Anand Vaidya: What Is Pure Consciousness? Non-Dualism & Indian Philosophy Of Mind

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Anand, I think the best way to
start this conversation, as I

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always do, is to start with
definitions.

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Let's start with defining
consciousness, the self and the

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mind.
OK, so I agree with you that

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it's good to start with
definitions, as long as we also

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keep in mind that.
Definitions are themselves

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things that are trying to
capture something other than

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words like the self,
consciousness, the state, not

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just the word.
But it's useful to start with

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definitions so that we have some
rough approximation of what

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we're trying to get at.
So the definitions I'm going to

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give are going to begin by
coming from, in the case of

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consciousness, Western
philosophy, and in the case of

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the self and the mind.
I will note when I'm talking

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about something in relationship
to Indian philosophy or non

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western philosophy and the
notion of mind in both of those

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traditions.
OK, so probably the most

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important definition of
consciousness to put on the

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table when you begin a
conversation is the definition

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of what's known as phenomenal
consciousness, which is

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articulated most carefully by
through the work of David

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Chalmers.
And was initially brought into

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relief and perspective by the
work of Thomas Nagel.

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And it is the notion that there
is something it's like to have

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an experience.
So if I have an experience and

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it has what is called the what
it's like feature, then we say

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that it's a state of phenomenal
consciousness.

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So what it's like to undergo
seeing red versus blue or

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different is different what it's
like to taste?

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Marinara sauce versus Curry is
different.

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What it's like to hear C minor
is different than A minor.

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These differences are capturing
what it's like.

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There's something, it's like
that's different in each of

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those cases.
Now, that definition of

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consciousness can be contrasted
with a richer notion, which is

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also important.
It's called affective

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consciousness.
OK, affective consciousness.

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Has to do with consciousness
that is phenomenal, but in

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addition has some sort of
affect, which means feeling or

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emotion related to it.
So what we would typically say

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is that if something pertains to
affective consciousness, there

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is something that has positive
or negative valence to it.

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That means it's not just that,
it.

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Feels like, sorry, it's just not
that there's a what it's like

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feature, it's that it feels
somewhat like on the pain,

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pleasure scale to go up or down.
OK, so that's affected

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consciousness.
And then the third notion that

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we needed to bring on the table
is the definition known As for

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access consciousness.
Access, not affect.

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Access consciousness has to do
with the fact that a state or

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representation is available for
use in action speech.

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Judgement and inference.
So the notion of access

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consciousness is often times
contrasted most clearly with the

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notion of phenomenal
consciousness because there is a

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debate controversy about whether
or not you can have phenomenal

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consciousness, sorry, access
consciousness without phenomenal

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consciousness.
OK, so the example that is used

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to motivate this is the case of
blind sight patients.

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So a blind sight patient, for
example, does not see out of the

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left side of their visual field
in the sense of having what it's

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like to see an object on the
table.

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But if you prompt a blind sight
patient to pick up something on

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the table, if you prompt them
enough times, then eventually

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they will probably reliably pick
up the object in the table.

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Which leads to the idea that
there's something there that

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guides their action, but there's
nothing.

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It's like for them to see that
thing, but there's a way in

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which they can act with
relationship to the world.

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There's a really nice.
Video out there you can show

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people of a person who's being
asked to walk down a hallway

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where there are a number of
ordinary obstacles like tables

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and chairs and basketballs and
whatnot, and they have blind

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sight.
And they successfully walk down

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the hallway, which suggests that
something is present there in

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their mind that is allowing them
to do something like a judgement

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of navigation in this corridor,
so blind sight.

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A very interesting topic just to
look at what's going on there.

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But again, the three definitions
we have are phenomenal

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consciousness.
There's a subjective what it's

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like aspect to the experience.
Often times that's what

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contrasts with different
experiences, the red versus blue

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case.
Then there's affective

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consciousness, there's some sort
of positive or negative valence

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in the conscious state, and then
there's access consciousness.

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OK, now one last important point
to make about all three of these

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is that the relationship between
these is something that people

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debate Now today in philosophy,
they all are being debated.

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So one of the debates that
people will have is like I

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pointed out, can you have access
consciousness without any

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phenomenal consciousness.
Another one people will debate

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is whether or not.
You can have phenomenal

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consciousness without affective
consciousness.

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Can it be the case that there's
something it's like to be in a

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specific state, but there's
nothing positive or negative

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about what it's like to be in
that state?

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Right, So it's.
Important to recognize that

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these are terms we use in
philosophy and cognitive

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neuroscience to think about
consciousness, but they're

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controversial, they have
relations between them, and they

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have very important
relationships to other ideas.

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That we might want to discuss.
So one thing I think that's

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relevant to bring up here is
what is the definition of

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sentience, right.
So sentience fits in the family

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of terms people often times
associate in talking about

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consciousness.
And I think the common notion of

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sentience is a combination of
two other more basic things.

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So the two basic things that
come together are phenomenal and

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affective consciousness.
Or you could say even just

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affective consciousness, because
affective consciousness implies

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phenomenal conscious.
If it feels a certain way,

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there's something it's like to
undergo it, and sentience is

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more clearly associated with
affective consciousness.

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But because there are these
other notions of consciousness,

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I prefer usually to talk not
about sentience, but about a

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certain type of consciousness.
One of the three we've

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mentioned.
OK, now one more distinction to

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come out that's relevant here is
that.

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These definitions are the common
ones in Western philosophy, that

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is that are being debated.
Now.

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If you look at classical Indian
philosophy though, the

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distinction that shows up most
often in the literature is a

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distinction between what is pure
consciousness and I guess for

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lack of a better term, impure
consciousness.

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And this has to do with the
distinction relating to what

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kind of structure the conscious
state has.

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So.
An ordinary experience in the

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world has what's known as a
subject object structure.

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There's the person who's
experiencing it and there's

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experience the person has, and
they're the objects of

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experience.
It's that I see this computer,

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it's that I see you through the
computer.

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It's that I hear this specific
sound.

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Those are the objects of
experience that I'm the subject

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of experience, so in pure
consciousness and Indian

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philosophy.
Is the notion of subject object

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consciousness.
It's a consciousness that

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relates to a subject, to an
object.

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It can also be known as
intentional consciousness, the

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fact that your mind is directed
at something.

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Pure consciousness, by contrast,
has no subject object structure.

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It lacks a subject object
structure.

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And again, like in the Western
case, it is also controversial.

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So just as someone can debate
whether or not.

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There is really access
consciousness without phenomenal

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consciousness.
Someone can really debate

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whether or not pure
consciousness even makes sense,

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given that the ordinary
understanding of conscious

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states is that they have a
subject, object structure.

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OK, so that'll cover, I think,
the initial definitions of what

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we mean by consciousness that we
have to have on the table.

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And then?
What we can do is talk about the

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self and we can talk about mind.
So let's start with mind first,

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since we're going in this kind
of order of consciousness mind,

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and then we're going down to
something like self.

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In Western philosophy, it's very
common to think that Franz

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Brentano made a very important
and landmark contribution to

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talking about the mind because
he had this idea that

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intentionality, this aspect in
which we can be directed at

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something.
Is sort of the mark of the

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mental, right?
So there's this notion, mental

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mind, and one of the core ideas
that captures it is that

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mentality exhibits
intentionality, that your mind

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is the type of thing that can be
directed or about something.

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When you're having a perceptual
experience or you're listening

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to someone, your mind is
directed at the object of the

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experience or.
What the person is saying to you

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in both of those cases, this key
feature that seems to be really

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important about mindedness is
that it has intentionality.

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Now, in some traditions of
philosophy, it is the case that

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when we think about mentality,
we think about it as part of

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nature, and in other traditions
we think of it as the one thing

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that seems to be the hardest
thing in nature to explain, OK.

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So one common thing in Indian
philosophy, in the Sankhya

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tradition for example, is to
talk about this notion of the

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mind as being something that is
part of nature, what is known as

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Prakriti, and talk about states
of consciousness like pure

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consciousness, as the thing
that's outside of nature.

