David Papineau: Is the Mind Just the Brain? Materialism & the Problem with Phenomenal Consciousness

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David, thanks so much for
joining me.

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I'm going to ask you a very
fundamental question, and I

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often ask this to my guests.
Can you give me a philosophical

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history of the mind body
problem?

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If you were to think about this
entire history of it, how it's

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framed, your views and your
current view on consciousness

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and the mind body problem, what
is the story you would tell?

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Good.
So I mean, I've written quite a

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lot about the history of the
mind body problem, but not going

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back that far, only going back
well, I guess as far as as

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Descartes, the scientific
revolution.

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So I'm no expert on how the mind
body problem was before that.

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But starting with Descartes, you
can see quite a simple sequence,

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I think.
So there's Descartes, we all

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know Descartes view, he's a
duelist.

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There's the physical world.
It's all it's all mechanical.

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It's just matter in motion.
And then in addition for

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Descartes, there's the mental
world and they and interact.

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He's an interactive duelist.
The mind affects the body, the

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body effects effects the mind.
And that was kind of the default

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position in early modern
philosophy with Descartes.

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But if you think from the let's
get the dates right from the

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middle of the 18th century, you
have a movement towards idealism

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and idealism becomes the
dominant, the dominant idea, at

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least in, in, in Western
philosophy.

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And that carries on through into
the 20th century.

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And if you're an idealist, there
isn't really a mind body

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problem.
The, the physical realm has just

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been shuffled off to the, to the
side.

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And then idealism starts
breaking down.

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And I'm in fact very interested.
I haven't written about it, but

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I'm I'm currently curious about
the history of what goes on when

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it breaks down.
Because you have, especially in

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Germany, you have Cantians or
neo Cantians who kind of a

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basically idealist empirical
world is the world of

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experience.
But at the same time, they're

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starting to take seriously
microphysical theories, the

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atomic theory of matter, kinetic
theory of gases, they're doing a

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lot of Physiology and they
really struggle to put the two

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perspectives together.
You know, everything is

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constructed out of materials in
the mind.

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But at the same time, it looks
like the mind is just this bunch

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of neural processes.
And how can and the neural

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process is a part of the
physical world that's

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constructed by the mind.
There's a terrible, terrible

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tangle there.
And we can go into details, but

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but by the middle of the 20th
century, the dominant view I

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think has become, and we can go
into the reasons for this, that

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that the physical world is
primary.

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So we've had right, we first of
all, we had dualism, both worlds

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are fundamental.
Then we had idealism, just the

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mental world.
Then we have a complete reversal

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physicalism.
There's just a physical world

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and and the the mental world, to
the extent it exists, of course

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it does, is part of the physical
world.

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So that's that's how I see the
history of the mind body problem

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in Western philosophy since
1600.

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I.
Think it's always it's always

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fascinating to see how someone
comes to their own view of

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consciousness or the mind body
problem based on their history

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and what they've learned about
it along the way.

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Something I'm particularly
fascinated by.

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Of course you are firmly a
materialist or physicalist,

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right?
And within this realm there's so

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many different theories of
consciousness.

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Just recently, Robert Kuhn
posted that wonderful taxonomy

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and it's.
I've, I've, I've seen that.

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In fact, I'm speaking to Robert.
He's interviewing me a

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conversation in a couple of
days.

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I think he's, you know, he's got
a competitor podcast and.

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Look, I'm speaking to him in
about, I think early fall, but.

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Because.
Podcast was he, my podcast was

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largely inspired by his podcast.
I mean, I, I even told him that

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by e-mail.
So we're going to chat as well.

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I'll ask him about your
conversation when the time

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comes.
But he wrote this wonderful

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taxonomy, and your name's in
there.

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It's mentioned, and it's
interesting to see all these

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different theories of
consciousness being discussed

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within this realm.
It's becoming very popular, it

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seems as well, but something
that's very apparent from the

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GIT.
Can you look at that taxonomy?

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Is that how many different
physicalist theories of

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consciousness they are?
So as a physicalist, what are

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your thoughts on this right now,
knowing that there's so many

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different thoughts?
Some people think it's an

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electromagnetic field, some
people think it's brain waves,

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some people think it's an epic
phenomenas.

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There's so many different views,
illusionism.

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Where's your head at on these
various physicalists?

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I think many people in this
area, people who think they're

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physicalists, take consciousness
much too seriously in the sense

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they reify it as a kind of
definite thing.

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And, and I think that a lot of
the thinking in that, in that

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line of business, especially, I
mean, including all the

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scientists who are trying to
develop some scientific theory

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of consciousness, they're
implicitly unknowingly motivated

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by thinking in a duellist way.
And it comes out in the way they

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talk.
They, they say the problem is to

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explain how does the brain give
rise to consciousness?

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How does it generate
consciousness?

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As if first of all, there's the
brain and then somehow there's

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this extra thing perhaps, you
know, comes on at certain point

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of evolution.
When did consciousness evolve?

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As if this is some, some extra
bit of material reality that

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comes into existence.
And I think that's taking

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consciousness much too
seriously.

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I think actually they're
thinking like Euless, they're

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thinking like Descartes.
They think there's all the

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physical realm.
And in addition, there's this

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extra stuff.
And there's going to be a sharp

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point at which this extra stuff
comes in existence and we need a

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theory of, of what causes it.
And I think that's all bad

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thinking.
And to that extent, I'm quite

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sympathetic to illusionists.
I mean, they saying if that's

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what you think of consciousness
is there ain't no such thing.

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I mean, I'm very disinclined to
say there's no consciousness.

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That sounds really silly.
I mean, of course we're

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conscious when we're awake.
We're conscious when we when we

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close our eyes, we lose our
visual consciousness.

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We don't want to stop talking in
those ways.

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But I think we're just talking
about a certain aspect of our

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physical processing.
And I'm rather suspicious that

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our everyday thinking about
consciousness, phenomenal

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consciousness, I mean, Ned
Block's very insistent, it's

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phenomenal consciousness.
We're thinking, not some kind of

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functionally defined state.
I don't think our everyday

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thinking of phenomenal
consciousness, what it's like,

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it's particularly precise.
I don't think it picks out an

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important scientific category.
I think it's a kind of loose way

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of referring to certain loosely
defined brain processes in

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humans, and it's not clear that
there's anything very definite

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that ties them together.
It's not clear that the notion

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is tight enough for us to decide
where the certain animals,

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octopuses, bees, lobsters, are
they conscious?

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And coming soon as a question of
which AI systems, if any, are

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conscious.
And I don't think we ought to

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spend a lot of time agonizing
about that question.

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I think when we start applying
the notion of consciousness

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derived from our own states to
these somewhat alien systems, I

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don't think it draws very sharp
lines.

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I, I think I agree with you that
sympathy that you feel for

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illusionism.
I, I don't think you know this,

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but I wrote a, my dissertation,
part of it, one of my theories

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of consciousness, one of the
aspects was writing and theories

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of consciousness.
And I wrote defending

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illusionism as a theory of
consciousness.

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And I find yeah.
Is it a Cape?

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Town.
Sorry.

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Was this a Cape Town?
Yeah, yeah.

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In Cape Town, South Africa.
Yeah.

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And it, I spoke to Keith prior
to this and during the course,

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Nicholas Humphrey, Mark Solms,
we all sort of, they pitched in

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and assisted me.
And so I gave them thanks in my

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dissertation.
But so I just spoke to Keith the

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other day and we were
discussing, we spoke for nearly

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five hours.
First we did a full podcast,

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then I allowed Keith to do a
full lecture for the show.

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So that's going to come out
soon.

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But we were just chatting about
how people don't understand what

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illusionism is.
So they think that that they're

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saying that there is no such
thing as consciousness, but

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that's not what they're saying.
They're saying that your idea of

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what you think consciousness is,
is actually the problem.

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And, and, and I think you were
touching on that slightly.

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I mean this the way people are
perceiving this problem seems to

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be the problem.
Yeah, yeah.

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I mean, so, so if you put it
like that, then I'm happy to

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agree.
It's I I just think it's odd to

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say consciousness is an
illusion.

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There's no.
I.

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Mean consciousness is an
everyday term, I mean.

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But of course, when you press,
when you press somebody like

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Keith or or Dandennett, rest his
soul.

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It turns out that underneath
they're really no different from

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kind of reductive physicalists
like me.

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No, they don't want to say
whenever conscious.

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They just want to say a certain
idea of consciousness is a

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mistake.
And there I agree with them.

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In fact, I, I think I'm probably
rather more radical than some

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than some illusionists in my
scepticism about a science of

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consciousness.
Consciousness is a thing that we

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can investigate.
But.

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Would you, would you describe it
as mysterionist in that sense,

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or would you?
No.

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No, I, I, I don't think there's
anything anything there that we

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it.
Cannot and at some point.

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Understand, I, I, I think our,
our concepts are too, too mushy

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to frame precise scientific
questions.

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But it's not that in reality,
there's something there that we,

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we don't have access to.
I think that's completely wrong.

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Yeah, I think that's exactly how
I feel about it.

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I think we're, I think we're
pretty much on the same page

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with it.
And I think that's why

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illusionism was so attractive to
me was because I saw it the way

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we're talking about it now.
And Keith slowly says his view

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is still the same.
However, I think he'd realizes

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that saying illusion of
consciousness might not be the

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best way to approach it.
And I think that's where someone

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like Nicholas Humphrey, who
calls it phenomenal surrealism,

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seems to be a better term.
So rather say instead of saying

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it's an illusion, say it's
surreal.

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It's something completely
different, but not what we think

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it is.
Yes, it's it's interesting.

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I don't think Keith or Dennett
were ever really definite about

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exactly which aspect of the
philosophical idea of

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consciousness they felt they
wanted to reject.

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I mean, a lot of the time,
Keith, and this is following

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Dennett, pick on the idea that
that colours and shapes are, are

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there in your conscious mind.
And then it's very keen on

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getting you to form an after
image of the American flag and

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then say, look, you know, you,
you think there's some whatever

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the reverse of red is, there's
some, there's some green there,

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but there's not, there's no
green anywhere.

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And so it's an illusion that
there's green and, and maybe

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that's one aspect of ordinary
thinking about consciousness,

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but, but I'm not sure that's an
important part of the everyday

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idea of consciousness.
I mean, if you ask people in the

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street, if you could get them to
focus on the question, do you

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think that when you see
something square, there's some

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squareness in your mind that
inside your mind there's

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something square?
I mean, I think if you've got

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them to focus on the question,
they'll probably say, no, that's

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silly.
Why?

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Why would anybody think that?
And and that's that's the thing

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that that Dennett and Keith
object to the most.

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And so, I mean, they're quite
right to object, but but to move

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00:13:24,040 --> 00:13:27,840
on from that say, and therefore
consciousness is an illusion as

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00:13:27,840 --> 00:13:30,120
people normally understand
consciousness, that seems to me

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00:13:30,120 --> 00:13:31,600
an extra step which I don't
agree with.

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00:13:32,600 --> 00:13:35,720
I think the main, the main part
that they were trying to cover

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was this was people believing
this is some sort of ethereal

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00:13:39,200 --> 00:13:41,600
essence like entity, almost like
the Ian Vital.

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00:13:41,880 --> 00:13:44,440
They, I think that was the main,
the core focus, at least for

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00:13:44,440 --> 00:13:47,200
Dennett's part, because for
people to believe that it's

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00:13:47,200 --> 00:13:49,920
almost like admitting there is a
soul or this is some sort of

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mystical, magical phenomenon.
But that's that, that's straight

238
00:13:53,960 --> 00:13:58,240
up duelist idea, right?
And, and if that's what we're

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00:13:58,240 --> 00:14:03,800
objecting to, then all
physicalists are illusionists,

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00:14:04,160 --> 00:14:09,160
which is not how Keith Keith
and, and presented they, they,

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00:14:09,240 --> 00:14:12,160
they present themselves as
somehow being more radical than

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00:14:12,160 --> 00:14:14,560
the physicalists.
All physicalists agree there's

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00:14:14,560 --> 00:14:17,520
no extra thing like like a vital
spirit.

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That's a duelist idea that we're
trying to get away from.

245
00:14:20,680 --> 00:14:22,720
Yeah.
I guess any would you consider

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00:14:22,720 --> 00:14:28,560
then an emergentism, a very
strong emergentism to to perhaps

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00:14:28,800 --> 00:14:37,520
fall into that category?
I, I think the term emergentism

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00:14:37,760 --> 00:14:40,880
muddied the water.
I mean, I'm, I'm, I've been in

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00:14:40,880 --> 00:14:46,400
this business quite a long time
now and, and we all struggle

250
00:14:46,400 --> 00:14:52,640
through the 70s and 80s and 90s
looking at different kinds of

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00:14:52,640 --> 00:14:56,240
non reductive physicalism and
supervenience and global

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00:14:56,240 --> 00:15:02,200
supervenience and so on.
And we got, we got clear about

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what was a duelist position and
what was a, a, a physicalist

254
00:15:06,960 --> 00:15:09,800
position without talking about
emergence.

255
00:15:10,360 --> 00:15:17,840
And if, if, if there's nothing
in the mind that's over and

256
00:15:17,840 --> 00:15:22,000
above the physical stuff, if the
physical stuff metaphysically

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00:15:22,000 --> 00:15:25,680
guarantees the mental stuff,
then you're a physicalist.

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00:15:26,000 --> 00:15:30,400
If you think there's a possible
worlds in which you have all the

259
00:15:30,400 --> 00:15:33,680
physical stuff and you don't
have the mental stuff, then

260
00:15:33,680 --> 00:15:36,800
you're a duelist.
And, and then, and that's all

261
00:15:36,800 --> 00:15:38,720
nice and clear.
And then people come along and

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00:15:38,720 --> 00:15:42,000
say, well, it emerges, right?
It emerges.

