nothing
like science when we want to

1000
01:01:26,040 --> 01:01:30,800
learn about the world and act in
the world, But everyday science,

1001
01:01:31,360 --> 01:01:34,120
I think we should take it with a
lot of salt, with a grain of

1002
01:01:34,120 --> 01:01:36,240
salt.
In fact, you know, more than a

1003
01:01:36,240 --> 01:01:38,880
grain of salt.
And that has a kind of concern.

1004
01:01:39,080 --> 01:01:42,240
You know, reassessing my own
understanding of the process of

1005
01:01:42,240 --> 01:01:48,280
science is a is a very difficult
muddling through mistakes,

1006
01:01:48,600 --> 01:01:51,000
through failed attempts, through
dead ends.

1007
01:01:51,160 --> 01:01:54,240
That sounds really amounts to
and that my next book is about

1008
01:01:54,520 --> 01:01:56,840
all this kind of of of of
question.

1009
01:01:57,160 --> 01:02:01,920
So that's why it's something
I've been really excited by in

1010
01:02:01,920 --> 01:02:06,600
in in philosophy of of science.
It's funny how a philosopher

1011
01:02:06,600 --> 01:02:11,040
who's trying to critique science
often has to backtrack and make

1012
01:02:11,040 --> 01:02:14,440
sure that they that they let the
people know that they still love

1013
01:02:14,440 --> 01:02:17,760
science.
Oh, yeah, I I absolutely.

1014
01:02:17,800 --> 01:02:23,600
Interpret it so quickly, you You
are absolutely right.

1015
01:02:25,440 --> 01:02:29,400
I can't talk about these matters
without letting people know that

1016
01:02:29,480 --> 01:02:32,000
I'm.
I'm not a science skeptic of a

1017
01:02:32,000 --> 01:02:35,760
specific type.
I do believe that science has

1018
01:02:35,760 --> 01:02:38,040
been the most incredible
epistemic at a prize.

1019
01:02:38,400 --> 01:02:42,400
But you're quite right.
If I don't say that, people look

1020
01:02:42,400 --> 01:02:46,680
at me in a very weird manner.
I want to make it clear.

1021
01:02:46,920 --> 01:02:48,160
Yeah, I know, I know that
feeling.

1022
01:02:48,160 --> 01:02:50,680
Because when I started this
podcast, I mean I'm very much

1023
01:02:50,680 --> 01:02:52,400
pro science.
I love everything about it.

1024
01:02:52,560 --> 01:02:54,800
But when I when I critique it or
talk about it from a

1025
01:02:54,800 --> 01:02:58,200
philosophical perspective, I see
the comments I get and and and

1026
01:02:58,200 --> 01:03:00,480
it's really not justified
because a lot of people then

1027
01:03:00,480 --> 01:03:03,840
assume you're very much anti
science once you make one

1028
01:03:03,920 --> 01:03:07,000
critique which is not correct,
no, it's it's actually wrong.

1029
01:03:07,320 --> 01:03:10,960
It's actually wrong because in
fact, often we criticize science

1030
01:03:10,960 --> 01:03:13,320
because we love them, because we
are acquainted with it, because

1031
01:03:13,320 --> 01:03:16,360
we because we we want to to
understand it better, because

1032
01:03:16,720 --> 01:03:19,360
because we think that's also the
way a good, a healthy science

1033
01:03:19,360 --> 01:03:21,240
work.
So in fact, my view is that

1034
01:03:21,240 --> 01:03:26,360
scepticism is one of the most
important scientific virtue, and

1035
01:03:26,360 --> 01:03:29,880
I think it should be brought
forward more that we should not

1036
01:03:29,880 --> 01:03:33,360
be afraid of being sceptical of
what much of science tells us,

1037
01:03:33,360 --> 01:03:36,480
because this is a proper
scientific attitude.

1038
01:03:36,720 --> 01:03:39,720
So anyway, yeah, so I totally
I'm with you on this one.

1039
01:03:40,200 --> 01:03:42,640
A lot of people don't seem to
realise the normativity we apply

1040
01:03:42,640 --> 01:03:46,200
to our scientific experience.
I mean, everybody, every

1041
01:03:46,200 --> 01:03:49,720
scientist, has a normative value
they're applying to the search.

1042
01:03:49,720 --> 01:03:51,920
So no matter what they're
researching, there's something

1043
01:03:51,920 --> 01:03:55,080
in the back of their head that
is trying to prove or disprove a

1044
01:03:55,080 --> 01:03:57,720
bias of their own.
And we often need to remember

1045
01:03:57,720 --> 01:03:59,840
that at the at the end of the
day, thank you Edward.

1046
01:03:59,880 --> 01:04:01,840
This has been such an amazing
conversation.

1047
01:04:01,960 --> 01:04:03,960
Anything from your side?
Any final words?

1048
01:04:05,280 --> 01:04:07,600
No, I just wanted to to to to to
thank you.

1049
01:04:07,800 --> 01:04:11,880
I've really been enjoying also
this, this discussion.

1050
01:04:12,360 --> 01:04:15,360
It's been really covering a lot
of ground and it's been really,

1051
01:04:15,400 --> 01:04:17,080
really, really enjoyable.
Thanks.

1052
01:04:17,080 --> 01:04:19,120
Thank you very much.
Thank you so much Edward.

1053
01:04:19,120 --> 01:04:21,880
And therefore, if ever we have a
round two, I think the nice

1054
01:04:21,960 --> 01:04:24,360
something that I often enjoy and
the listeners really like is we

1055
01:04:24,360 --> 01:04:27,120
take a paper of yours and we
dissect it in depth.

1056
01:04:27,160 --> 01:04:29,400
And I and I run it through with
the audience.

1057
01:04:29,400 --> 01:04:31,680
People really seem to.
I would love that, I would love

1058
01:04:31,680 --> 01:04:33,280
that.
So feel free to reach out again

1059
01:04:33,280 --> 01:04:35,160
and we can we can schedule
another meeting.

1060
01:04:35,320 --> 01:04:36,640
Definitely.
Thank you so much, Edward.

1061
01:04:36,640 --> 01:04:38,720
Have a great day.
All right.

1062
01:04:38,720 --> 01:04:40,960
Thank you very, very much.
I really actually, I was very

1063
01:04:40,960 --> 01:04:43,160
sincere actually.
I really enjoyed the the

1064
01:04:43,160 --> 01:04:45,360
discussion.
I think it went, it went, it

1065
01:04:45,360 --> 01:04:48,760
went very well.
So yeah, it was, it was a real

1066
01:04:48,760 --> 01:04:50,080
pleasure.
Thanks again.