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And in Western philosophy,
because there's a relationship

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between intentional
consciousness and phenomenal

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consciousness, there's a
tendency to think that

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intentionality and phenomenal
consciousness are these two

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things that are hard to explain
in nature, right.

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OK, so that's the.
So that's a little bit about the

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notion of mind and mentality.
One of the things that I'm

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trying to push for clarification
here is that you should not

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assume.
In a cross traditional dialogue

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that the notion of mind and
mentality means the same thing

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as consciousness.
Because in some traditions what

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is being picked out by
consciousness has a different

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function and is more specific
and a very salient and important

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way.
OK, so final one the self.

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OK, this one.
I believe someone at one point

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in time pointed out to me that
we can find at least 17

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different notions of the self.
So we're not going to go through

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all of them.
I don't even think I know all of

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them, but I used to teach
classes on and I'd go through a

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couple.
So I think we'll go through some

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of the core ideas.
I think actually maybe it's

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better to think of it not just
core ideas, but ways of

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conceptualizing self talk, talk
of the self, right.

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Right.
So this is like like

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conceptions, not definitions.
This is like ways of thinking

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about what's going on.
I I I think.

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One of the ways to start is that
the self is sometimes thought of

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as this thing that's like the
agent or principal controller of

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the body.
Like somehow it is either

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distinct from the physical body
or it is a sub component of the

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rest of the body.
But it's not the whole body.

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OK, and it has certain
properties.

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It has the property.
To control the body, to be the

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actor acting and making
decisions.

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It has a will or balloon to us
and it is somehow what is

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responsible for agency in the
body and through the body.

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OK.
And so that is a conception that

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is often times discussed.
Now, for some people that is a

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very strange notion because they
don't think.

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That there's some actor
controlling their body, or they

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don't think that there's
anything smaller than their

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body.
That is the self.

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So for some people, talking
about the self just as talking

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about what's called the person.
OK, so we don't want to say that

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persons themselves in the
beginning are the same thing.

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And there's a relationship here
where we can now talk about self

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and person.
OK, so that's one notion of the

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self.
Sorry, 1.

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Conception of the self.
That sort of is clearly out

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there in a lot of different
areas.

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So two other ones that show up
are what's known as the

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narrative conception of the
self, which is the idea that

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whatever is the self, there is
nothing to it other than it's a

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series of narrations on a life
story.

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It's a very popular notion.
Both of you know a lot of

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00:14:09,280 --> 00:14:10,840
students.
I teach in younger generations

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00:14:10,840 --> 00:14:16,200
of people, but also it's found
in psychology and other areas of

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00:14:16,200 --> 00:14:19,160
research and therapy.
So there is this idea that the

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self is like a constructed
story, all of which is not

237
00:14:23,880 --> 00:14:28,800
explicit at anyone time to a
person who has a narrative self

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00:14:29,240 --> 00:14:33,760
but can be made explicit, can be
adjusted changes over time and

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00:14:33,760 --> 00:14:36,600
plays a role in certain
psychological states.

240
00:14:37,040 --> 00:14:40,280
So the narrative conception of
the self can help explain why,

241
00:14:40,280 --> 00:14:43,920
for example, someone might be
feeling depressed from a certain

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00:14:43,920 --> 00:14:47,480
point of view, or why they might
be feeling elated, because the

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00:14:47,480 --> 00:14:51,120
story they have of their self is
something that gives an

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00:14:51,120 --> 00:14:55,880
explanatory credence or or is
able to explain why they're

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00:14:55,880 --> 00:14:57,880
having certain kinds of
psychological states.

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00:14:58,240 --> 00:15:00,480
So there's a lot of work on
narrative conceptions of the

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00:15:00,480 --> 00:15:02,560
stuff.
They're very interesting, but

248
00:15:02,560 --> 00:15:06,680
this can be contrasted with the
authorial.

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00:15:08,080 --> 00:15:13,440
Sense of the self, which is OK.
If the self is a story, and a

250
00:15:13,440 --> 00:15:18,200
story is a creation and an act
of assembly, then there's

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00:15:18,200 --> 00:15:20,200
something there that's doing
that, right?

252
00:15:20,200 --> 00:15:22,960
Otherwise, you're telling me
there's a story without an

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00:15:22,960 --> 00:15:24,960
author, but there is no sense of
making sense.

254
00:15:25,200 --> 00:15:29,000
We can't make sense of the
notion of a story without an

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00:15:29,000 --> 00:15:32,560
author.
So the authorial self is

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00:15:32,560 --> 00:15:35,920
sometimes seen to be related to
the.

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00:15:37,200 --> 00:15:40,960
The actor controller principal
controller self.

258
00:15:41,240 --> 00:15:45,240
But it need not be and the
reason why is because you can

259
00:15:45,240 --> 00:15:50,200
say that certain things are true
of the authorial self that make

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00:15:50,200 --> 00:15:57,720
it more sorry, less robust than
the actor principal self, right?

261
00:15:57,920 --> 00:16:01,840
So you can say, for example, the
authorial self is really subject

262
00:16:02,200 --> 00:16:06,680
to a lot of inherent.
Problems that occur in the body

263
00:16:06,880 --> 00:16:09,040
that affect what it's able to
do.

264
00:16:09,040 --> 00:16:12,640
So for example, bias is one
thing that happens that can show

265
00:16:12,640 --> 00:16:17,160
up with the authorial self, like
you're you're inclined as an

266
00:16:17,160 --> 00:16:20,200
authorial self to tell a certain
kind of story about yourself,

267
00:16:20,520 --> 00:16:22,080
right?
As opposed to another one.

268
00:16:22,680 --> 00:16:27,400
Notions of the actor and the
principal self often times try

269
00:16:27,400 --> 00:16:31,080
to say that this is the seat of.
The most.

270
00:16:31,200 --> 00:16:34,320
This is the thing that is pure.
This is the thing that has power

271
00:16:34,320 --> 00:16:37,400
and control and can do all these
things and makes decisions.

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00:16:37,600 --> 00:16:41,200
But authorial notions of the
self are more just trying to

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00:16:41,200 --> 00:16:45,960
make sense of how narration
could be a coherent idea by

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00:16:45,960 --> 00:16:49,280
focusing on the fact that
there's an author and there's no

275
00:16:49,280 --> 00:16:51,680
commitment.
To the claim in the authorial

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00:16:51,680 --> 00:16:54,800
self that like it's not the
whole body or it's like some sub

277
00:16:54,800 --> 00:16:59,000
component or those things are
not as relevant as explaining

278
00:16:59,240 --> 00:17:02,840
the conceptual coherence of
narrative conceptions against

279
00:17:02,840 --> 00:17:05,640
the back of something that would
be responsible for the

280
00:17:05,640 --> 00:17:08,599
narration, right.
That's kind of what we get

281
00:17:08,599 --> 00:17:10,920
there.
OK, so one last one that's also

282
00:17:10,920 --> 00:17:14,319
relevant is the idea of the true
self.

283
00:17:14,480 --> 00:17:18,359
That shows up a lot in Indian
philosophy under the term Atman.

284
00:17:19,359 --> 00:17:24,720
And so the true self is supposed
to be more closely associated

285
00:17:25,040 --> 00:17:29,760
with the principal actor control
notion of the self.

286
00:17:30,040 --> 00:17:34,480
But again, it it's it's
important to recognize it here.

287
00:17:34,680 --> 00:17:38,600
When we're talking, we must pay
attention to the role of whether

288
00:17:38,600 --> 00:17:43,240
or not free will is possible or
not in thinking about this self.

289
00:17:43,240 --> 00:17:48,400
So there can be a true self in
an Indian tradition for which?

290
00:17:48,920 --> 00:17:52,560
There is no freedom that would
be completely inconsistent with

291
00:17:52,560 --> 00:17:57,160
the idea of the actor principal
self that's present in other

292
00:17:57,160 --> 00:18:01,040
traditions where this is what is
what's being explained is a true

293
00:18:01,040 --> 00:18:03,760
seed of free will, right?
So, right.