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00:15:42,000 --> 00:15:46,720
And you think, hang on, well,
does emergence mean that there's

264
00:15:46,720 --> 00:15:50,800
something guaranteed by the
physical stuff that maybe can't

265
00:15:50,800 --> 00:15:56,160
be defined in physical terms, IE
weak emergence, which is just a

266
00:15:56,160 --> 00:15:59,080
version of physicalism?
Or does it mean there's

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00:15:59,080 --> 00:16:02,640
something that's not guaranteed
by the physical stuff at all, IE

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00:16:02,640 --> 00:16:05,360
dualism?
And that's what people call

269
00:16:05,360 --> 00:16:08,400
strong emergence.
So, so I don't think it helps to

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00:16:08,400 --> 00:16:10,720
bring in the term emergence.
And and when, you know, when we

271
00:16:10,720 --> 00:16:13,120
start pressing, it turns out
weak emergence is just

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00:16:13,600 --> 00:16:16,520
physicalism allowing that you
can't necessarily define

273
00:16:16,520 --> 00:16:20,840
anything as strictly physical
terms, IE non reductive, non

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00:16:20,840 --> 00:16:24,360
reductive physicalism and strong
emergence is just dualism.

275
00:16:24,360 --> 00:16:27,200
So I mean, maybe I'm missing
something, you can you can tell

276
00:16:27,200 --> 00:16:29,200
me.
No, I think you're covering it

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00:16:29,200 --> 00:16:33,240
quite well.
It's been about 20 to 22 years

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00:16:33,240 --> 00:16:35,240
since you wrote Thinking about
Consciousness.

279
00:16:35,920 --> 00:16:37,360
I guess.
I guess.

280
00:16:37,920 --> 00:16:43,800
Yeah, it's it's 2002 years.
So between then and now, how

281
00:16:43,800 --> 00:16:45,480
have your thoughts on
consciousness changed?

282
00:16:45,600 --> 00:16:49,840
If they have in any way?
Good.

283
00:16:54,280 --> 00:16:56,320
Not very much.
It's a wonderful book by the

284
00:16:56,320 --> 00:16:59,440
way, just just everyone watching
a list and they can, they can

285
00:16:59,440 --> 00:17:01,520
read it.
I'll put a link to it as well.

286
00:17:02,160 --> 00:17:04,079
Thank you very much.
Not very much at all.

287
00:17:04,079 --> 00:17:09,800
In fact, Tim Crane emailed me.
In fact, did he e-mail me?

288
00:17:09,800 --> 00:17:14,480
I think he texted me a week or
two ago saying, look, what's

289
00:17:14,480 --> 00:17:33,600
your most up to
And so I said I, you know, I, I

290
00:17:33,600 --> 00:17:36,160
think, I think the best thing
I've written on the arguments of

291
00:17:36,160 --> 00:17:42,120
physicalism is still in that
book and I've changed my mind on

292
00:17:42,120 --> 00:17:46,200
some, some details.
I wrote a long paper on

293
00:17:46,880 --> 00:17:52,560
phenomenal concepts and I think
I was thinking about them in a

294
00:17:52,560 --> 00:17:56,640
bad way in the book.
I now don't think of them as

295
00:17:57,680 --> 00:18:01,120
demonstrative concepts or
quotational concepts.

296
00:18:01,200 --> 00:18:05,600
I think of them as more just
recognitional concepts.

297
00:18:06,280 --> 00:18:09,680
So that's one thing I'm
different about.

298
00:18:12,560 --> 00:18:15,160
A strong theme in the book is
the thing we've touched on

299
00:18:15,160 --> 00:18:19,840
already, the extent to which
people are inclined to think in

300
00:18:19,840 --> 00:18:23,440
duellist terms when they don't
realize that they say they're

301
00:18:23,440 --> 00:18:26,160
physicalists, but really they're
thinking in duellist terms and

302
00:18:26,160 --> 00:18:29,040
generating problems for
themselves by thinking in

303
00:18:29,040 --> 00:18:32,520
duellist terms.
And in the book and in my early

304
00:18:32,520 --> 00:18:36,040
writing, I heard a specific
theory of why that was, which I

305
00:18:36,040 --> 00:18:39,600
called the antipathetic fallacy.
I said, you know, when you think

306
00:18:39,600 --> 00:18:43,560
of a mental state subjectively
in terms of what it's like, it

307
00:18:43,560 --> 00:18:47,000
feels very different from
thinking about it as a physical

308
00:18:47,000 --> 00:18:49,520
state.
And somehow the the way you're

309
00:18:49,680 --> 00:18:52,520
two ways of thinking about it a
different confuses you into

310
00:18:52,520 --> 00:18:55,240
thinking that what you're
thinking about is different.

311
00:18:55,840 --> 00:18:59,680
And now I'm not so sure that
that's the right explanation of

312
00:18:59,680 --> 00:19:03,000
the what I call the intuition of
duelism, intuition of

313
00:19:03,000 --> 00:19:07,440
distinctness.
And I'm open to, I mean, why

314
00:19:07,440 --> 00:19:09,840
should there be one explanation?
There's maybe lots of reasons

315
00:19:09,840 --> 00:19:12,040
that pressure people into
thinking in duellist ways.

316
00:19:12,680 --> 00:19:21,120
So I'm a bit different on that.
And I think I had Kripke wrong

317
00:19:21,200 --> 00:19:23,800
in the book along with everybody
else.

318
00:19:24,240 --> 00:19:30,880
I took Kripke to be a special
case of what's called the

319
00:19:30,880 --> 00:19:33,800
two-dimensional argument against
physicalism.

320
00:19:33,920 --> 00:19:37,800
And I know, I think that's
clearly not what Kripke was up

321
00:19:37,800 --> 00:19:39,120
to.
And I've written a couple of

322
00:19:39,120 --> 00:19:41,880
papers about how to understand
Kripke's argument.

323
00:19:41,880 --> 00:19:43,400
I think it's a very interesting
argument.

324
00:19:43,880 --> 00:19:48,240
So I mean, but as you can see,
these these are kind of quite

325
00:19:48,240 --> 00:19:50,160
specific technical points of
detail.

326
00:19:50,240 --> 00:19:52,760
The the the the main, the main
thing of the book I'm still

327
00:19:53,320 --> 00:19:57,640
pretty keen on, especially the
bit at the end, which is kind of

328
00:19:57,640 --> 00:20:02,520
added on to all my engagement
with the technical literature on

329
00:20:02,520 --> 00:20:06,560
consciousness, which is.
Arguing that our notion of

330
00:20:07,720 --> 00:20:11,000
notion of consciousness and
notion Ned Block's notion of

331
00:20:11,000 --> 00:20:15,040
phenomenal consciousness is not
a very precise notion.

332
00:20:15,360 --> 00:20:18,480
It's it's vague or
indeterminate.

333
00:20:18,560 --> 00:20:22,720
It, it's not sufficiently
focused to tell us whether

334
00:20:23,400 --> 00:20:25,840
lobsters are conscious.
I mean, not, it's not that we're

335
00:20:25,840 --> 00:20:28,120
ignorant about with logic.
It's not sufficiently focused

336
00:20:28,920 --> 00:20:31,600
for there to be a fact of the
matter about whether lobsters

337
00:20:31,600 --> 00:20:34,760
are conscious.
I mean, maybe that's an

338
00:20:34,880 --> 00:20:43,120
interesting way to put my my
somewhat illusionist anti

339
00:20:43,120 --> 00:20:45,600
realist about you, about
consciousness.

340
00:20:45,600 --> 00:20:53,040
I I, I think asking whether did
I say octopuses or lobsters.

341
00:20:53,040 --> 00:20:54,760
I'm jumping back and forth the.
Same.

342
00:20:54,760 --> 00:20:56,760
I think you said lobsters.
Yeah.

343
00:20:58,720 --> 00:21:01,080
I could be wrong.
People worry about whether

344
00:21:01,080 --> 00:21:04,120
whether we can mistreat
lobsters, whether we can boil

345
00:21:04,120 --> 00:21:06,040
them alive.
And they say, oh, well, if

346
00:21:06,040 --> 00:21:07,320
they're not conscious, it'll be
all right.

347
00:21:07,320 --> 00:21:08,960
If they are conscious, it would
be terrible.

348
00:21:09,240 --> 00:21:11,120
So we've got to find out whether
they're conscious.

349
00:21:11,800 --> 00:21:15,480
And I think that's a mug's game.
I don't think you are going to

350
00:21:15,480 --> 00:21:16,560
find out whether they're
conscious.

351
00:21:16,560 --> 00:21:20,600
Because what you're really
asking is, do they have states

352
00:21:21,000 --> 00:21:24,040
like these ones, the ones I have
when my eyes are open and I'm

353
00:21:24,040 --> 00:21:27,240
awake.
And in truth, they have states

354
00:21:27,240 --> 00:21:30,520
that are like that in some
respects and not like that in

355
00:21:30,520 --> 00:21:33,640
many other respects.
And there's no fact of the

356
00:21:33,640 --> 00:21:35,920
matter about whether they're
conscious.

357
00:21:35,920 --> 00:21:38,480
I don't think it follows that
there's no fact of the matter

358
00:21:38,960 --> 00:21:41,240
about how you should treat them.
I mean, that's something we're

359
00:21:41,240 --> 00:21:44,200
working on at the moment.
And so I think the questions of

360
00:21:44,200 --> 00:21:49,960
animal welfare and in the future
AI welfare should be addressed

361
00:21:49,960 --> 00:21:52,800
directly.
Find out about lobsters, find

362
00:21:52,800 --> 00:21:55,680
out about how complex they are,
find out about what kinds of

363
00:21:56,320 --> 00:22:00,800
projects they pursue, and so on.
And on that basis, you can

364
00:22:00,800 --> 00:22:05,280
figure out whether it's OK to
mistreat them, in what ways you

365
00:22:05,280 --> 00:22:07,160
can treat them.
But don't.

366
00:22:07,680 --> 00:22:10,120
Don't try and decide first
whether they're conscious you'll

367
00:22:10,120 --> 00:22:14,720
you you're going often a
helpless, I mean a unhelpful

368
00:22:14,720 --> 00:22:16,360
detour.
Yeah, it's, it's almost like

369
00:22:16,360 --> 00:22:19,080
trying to figure out almost
intelligence at that point.

370
00:22:19,200 --> 00:22:21,680
What, what, what kind of
intelligences are they showing

371
00:22:21,720 --> 00:22:24,080
via the behaviour, what they're
doing?

372
00:22:24,640 --> 00:22:26,640
So it's not necessarily about
consciousness at this point.

373
00:22:26,640 --> 00:22:27,840
We're actually talking about
more.

374
00:22:28,360 --> 00:22:30,800
Are they showing into
intelligent life and

375
00:22:31,000 --> 00:22:33,560
interactivity with the world?
Good, good.

376
00:22:33,680 --> 00:22:35,480
So.
But when we talk about

377
00:22:35,480 --> 00:22:39,200
intelligence, it's perfectly
clear that this is going to come

378
00:22:39,200 --> 00:22:42,360
in degrees.
If you want a yes, no answer to

379
00:22:42,360 --> 00:22:45,200
are lobsters intelligent?
You really aren't going to get

380
00:22:45,200 --> 00:22:47,080
it.
It's a it's a pretty open-ended

381
00:22:47,520 --> 00:22:50,440
concept.
You can specify what level of

382
00:22:50,440 --> 00:22:53,960
intelligence they have, but it's
not a yes, no thing.

383
00:22:54,320 --> 00:22:57,320
And then having figured out what
level of intelligence they have,

384
00:22:57,560 --> 00:23:00,520
you can figure out how you
should how you should treat

385
00:23:00,520 --> 00:23:02,440
them.
And but when it comes to

386
00:23:02,440 --> 00:23:05,200
consciousness, people are
inclined to think about it

387
00:23:05,200 --> 00:23:06,960
differently.
Think I know consciousness.

388
00:23:07,440 --> 00:23:10,840
Now there's a yes, no question.
Now there's the question of does

389
00:23:10,840 --> 00:23:13,280
the light come on in the in the
in?

390
00:23:14,440 --> 00:23:17,840
And I think are they conscious?
Is just like asking are they

391
00:23:17,840 --> 00:23:20,200
intelligent?
I mean, how much of A point of

392
00:23:20,200 --> 00:23:22,920
view do they have?
How far do they have a project?

393
00:23:22,920 --> 00:23:25,320
How far do they distinguish
themselves from the rest of the

394
00:23:25,320 --> 00:23:28,200
world?
Think of themselves as, I mean,

395
00:23:28,200 --> 00:23:35,280
clearly in some sense they do.
And so Jonathan Birch at the

396
00:23:35,280 --> 00:23:38,760
NSC, just across the road from
me in London, has just this very

397
00:23:38,760 --> 00:23:42,480
fine book, which I spend a lot
of time talking to him about

398
00:23:42,840 --> 00:23:45,440
before he published it, called
The Edge of Sentience.

399
00:23:46,280 --> 00:23:49,480
And it's it's, it's, it's about
animal welfare.

400
00:23:50,200 --> 00:23:54,000
But he hinges the whole debate
on we've got to figure out

401
00:23:54,000 --> 00:23:59,680
whether they're conscious.
And and then he says it's, it's,

402
00:24:01,600 --> 00:24:05,000
it's kind of hard to be sure.
So we should err on the side of

403
00:24:05,000 --> 00:24:07,160
caution.
So let's look at all the things

404
00:24:07,160 --> 00:24:09,720
they do.
And that's some indication that

405
00:24:09,720 --> 00:24:11,920
they're conscious.
Therefore we should treat them.

406
00:24:11,920 --> 00:24:16,600
We should, you know, we should
take their interest into account

407
00:24:16,600 --> 00:24:18,320
in, in thinking about how to
treat them.

408
00:24:18,320 --> 00:24:22,320
And I think he gets to the right
answer, but he's taken this

409
00:24:22,800 --> 00:24:26,040
unhelpful detour through the
question of are they conscious?

410
00:24:26,040 --> 00:24:27,440
Which I don't think adds
anything.

411
00:24:27,800 --> 00:24:30,040
I think it's quite, it's such a
slippery slope to have that

412
00:24:30,040 --> 00:24:32,640
discussion.
Because when I think about if,

413
00:24:32,680 --> 00:24:35,240
let's say if you're a pan psych
is an idealist, if you think

414
00:24:35,240 --> 00:24:37,520
either everything is conscious
or everything has an element of

415
00:24:37,520 --> 00:24:40,800
consciousness, you're, you tend
to have certain different moral

416
00:24:40,800 --> 00:24:43,560
and ethical views.
But if you're a physicalist and

417
00:24:43,560 --> 00:24:46,920
you're trying to find a specific
aspect when something switches

418
00:24:46,920 --> 00:24:49,640
on or if the light switches on
and off, you're placed in such a

419
00:24:49,640 --> 00:24:54,160
weird ethical dilemma and your
behaviour has to somehow show

420
00:24:54,400 --> 00:24:55,880
that you believe this in some
way.

421
00:24:56,720 --> 00:24:59,280
I think a good approach would be
to assume everything is

422
00:24:59,440 --> 00:25:03,600
intelligent in varying degrees
and then try to treat them in

423
00:25:03,600 --> 00:25:06,400
specific ways and give you an
example, ancient cultures, when

424
00:25:06,400 --> 00:25:09,200
they would kill an animal or eat
a certain meal, they'd do a

425
00:25:09,200 --> 00:25:13,240
prayer around it, sort of have a
ritual around this thing to sort

426
00:25:13,240 --> 00:25:17,040
of show appreciation for this
intelligence and and then fully

427
00:25:17,040 --> 00:25:19,440
acknowledge that you've done
something to it.

428
00:25:20,600 --> 00:25:23,280
But I'm also not not giving any
ethical advice for everyone.

429
00:25:23,280 --> 00:25:25,600
Who's going to Who's going to
shit on me in the comments?

430
00:25:27,040 --> 00:25:30,000
So I'm I'm slightly curious
about Pancychus.

431
00:25:30,000 --> 00:25:33,480
I mean you you, you read off
from Pancychism that they will

432
00:25:33,480 --> 00:25:37,640
regard all to.
Have sort of protocol.

433
00:25:37,840 --> 00:25:42,600
All life and not just all life,
all all reality deserving of

434
00:25:42,600 --> 00:25:44,760
moral respect.
I mean, I don't think they'd be

435
00:25:44,760 --> 00:25:46,640
too quick to draw that
consequence, would they?

436
00:25:46,640 --> 00:25:51,080
I mean, it's not like stones
need to be.

437
00:25:51,440 --> 00:25:53,120
Their moral interests need to be
considered.

438
00:25:53,120 --> 00:25:57,120
So, so they they're going to
have to bring in some other

439
00:25:57,120 --> 00:26:01,360
level of kind of moral, morally
significant consciousness on top

440
00:26:01,360 --> 00:26:04,160
of their their panpsychism.
But what?

441
00:26:05,240 --> 00:26:08,040
What are your thoughts on the
fact that panpsychism does seem

442
00:26:08,040 --> 00:26:15,640
to be growing at a still or do
you believe?

443
00:26:15,640 --> 00:26:17,880
You know, I, I'm, I'm just, I'm
just trying to get into phone.

444
00:26:17,880 --> 00:26:27,400
I, I, I think it's all perverse
and, and where's the mistake?

445
00:26:27,960 --> 00:26:37,360
I mean, they have to assume
something that I find very

446
00:26:37,360 --> 00:26:48,920
difficult to take seriously,
which is that after you've

447
00:26:50,800 --> 00:26:56,720
fixed, specified how things
behave, how all the things in

448
00:26:56,720 --> 00:27:01,640
the world interact, I you
specify the laws, the shape of

449
00:27:01,640 --> 00:27:06,040
the laws that govern the world,
then there's a further question

450
00:27:07,080 --> 00:27:12,880
about which properties, as it
were, as it sometimes put,

451
00:27:12,880 --> 00:27:18,480
breathe fire into the equations,
which properties play these law

452
00:27:18,480 --> 00:27:21,200
like roles, these nomological
roles.

453
00:27:21,680 --> 00:27:26,800
So they're all committed to the
view that the properties are

454
00:27:26,800 --> 00:27:31,800
separate from the behaviour.
So I mean, they're committed to

455
00:27:31,800 --> 00:27:36,800
the view that there could be a
world just like this world in

456
00:27:36,800 --> 00:27:42,480
which you have material bodies
and you subject to the forces

457
00:27:42,480 --> 00:27:47,080
they accelerate to a certain
degree, but in in which the role

458
00:27:47,080 --> 00:27:51,440
of resistance to acceleration
isn't played by mass, but by

459
00:27:51,440 --> 00:27:57,520
some different quantity smash.
And so their idea is the laws

460
00:27:57,520 --> 00:28:01,720
don't fix the properties.
And that seems to me crazy.

461
00:28:01,720 --> 00:28:05,160
A world that's just like this
world and bodies are

462
00:28:05,160 --> 00:28:10,360
characterized by a quantity that
measures their resistance to

463
00:28:10,360 --> 00:28:16,160
acceleration and measures their
gravitational charge and so on,

464
00:28:16,360 --> 00:28:19,640
but in which that quantity isn't
mass, but something else that's

465
00:28:19,640 --> 00:28:22,400
not another world, that's just
the same world once more.

466
00:28:23,000 --> 00:28:31,800
So their whole position is, is
is built on the assumption that

467
00:28:31,880 --> 00:28:34,360
even after you've got the
behaviour all fixed, there's a

468
00:28:34,360 --> 00:28:38,000
further question of what comes
in to, as it were, play the

469
00:28:38,000 --> 00:28:43,280
behaviour, play the roles.
And the reason they're attracted

470
00:28:43,280 --> 00:28:48,120
to this position is because they
take it that zombies are

471
00:28:48,120 --> 00:28:50,400
possible.
They take it that it's possible

472
00:28:51,560 --> 00:28:54,400
that there could be a world
physically just like this world,

473
00:28:55,240 --> 00:28:59,040
but in which there's no
consciousness and and their

474
00:28:59,040 --> 00:29:02,000
story about how that's possible
as K we'll have a world just

475
00:29:02,000 --> 00:29:04,680
like this world.
Everything behaves the same will

476
00:29:04,680 --> 00:29:08,080
way.
But in that world, the the the

477
00:29:11,320 --> 00:29:14,640
the law like roles are filled by
something different.

478
00:29:14,640 --> 00:29:18,440
They're filled by something that
doesn't involve consciousness.

479
00:29:19,360 --> 00:29:24,880
And the whole thing is don't be
rude because I've got some

480
00:29:25,880 --> 00:29:28,000
psychos, friends and students
who are serious people.

481
00:29:28,000 --> 00:29:31,400
But I think the whole thing is
metaphysically silly.

482
00:29:31,840 --> 00:29:45,760
And, and it's, it's motivated by
the conviction that conscious

483
00:29:45,760 --> 00:29:49,000
goings on are extra to the
physical goings on.

484
00:29:49,040 --> 00:29:51,760
And I don't think that
conviction has any good

485
00:29:51,760 --> 00:29:55,040
argumentative basis.
I think that's just the duelist

486
00:29:55,040 --> 00:29:57,720
intuition once more.
And so they're starting from the

487
00:29:57,720 --> 00:30:01,200
duelist intuition and they're
appealing to this weird

488
00:30:01,200 --> 00:30:11,440
metaphysical assumption to to
fill it out and feel very

489
00:30:11,440 --> 00:30:13,360
strange.
I mean, they they fill out the

490
00:30:13,360 --> 00:30:17,600
duelist assumption in this
metaphysically weird way because

491
00:30:17,600 --> 00:30:20,320
they respect the causal
completeness of physics because

492
00:30:20,320 --> 00:30:24,120
they don't think the interactive
dualism is a serious

493
00:30:24,120 --> 00:30:27,000
possibility.
So OK, you asked me what do I

494
00:30:27,000 --> 00:30:30,160
think about panpsychism?
I've just given you my my rant

495
00:30:30,600 --> 00:30:35,200
and psychism.
It's it's all mis mis mis, mis

496
00:30:35,200 --> 00:30:38,800
motivated, misconceived.
Initially, when I first, when I

497
00:30:38,800 --> 00:30:41,960
first used to think about this,
I, I, I also, I really outright

498
00:30:41,960 --> 00:30:43,640
rejected it.
I thought it was completely

499
00:30:43,920 --> 00:30:47,800
ridiculous, but there's certain
scientists and philosophers,

500
00:30:47,800 --> 00:30:51,280
more scientists actually, who
are slowly convincing me more

501
00:30:51,280 --> 00:30:55,360
and more of of of these proto
elements of not consciousness.

502
00:30:55,360 --> 00:30:59,000
But because of this non binary
distinction of what is

503
00:30:59,000 --> 00:31:01,920
intelligent and what is not,
it's easy to see how levels of

504
00:31:01,920 --> 00:31:06,200
intelligence can levels of
intelligence can can increase

505
00:31:06,200 --> 00:31:10,360
and and almost like a spectrum.
So it becomes quite easy to then

506
00:31:10,360 --> 00:31:13,640
say that it's easy to think that
we're just part of the spectrum

507
00:31:13,640 --> 00:31:16,440
with experience and there is no
on and off switch.

508
00:31:16,440 --> 00:31:18,880
So.
So in that sense, would a

509
00:31:18,880 --> 00:31:21,320
version of panpsychism that
considers everything in the

510
00:31:21,320 --> 00:31:28,840
spectrum count?
So one of the most recent things

511
00:31:28,840 --> 00:31:33,600
I wrote about consciousness was
the problem of consciousness in

512
00:31:33,600 --> 00:31:37,240
the Oxford Handbook of the
Philosophy of Consciousness

513
00:31:37,640 --> 00:31:46,480
edited by Uriah Kriegel.
And I ended up there saying, I'm

514
00:31:46,480 --> 00:31:53,040
not really sure we have any need
for the notion of phenomenal

515
00:31:53,040 --> 00:31:55,760
consciousness.
We can define access

516
00:31:55,760 --> 00:31:59,120
consciousness and maybe kind of
various functional offices in

517
00:31:59,120 --> 00:32:01,080
the brain.
You might think these are, you

518
00:32:01,080 --> 00:32:03,680
know, roughly what we refer to
when we talk about conscious

519
00:32:03,680 --> 00:32:08,080
States and do we need this extra
idea of phenomenal

520
00:32:08,080 --> 00:32:10,640
consciousness.
And, and then I said, partly

521
00:32:10,640 --> 00:32:16,680
motivated by Peter Godfrey
Smith's recent work, that what's

522
00:32:16,680 --> 00:32:23,280
really going on is we're having
organisms that increasingly have

523
00:32:23,280 --> 00:32:26,320
bodies and, and act.
And once you act, you have to

524
00:32:26,320 --> 00:32:30,680
distinguish between, between
yourself and your environment.

525
00:32:30,680 --> 00:32:34,720
You have to distinguish between
interactions with the

526
00:32:34,720 --> 00:32:39,160
environment that are due to your
actions as opposed to something

527
00:32:39,160 --> 00:32:42,520
coming and bumping into you.
It's very important if you're an

528
00:32:42,520 --> 00:32:44,280
agent, to be able to make that
distinction.

529
00:32:44,720 --> 00:32:48,560
And so once you have organisms
that act, they will have a

530
00:32:48,800 --> 00:32:51,200
perspective on reality.
They'll distinguish between

531
00:32:51,200 --> 00:32:53,760
themselves and the rest of
reality.

532
00:32:54,160 --> 00:32:58,520
And then you have more and more
complicated cognitive systems.

533
00:32:58,960 --> 00:33:04,280
And I said, look, we don't need
anything to get consciousness

534
00:33:05,240 --> 00:33:10,200
other than the physical
processes playing a certain role

535
00:33:10,200 --> 00:33:16,000
for, for, for subjects, for
beings that have a perspective

536
00:33:16,000 --> 00:33:20,600
on reality.
And, and I said, well, it's a

537
00:33:20,600 --> 00:33:23,080
bit like panpsychism, you know,
we've got all this physical

538
00:33:23,080 --> 00:33:27,440
stuff and then we don't need any
anything extra to make it.

539
00:33:27,920 --> 00:33:30,400
We just need it to be arranged
in the right way.

540
00:33:30,400 --> 00:33:35,640
But so.
That's exactly what I was.

541
00:33:35,760 --> 00:33:38,600
Trying to yeah, but and and and
the pensacist got rather

542
00:33:38,600 --> 00:33:40,720
excited, but I said no, no, no,
I'm not.

543
00:33:40,720 --> 00:33:42,520
Thinking because it's not only
Peter's I.

544
00:33:42,520 --> 00:33:45,480
Think it it it does require the
subjects to be there.

545
00:33:45,480 --> 00:33:48,800
I mean otherwise.
I, I, I look at Michael Levin's

546
00:33:48,800 --> 00:33:51,000
work, Carl 1st and these people
who are also doing these work,

547
00:33:51,000 --> 00:33:54,520
they also sort of showing that
it could just be the spectrum

548
00:33:54,520 --> 00:33:56,680
like thing.
And then you don't necessarily

549
00:33:56,680 --> 00:33:59,280
need this word phenomenal
consciousness.

550
00:33:59,280 --> 00:34:02,680
We're all technically having
different varying experiences

551
00:34:03,680 --> 00:34:05,720
that don't necessarily need to
be termed.

552
00:34:06,800 --> 00:34:08,960
Yeah.
So I, I, I think, I think the,

553
00:34:15,199 --> 00:34:19,199
the famous Ned blog paper was,
was, has been a unfortunate

554
00:34:20,320 --> 00:34:25,760
influence.
And I've, I've just been

555
00:34:25,760 --> 00:34:32,080
recently writing something very
much orientated to the, to the

556
00:34:33,000 --> 00:34:36,760
issue of moral standing and
arguing against the idea that

557
00:34:36,760 --> 00:34:39,920
consciousness is the key to
moral standing.