294
00:18:03,760 --> 00:18:07,560
So let's let's, I mean, I'm sort
of avoiding giving a lot of

295
00:18:07,560 --> 00:18:10,520
names of people who said such
things because that'll just bog

296
00:18:10,520 --> 00:18:12,560
us down.
But I'm distinguishing

297
00:18:12,600 --> 00:18:15,440
conceptually the space of what
is relevant here.

298
00:18:15,440 --> 00:18:17,000
So I just want to make that
clear like.

299
00:18:17,360 --> 00:18:21,520
You will find in Indian
traditions one sort of notion of

300
00:18:21,520 --> 00:18:24,240
the true self, and you wouldn't,
for example, say that.

301
00:18:24,240 --> 00:18:27,600
That's the same notion you find
in Immanuel Kant when he talks

302
00:18:27,600 --> 00:18:30,040
about the transcendental self or
the numinal self or something

303
00:18:30,040 --> 00:18:32,200
like that.
So names are not important.

304
00:18:32,200 --> 00:18:34,440
The conceptual distinction is
really what's important.

305
00:18:34,440 --> 00:18:39,320
What's relevant here is the role
that freedom plays as a property

306
00:18:39,320 --> 00:18:43,960
of the thing that's said to be a
self right, and this also.

307
00:18:44,440 --> 00:18:47,680
Can pertain to whether or not
it's material or immaterial,

308
00:18:47,680 --> 00:18:50,600
right?
So it could be a notion of a

309
00:18:50,600 --> 00:18:57,040
material true self that lacks
freedom, a material actor self

310
00:18:57,520 --> 00:19:01,680
that has freedom, an immaterial
actor self which is the only way

311
00:19:01,680 --> 00:19:06,200
to explain freedom, or an
immaterial true self that's

312
00:19:06,200 --> 00:19:10,240
housed in a material body but is
ultimately identical to pure

313
00:19:10,240 --> 00:19:11,800
consciousness.
Which is the advice?

314
00:19:12,440 --> 00:19:13,480
OK.
Yeah.

315
00:19:13,480 --> 00:19:17,560
So those are our terms.
You go now, so look there's a

316
00:19:17,560 --> 00:19:20,960
lot to unpack there and I think
it's they're all fascinating in

317
00:19:20,960 --> 00:19:22,320
their own right, each
perspective.

318
00:19:22,320 --> 00:19:26,680
But you you you mentioned this
subject object distinction and

319
00:19:26,680 --> 00:19:29,840
how in both Indian philosophy
and Western philosophy these are

320
00:19:29,840 --> 00:19:32,320
perceived very differently.
I think let's unpack that a

321
00:19:32,320 --> 00:19:35,120
little because the fact that we
have thousands of years worth of

322
00:19:35,120 --> 00:19:37,760
the mind body problem within
Western philosophy and how it's

323
00:19:37,760 --> 00:19:41,000
interpreted and how we apply any
sort of initiative moving

324
00:19:41,000 --> 00:19:42,800
forward to trying to understand
consciousness.

325
00:19:43,320 --> 00:19:46,840
It is dependent on the fact that
we only use this sort of

326
00:19:46,840 --> 00:19:49,400
paradigm to understand this.
But there's also thousands of

327
00:19:49,400 --> 00:19:52,640
years of Eastern philosophy and
Indian philosophy that has so

328
00:19:52,640 --> 00:19:56,640
much to say and is perhaps not
if it is brought into the

329
00:19:56,640 --> 00:19:58,760
conversation.
Maybe it's not the right people

330
00:19:58,760 --> 00:20:01,760
bringing it in because you have
an influx of people who who

331
00:20:01,760 --> 00:20:05,920
claim to understand Indian
philosophy today via Western

332
00:20:05,920 --> 00:20:07,560
perspectives, and I don't think
they.

333
00:20:08,120 --> 00:20:10,320
Particularly do it justice
because growing up as a child, I

334
00:20:10,320 --> 00:20:14,280
mean I'm Indian and as a South,
as an Indian from South Africa,

335
00:20:14,520 --> 00:20:18,160
I have my own perception of what
it is to understand Indian

336
00:20:18,160 --> 00:20:21,320
culture and it's very different
from my ancient ancestors in

337
00:20:21,320 --> 00:20:23,200
India.
So I can imagine the blurry

338
00:20:23,360 --> 00:20:25,840
lines that take place when
people try to interpret Indian

339
00:20:25,840 --> 00:20:28,480
philosophy already with that.
So there's a lot that I said

340
00:20:28,480 --> 00:20:30,200
there.
But with that being said, what

341
00:20:30,200 --> 00:20:33,000
is your take on the differences
between Western philosophy of

342
00:20:33,000 --> 00:20:34,720
mind and Indian philosophy of
mind?

343
00:20:35,000 --> 00:20:39,000
And how are these two fields
coming together or providing

344
00:20:39,000 --> 00:20:44,360
insight of the lack of, let's
say, definitive answers within

345
00:20:44,360 --> 00:20:47,560
each field?
OK, good question.

346
00:20:48,120 --> 00:20:52,920
So first thing is that I think
it's it's there's no error in

347
00:20:52,920 --> 00:20:54,960
this question whatsoever.
I just want to make that clear.

348
00:20:55,200 --> 00:20:58,160
But this question requires
careful qualification in the

349
00:20:58,160 --> 00:21:02,560
following sense.
There is nothing that we can

350
00:21:02,560 --> 00:21:05,000
say.
Is the Western tradition and

351
00:21:05,000 --> 00:21:07,800
there is nothing we can say is
the Indian tradition because

352
00:21:07,800 --> 00:21:10,320
there has been global
interaction for thousands of

353
00:21:10,320 --> 00:21:12,680
years.
So, So what we really mean when

354
00:21:12,680 --> 00:21:16,960
we say something like this are
relative to certain pockets

355
00:21:17,520 --> 00:21:19,960
within each of these
geographical regions.

356
00:21:20,200 --> 00:21:23,440
As time goes forward, there
seems to be currents and

357
00:21:23,440 --> 00:21:27,560
discussions and then across time
also that line up and don't line

358
00:21:27,560 --> 00:21:31,640
up and that precisification.
Is absolutely necessary for

359
00:21:31,640 --> 00:21:34,360
making any sense of what we
would we should be asking in

360
00:21:34,360 --> 00:21:37,720
this area for me to grossly
generalize across these true.

361
00:21:37,800 --> 00:21:41,400
I'll just give you an example.
I think someone else mentioned

362
00:21:41,400 --> 00:21:44,960
to me something about the role
of spirituality in discussions

363
00:21:44,960 --> 00:21:48,960
of consciousness in Indian
philosophy in contrast to what

364
00:21:48,960 --> 00:21:53,080
is done in Western philosophy,
and I had to remind them that

365
00:21:53,120 --> 00:21:55,760
that's incorrect.
There are Indian philosophical

366
00:21:55,760 --> 00:21:59,200
traditions that eschew.
Spirituality and their

367
00:21:59,200 --> 00:22:02,080
discussions of consciousness all
together it's it's just it's

368
00:22:02,240 --> 00:22:08,320
it's more it's a lot easier to
pick up specific like items of

369
00:22:08,320 --> 00:22:11,760
discussion and see them you know
again and also I would say that

370
00:22:11,760 --> 00:22:17,040
this holds more generally for
you know Chinese philosophy,

371
00:22:17,040 --> 00:22:20,240
Arabic philosophy, Maori
philosophy and lots of other

372
00:22:20,240 --> 00:22:23,680
cultures it's.
So if you go too far down this

373
00:22:23,680 --> 00:22:25,880
thing, then you end up saying
I'm only talking about this guy

374
00:22:25,880 --> 00:22:28,360
and this time period relative to
this guy and this time period or

375
00:22:28,360 --> 00:22:30,920
this woman and this time period
against that guy and that time

376
00:22:30,920 --> 00:22:33,840
period and it starts to become
just impossible to generalize it

377
00:22:33,840 --> 00:22:35,040
all.
So I don't think you have to go

378
00:22:35,040 --> 00:22:40,800
that far, but if I don't qualify
in some ways it, it would be

379
00:22:41,080 --> 00:22:42,600
bad.
So now the qualification has

380
00:22:42,600 --> 00:22:46,520
been made, let me just try and
give you some current things

381
00:22:47,000 --> 00:22:48,520
that are irrelevant.
So.