558
00:34:39,920 --> 00:34:44,280
So, and, and I said, look,
people who think that

559
00:34:44,280 --> 00:34:47,199
consciousness is the key to
moral standing, they really are

560
00:34:47,199 --> 00:34:50,400
thinking in terms of phenomenal
consciousness and they want to

561
00:34:50,400 --> 00:34:52,639
get a good theory of phenomenal
consciousness.

562
00:34:52,639 --> 00:34:59,320
So I said, let's go back and
look at look at how Ned Block

563
00:34:59,320 --> 00:35:03,120
actually introduced the idea of
phenomenal consciousness as it

564
00:35:03,120 --> 00:35:05,840
means he defines access
consciousness states that are

565
00:35:05,840 --> 00:35:10,600
available for action, control
and self report in organisms

566
00:35:10,600 --> 00:35:14,360
that can report and so on.
And then he said, that's one

567
00:35:14,360 --> 00:35:16,360
thing that's all functional
definition.

568
00:35:16,560 --> 00:35:20,160
But I want to talk about
phenomenal consciousness.

569
00:35:20,160 --> 00:35:28,240
And and then you wait for him to
define that and he says, I can't

570
00:35:28,240 --> 00:35:31,200
define it.
And I think I'm almost quoting

571
00:35:31,200 --> 00:35:33,800
in any remotely non circular
way.

572
00:35:34,560 --> 00:35:39,720
All we can do is point to the
states which we know to be

573
00:35:39,720 --> 00:35:43,240
phenomenally conscious.
So I mean, it's quite explicit

574
00:35:43,240 --> 00:35:48,320
there that, that he's saying
states like these and he's

575
00:35:48,320 --> 00:35:52,680
pointing to the human states
that we normally recognize as

576
00:35:53,600 --> 00:35:57,720
conscious.
And, and in, in, in the paper,

577
00:35:57,720 --> 00:35:59,120
it's on my website.
I mean, it's, it's work in

578
00:35:59,120 --> 00:36:01,000
progress.
It's not, it's not published

579
00:36:01,000 --> 00:36:02,680
yet.
It's called consciousness is not

580
00:36:02,680 --> 00:36:08,320
the key to moral moral standing.
I point out that the states that

581
00:36:08,320 --> 00:36:14,120
we point to, the ones that
paradigmatically conscious share

582
00:36:14,120 --> 00:36:21,600
quite a lot of different
features and and the trouble is

583
00:36:21,600 --> 00:36:26,920
that once you move beyond human
beings, these features come

584
00:36:26,920 --> 00:36:31,760
apart.
So they're features like being

585
00:36:31,760 --> 00:36:37,680
introspectively available and
interacting with conditioning in

586
00:36:37,680 --> 00:36:40,680
various ways and playing a
certain role in action control

587
00:36:41,120 --> 00:36:49,280
and involving in humans certain
kind of feedback loops between

588
00:36:49,280 --> 00:36:52,360
the cortex and the thalamus and
so on.

589
00:36:53,280 --> 00:36:56,800
And OK, so that states like
those, and now we go to

590
00:36:56,920 --> 00:37:01,400
organisms that don't have a
cortex, are there states enough

591
00:37:01,400 --> 00:37:04,360
like ours to be like ours or
not?

592
00:37:05,040 --> 00:37:08,840
And in fact, Peter Carruthers in
his recent book on consciousness

593
00:37:08,840 --> 00:37:11,840
and animal welfare, I mean,
thanks very much for the line

594
00:37:11,840 --> 00:37:16,200
that that that I take.
And also Francois Camara has got

595
00:37:16,200 --> 00:37:21,320
a paper against against thinking
of moral welfare in terms of

596
00:37:21,320 --> 00:37:26,640
consciousness.
And Peter has this analogy

597
00:37:26,640 --> 00:37:33,080
between, yeah, OK, there's a
nice neighbourhood, you know,

598
00:37:33,080 --> 00:37:35,800
like, where do you live?
Do you live in Rhonda boy?

599
00:37:35,800 --> 00:37:37,480
Is Rhonda boy?
Is Rhonda Boy still in a nice

600
00:37:37,480 --> 00:37:39,560
neighbourhood?
It's, well, it actually is.

601
00:37:39,560 --> 00:37:42,840
It's not bad.
OK, you seem to be very.

602
00:37:42,920 --> 00:37:44,520
Familiar with Cape Town?
Great.

603
00:37:46,320 --> 00:37:49,280
And, and he says, well, yeah, we
said, you know, we can agree

604
00:37:49,280 --> 00:37:51,280
that certain place at night.
And then we go to another

605
00:37:51,280 --> 00:37:54,160
neighbourhood and, and we start
disagreeing.

606
00:37:54,160 --> 00:37:57,200
Is it a nice neighbourhood?
And it turns out, well, what we

607
00:37:57,200 --> 00:38:03,240
meant by nice neighbourhood is,
yeah, it's got, it's got Lonnie

608
00:38:03,240 --> 00:38:06,120
shops and can I speak Afrikaans?
Yeah.

609
00:38:07,320 --> 00:38:12,640
And not too much litter and so
on and, and smart houses and now

610
00:38:12,640 --> 00:38:15,360
and, and, and now we go to a
neighbourhood that's got some of

611
00:38:15,360 --> 00:38:18,840
those things and not others.
And is it still a nice

612
00:38:18,840 --> 00:38:20,680
neighbourhood?
And he points out, look, I mean,

613
00:38:20,680 --> 00:38:24,120
we, we, we never laid down
exactly what the criteria for

614
00:38:24,120 --> 00:38:26,280
being a nice neighbourhood were.
I mean, there's a lot of

615
00:38:27,200 --> 00:38:29,840
factors.
And when, when we get somewhere

616
00:38:29,840 --> 00:38:34,120
that has some of them and not
others, there's no fact of the

617
00:38:34,120 --> 00:38:35,640
matter of whether it's a nice
neighbourhood.

618
00:38:35,640 --> 00:38:37,080
And, and he says it's exactly
the same.

619
00:38:37,080 --> 00:38:40,240
There's no fact of the matter
about whether, whether lobsters

620
00:38:40,240 --> 00:38:43,200
are conscious.
They've got some features in

621
00:38:43,200 --> 00:38:48,600
common with our the State 3.2
and none others.

622
00:38:51,400 --> 00:38:53,000
Yeah, I completely agree with
that.

623
00:38:53,000 --> 00:38:54,720
I love that analogy because it's
true.

624
00:38:54,720 --> 00:38:57,440
If when I think about a city, if
we had to consider Cape Town a

625
00:38:57,440 --> 00:38:59,920
city and then compare it to
where I was born and where I was

626
00:38:59,920 --> 00:39:04,000
raised in Kwazulu Natal in
Durban, it's it's not the same.

627
00:39:04,000 --> 00:39:06,400
So if you're talking about
safety, I think about like Cape

628
00:39:06,400 --> 00:39:08,560
Town's the safest place you can
be in South Africa.

629
00:39:09,880 --> 00:39:12,360
The rest of the place you
sometimes it's almost as if Cape

630
00:39:12,360 --> 00:39:14,440
Town's another country and it's
owned in South Africa.

631
00:39:15,520 --> 00:39:18,680
Yeah, yeah, like a.
Cape Town Brexit type thing

632
00:39:18,680 --> 00:39:22,560
happening here at some point.
So, so you don't know.

633
00:39:22,560 --> 00:39:24,840
I, I, I, I, I grew up for 10
years in Durban.

634
00:39:25,000 --> 00:39:27,240
Oh, really?
I have no idea.

635
00:39:27,640 --> 00:39:30,360
Wow.
OK, I went, I went to DHS Durban

636
00:39:30,360 --> 00:39:33,560
High School and this.
Is this is turned out?

637
00:39:34,480 --> 00:39:39,000
And and Howard College,
University of UK Zet ZN

638
00:39:39,360 --> 00:39:41,520
University of Natalia as it was
then and.

639
00:39:41,960 --> 00:39:45,160
Internship there at at well, I'm
not at the university, but at

640
00:39:45,160 --> 00:39:47,680
the hospital that's associated
with it, King Edward Hospital.

641
00:39:48,680 --> 00:39:51,120
Yeah, very cool.
David, that's that's quite cool.

642
00:39:51,120 --> 00:39:54,600
So you know, so look Durban, I
grew up in Durban and it's it's

643
00:39:54,600 --> 00:39:56,440
very different from Cape Town.
So if you.

644
00:39:56,560 --> 00:39:59,480
Very, very interesting, Very
interesting place for people who

645
00:39:59,480 --> 00:40:02,880
aren't South African.
Durban's very vibrant because

646
00:40:02,880 --> 00:40:05,640
it's.
It's ethnically very mixed.

647
00:40:05,640 --> 00:40:11,360
I mean, it's, it's African Zulus
and, and Indian heritage people

648
00:40:11,360 --> 00:40:16,720
and Europeans and.
There's millions Indian I think,

649
00:40:16,800 --> 00:40:20,320
the highest population in within
the city I think, except for

650
00:40:20,320 --> 00:40:24,440
maybe London which is which is
crazy I think.

651
00:40:24,560 --> 00:40:28,200
I think it's it's, it's a very
vibrant place as a result here.

652
00:40:28,200 --> 00:40:30,440
Very multicultural.
I used to speak Zulu a little

653
00:40:30,440 --> 00:40:34,040
bit when I was younger.
Can't anymore, I've lost that

654
00:40:34,040 --> 00:40:37,360
skill.
But anyway, to get back to it,

655
00:40:37,360 --> 00:40:42,200
when we think about these
definition problems, because

656
00:40:42,200 --> 00:40:44,160
now, because now we're
fundamentally talking about

657
00:40:44,520 --> 00:40:46,720
things like, OK, we've got
someone who says there's an

658
00:40:46,720 --> 00:40:48,880
explanatory gap.
We've got Thomas Nagel who says

659
00:40:49,720 --> 00:40:52,840
it's the what is it like this
qualitative qualia, this essence

660
00:40:52,840 --> 00:40:55,880
like property, only we've got
Chalmers who's talking about a

661
00:40:55,880 --> 00:40:57,640
hard problem versus the easy
problem.

662
00:40:58,040 --> 00:40:59,280
It all comes down to the same
thing.

663
00:40:59,280 --> 00:41:02,920
If you think about the easy
problems, are they really easy?

664
00:41:03,000 --> 00:41:05,840
I mean, is it really something
we should say is an easy

665
00:41:05,840 --> 00:41:09,280
problem?
Or if we just solve each easy

666
00:41:09,280 --> 00:41:11,720
problem, are we technically
solving the hard problem

667
00:41:11,760 --> 00:41:16,560
indirectly?
So I think they're just easy

668
00:41:16,640 --> 00:41:18,920
problems.
Easy problems aren't that that

669
00:41:18,920 --> 00:41:28,680
easy and sometimes they might be
not really soluble because we're

670
00:41:28,760 --> 00:41:33,560
we're we're posing them using
using mushy, vague concepts.

671
00:41:33,560 --> 00:41:35,680
I mean like, you know what, what
is intelligence?

672
00:41:35,680 --> 00:41:38,720
What is what is creativity?
I mean, you, you find people

673
00:41:38,720 --> 00:41:40,480
studying creativity.
It drives me crazy.

674
00:41:40,480 --> 00:41:43,400
I mean, nobody knows what we
mean by creativity.

675
00:41:43,400 --> 00:41:48,200
You can, you know, the ants can
be creative sometimes and you

676
00:41:48,200 --> 00:41:50,240
know, Einstein and da Vinci are
creative will be.

677
00:41:50,240 --> 00:41:52,200
I mean, well, I think there's
one thing there, the mushy

678
00:41:52,200 --> 00:41:57,600
concepts.
So, but, but we don't feel

679
00:41:57,600 --> 00:42:02,800
there's, there's some deep, deep
difficulty in studying

680
00:42:02,800 --> 00:42:05,640
intelligence or memory, or I
mean, all the things that that

681
00:42:05,800 --> 00:42:07,960
Chalmers thinks are easy
problems.

682
00:42:07,960 --> 00:42:12,560
I agree about that.
So I'm happy to to call the easy

683
00:42:12,560 --> 00:42:14,920
problems easy.
Putting to one side this issue

684
00:42:14,920 --> 00:42:18,760
of, of ill defined concepts.
What I'm much more suspicious of

685
00:42:18,760 --> 00:42:20,800
is the idea that there's a hard
problem.

686
00:42:20,840 --> 00:42:27,120
And, and I don't know if you've
got into this, I mean, it's not

687
00:42:27,120 --> 00:42:32,480
always clear exactly what the
hard problem is.

688
00:42:33,280 --> 00:42:40,440
So sometimes charmers in the
original book says, look,

689
00:42:41,560 --> 00:42:50,040
there's easy problem and they're
all to do with functionally

690
00:42:50,040 --> 00:42:52,840
defined concepts like
intelligence, memory and so on.

691
00:42:52,960 --> 00:42:56,800
And then we have phenomenal
concepts, these special

692
00:42:56,800 --> 00:43:00,280
concepts, we think about
conscious states not in terms of

693
00:43:00,280 --> 00:43:03,320
what they do, but in terms of
what they feel like.

694
00:43:04,320 --> 00:43:09,480
And the hard problem is to
figure out what do phenomenal

695
00:43:09,480 --> 00:43:13,560
concepts refer to.
Now if if that's what the hard

696
00:43:13,560 --> 00:43:19,160
problem is, they're all the
orthodox a posterior

697
00:43:19,160 --> 00:43:22,600
physicalists who recognise
phenomenal concepts think that

698
00:43:22,600 --> 00:43:26,760
the Mary thought experiment
shows that we have special ways

699
00:43:26,760 --> 00:43:29,480
of thinking about our conscious
states, kind of thinking about

700
00:43:29,480 --> 00:43:33,320
them directly.
We can discuss how phenomenal

701
00:43:33,320 --> 00:43:38,040
concepts work, but we somehow
use those states to think about

702
00:43:38,320 --> 00:43:42,760
the self same states or we we
kind of point to our own states

703
00:43:42,760 --> 00:43:45,440
in some way.
So these special concepts which

704
00:43:45,440 --> 00:43:48,560
aren't functional concepts don't
characterize the states in terms

705
00:43:48,560 --> 00:43:51,560
of what they do.
But a posterior physics.

706
00:43:51,560 --> 00:43:55,000
This have a whole lot of stories
about how those concepts refer

707
00:43:55,000 --> 00:43:57,960
to physical brain states.
They're just a special way of

708
00:43:57,960 --> 00:43:59,600
thinking about physical brain
states.

709
00:43:59,920 --> 00:44:03,680
And if that's the hard problem,
figuring out what do phenomenal

710
00:44:03,680 --> 00:44:07,960
concepts refer to, I say it's
been solved by a posterior

711
00:44:07,960 --> 00:44:10,720
physicalism.
Then you'll find charmers

712
00:44:10,720 --> 00:44:14,520
switching around and saying the,
the, the the issue was, was to

713
00:44:14,520 --> 00:44:19,120
explain how does the brain give
rise to phenomenal

714
00:44:19,120 --> 00:44:22,160
consciousness.
So now we're not talking

715
00:44:22,320 --> 00:44:25,440
phenomenal concepts, we're
talking about reality.

716
00:44:25,840 --> 00:44:29,720
And there's this idea that the
brain gives rise to phenomenal

717
00:44:29,720 --> 00:44:32,040
consciousness.
And if you want to put it like

718
00:44:32,040 --> 00:44:35,640
that, I'll say I just reject
that problem.

719
00:44:35,640 --> 00:44:38,920
I don't think the brain does
give rise to phenomenal

720
00:44:39,040 --> 00:44:42,040
consciousness.
That's that's that's that

721
00:44:42,040 --> 00:44:47,080
question presupposes dualism.
You're presupposing that there's

722
00:44:47,080 --> 00:44:49,560
something extra over and above
the brain processes.

723
00:44:49,560 --> 00:44:52,120
And we physicalists reject that
assumption.

724
00:44:52,120 --> 00:44:55,480
So we think the hard problem is
ill posed so.

725
00:44:57,920 --> 00:45:01,560
What do you you mentioned Mary's
room experiment.

726
00:45:01,640 --> 00:45:04,000
I was I I spoke to Frank Jackson
on via e-mail.

727
00:45:04,000 --> 00:45:06,680
We're still hopefully going to
chat at some point because he's

728
00:45:07,240 --> 00:45:10,360
he spoke about the fact that
this OK, he gives the example of

729
00:45:10,360 --> 00:45:13,720
Mary's room and exiting.
She what does she experience

730
00:45:13,720 --> 00:45:14,680
something new?
Yes or no?

731
00:45:16,280 --> 00:45:18,160
And then apparently it changed
afterwards.

732
00:45:18,160 --> 00:45:20,920
So I want to dissect as to why
this happened to him, but what

733
00:45:20,920 --> 00:45:22,960
are your thoughts on the
experiment in general?

734
00:45:25,800 --> 00:45:28,600
I, I I can tell you what
happened with Frank, but.

735
00:45:29,160 --> 00:45:30,680
Yeah, I think so.
Do that as I.

736
00:45:31,600 --> 00:45:36,960
I think, as does nearly
everybody else in this business,

737
00:45:37,920 --> 00:45:42,520
that the Mary thought experiment
is a knock down argument

738
00:45:44,360 --> 00:45:48,640
establishing the existence of
phenomenal concepts and refuting

739
00:45:48,680 --> 00:45:51,800
what used to be called a priori
physicalism.

740
00:45:53,080 --> 00:45:59,480
So they used to be the idea and
it was the standard view among

741
00:45:59,480 --> 00:46:04,800
physicalists until the Mary
thought experiment that think

742
00:46:04,800 --> 00:46:11,720
Wittgenstein think logical
behaviourism that that our only

743
00:46:11,720 --> 00:46:17,360
concepts of mental states were
concepts of states that played a

744
00:46:17,360 --> 00:46:21,040
certain functional role.
So our concept of pain was our

745
00:46:21,040 --> 00:46:25,280
concept of of something inside
you that's caused by damage and

746
00:46:25,280 --> 00:46:27,200
gives rise to avoidance
behaviour.

747
00:46:27,800 --> 00:46:31,160
Our concept of the experience of
seeing red and something inside

748
00:46:31,160 --> 00:46:34,000
you might make you feel a bit
jangled is caused by ripe

749
00:46:34,000 --> 00:46:37,720
tomatoes and so on.
Our only way of thinking about

750
00:46:38,120 --> 00:46:42,160
about mental states is in terms
of their causes and effects,

751
00:46:42,160 --> 00:46:44,840
basically.
And that was the standard,

752
00:46:45,240 --> 00:46:49,960
standard view.
And on that view, the idea that

753
00:46:50,120 --> 00:46:55,680
that there could be a being who
was physically just like me but

754
00:46:55,680 --> 00:47:00,320
had no consciousness was
rejected as conceptually

755
00:47:00,320 --> 00:47:02,000
impossible.
I mean, if you know, if it walks

756
00:47:02,000 --> 00:47:04,440
like me and it talks like me,
well then it feels like me.

757
00:47:04,440 --> 00:47:07,280
That was the idea.
Because all our concepts of

758
00:47:07,280 --> 00:47:11,880
feelings were concepts of states
that made you behave a certain

759
00:47:11,880 --> 00:47:13,920
way.
So that used to be the standard,

760
00:47:14,160 --> 00:47:18,120
standard view.
And I take the Mary thought

761
00:47:18,120 --> 00:47:22,320
experiment to be a knock down
refutation of that view.

762
00:47:22,320 --> 00:47:28,600
Because if that was the view,
then Mary wouldn't learn

763
00:47:28,600 --> 00:47:34,280
anything when she in any sense,
she wouldn't in any sense learn

764
00:47:34,280 --> 00:47:40,040
something when she has the the
experience caused by looking at

765
00:47:40,040 --> 00:47:43,680
ripe tomatoes.
And it seems to me pretty

766
00:47:43,680 --> 00:47:46,920
obvious and to Nelly, everybody
else, wonderful thought

767
00:47:46,920 --> 00:47:49,640
experiment that of course she
knows something.

768
00:47:49,920 --> 00:47:52,520
Here she is, she's a scientist.
She knows all about wavelengths

769
00:47:52,520 --> 00:47:54,360
and people having colour
experience.

770
00:47:54,360 --> 00:47:57,120
She's never had them.
She can talk about the green

771
00:47:57,120 --> 00:47:59,680
colour experience and the red
colour experience.

772
00:47:59,680 --> 00:48:01,560
I mean, in terms of the
wavelengths and things that

773
00:48:01,560 --> 00:48:06,520
caused them.
And, and now she comes and has

774
00:48:06,520 --> 00:48:12,960
the experience and she discovers
that the thing caused by red

775
00:48:12,960 --> 00:48:16,360
tomatoes is, is this one and not
the one that's caused by grass.

776
00:48:16,360 --> 00:48:18,800
And I mean, you know, you can
see from her point of view, it

777
00:48:18,800 --> 00:48:20,120
could have been the other way
around.

778
00:48:20,120 --> 00:48:24,600
I mean, she's learnt something
she didn't know before and, and,

779
00:48:25,000 --> 00:48:28,000
and you've got to accept that.
And of course we physically say,

780
00:48:28,080 --> 00:48:31,720
well, she's only learnt
something new at the level of

781
00:48:31,720 --> 00:48:34,800
concepts.
She's acquired a new way of

782
00:48:34,800 --> 00:48:40,360
thinking about red experiences,
and because she didn't have this

783
00:48:40,360 --> 00:48:45,680
new way of thinking before, she
didn't previously know that ripe

784
00:48:45,680 --> 00:48:49,200
tomatoes cause this, and now she
kind of uses a phenomenal

785
00:48:49,200 --> 00:48:53,920
concept and now she knows that
so she's but but that she always

786
00:48:53,920 --> 00:48:59,040
knew that ripe tomatoes caused
neural oscillations.

787
00:48:59,080 --> 00:49:04,760
Neural oscillations.
Why in visual cortex 4 and she

788
00:49:04,760 --> 00:49:08,080
always knew that and now she
knows that ripe tomatoes call

789
00:49:08,080 --> 00:49:12,800
this and and all we physicalists
say is well, so she's got a new

790
00:49:12,800 --> 00:49:15,720
concept for an old thing.
I mean, she's got a new concept.

791
00:49:15,720 --> 00:49:19,640
I'm expressing it by this and it
refers to just the same thing as

792
00:49:19,640 --> 00:49:24,920
her old concept oscillations Y
in V4 referred to.

793
00:49:25,640 --> 00:49:27,720
So I mean, that's my friend Tim
Craig.

794
00:49:28,360 --> 00:49:32,040
Two concepts, one thing,
philosophers love that.

795
00:49:32,040 --> 00:49:34,240
They love that.
Two concepts, one thing.

796
00:49:34,360 --> 00:49:38,040
And that's what we a posterior
physicalists say.

797
00:49:39,160 --> 00:49:47,120
And and everybody not just that
physicalists, but also nearly

798
00:49:47,120 --> 00:49:49,600
all duellists think, yeah,
there's phenomenal concepts.

799
00:49:49,600 --> 00:49:51,080
Mary gets a new phenomenal
concept.

800
00:49:52,520 --> 00:49:56,120
The the difference is that the
duellists think phenomenal

801
00:49:56,120 --> 00:49:59,840
concepts refer to something
extra and non physical, whereas

802
00:49:59,840 --> 00:50:01,840
the physicals think the
phenomenal concepts refer to

803
00:50:01,840 --> 00:50:08,000
something something physical.
OK, now, but you're curious

804
00:50:08,000 --> 00:50:10,840
about what happened to Frank?
Yeah, OK.

805
00:50:11,080 --> 00:50:12,480
I have an idea, but I'd love to
hear your.

806
00:50:13,080 --> 00:50:15,280
Your OK, let me fill out the
story.

807
00:50:15,800 --> 00:50:18,520
So we've got everybody agreeing
there's phenomenal concepts, but

808
00:50:18,520 --> 00:50:21,680
the physicalists say, look, they
refer to physical things and the

809
00:50:21,680 --> 00:50:24,880
duelists say no, they refer to
some extra special conscious

810
00:50:24,880 --> 00:50:29,640
mind stuffy thing.
And it's clear enough that the

811
00:50:29,640 --> 00:50:33,240
fact that the Mary thought
experiment shows us these extra

812
00:50:33,240 --> 00:50:36,760
concepts does not in itself
establish that they refer to

813
00:50:36,760 --> 00:50:42,920
something non physical.
But then the the duellists, and

814
00:50:42,920 --> 00:50:45,600
I'm thinking especially here,
David Chalmers, Frank Jackson,

815
00:50:45,600 --> 00:50:49,400
various others say there's
something, there's something

816
00:50:49,400 --> 00:50:56,880
special about phenomenal
concepts that means that they

817
00:50:56,880 --> 00:50:58,920
can't refer to to physical
things.

818
00:50:59,880 --> 00:51:02,720
And now we get the whole
business of two-dimensional

819
00:51:02,720 --> 00:51:07,040
semantics and the fact that
phenomenal concepts don't refer

820
00:51:07,040 --> 00:51:10,560
by description, they somehow
refer directly.

821
00:51:11,680 --> 00:51:16,560
And the two-dimensional crucial
2 dimensional assumption is in

822
00:51:16,560 --> 00:51:21,840
effect that terms that refer
directly are not just

823
00:51:22,480 --> 00:51:26,120
semantically direct, They don't
refer by description, but are

824
00:51:26,120 --> 00:51:32,440
also epistemologically direct.
They will reveal all the

825
00:51:32,440 --> 00:51:34,640
essential features.
They're referent to you a

826
00:51:35,280 --> 00:51:37,880
priori.
And then the I mean, this is

827
00:51:39,360 --> 00:51:43,440
simplifying the two-dimensional
argument, but but in in a way

828
00:51:43,440 --> 00:51:48,040
that it's fair to it.
So the idea is that phenomenal

829
00:51:48,040 --> 00:51:50,640
concepts are special.
They refer directly, so they

830
00:51:50,640 --> 00:51:53,800
should be epistemologically
revelatory.

831
00:51:54,640 --> 00:51:58,600
If what they're referring to is
by its nature physical, you

832
00:51:58,600 --> 00:52:01,880
ought to be able to see that
what you're thinking about is

833
00:52:01,880 --> 00:52:05,160
physical, but you can't, so it
can't be physical.

834
00:52:05,880 --> 00:52:08,760
And that's the two-dimensional
argument.

835
00:52:09,400 --> 00:52:15,600
And Frank is very committed to
that way of thinking about

836
00:52:15,600 --> 00:52:20,960
semantics and epistemology and
what's, what's his nice book

837
00:52:21,160 --> 00:52:25,320
from 2025 years ago, from
concepts to metaphysics, I think

838
00:52:27,280 --> 00:52:31,600
anyway, he he so, so he has the
Mary argument that gives you

839
00:52:31,600 --> 00:52:36,040
phenomenal concepts and then the
two-dimensional semantics that

840
00:52:36,040 --> 00:52:38,040
takes you from nominal concepts
to dualism.

841
00:52:38,600 --> 00:52:44,960
OK.
And he got to dislike dualism

842
00:52:46,560 --> 00:52:52,360
because he always believed in
the causal closure of the

843
00:52:52,360 --> 00:52:54,320
physical.
He thought that if there were

844
00:52:54,320 --> 00:52:57,480
these extra dualist states,
they'd have to be epiphenomenal.