382
00:22:50,000 --> 00:22:52,600
I think right now I'll kind of
maybe I'll do it backwards.

383
00:22:52,600 --> 00:22:54,440
I'll start now with what's going
on now.

384
00:22:54,920 --> 00:22:57,320
Right now.
There seems to be a lot of

385
00:22:57,320 --> 00:23:02,720
interest in contemporary debates
about the nature of

386
00:23:02,720 --> 00:23:09,160
consciousness, where the ideas
that are being discussed seem

387
00:23:09,160 --> 00:23:14,480
like they could clearly be
advanced, interrogated,

388
00:23:14,640 --> 00:23:18,840
supplemented, discussed in more
detail by the Intersection.

389
00:23:19,440 --> 00:23:23,280
Of a period of Indian philosophy
from the 2nd century to the 17th

390
00:23:23,280 --> 00:23:26,280
century at least, if not also
from the middle part of the 20th

391
00:23:26,280 --> 00:23:29,160
century.
I myself have contributed to

392
00:23:29,160 --> 00:23:33,600
work in this area and in fact
earlier today I was talking with

393
00:23:33,600 --> 00:23:36,760
my friends who I'm now working
with and we're having a

394
00:23:37,040 --> 00:23:40,280
three-year research project on
exactly how to do this with

395
00:23:40,280 --> 00:23:44,280
respect to 1 tradition in Indian
philosophy and contemporary work

396
00:23:44,280 --> 00:23:47,600
in analytic philosophy.
So I definitely think it's the

397
00:23:47,640 --> 00:23:49,480
timing.
Is right.

398
00:23:49,480 --> 00:23:53,800
So one kind of coarse grained
way to say it is that two groups

399
00:23:53,800 --> 00:23:57,400
of people who for a long time,
at least 100 years, started to

400
00:23:57,400 --> 00:24:00,360
move away from each other and
stop talking to each other have

401
00:24:00,360 --> 00:24:02,720
now decided there might be time
to talk to each other.

402
00:24:02,960 --> 00:24:05,200
And these are the people that
work in philosophy of religion

403
00:24:05,440 --> 00:24:07,880
and the people that work in the
philosophy of mine.

404
00:24:08,680 --> 00:24:11,840
Those people have decided now
that they want to start talking

405
00:24:11,840 --> 00:24:15,080
to each other and given that in
classical Indian philosophy,

406
00:24:15,080 --> 00:24:16,920
specifically in the Vedanta
tradition.

407
00:24:17,280 --> 00:24:20,560
There is always a discussion of
these two elements together.

408
00:24:21,080 --> 00:24:25,120
It's natural to think that there
is a way to engage in that

409
00:24:25,120 --> 00:24:27,240
conversation.
So that's kind of where like

410
00:24:27,240 --> 00:24:29,480
some of the cutting edge stuff
is going on.

411
00:24:29,480 --> 00:24:32,640
It's sort of sometimes called
the debate or the relationship

412
00:24:32,640 --> 00:24:34,760
between pan psychism and
panentheism.

413
00:24:34,760 --> 00:24:37,880
That's some technical way of
talking about it, but it need

414
00:24:37,880 --> 00:24:39,520
not be.
You don't need these fancy

415
00:24:39,520 --> 00:24:40,920
terms.
You just need this idea that,

416
00:24:40,920 --> 00:24:45,120
like something about religious
doctrines in which God has

417
00:24:45,120 --> 00:24:48,360
discussed, is now going to be.
Framed in conversation with

418
00:24:48,360 --> 00:24:50,600
what's going on in consciousness
studies.

419
00:24:50,840 --> 00:24:53,000
So that's kind of like the frame
of like the cutting edge I would

420
00:24:53,000 --> 00:24:56,000
say like there was a recent
conference actually in upstate

421
00:24:56,000 --> 00:24:58,160
New York specifically discussing
this.

422
00:24:58,440 --> 00:25:01,160
I'm part of a three-year John
Templeton Grant discussing

423
00:25:01,400 --> 00:25:05,120
Vaishnavite conceptions of God
and consciousness and analytic

424
00:25:05,120 --> 00:25:06,760
philosophy.
For the next three years.

425
00:25:07,400 --> 00:25:11,000
There already was several
anthologies that came out on

426
00:25:11,000 --> 00:25:15,000
this topic and journal Sophia.
And other people are now working

427
00:25:15,000 --> 00:25:18,280
on this, and there are a lot of
ways it can unravel once you

428
00:25:18,280 --> 00:25:21,040
bring artificial intelligence
into the conversation as well.

429
00:25:21,040 --> 00:25:23,480
But I'll get to later.
But let's stay focused more

430
00:25:23,480 --> 00:25:26,520
first on this, a general theme.
OK.

431
00:25:26,760 --> 00:25:30,480
So the classic distinction
pretty much I think most

432
00:25:30,480 --> 00:25:34,480
teachers of comparative
philosophy would like to say is

433
00:25:34,480 --> 00:25:37,040
that there's a vertical versus a
horizontal problem.

434
00:25:37,240 --> 00:25:40,560
This is a gross generalization,
but for the purposes now that

435
00:25:40,560 --> 00:25:42,480
we've qualified, we can say
this.

436
00:25:42,920 --> 00:25:46,480
The vertical problem is the mind
body problem as it's understood

437
00:25:46,840 --> 00:25:50,320
between Descartes, for example,
and Princess Elizabeth of

438
00:25:50,320 --> 00:25:54,480
Bohemia in her correspondences
with him, where she challenges

439
00:25:54,800 --> 00:25:58,160
him on certain idea, his ideas
about mental causation.

440
00:25:58,160 --> 00:26:00,040
Right.
So basically he ends up giving a

441
00:26:00,040 --> 00:26:03,840
duelist picture in which the
mind is a completely different

442
00:26:03,840 --> 00:26:07,560
kind of substance articulated by
the idea of pure thought.

443
00:26:07,960 --> 00:26:11,400
And it's different from Rey's
extensia, which are material

444
00:26:11,400 --> 00:26:13,520
bodies in the world that can be
divided infinitely.

445
00:26:14,040 --> 00:26:17,760
And she wonders then, well, how
can the mind, the principal

446
00:26:17,760 --> 00:26:21,240
actor who chooses to move the
body, move the body if they're

447
00:26:21,240 --> 00:26:23,200
two different kinds of
substances and causation is

448
00:26:23,200 --> 00:26:26,400
restricted to substances that
are of the same kind, right?

449
00:26:26,840 --> 00:26:29,040
If only material bodies can
cause interact with other

450
00:26:29,040 --> 00:26:31,760
material bodies, how can
something non material interact

451
00:26:31,760 --> 00:26:34,480
with the material body, right?
So Principal points us out and.

452
00:26:34,960 --> 00:26:39,880
This is becomes sort of the
vertical problem of that is the

453
00:26:39,880 --> 00:26:43,440
mind body problem emanating
forward from.

454
00:26:43,440 --> 00:26:45,720
And also we should make it clear
I'm not gonna be talking about

455
00:26:45,720 --> 00:26:49,320
any mind body problem in Western
philosophy before what happens

456
00:26:49,960 --> 00:26:51,680
through Descartes forward
because that's just gonna

457
00:26:51,680 --> 00:26:53,480
complicate things even more.
We're just talking about the

458
00:26:53,480 --> 00:26:55,760
standard.
That's the most common notion

459
00:26:55,760 --> 00:26:57,240
that people are talking about in
the West.

460
00:26:58,000 --> 00:27:00,680
This is a rough characterization
of it that people can

461
00:27:00,680 --> 00:27:04,560
understand, and so for reasons
that have to relate to.