845
00:52:58,400 --> 00:53:01,440
He started to think that
epiphenomenalism looks more and

846
00:53:01,440 --> 00:53:06,680
more horrible.
So normal people would say, yes,

847
00:53:06,680 --> 00:53:09,720
you've established phenomenal
concepts and if you buy 2

848
00:53:09,720 --> 00:53:12,360
dimensionalism, you're going to
be moved to dualism,

849
00:53:12,360 --> 00:53:14,440
epiphenomenalism.
So you better give up the two

850
00:53:14,440 --> 00:53:17,800
dimensionalism.
But Frank was rarely attached to

851
00:53:17,800 --> 00:53:21,280
the two dimensionalism, so he
gave up the Mary argument.

852
00:53:21,920 --> 00:53:26,120
And he's like the only person
who doesn't believe in the Mary

853
00:53:26,120 --> 00:53:28,040
argument.
I mean, I, I, I'll, I'll, I'll

854
00:53:28,040 --> 00:53:31,800
tell you who else doesn't
believe in the Mary argument is

855
00:53:33,840 --> 00:53:35,320
Dennett.
Dennett never believed in the

856
00:53:35,320 --> 00:53:38,640
Mary argument because he was
always a logical behaviourist.

857
00:53:39,560 --> 00:53:43,080
And and Dennett studied under a
behaviourist, a very famous one

858
00:53:43,080 --> 00:53:44,360
as well.
Yeah, right.

859
00:53:44,400 --> 00:53:47,720
Yeah, absolutely, absolutely.
And he never gave up his rile

860
00:53:47,760 --> 00:53:50,960
Riley and commitments in in that
way so.

861
00:53:53,840 --> 00:53:56,400
Another thing I often think
about, because when I was

862
00:53:56,400 --> 00:54:00,640
writing about it, when when I
spoke about the Mary Room, the

863
00:54:00,800 --> 00:54:03,240
knowledge argument, I thought
about the fact that, and it's,

864
00:54:03,280 --> 00:54:06,560
it's also not the same
experience that everyone's going

865
00:54:06,560 --> 00:54:08,080
to have.
So just like goes back to what

866
00:54:08,080 --> 00:54:11,680
we were talking about earlier,
if every person was a separate

867
00:54:11,680 --> 00:54:14,960
Mary, let's say whatever they
all first see for the first time

868
00:54:14,960 --> 00:54:16,560
is not going to be the same
anyway.

869
00:54:16,560 --> 00:54:21,360
So it's not like there is a
distinct solid thing that is

870
00:54:21,360 --> 00:54:25,360
going to be experienced here.
This is still also a very blurry

871
00:54:25,920 --> 00:54:28,320
spectrum of different
encounters.

872
00:54:29,000 --> 00:54:34,920
Yeah, I don't, I not sure that
that is too much.

873
00:54:36,000 --> 00:54:38,240
I agree.
I mean, the, the, the, the

874
00:54:40,840 --> 00:54:43,800
psychology, psychophysics here
is very interesting.

875
00:54:43,800 --> 00:54:46,040
You, you know, when you're, when
you're a kid, do people all see

876
00:54:46,040 --> 00:54:47,560
the same colors when they're
looking at the same thing?

877
00:54:47,960 --> 00:54:50,880
And you think that or, you know,
if you're a victor's tenure, you

878
00:54:50,880 --> 00:54:53,880
think it's a, you know, silly
private language you're thinking

879
00:54:53,880 --> 00:54:56,160
about.
But in fact, the scientific

880
00:54:56,160 --> 00:54:58,320
evidence is that people do see
different things.

881
00:54:58,320 --> 00:55:00,400
They do have different
experiences when they're looking

882
00:55:00,400 --> 00:55:03,040
at the same things.
And yeah, I mean, do you know

883
00:55:03,040 --> 00:55:06,880
the experiments on, on seeing
pure colours?

884
00:55:06,880 --> 00:55:13,800
I mean, can you see a, a, a
pure, a pure yellow without any

885
00:55:14,360 --> 00:55:17,800
red or green in?
And it's a quite distinct

886
00:55:18,160 --> 00:55:20,560
experience.
People can, can tune and tell

887
00:55:20,560 --> 00:55:22,600
you when they're seeing pure
yellow.

888
00:55:23,120 --> 00:55:27,800
And it turns out that different
people see pure yellow looking

889
00:55:27,800 --> 00:55:31,080
at different things.
So, you know, you and I will

890
00:55:31,080 --> 00:55:33,080
look at the same yellow book and
one of us will have one

891
00:55:33,080 --> 00:55:34,680
experience, somebody else.
I mean, it's quite a lot of

892
00:55:34,680 --> 00:55:39,440
interpersonal variation, but I
don't think that really matters

893
00:55:39,440 --> 00:55:46,480
for the philosophical arguments.
And the reason is that with the

894
00:55:46,480 --> 00:55:52,800
Mary experiment, we're thinking
of my phenomenal concept of the

895
00:55:52,800 --> 00:55:55,720
experience I have when I look at
the yellow books, rather

896
00:55:55,720 --> 00:55:58,960
specific phenomenal concept.
Yeah, it is in in essence.

897
00:55:59,720 --> 00:56:02,960
We shouldn't assume that it's
the same refers to the same

898
00:56:02,960 --> 00:56:06,520
thing as the concept you form
when you look at the same book.

899
00:56:07,960 --> 00:56:10,560
The concept we were talking
about earlier was the concept of

900
00:56:10,720 --> 00:56:14,560
the generic concept of
phenomenal consciousness as

901
00:56:14,560 --> 00:56:17,920
such.
And you might wonder how that

902
00:56:17,920 --> 00:56:21,000
generic concept relates to the
specific concepts we have of

903
00:56:21,000 --> 00:56:23,280
this or that kind of experience.
And that's an interesting

904
00:56:23,280 --> 00:56:27,720
question in itself, but I don't
think the fact that different

905
00:56:27,720 --> 00:56:32,080
people will form differently
referring phenomenal concepts in

906
00:56:32,080 --> 00:56:37,040
response to the same physical
object is this point as the

907
00:56:37,040 --> 00:56:40,800
concept of phenomenal
consciousness is a bit mushy and

908
00:56:40,800 --> 00:56:42,440
indeterminate.
And I think they're they're.

909
00:56:43,040 --> 00:56:45,040
I agree with you.
I think that's the the fact that

910
00:56:45,040 --> 00:56:47,400
everyone's having a different
experience doesn't necessarily

911
00:56:47,400 --> 00:56:50,720
rule out the fact that that's a
possibility.

912
00:56:50,920 --> 00:56:53,280
But you're right, because I did
come at it from a very

913
00:56:53,280 --> 00:56:57,000
psychological one, because mine
was exploring the different

914
00:56:57,080 --> 00:57:00,240
experiences of psychiatric
patients, even discussing things

915
00:57:00,240 --> 00:57:03,080
like the philosophical, the
zombie argument.

916
00:57:03,480 --> 00:57:05,760
And if you try and talk about
whether we're talking about

917
00:57:05,760 --> 00:57:08,720
someone who's a philosophical
zombie, we have psychological

918
00:57:08,720 --> 00:57:11,200
zombies everywhere all the time.
When you take a schizophrenic

919
00:57:11,200 --> 00:57:14,360
patient or a psychotic patient,
you have no idea whether their

920
00:57:14,360 --> 00:57:18,400
sense of reality is even
remotely close to what you

921
00:57:18,400 --> 00:57:20,680
experience, especially if
they're acutely psychotic.

922
00:57:21,080 --> 00:57:23,720
So the question comes in, do
does that count as a

923
00:57:23,840 --> 00:57:26,120
philosophical zombie?
Is there some sort of an

924
00:57:26,120 --> 00:57:28,640
argument that could be made that
this is not a conscious person?

925
00:57:28,880 --> 00:57:31,520
What if their conscious
experience is that they are dead

926
00:57:31,520 --> 00:57:34,280
and not conscious?
You have to stop asking all

927
00:57:34,280 --> 00:57:36,920
these weird questions because
these are some experiences

928
00:57:36,920 --> 00:57:38,880
people have.
Derealization.

929
00:57:39,720 --> 00:57:43,160
Feeling like death.
So what's the syndrome when

930
00:57:43,160 --> 00:57:45,280
people think they're dead?
That's got a name.

931
00:57:45,920 --> 00:57:47,920
Retard syndrome.
Yeah, and.

932
00:57:49,960 --> 00:57:51,040
And that's fascinating because
I.

933
00:57:51,480 --> 00:57:53,920
Mean it's it's not quite the
same as saying they're not

934
00:57:53,920 --> 00:57:59,000
conscious, but but it it it is
I'm not conscious part I mean is

935
00:57:59,000 --> 00:58:01,840
is that.
Different no, they no, they are

936
00:58:02,040 --> 00:58:04,640
certain different psychiatric
conditions where people do

937
00:58:04,640 --> 00:58:06,720
fundamentally believe.
I don't think there's there's

938
00:58:06,720 --> 00:58:09,880
certain names for them, but
they're so derealized to a point

939
00:58:09,880 --> 00:58:12,800
where they become blurred into
reality with everything else,

940
00:58:13,120 --> 00:58:16,040
lose a sense of selflessly.
So there's no sense of self

941
00:58:16,040 --> 00:58:18,280
anymore.
And then thereafter there is no

942
00:58:18,280 --> 00:58:21,320
sense of consciousness because
they feel so immersed with

943
00:58:21,320 --> 00:58:25,200
reality that in a very different
way that we can perceive or or

944
00:58:25,200 --> 00:58:28,480
talk about in order to.
But it's similar to someone

945
00:58:28,480 --> 00:58:30,680
taking an experimental trip with
shrooms.

946
00:58:30,680 --> 00:58:34,480
I guess at that point you this
altered state of consciousness.

947
00:58:35,680 --> 00:58:38,080
But it would seem odd to say
that they're not conscious.

948
00:58:38,080 --> 00:58:39,040
I mean.
Yeah, it would be.

949
00:58:39,040 --> 00:58:41,280
It would be very stretchless.
There's still something being

950
00:58:41,280 --> 00:58:43,920
experienced and in essence,
therefore something is

951
00:58:44,120 --> 00:58:47,280
conscious.
But then what is it?

952
00:58:49,120 --> 00:58:52,320
Where is it?
Yes.

953
00:58:52,640 --> 00:58:55,320
If you OK, David, if you, if
you, if you had to think of OK,

954
00:58:55,320 --> 00:58:58,960
what consciousness most likely
is, how would you define that?

955
00:59:01,480 --> 00:59:03,520
Because we've spoken very much
about what it's not.

956
00:59:05,880 --> 00:59:21,940
So I don't know and.
But is it?

957
00:59:22,020 --> 00:59:28,100
I think that's the best.
So, so you're pressing me here

958
00:59:28,100 --> 00:59:33,980
and I've never quite addressed
this question in the way I am.

959
00:59:35,100 --> 00:59:39,160
No, but I've been saying that
the the the concept phenomenal

960
00:59:39,160 --> 00:59:43,040
consciousness is mushy.
It's a multi criterion concept

961
00:59:43,040 --> 00:59:48,360
and it doesn't really tell us
what to say when the criteria

962
00:59:48,360 --> 00:59:52,160
come apart in different
organisms.

963
00:59:53,200 --> 01:00:02,800
And I'm not sure we need a
notion that.

964
01:00:08,480 --> 01:00:12,200
That refines a way the
equivocation.

965
01:00:12,280 --> 01:00:17,520
I mean, we, we, we have a notion
of, of access consciousness,

966
01:00:18,360 --> 01:00:21,840
things that you can
introspectively identify.

967
01:00:21,840 --> 01:00:25,680
We have a notion of, of things
that play a certain role in

968
01:00:25,680 --> 01:00:29,680
action control.
We have a notion of of things

969
01:00:29,680 --> 01:00:35,800
that allow certain kinds of, of
associated associative

970
01:00:35,800 --> 01:00:42,320
conditioning and so on.
And these things tend to to

971
01:00:44,360 --> 01:00:46,600
overlap, coincide in human
beings.

972
01:00:47,200 --> 01:00:51,680
And I don't think there's
anything more to say.

973
01:00:51,680 --> 01:00:56,280
I don't think there is a
definite thing conscious apart

974
01:00:56,280 --> 01:01:02,280
from these various different
kind of functional definitions

975
01:01:02,280 --> 01:01:05,600
of different states which are
pretty tightly correlated in

976
01:01:05,600 --> 01:01:13,520
human beings and clearly come
apart in different animals.

977
01:01:15,960 --> 01:01:19,760
We have cases where they come
apart in human beings.

978
01:01:19,760 --> 01:01:23,160
I mean, you think of all the net
block generated stuff about

979
01:01:23,160 --> 01:01:27,360
cognitive overflow.
You know, we got these states at

980
01:01:27,360 --> 01:01:30,960
the back of the brain that have
a lot of information in and then

981
01:01:30,960 --> 01:01:33,040
we have these states at the
front of the brain that we can

982
01:01:33,040 --> 01:01:40,880
report and, and which of those
are really the conscious states.

983
01:01:41,040 --> 01:01:46,040
And I'm not sure it's a serious,
a serious debate.

984
01:01:46,040 --> 01:01:48,400
The ones in the front of the
brain are accessible.

985
01:01:48,400 --> 01:01:51,160
The ones in the back of the
brain carried a lot of

986
01:01:51,160 --> 01:01:54,560
information that that can be
used elsewhere.

987
01:01:55,080 --> 01:02:02,000
And if you look at that debate,
you'll find people trying to

988
01:02:02,520 --> 01:02:07,720
argue that, well, there's
certain things you can't

989
01:02:07,720 --> 01:02:10,840
explain.
If you think the consciousness

990
01:02:10,840 --> 01:02:13,160
is only in the front of the
brain and not at the back of the

991
01:02:13,160 --> 01:02:20,680
brain, or vice versa, and you
think, hang on, if you plump the

992
01:02:20,680 --> 01:02:25,040
consciousness here or there, why
does that give you different

993
01:02:25,040 --> 01:02:28,200
explanations?
Surely in brain processing

994
01:02:28,200 --> 01:02:32,040
terms, we explain things in
terms of brain processes that

995
01:02:32,040 --> 01:02:37,240
have certain causes and effects,
and the idea that deciding which

996
01:02:37,240 --> 01:02:40,720
of those states is conscious is
going to give you some extra

997
01:02:40,720 --> 01:02:44,640
explanatory payoff, That looks
weird to me.

998
01:02:44,640 --> 01:02:46,720
But that seems to be a
presupposition to this whole

999
01:02:46,720 --> 01:02:50,400
debate.
So look, I think this whole

1000
01:02:50,400 --> 01:02:56,360
business of trying to identify
consciousness either in

1001
01:02:56,360 --> 01:03:01,080
scientific terms or in
philosophical terms is is

1002
01:03:01,080 --> 01:03:06,400
misguided.
It's, it's generated by implicit

1003
01:03:06,400 --> 01:03:10,000
duelist thinking, the idea that
there's some extra thing there

1004
01:03:10,080 --> 01:03:14,640
over and above, over and above
the brain processes.

1005
01:03:14,960 --> 01:03:20,280
But having said that, I I have
serious colleagues who don't

1006
01:03:20,280 --> 01:03:25,440
make any of the mistakes that
I'm accusing the general kind of

1007
01:03:25,440 --> 01:03:28,320
consciousness industry of
making, and they say, no, no,

1008
01:03:28,320 --> 01:03:33,480
don't prejudge the fact that we
might well find an important

1009
01:03:34,160 --> 01:03:38,600
scientific category that
coincides with consciousness to

1010
01:03:38,600 --> 01:03:42,120
human beings and is of some
explanatory importance.

1011
01:03:42,120 --> 01:03:44,640
And I don't want to rule that
out.

1012
01:03:45,400 --> 01:03:51,080
It may just pan out like that,
but I'm not, I'm not optimistic,

1013
01:03:51,080 --> 01:03:54,000
and I don't see any a priori
reasons for supposing it has to

1014
01:03:54,000 --> 01:03:56,840
pan out like that.
David, are you familiar with

1015
01:03:57,800 --> 01:04:05,480
Michael Graziano's work?
I'm just trying to remember.

1016
01:04:05,640 --> 01:04:09,800
Remind me so.
When I think it was in 2018,

1017
01:04:09,800 --> 01:04:14,920
Keith Keith published a journal
called Illusionism as a Theory

1018
01:04:14,920 --> 01:04:18,680
of Consciousness, and he got a
group of writers to contribute

1019
01:04:18,680 --> 01:04:20,640
to it.
Some of them was Nicholas

1020
01:04:20,640 --> 01:04:22,880
Humphrey, Daniel Dennett,
Francois Camara.

1021
01:04:22,880 --> 01:04:27,200
You spoke about him earlier,
Susan Blackmore, Dirk

1022
01:04:27,200 --> 01:04:28,480
Pierreboom.
And one of them was Michael

1023
01:04:28,480 --> 01:04:31,000
Graziano, because he's got what
is known as the attention schema

1024
01:04:31,000 --> 01:04:33,520
theory.
And, and the and the whole

1025
01:04:33,520 --> 01:04:37,320
purpose of this gathering of
these different thinkers was to

1026
01:04:37,320 --> 01:04:40,440
do exactly what you're talking
about right now is to, is to

1027
01:04:40,440 --> 01:04:43,560
show people that the framing of
these problems is fundamentally

1028
01:04:43,560 --> 01:04:46,440
the problem is where the problem
really lies.

1029
01:04:46,440 --> 01:04:49,120
It's not that they're saying
consciousness doesn't exist.

1030
01:04:49,360 --> 01:04:52,320
It's more that we we're just
searching for the wrong thing.

1031
01:04:53,840 --> 01:04:56,480
And and I think, I think you
would have been perfect in that

1032
01:04:57,120 --> 01:04:59,080
catalogue just as a yeah.
Yeah.

1033
01:05:00,800 --> 01:05:04,320
But you, yeah, Michael's work,
specifically, when you, when you

1034
01:05:04,320 --> 01:05:06,760
look into the neuroscience
behind his work, it's easy to

1035
01:05:06,760 --> 01:05:09,400
see why we do this, which is why
I think you should actually

1036
01:05:09,400 --> 01:05:10,680
check it out because it's
fascinating you.

1037
01:05:10,920 --> 01:05:15,440
His attention schema theory sort
of indicates why we tend to have

1038
01:05:15,440 --> 01:05:19,400
this thought that there is this
essence, like quantity, quality

1039
01:05:19,400 --> 01:05:22,800
in this experience due to
certain heuristic thing

1040
01:05:23,520 --> 01:05:26,880
adaptations, biological
adaptations, which are useful

1041
01:05:27,080 --> 01:05:29,400
but not necessarily accurate.
And, you know, there's a whole

1042
01:05:29,400 --> 01:05:30,560
lot of work.
I don't want to butcher his

1043
01:05:30,560 --> 01:05:33,160
work, but at some point I think
you should check it out.

1044
01:05:35,320 --> 01:05:42,920
But you might well wonder how
are these issues going to be

1045
01:05:42,920 --> 01:05:45,920
decided?
I mean, I've been saying that

1046
01:05:45,920 --> 01:05:49,160
the the, the concept of
consciousness is mushy.

1047
01:05:50,320 --> 01:05:53,360
Let me come at the problem from
a different a different end.

1048
01:05:53,520 --> 01:05:58,560
If, if you think about the
standard way of testing the

1049
01:05:58,560 --> 01:06:03,280
theories of consciousness in
humans, I don't know global

1050
01:06:03,280 --> 01:06:08,640
workspace theory, perceptual
reality monitoring, whatever.

1051
01:06:10,120 --> 01:06:13,360
You have some theory, you say,
look, here are these processes

1052
01:06:13,360 --> 01:06:15,280
in the brain.
I'll, I'll, I'll give you a

1053
01:06:15,280 --> 01:06:17,080
characterization of them.
And I say, those are the

1054
01:06:17,080 --> 01:06:24,160
conscious ones, right?
And now we tested by finding

1055
01:06:24,160 --> 01:06:28,560
people who have those processes
going on and saying, were you

1056
01:06:28,560 --> 01:06:35,520
conscious and all finding people
who lack those processes and

1057
01:06:35,520 --> 01:06:37,520
checking whether they say, Oh,
no, I wasn't conscious.

1058
01:06:37,520 --> 01:06:39,240
I mean of, of of the relevant
thing.

1059
01:06:40,000 --> 01:06:45,600
So by the nature of the
methodology, we seem to be

1060
01:06:46,080 --> 01:06:50,480
equating equating consciousness
with access consciousness.

1061
01:06:50,480 --> 01:06:55,360
It's it's conscious if and only
if subjects can report the

1062
01:06:55,360 --> 01:06:59,080
state.
OK, but then we're told by Ned

1063
01:06:59,080 --> 01:07:01,520
Block and others, I don't know,
but let's not be too quick.

1064
01:07:01,520 --> 01:07:05,080
Let's not assume that phenomenal
consciousness coincides with

1065
01:07:05,080 --> 01:07:09,520
access consciousness, right?
And OK, fair enough.

1066
01:07:09,520 --> 01:07:10,680
I mean, access conscious is one
thing.

1067
01:07:10,680 --> 01:07:13,200
And these people have in mind
that there's something that

1068
01:07:13,280 --> 01:07:16,120
mightn't properly overlap with
that.

1069
01:07:16,920 --> 01:07:19,960
But now what are the rules for
deciding the game?

1070
01:07:20,200 --> 01:07:22,320
I mean, how are we to, I mean,
I've got a theory.

1071
01:07:22,320 --> 01:07:26,200
I mean, you know, integrated
information, it's all over the

1072
01:07:26,200 --> 01:07:27,880
place.
I say that's consciousness.

1073
01:07:30,960 --> 01:07:33,320
Eva Jablanca says unlimited
associative learning.

1074
01:07:33,320 --> 01:07:35,920
That's consciousness.
And you know, it's, it's there

1075
01:07:36,360 --> 01:07:37,640
in some animals.
How?

1076
01:07:37,680 --> 01:07:40,360
How are we supposed to decide
which of these series is right?

1077
01:07:41,200 --> 01:07:43,480
Susan Blackmore calls that
delusionism.

1078
01:07:44,440 --> 01:07:47,400
What's delusionism that?
She she refers to the fact that

1079
01:07:47,400 --> 01:07:51,280
we we constantly Let me let me
just first think about this

1080
01:07:51,280 --> 01:07:53,640
before I incorrectly define
this.

1081
01:07:53,920 --> 01:07:57,400
So delusionism is the fact that
we walk around thinking that we

1082
01:07:57,400 --> 01:07:59,800
are conscious most of the time.
So she quotes Marvin Minsky by

1083
01:07:59,800 --> 01:08:03,440
saying we think that we'll never
make a computer that is

1084
01:08:03,440 --> 01:08:05,120
conscious or aware of what it's
doing.

1085
01:08:05,120 --> 01:08:07,320
But then again, we really are
ourselves.

1086
01:08:07,440 --> 01:08:10,480
So it's, and I'm paraphrasing
that quote.

1087
01:08:11,040 --> 01:08:14,920
So she she brings up the fact
that you don't really think

1088
01:08:14,920 --> 01:08:16,880
about whether you're conscious
unless you stop and ask

1089
01:08:16,880 --> 01:08:18,720
yourself, am I conscious right
now?

1090
01:08:19,160 --> 01:08:21,560
So for the most part, you're
just walking around on

1091
01:08:21,560 --> 01:08:25,240
autopilot, driving your car
home, doing whatever you have to

1092
01:08:25,240 --> 01:08:26,640
do.
And then there are varying

1093
01:08:26,640 --> 01:08:28,479
moments in the day where you
finally think, OK, am I

1094
01:08:28,479 --> 01:08:30,760
conscious now?
And she says that's a part of

1095
01:08:30,760 --> 01:08:33,560
the illusion problem that Keith
and then we're talking about.

1096
01:08:33,800 --> 01:08:36,200
But then there's this delusional
problem where we still think,

1097
01:08:36,200 --> 01:08:39,200
even though we know we're not
conscious most of the time, that

1098
01:08:39,200 --> 01:08:41,319
we still tend to think we are
all the time.

1099
01:08:41,760 --> 01:08:44,319
And that's a fundamental
problem, which again goes back

1100
01:08:44,399 --> 01:08:50,040
to the psychology of it all.
But is she assuming there that I

1101
01:08:50,640 --> 01:08:53,680
mean it sounds like she's
assuming something like and the

1102
01:08:53,680 --> 01:08:56,640
current higher order theory of
consciousness, which I don't

1103
01:08:56,640 --> 01:09:00,319
think many people assume that,
IE the state is only conscious

1104
01:09:00,319 --> 01:09:03,640
if you're actually thinking at a
meta level.

1105
01:09:04,120 --> 01:09:10,120
I'm having this state and even
people who like higher order

1106
01:09:10,120 --> 01:09:11,800
theories of consciousness, which
is basically equating

1107
01:09:11,800 --> 01:09:15,080
consciousness with actual
consciousness, tend not to be a

1108
01:09:15,080 --> 01:09:17,680
current higher order theories.
The dispositional higher order

1109
01:09:17,680 --> 01:09:23,160
theories, IE that you would have
been able to form a higher order

1110
01:09:23,160 --> 01:09:25,800
judgement about the state if you
put your mind to it.

1111
01:09:25,960 --> 01:09:28,520
And it's pretty clear that if
you're going to be an access

1112
01:09:28,520 --> 01:09:31,040
consciousness person, you have
to be dispositional.

1113
01:09:31,040 --> 01:09:34,000
So.
She's she's, I think more along

1114
01:09:34,000 --> 01:09:37,279
the line of an illusionist.
She does not believe that we'll

1115
01:09:37,279 --> 01:09:40,680
find and she's not mysterious,
but she does think that he's

1116
01:09:40,680 --> 01:09:43,040
finding neural correlates of
consciousness is an is a

1117
01:09:43,040 --> 01:09:45,319
pointless journey.
We'll never really find that

1118
01:09:45,319 --> 01:09:49,200
because there is no conscious
state in that in the way we

1119
01:09:49,200 --> 01:09:50,920
search for it.
But that's part of the

1120
01:09:50,920 --> 01:09:53,399
delusional mindset for this
they're.

1121
01:09:54,360 --> 01:09:55,640
Not happy to be with her.
Yeah, yeah.

1122
01:09:56,600 --> 01:09:58,040
I think you guys do align in
that regard.

1123
01:09:58,520 --> 01:10:02,960
The OK, David, to to sort of
round off, let's say there is

1124
01:10:03,320 --> 01:10:05,800
these states of consciousness
existing and we go through life

1125
01:10:05,800 --> 01:10:07,680
doing this.
What are your thoughts on free

1126
01:10:07,680 --> 01:10:10,720
will?
Just as a as a segue to to the

1127
01:10:10,720 --> 01:10:13,920
end of the conversation.
It's a poor segue, but.

1128
01:10:15,160 --> 01:10:18,520
I've I've I've always been a
happy compatibilist about about

1129
01:10:18,760 --> 01:10:25,960
free will.
I can't really see what the

1130
01:10:25,960 --> 01:10:30,240
people who are uneasy about
compatibilism are hankering for.