462
00:27:05,040 --> 00:27:08,080
Causation.
People then adopt certain

463
00:27:08,080 --> 00:27:12,120
theories in that space, such as
materialism, because it allows

464
00:27:12,120 --> 00:27:15,280
us to solve this problem.
Mental causation, that's what's

465
00:27:15,480 --> 00:27:19,080
going going on in Indian
philosophy.

466
00:27:19,080 --> 00:27:26,080
It's not clear that that frame
is functioning that way.

467
00:27:27,080 --> 00:27:32,920
What seems clear in other
traditions like sankhya and.

468
00:27:34,120 --> 00:27:37,120
Bali Vedanta 2 is more what's
sometimes referred to as a

469
00:27:37,160 --> 00:27:41,040
horizontal problem, which is
what is.

470
00:27:41,040 --> 00:27:44,000
So if you want to put it nicely,
what is the relationship between

471
00:27:44,480 --> 00:27:50,880
Purusha and Sankhya and Prakriti
which is pure consciousness and

472
00:27:51,200 --> 00:27:54,680
the nature?
What's the relationship between

473
00:27:54,680 --> 00:27:56,000
the?
So this is a theory where

474
00:27:56,000 --> 00:27:59,960
something like the ideas of the
mind body problem.

475
00:28:00,640 --> 00:28:04,000
In Western philosophy can be
grafted onto the other side and

476
00:28:04,000 --> 00:28:06,520
you can start to see maybe how
to understand it that way.

477
00:28:07,000 --> 00:28:10,160
But the trajectory of what's
happening in the thing in the

478
00:28:10,160 --> 00:28:12,320
literature just doesn't go that
way.

479
00:28:12,320 --> 00:28:15,200
And so that would be a way of
answering your question by

480
00:28:15,200 --> 00:28:19,600
saying with respect to a certain
frame of Indian philosophy, you

481
00:28:19,600 --> 00:28:22,280
can find a difference when
people are talking about

482
00:28:22,280 --> 00:28:24,200
something called the mind body
problem.

483
00:28:24,360 --> 00:28:26,000
But again, I just want to note
this.

484
00:28:26,400 --> 00:28:29,440
If you think that there are no
materialist schools of mind in

485
00:28:29,440 --> 00:28:31,800
Indian philosophy, you would be
horribly mistaken.

486
00:28:32,040 --> 00:28:35,760
The Charvaka school basically
has one of the strongest forms

487
00:28:35,760 --> 00:28:37,920
of materialism I've ever taught
in my life.

488
00:28:37,920 --> 00:28:41,080
It's extremely strong form of
materialism and they are

489
00:28:41,080 --> 00:28:45,120
definitely people who are
debating various Hindu schools,

490
00:28:45,120 --> 00:28:46,480
Buddhist schools and Jain
schools.

491
00:28:46,480 --> 00:28:50,040
So it's very hard to like take
them out of you know, the sort

492
00:28:50,040 --> 00:28:52,560
of view of, you know, what are
the schools that are found in

493
00:28:52,560 --> 00:28:54,320
the geographic area called
India.

494
00:28:54,760 --> 00:28:58,200
Now back then, so it's very
clear that like like you're not

495
00:28:58,200 --> 00:29:00,880
going to get out of this this
thing by saying that there's

496
00:29:00,880 --> 00:29:03,640
this general thing that's going
on in India that's not going on

497
00:29:04,040 --> 00:29:05,680
over here.
The materialism that they

498
00:29:05,680 --> 00:29:09,360
advocate can be brought into
conversation with various

499
00:29:09,400 --> 00:29:13,640
ancient thinkers in Greece as
well as modern thinkers in the

500
00:29:15,520 --> 00:29:18,480
in the 20th century.
So I can give names to that, but

501
00:29:18,640 --> 00:29:21,360
so that that's the thing.
So, but there is that general

502
00:29:21,360 --> 00:29:24,320
contrast of.
What is the relationship between

503
00:29:24,320 --> 00:29:28,320
this pure type of consciousness
and the mind?

504
00:29:28,360 --> 00:29:30,960
And and remember, because of
what I said, now we have some

505
00:29:30,960 --> 00:29:34,000
tools to understand the
difference here in this system

506
00:29:34,000 --> 00:29:37,360
of sampia.
The operations of the mind

507
00:29:37,360 --> 00:29:40,240
concerning intentionality,
functioning, reasoning, judging

508
00:29:40,240 --> 00:29:43,560
and all that aren't already part
of nature, right?

509
00:29:44,080 --> 00:29:46,520
It was in the sort of Brentano
sort of thing where

510
00:29:46,520 --> 00:29:49,560
intentionality and phenomenal
consciousness are related in a

511
00:29:49,560 --> 00:29:51,520
way or can be related to one
another.

512
00:29:51,880 --> 00:29:53,960
But we have this problem of
like, well, how is the mind

513
00:29:53,960 --> 00:29:57,640
directed at things?
Yeah, like, yeah, exactly.

514
00:29:58,640 --> 00:30:01,320
I mean, one way you could think
about this also that makes it

515
00:30:01,320 --> 00:30:04,200
sort of relevant is I I want to
make sure I get this right.

516
00:30:04,640 --> 00:30:06,680
I don't know if I will, because
it's been a while since I taught

517
00:30:06,680 --> 00:30:11,120
this particular thing.
But intentionality is something

518
00:30:11,120 --> 00:30:14,480
that can direct you at something
that doesn't exist, right?

519
00:30:15,040 --> 00:30:19,560
So suppose I am searching for
Atlantis.

520
00:30:20,200 --> 00:30:22,880
And let's assume that Atlantis
actually doesn't exist.

521
00:30:23,320 --> 00:30:28,560
So then my mind is directed at
something that doesn't exist

522
00:30:29,040 --> 00:30:33,040
right Yet.
The math best explanation for my

523
00:30:33,080 --> 00:30:37,600
behaviour in terms of my
beliefs, desire, life, project,

524
00:30:37,600 --> 00:30:41,160
planning in order to be the one
who finds this place first are

525
00:30:41,160 --> 00:30:43,560
only explained by a non existent
object.

526
00:30:44,160 --> 00:30:47,440
That seems to be a very hard
thing for a materialist theory

527
00:30:47,840 --> 00:30:49,680
to explain.
That seems to be the most

528
00:30:49,680 --> 00:30:52,560
fundamental feature of what can
happen to us.

529
00:30:52,560 --> 00:30:57,520
We are often times motivated and
directed by non existent

530
00:30:57,520 --> 00:31:00,320
objects, right?
Sure, we're we're also motivated

531
00:31:00,640 --> 00:31:03,840
by existent objects, but if the
mind has this feature that it

532
00:31:03,840 --> 00:31:07,960
can do that, that's that.
I mean to some people, honestly,

533
00:31:08,120 --> 00:31:10,600
that question is what gets them
into philosophy of mind.

534
00:31:10,640 --> 00:31:12,400
That's actually the one in
western philosophy.

535
00:31:12,400 --> 00:31:13,840
A lot of people are like, wait a
minute.

536
00:31:14,240 --> 00:31:17,760
That's that does sound like a
really powerful explanation.

537
00:31:18,120 --> 00:31:21,960
You know, this person spent
their life doing something and

538
00:31:21,960 --> 00:31:25,360
the best explanation for it is
that there was this thing their

539
00:31:25,360 --> 00:31:28,640
mind was directed at.
It was a false belief, but but

540
00:31:28,640 --> 00:31:31,240
still the only explanation, that
thing that doesn't exist was

541
00:31:31,240 --> 00:31:33,800
explaining why they did all
these other things right.

542
00:31:34,160 --> 00:31:37,120
Well, that that that thing that
doesn't exist has to be the

543
00:31:37,120 --> 00:31:40,000
explanatory factor.
And that's makes people think,

544
00:31:40,040 --> 00:31:43,120
well, the mind has its capacity
for intentionality.

545
00:31:43,480 --> 00:31:46,640
And oftentimes intentionality
comes along with phenomenal

546
00:31:46,640 --> 00:31:50,400
consciousness or something.
It's like to desire to you know

547
00:31:50,400 --> 00:31:52,840
find Atlantis, right.
There's like something related

548
00:31:52,840 --> 00:31:56,080
to that.
It's affected in some ways but

549
00:31:56,080 --> 00:31:59,480
but that thing that that that
thing but and that question of

550
00:31:59,480 --> 00:32:01,960
intentionally directed
consciousness towards non

551
00:32:01,960 --> 00:32:05,080
existent objects is not like a
very common.

552
00:32:05,080 --> 00:32:08,640
It's not actually a very big
theme in Indian philosophy of

553
00:32:08,640 --> 00:32:11,600
mind you don't see a lot of
people discussing.

554
00:32:12,000 --> 00:32:13,920
That I'm not going to say it's
not there, because every time

555
00:32:13,920 --> 00:32:16,240
someone says that it's lo and
behold, you find it 15 days

556
00:32:16,240 --> 00:32:18,280
later.
So do not find yourself.

557
00:32:18,320 --> 00:32:20,640
It's not present in a lot of
literature I look at.

558
00:32:20,640 --> 00:32:22,880
That's not the going.
So sometimes people like to say

559
00:32:22,880 --> 00:32:24,440
this, This will help you to have
a lot.

560
00:32:25,120 --> 00:32:29,520
They like to say that the
concerns and motivations for

561
00:32:29,520 --> 00:32:34,480
doing philosophy of mind are
driven by different explanatory

562
00:32:34,760 --> 00:32:36,080
aims, Right?
Right.

563
00:32:36,240 --> 00:32:41,040
The explanatory aim isn't.
To show how the mind can be

564
00:32:41,040 --> 00:32:44,880
directed at non existent
objects, the primary explanatory

565
00:32:45,080 --> 00:32:49,160
aim is to show the relationship
between the individual self and

566
00:32:49,160 --> 00:32:52,400
God right?
And that is tied into their

567
00:32:52,400 --> 00:32:54,560
philosophy of mind and
philosophy of consciousness.

568
00:32:54,760 --> 00:32:59,160
And that is something that a lot
of people now who are working on

569
00:32:59,160 --> 00:33:03,400
consciousness in the West are
returning to as a question to

570
00:33:03,400 --> 00:33:05,800
which Indian philosophy already
had a lot to say.

571
00:33:05,800 --> 00:33:07,480
So now let's explain the western
side.

572
00:33:07,880 --> 00:33:10,360
Of this so you can see a little
bit more of what's going on and

573
00:33:10,360 --> 00:33:14,680
how they connect.
So two of the most common views

574
00:33:15,240 --> 00:33:18,760
out there right now about
consciousness in Western

575
00:33:18,760 --> 00:33:21,160
analytic philosophy that are
being debated and I know people

576
00:33:21,160 --> 00:33:23,520
on both of these sides.
Not there's a lot of views by

577
00:33:23,520 --> 00:33:25,200
the way.
I'm just focusing on two.

578
00:33:25,200 --> 00:33:28,120
I mean I can go through a list
of longer ones but two of them

579
00:33:28,480 --> 00:33:30,360
are pan psychism and
illusionism.

580
00:33:30,560 --> 00:33:33,080
All right.
So the fundamental thesis or

581
00:33:33,080 --> 00:33:36,320
sorry, not the fun of the, the
the central thesis like the

582
00:33:36,320 --> 00:33:39,560
thesis of.
Of illusionism is that our

583
00:33:39,560 --> 00:33:42,720
phenomenal consciousness
properties of what it's like to

584
00:33:42,720 --> 00:33:45,520
feel things, see things, are all
illusions.

585
00:33:46,640 --> 00:33:49,280
Doesn't mean we don't have them
in a sense, but it does mean in

586
00:33:49,280 --> 00:33:52,840
a sense they're just illusions.
Just as like when you see a

587
00:33:52,840 --> 00:33:56,320
snake superimposed on a rope,
there's no snake there, right?

588
00:33:56,320 --> 00:33:59,200
There's just a rope, right?
So if you're saying that the

589
00:33:59,200 --> 00:34:03,840
illusions in our experience are
are phenomenal properties or

590
00:34:03,840 --> 00:34:06,400
phenomenal conscious illusion,
you are in some sense.

591
00:34:06,920 --> 00:34:09,520
Coming close to talking that
way, you're saying they're not

592
00:34:09,520 --> 00:34:11,040
really there in some sense,
right?

593
00:34:11,040 --> 00:34:13,480
But they're kind of have this
intermediate existence or

594
00:34:13,480 --> 00:34:18,159
something like that.
So this is a version that is

595
00:34:18,159 --> 00:34:23,719
consistent with certain kinds of
materialism about the mind, but

596
00:34:23,719 --> 00:34:27,360
it's being novel in the way in
which it's trying to tease out

597
00:34:27,679 --> 00:34:30,520
what's going on.
So one of the ways in which this

598
00:34:30,520 --> 00:34:33,960
is often times explained as
being an interesting thing is.

599
00:34:34,400 --> 00:34:37,040
It kind of shifts our attention
to explaining phenomenal

600
00:34:37,040 --> 00:34:40,199
consciousness, to explaining why
we have such an illusion.

601
00:34:40,760 --> 00:34:44,400
Why would evolution have
generated in us this illusion?

602
00:34:44,400 --> 00:34:49,000
What role does this illusion
play in our existence?

603
00:34:49,080 --> 00:34:53,920
OK, so it's not based primarily
on so other forms of materialism

604
00:34:53,920 --> 00:34:58,040
are motivated by this stuff
about causation, but this is not

605
00:34:58,040 --> 00:35:00,840
motivated by causation.
This is motivated more.

606
00:35:01,240 --> 00:35:04,360
By the fact that if we alter our
way of thinking of things and

607
00:35:04,360 --> 00:35:07,880
think about it as an illusion,
we can start to wonder why this

608
00:35:07,880 --> 00:35:10,600
illusion was generated or what's
what's going on with this

609
00:35:10,600 --> 00:35:12,920
illusion.
So that sits in contrast with

610
00:35:12,960 --> 00:35:17,480
another view, and I'm sorry to
stop you there, but someone

611
00:35:17,480 --> 00:35:20,400
who's really trying to work on
that a lot lately I noticed, is

612
00:35:20,400 --> 00:35:21,920
Nicholas Humphrey.
I'm not sure if you've seen.

613
00:35:22,720 --> 00:35:23,680
I know you.
Yeah.

614
00:35:23,720 --> 00:35:26,480
So he's been trying to actually
figure out that concept out now.

615
00:35:26,640 --> 00:35:28,440
The evolution of it, the
function of it.

616
00:35:28,440 --> 00:35:30,600
Why is this illusion occurring?
Sorry.

617
00:35:30,680 --> 00:35:33,520
I still sorry.
So Nicholas Humphries has a book

618
00:35:33,520 --> 00:35:36,600
called Soul Dust, I believe.
I think that's what it's called.

619
00:35:36,960 --> 00:35:41,440
And I speak most frequently with
Keith Frankish, who is pretty

620
00:35:41,440 --> 00:35:44,880
much the person who's pioneered
that term in the field.

621
00:35:45,360 --> 00:35:48,360
He also works a lot on this.
But actually, you know, my last

622
00:35:48,360 --> 00:35:51,640
conversation with Keith Frankish
in Crete just a couple of months

623
00:35:51,640 --> 00:35:53,280
ago.
He actually told me that I

624
00:35:53,280 --> 00:35:55,400
should start reading Nicholas
Humphrey's work more and more

625
00:35:55,400 --> 00:35:58,440
because it has an interestingly
different way of explaining a

626
00:35:58,440 --> 00:36:00,960
lot of these things.
So you're right, it is cutting

627
00:36:00,960 --> 00:36:02,480
edge stuff.
I think that book isn't that

628
00:36:02,480 --> 00:36:04,320
recent, but you're right.
Nicholas Humphreys is one of the

629
00:36:04,320 --> 00:36:06,760
perfect people.
He's he's a new book now called

630
00:36:06,760 --> 00:36:09,240
Sentience and he he tries to
work on that a lot more.