1131
01:10:30,320 --> 01:10:44,440
I mean, it's perfectly clear to
me that if free will is

1132
01:10:44,440 --> 01:10:47,320
something worth having, I'm just
thinking of, then it's all the

1133
01:10:47,320 --> 01:10:57,240
free will worth having.
It's my being able to make a

1134
01:10:57,240 --> 01:11:03,520
change, direct what I do as a
result of my character, my aims,

1135
01:11:03,520 --> 01:11:10,320
my deliberation and so on.
And the idea that what you

1136
01:11:10,320 --> 01:11:14,320
really want is that after all
that's done, it's work.

1137
01:11:14,320 --> 01:11:18,800
There's some extra bit of
something that comes from

1138
01:11:18,800 --> 01:11:21,640
outside my character and my
beliefs and desires making a

1139
01:11:21,640 --> 01:11:25,360
difference.
I mean, many people have made

1140
01:11:25,360 --> 01:11:28,120
this point before.
Gaines, Strawson, Frederick Will

1141
01:11:28,120 --> 01:11:34,400
that that bringing in some extra
random element is no more giving

1142
01:11:34,400 --> 01:11:36,520
me free will than what I had
before.

1143
01:11:37,560 --> 01:11:41,680
And so no, I'm a happy
compatibilist.

1144
01:11:43,280 --> 01:11:46,680
I think do you think making an
active choice, sorry to to

1145
01:11:47,080 --> 01:11:50,880
interrupt you feel like making
those choices that the very

1146
01:11:50,880 --> 01:11:55,640
moment that we make a choice
could be the the essence like

1147
01:11:55,640 --> 01:11:57,840
quality of consciousness that
we're all searching for.

1148
01:12:04,880 --> 01:12:08,200
Not really.
I, I, no, I, I think a lot of

1149
01:12:08,200 --> 01:12:13,080
the things I would like to think
I'm doing and I'm doing free

1150
01:12:16,280 --> 01:12:18,880
without much assistance from
consciousness.

1151
01:12:18,880 --> 01:12:22,480
I'm, I'm not sure the two
categories will overlap that.

1152
01:12:23,360 --> 01:12:28,160
But let me make one final point
because this is interesting for

1153
01:12:28,160 --> 01:12:36,280
your, for your viewers.
So Dennett on free will, he says

1154
01:12:36,400 --> 01:12:39,960
there is free will.
He argues with Greg Caruso and

1155
01:12:39,960 --> 01:12:43,840
other illuminativists about free
will that look, it's not quite

1156
01:12:44,680 --> 01:12:46,400
what you might have been hoping
for.

1157
01:12:46,400 --> 01:12:49,560
You might have been hoping for
some kind of agent causality

1158
01:12:49,560 --> 01:12:52,520
coming from outside the realm of
natural law, but you aren't

1159
01:12:52,520 --> 01:12:55,720
going to get any such thing.
But what we have, what we have

1160
01:12:55,720 --> 01:12:59,640
is our actions being directed
crucially by our character

1161
01:12:59,640 --> 01:13:01,880
abolition design.
So that's, that's all that you

1162
01:13:01,880 --> 01:13:04,080
should be hankering for.
That's that's important thing,

1163
01:13:04,080 --> 01:13:08,560
that's what matters.
So you know, he's he we have, we

1164
01:13:08,560 --> 01:13:10,080
have free will.
It's all the free will worth

1165
01:13:10,080 --> 01:13:11,680
having.
Not quite what you might have

1166
01:13:11,680 --> 01:13:14,080
hoped for if you were a
religious kind of person, but

1167
01:13:15,080 --> 01:13:18,000
nothing wrong with it.
When it comes to consciousness,

1168
01:13:19,240 --> 01:13:22,920
it's the same story.
We know we have mental states

1169
01:13:22,920 --> 01:13:27,080
that we're we're introspectively
aware of and important for our

1170
01:13:27,320 --> 01:13:33,920
action, control and so on.
Not quite what the duellists

1171
01:13:33,960 --> 01:13:36,280
thought was was going on, but
still.

1172
01:13:36,280 --> 01:13:38,120
There's this stuff going on
inside you.

1173
01:13:38,800 --> 01:13:42,840
But on consciousness.
He doesn't say that's all the

1174
01:13:42,840 --> 01:13:45,160
consciousness worth having.
I'm in favor of consciousness.

1175
01:13:45,160 --> 01:13:48,920
He says consciousness is an
illusion and and the two setups

1176
01:13:48,920 --> 01:13:52,480
are exactly the same.
I mean, from a physicalist point

1177
01:13:52,480 --> 01:13:56,200
of view, you get an awful lot of
free will of consciousness.

1178
01:13:56,200 --> 01:13:59,760
Maybe all the things that you
wanted, but not what duellist

1179
01:13:59,760 --> 01:14:01,680
religious people would have been
hoping for.

1180
01:14:02,160 --> 01:14:05,080
And why does he go
illuminativist about

1181
01:14:05,080 --> 01:14:08,120
consciousness and non alumnus
about free will?

1182
01:14:08,120 --> 01:14:12,160
And I've asked him that.
I asked him that there was some

1183
01:14:12,160 --> 01:14:17,720
kind of podcast we were both on
and and I said what's?

1184
01:14:18,000 --> 01:14:19,240
And he said there isn't any
difference.

1185
01:14:19,240 --> 01:14:21,120
The two situations are exactly
the same.

1186
01:14:21,280 --> 01:14:22,840
And I said, so it's just
rhetoric.

1187
01:14:22,840 --> 01:14:25,600
Is it the illusionism?
And he said, yeah, I guess it

1188
01:14:25,600 --> 01:14:27,240
is.
I guess it is so.

1189
01:14:27,760 --> 01:14:29,600
That was something I often
wanted as well.

1190
01:14:29,600 --> 01:14:31,080
That's exactly what I've always
thought.

1191
01:14:31,080 --> 01:14:33,400
Well, how does he get to that
conclusion about the other?

1192
01:14:33,640 --> 01:14:35,880
And, and I'm glad you actually
brought that up.

1193
01:14:35,880 --> 01:14:38,320
Thank you.
Good.

1194
01:14:38,600 --> 01:14:40,360
Yeah, it's it's something I've
often thought about because

1195
01:14:40,360 --> 01:14:43,720
you'd assume that he'd go down
the Sam Harris route with his

1196
01:14:43,720 --> 01:14:46,000
consciousness mindset.
But if if for some reason they

1197
01:14:46,000 --> 01:14:48,880
just don't coincide there,
unlike their religious views.

1198
01:14:50,760 --> 01:14:55,480
Yes, maybe it's something to do
with his Gilbert Ryle logical

1199
01:14:55,480 --> 01:14:57,160
behaviourism.
Behaviourism.

1200
01:14:58,800 --> 01:15:00,240
I also think maybe it has.
Something to do.

1201
01:15:00,320 --> 01:15:03,120
He's for he's for free will and
action, but he's against

1202
01:15:03,120 --> 01:15:06,880
consciousness.
But but in truth, his views

1203
01:15:06,880 --> 01:15:09,240
about the two subjects are just
the same.

1204
01:15:09,240 --> 01:15:13,360
And, and I think that's, I don't
want to be illuminivist about

1205
01:15:13,360 --> 01:15:20,280
either, but it's, yeah.
David, what philosophical

1206
01:15:20,600 --> 01:15:26,320
questions really play at you at
night currently?

1207
01:15:27,320 --> 01:15:32,800
I'm writing a book about
causation, which is, and causal

1208
01:15:32,800 --> 01:15:39,840
inference and probability and
the direction of time and things

1209
01:15:39,840 --> 01:15:43,600
like that.
And I'll tell you the one thing

1210
01:15:43,600 --> 01:15:45,800
that really puzzles me is
probability.

1211
01:15:47,160 --> 01:15:53,080
And I mean, we've been talking
about consciousness.

1212
01:15:53,080 --> 01:15:55,560
I said I haven't changed my mind
very much since I wrote that

1213
01:15:55,560 --> 01:15:58,000
book 20 years ago.
And on plenty of things, you

1214
01:15:58,000 --> 01:16:00,320
know, I've formed a view and
I've been happy with it.

1215
01:16:00,920 --> 01:16:04,320
Probability, I find I keep on
changing my mind.

1216
01:16:04,320 --> 01:16:07,160
I think it's such a deep and
difficult issue.

1217
01:16:08,200 --> 01:16:12,720
I love thinking about it.
In fact, I'm writing this book

1218
01:16:12,720 --> 01:16:15,600
about causation that involves
probabilities a great deal.

1219
01:16:15,960 --> 01:16:19,160
But I hope I can write it in
such a way that it doesn't

1220
01:16:19,160 --> 01:16:20,560
matter what you think about
probability.

1221
01:16:20,560 --> 01:16:23,800
You should agree with me what I
what I say about causation.

1222
01:16:23,800 --> 01:16:25,960
But.
Yes.

1223
01:16:26,240 --> 01:16:27,640
Do you have a working title for
the book?

1224
01:16:27,640 --> 01:16:29,880
What's are you last?
It's it's.

1225
01:16:30,160 --> 01:16:33,360
Going to be called pauses.
That's it.

1226
01:16:33,920 --> 01:16:35,880
Pauses causes no good.
Causes.

1227
01:16:36,600 --> 01:16:38,520
That's.
No, no subheadings.

1228
01:16:39,320 --> 01:16:49,120
So yes, there's a book by your
ex colleague.

1229
01:16:49,120 --> 01:16:54,560
He's no longer in Cape Town.
JM Curcier Oh, Diary of a Bad

1230
01:16:54,560 --> 01:16:56,760
Year, I think where where he has
a lot.

1231
01:16:56,800 --> 01:17:02,760
I mean, he's he's a fine writer
and a real philosopher if you

1232
01:17:02,800 --> 01:17:05,680
ask me.
And this book has a lot of of a

1233
01:17:05,680 --> 01:17:07,880
side sort of philosophical
nature talking about Freeman and

1234
01:17:07,880 --> 01:17:10,000
so.
And one of them is probability

1235
01:17:10,000 --> 01:17:13,760
says what is probability?
It makes no sense.

1236
01:17:13,760 --> 01:17:19,560
You know, that here's this coin.
I spin it, it comes on heads or

1237
01:17:19,560 --> 01:17:23,840
it comes down tails, but it's
not just one or not.

1238
01:17:23,840 --> 01:17:27,280
There's supposed to be this
number around, which is .5, but

1239
01:17:27,400 --> 01:17:31,120
where's this .5 in reality?
How do you get probability into

1240
01:17:31,120 --> 01:17:33,880
reality?
That's the thing that keeps you

1241
01:17:33,880 --> 01:17:35,000
awake at night, I'm afraid.
And.

1242
01:17:35,680 --> 01:17:37,560
That and that goes so much
deeper when you think about the

1243
01:17:37,560 --> 01:17:40,120
way quantum mechanics works and
then probabilities play a role.

1244
01:17:42,400 --> 01:17:45,880
Yeah, so.
It it expands into every

1245
01:17:45,880 --> 01:17:47,160
conversation you could possibly
have.

1246
01:17:48,080 --> 01:17:52,320
And I I, I think about that the
great a great deal and.

1247
01:17:53,240 --> 01:17:56,600
Do you think then that's because
that's so misunderstood?

1248
01:17:57,080 --> 01:17:59,920
It's either a good, it's, it's
either a nice way for some

1249
01:18:00,160 --> 01:18:02,560
philosophers and scientists to
pretend that consciousness comes

1250
01:18:02,560 --> 01:18:05,840
from that some sort of a quantum
indeterminacy or some sort of

1251
01:18:05,840 --> 01:18:09,520
probabilities within a quantum
realm or, or do you think that's

1252
01:18:09,520 --> 01:18:12,040
just them trying too hard?
You know, if you give it like a

1253
01:18:12,040 --> 01:18:15,240
Penrose microtubules, you go
deep enough.

1254
01:18:15,640 --> 01:18:22,960
I mean, I, I, I, I'm just
writing about other, you know,

1255
01:18:23,920 --> 01:18:28,680
bad move in philosophy is you've
got if you've got one big puzzle

1256
01:18:28,680 --> 01:18:32,000
and you've got another big
puzzle, they over the same

1257
01:18:32,000 --> 01:18:34,480
puzzle, right.
And you looks like you've made

1258
01:18:34,480 --> 01:18:36,240
progress.
You've reduced 2 puzzles to one,

1259
01:18:36,880 --> 01:18:39,160
but it's just made-up.
I mean, you haven't reduced 2

1260
01:18:39,160 --> 01:18:40,560
puzzles to one there, but it's
still there.

1261
01:18:40,760 --> 01:18:43,600
Well.
Now I'm looking forward to

1262
01:18:43,600 --> 01:18:46,360
causes.
David, anything, any final

1263
01:18:46,360 --> 01:18:48,640
words, anything else you you
think that we haven't touched on

1264
01:18:48,640 --> 01:18:51,480
in consciousness, the mind, body
problem, free will, all causes

1265
01:18:51,480 --> 01:18:54,520
that you'd like to?
And I think we've covered a lot

1266
01:18:54,520 --> 01:18:56,120
of a lot of ground and that was
a lot of fun.

1267
01:18:56,120 --> 01:18:57,600
So thank you.
Thank you very much.

1268
01:18:57,600 --> 01:18:59,840
It's nice.
It's nice to spend time with

1269
01:18:59,840 --> 01:19:01,360
you.
Thank you so much, I appreciate

1270
01:19:01,360 --> 01:19:02,760
it.
From 1 Durbanite to another, I

1271
01:19:02,760 --> 01:19:04,240
can't, I can't believe it.
I'm still, my mind's still

1272
01:19:04,240 --> 01:19:05,640
blown.
I'm still fixated on that.

1273
01:19:06,640 --> 01:19:09,680
Yeah, OK.
Yeah, cheers.

1274
01:19:09,720 --> 01:19:10,640
Cheers, David.
Take care.

1275
01:19:10,640 --> 01:19:13,040
Hope we chat again soon.
Hey, bye, Tim.

1276
01:19:13,120 --> 01:19:13,560
Bye bye.