631
00:36:09,240 --> 00:36:11,040
So he's done a lot of different
things.

632
00:36:11,040 --> 00:36:13,320
Yeah, recently.
Yeah, that that that makes sense

633
00:36:13,320 --> 00:36:15,320
to me that right.
So I think you know, so it is.

634
00:36:15,640 --> 00:36:18,400
I know I can already anticipate
probably why it's called

635
00:36:18,400 --> 00:36:21,800
sentience, because illusionists.
Have this issue when it comes to

636
00:36:21,800 --> 00:36:24,240
the moral grounding problem
which we'll get to later and I

637
00:36:24,240 --> 00:36:26,440
and I understand that I'll
probably have very different

638
00:36:26,440 --> 00:36:29,840
views than Nicholas Humphrey on
this but so we'll get to that So

639
00:36:29,840 --> 00:36:33,760
the the the the the the contrast
is the pan psychist view and the

640
00:36:33,760 --> 00:36:37,120
motivation to for pan psychism.
I mean this is I'm going to give

641
00:36:37,160 --> 00:36:39,240
I'm giving very rough and
accessible explanations.

642
00:36:39,240 --> 00:36:42,120
These aren't the technical
details, but I've always liked

643
00:36:42,120 --> 00:36:46,960
this thought that I find in the
work of Galen Strassen where the

644
00:36:46,960 --> 00:36:50,280
idea is that.
You want to explain phenomenal

645
00:36:50,280 --> 00:36:54,720
consciousness, but it it seems
like unless you say that at the

646
00:36:54,720 --> 00:36:59,160
fundamental level, the universe
has some things that have bits

647
00:36:59,160 --> 00:37:02,880
of consciousness and micro
psychism as it's called, you

648
00:37:02,880 --> 00:37:07,040
would have to say that something
emerges from something and there

649
00:37:07,040 --> 00:37:10,160
is no way to conceive of how it
emerges.

650
00:37:10,160 --> 00:37:12,640
So the analogy I used to teach
this, which I believe he

651
00:37:12,640 --> 00:37:16,040
discusses too, is that you can't
really conceive.

652
00:37:17,080 --> 00:37:20,600
How to get a real line in the
world from non extended

653
00:37:20,600 --> 00:37:24,280
Cartesian points is not going to
happen, because the relationship

654
00:37:24,280 --> 00:37:28,880
between extension and non
extension is not such that some

655
00:37:28,880 --> 00:37:32,480
form of complexity in
aggregation is conceivably going

656
00:37:32,480 --> 00:37:35,480
to give you that thing.
And so he tries to say in some

657
00:37:35,480 --> 00:37:37,760
sense, or at least when I teach
it, I do it this way.

658
00:37:37,960 --> 00:37:40,520
I say well, phenomenal
consciousness that what it's

659
00:37:40,520 --> 00:37:43,720
like feature seems to exhibit a
similar thing.

660
00:37:43,720 --> 00:37:47,560
No amount of aggregation of non.
Phenomenal kinds of things

661
00:37:47,560 --> 00:37:52,520
appears to in complexity way or
whatever get you this thing

662
00:37:52,600 --> 00:37:55,880
phenomenal consciousness.
So why not say that at least

663
00:37:55,880 --> 00:38:00,200
some points sometimes points on
some things at the fundamental

664
00:38:00,200 --> 00:38:05,600
level are already conscious and
then this leads to a big you

665
00:38:05,600 --> 00:38:08,600
know area so now then then this
is how we can see something.

666
00:38:08,640 --> 00:38:12,080
So this view, the micro cyclist
view, takes one kind of stance

667
00:38:12,840 --> 00:38:15,080
and then for.
Reasons that I can get into if

668
00:38:15,080 --> 00:38:17,000
you want to.
There's another view called

669
00:38:17,000 --> 00:38:22,280
Cosmos psychism which says why
assume that it's individual bits

670
00:38:22,280 --> 00:38:25,760
like molecules and protons or
whatever they're have this

671
00:38:25,920 --> 00:38:29,040
phenomenal consciousness in a
microscopic micro level.

672
00:38:29,360 --> 00:38:32,760
Why not assume that the universe
as a whole is consciousness and

673
00:38:32,760 --> 00:38:36,640
that's the fundamental thing.
And then there's cosmos psychism

674
00:38:37,040 --> 00:38:40,680
and and psychism.
Yeah, that's been sort of takes

675
00:38:40,720 --> 00:38:42,000
it.
Philip Goff starts to work on

676
00:38:42,000 --> 00:38:45,000
that from that direction.
Yes, all right, so those are the

677
00:38:45,000 --> 00:38:49,240
two general like, look by the
way, in between, at least in the

678
00:38:49,240 --> 00:38:51,800
pan psychism camp, there's a
bunch of different like views of

679
00:38:51,800 --> 00:38:53,640
how to like work this out.
So it even an analytic

680
00:38:53,640 --> 00:38:55,680
philosophy, let alone Indian
falsy.

681
00:38:55,920 --> 00:38:59,040
The illusion is a one is a
little bit more straightforward.

682
00:38:59,040 --> 00:39:02,800
Although I would say that my
impression is that Daniel

683
00:39:02,800 --> 00:39:09,240
Dennett, Nicholas Humphries,
Frank Keith Frankish and Jay

684
00:39:09,240 --> 00:39:12,160
Garfield have subtly different
ways.

685
00:39:12,640 --> 00:39:14,520
Of articulating what the
illusion is.

686
00:39:14,520 --> 00:39:18,480
So I've worked heavily with Jay
Garfield and I've written and

687
00:39:18,480 --> 00:39:21,120
talked a little bit with Keith
Frankish about their different

688
00:39:21,120 --> 00:39:23,160
version or what I perceive to be
different versions.

689
00:39:23,560 --> 00:39:27,760
And I think a lot of it has to
do with the way in which you

690
00:39:27,760 --> 00:39:29,320
talk about the nature of the
illusion.

691
00:39:29,560 --> 00:39:33,520
So I tend to have a very strong
impression that the core notion

692
00:39:33,520 --> 00:39:38,120
of an illusion is visual.
And because of that, when I try

693
00:39:38,120 --> 00:39:42,200
to make the analogy with what is
illusory in the case.

694
00:39:42,560 --> 00:39:45,920
Of phenomenal consciousness.
I get confused right away.

695
00:39:45,920 --> 00:39:48,520
To which they tell me that's
because you're focusing on the

696
00:39:48,520 --> 00:39:53,280
illusion being a visual.
And then they say, but it's

697
00:39:53,280 --> 00:39:56,360
really a cognitive illusion to
which then we debate.

698
00:39:56,360 --> 00:40:00,080
And I say the notion of this
cognitive illusion doesn't

699
00:40:00,080 --> 00:40:02,240
really do service to what you're
trying to say.

700
00:40:02,480 --> 00:40:05,520
Because if it's a cognitive
illusion of this kind, I could

701
00:40:05,520 --> 00:40:08,720
just stop having that belief,
because beliefs are a little bit

702
00:40:08,720 --> 00:40:11,560
more subject to control.
Then the illusions we have in

703
00:40:11,560 --> 00:40:13,560
the liar case, like in the muted
liar case, there's only what

704
00:40:13,560 --> 00:40:14,800
you're going to do to get rid of
it.

705
00:40:14,800 --> 00:40:16,640
It's just going to happen.
You're hard wired that way.

706
00:40:16,960 --> 00:40:19,160
So if they're trying to say
we're hard wired to have this

707
00:40:19,720 --> 00:40:23,560
belief, illusion, false belief,
it seems a little bit less

708
00:40:23,840 --> 00:40:27,280
believable to me that people
just can't get rid of that.

709
00:40:27,680 --> 00:40:30,360
So I think that, but this is an
ongoing debate.

710
00:40:30,360 --> 00:40:32,560
Like I talk to them about all
this all the time and I'm like,

711
00:40:32,560 --> 00:40:35,560
I'm not sure I get it.
But then in the panpsychist camp

712
00:40:36,400 --> 00:40:39,200
there are two well known
problems that motivate the

713
00:40:39,200 --> 00:40:43,440
discussion, which is exactly how
Indian philosophy came to be.

714
00:40:43,440 --> 00:40:47,200
More relevant is because once
people started looking at these

715
00:40:47,200 --> 00:40:52,840
issues of micro psychism where
there are small atom like micro

716
00:40:52,840 --> 00:40:55,920
conscious, sensitive and cosmos
like them, where there's one

717
00:40:56,120 --> 00:40:59,960
gigantic field of consciousness,
there became the twin problems

718
00:40:59,960 --> 00:41:01,600
of combination and D
combination.

719
00:41:01,600 --> 00:41:05,760
Which is if there are micro
conscious entities.

720
00:41:05,760 --> 00:41:11,760
I need to explain how I get your
Tev unified conscious States and

721
00:41:11,760 --> 00:41:14,400
if there is a cosmic
consciousness then I need to

722
00:41:14,400 --> 00:41:17,560
figure out how does the cosmic
consciousness reduce or de

723
00:41:17,560 --> 00:41:20,840
combine so that there's Tev
consciousness in my

724
00:41:20,840 --> 00:41:23,800
consciousness right?
And again given that our

725
00:41:23,960 --> 00:41:29,280
consciousness are different we
have to explain the difference

726
00:41:29,400 --> 00:41:33,960
too right?
So this once this happened in,

727
00:41:33,960 --> 00:41:37,200
in contemporary analytic
philosophy, myself and a couple

728
00:41:37,200 --> 00:41:40,840
of other Indian philosophers
started really sort of like

729
00:41:40,840 --> 00:41:44,520
working like like so trying to
make the case that you needed to

730
00:41:44,520 --> 00:41:47,080
pay attention to this.
And we published a volume of the

731
00:41:47,080 --> 00:41:49,720
Monist journal dedicated to
discussing this.

732
00:41:49,720 --> 00:41:52,240
And now there's much more work
being done.

733
00:41:52,240 --> 00:41:54,440
And that's sort of how the
pantheism stuff got off the

734
00:41:54,440 --> 00:41:56,560
ground.
But you will notice that in all

735
00:41:56,560 --> 00:41:59,760
of these debates, Indian
philosophers are talking about,

736
00:42:00,240 --> 00:42:04,600
if I was to say to them like,
hey, you know, let's talk about

737
00:42:04,680 --> 00:42:07,880
this because we're interested in
phenomenal consciousness, they'd

738
00:42:07,880 --> 00:42:10,280
be like, that's really not my
motivation.

739
00:42:10,280 --> 00:42:12,640
I'm not sure I'm really that
concerned with explaining.

740
00:42:12,800 --> 00:42:15,720
If that ends up being a side
effect of what I'm talking

741
00:42:15,720 --> 00:42:18,160
about, then then hey, go have
fun with that.

742
00:42:18,280 --> 00:42:21,840
Their primary motivation had to
be the relationship to God.

743
00:42:21,840 --> 00:42:24,760
I mean, that's clearly what's
being done in the debates

744
00:42:24,760 --> 00:42:28,920
between Ramanuja, who came after
Shankara and the Vishistha

745
00:42:28,920 --> 00:42:32,560
invite the Vedanta school, and
his debates with Shankara's

746
00:42:32,600 --> 00:42:35,200
Advaita Vedanta.
They clearly are concerned with

747
00:42:35,200 --> 00:42:37,600
the relationship and
intelligibility of the

748
00:42:37,600 --> 00:42:41,640
individual self to God on a
picture where something like a

749
00:42:41,840 --> 00:42:44,680
field of universal consciousness
is present.

750
00:42:45,440 --> 00:42:48,760
But they're not really, you
know, sitting there wondering

751
00:42:49,000 --> 00:42:52,720
how to explain whether and how
you have AC sharp experience

752
00:42:52,720 --> 00:42:55,240
versus an F# experience.
I mean, that just wasn't there.

753
00:42:55,320 --> 00:42:58,280
So that's again another way to
have to see this sort of thing

754
00:42:58,280 --> 00:43:02,120
where it's like there are
different streams of what is

755
00:43:02,120 --> 00:43:04,440
motivating these people to talk
about these things.

756
00:43:04,720 --> 00:43:07,000
I'm not always so sure.
It's good to say that they don't

757
00:43:07,000 --> 00:43:11,760
have any.
Like if you told one of those

758
00:43:11,760 --> 00:43:13,800
people, hey, there's this
problem we're working on, we

759
00:43:13,800 --> 00:43:16,640
could go back in time and ask
them, Like I said, I'm not sure

760
00:43:16,640 --> 00:43:20,600
they wouldn't become interested
and what to say, what they would

761
00:43:20,600 --> 00:43:23,320
think.
But if if I said this is the

762
00:43:23,320 --> 00:43:25,760
reason to be talking about it, I
think they would laugh at me.

763
00:43:25,760 --> 00:43:28,000
They would think this is crazy,
this is not, this is not why

764
00:43:28,040 --> 00:43:29,560
we're doing it.
Yeah, you get it.

765
00:43:29,800 --> 00:43:32,240
It's almost like, I mean just
another way to to reiterate what

766
00:43:32,240 --> 00:43:34,200
you're trying to say.
It's like with idealist

767
00:43:34,200 --> 00:43:37,000
philosophy it's almost like a
Berkeley and Berkeley's version

768
00:43:37,000 --> 00:43:39,400
of trying to understand it to
prove God's existence.

769
00:43:39,600 --> 00:43:42,320
Whereas today's idealist
philosophers have they they have

770
00:43:42,360 --> 00:43:45,280
absolutely no interest in that.
They're very much almost atheist

771
00:43:45,280 --> 00:43:48,560
towards the topic but but very
but still trying to ground that

772
00:43:48,560 --> 00:43:50,840
framework is that what you're
trying to say is that I mean it

773
00:43:50,840 --> 00:43:54,280
was very OK that that is so that
that I'm not I wasn't trying to

774
00:43:54,280 --> 00:43:56,920
say that a moment ago but but
that characterization is

775
00:43:56,920 --> 00:44:00,760
absolutely correct.
In fact that characterization is

776
00:44:00,760 --> 00:44:03,920
exactly the characterization
that led to this grant that I'm

777
00:44:03,920 --> 00:44:06,720
part of on John Templeton
Foundation on Vaishnavite

778
00:44:06,720 --> 00:44:08,600
conceptions of God and cosmos
psychism.

779
00:44:08,600 --> 00:44:11,400
That's exactly what we argued.
What the the producers, they

780
00:44:11,400 --> 00:44:14,680
argued, well, that basically
there has a tendency in

781
00:44:14,680 --> 00:44:18,720
contemporary versions of Cosmos
psychism to sort of tacitly

782
00:44:18,720 --> 00:44:22,520
assume that a form of atheism is
true or that it's consistent

783
00:44:22,800 --> 00:44:24,760
with these Cosmos psychic
explanations.

784
00:44:25,000 --> 00:44:28,960
But yet in the vast amounts of
Vedantic philosophy that

785
00:44:28,960 --> 00:44:33,800
discusses Cosmos psychism, it
would be bad to assume that that

786
00:44:33,800 --> 00:44:35,560
was even at play.
It's more like, what is the

787
00:44:35,560 --> 00:44:39,240
relationship between those?
So I mean that could be, I mean,

788
00:44:39,240 --> 00:44:43,560
so like let's make it clear that
doesn't make it a good position,

789
00:44:43,760 --> 00:44:46,560
it makes it just the relevant
distinction.

790
00:44:46,640 --> 00:44:49,760
So it could turn out to be the
case that trying to say that

791
00:44:49,880 --> 00:44:53,920
atheistic discussion of Cosmos
psychism is better than an

792
00:44:53,920 --> 00:44:57,160
atheistic discussion, it just
turned out to be really bad and

793
00:44:57,160 --> 00:45:00,280
leads to bad consequences.
But is it true that there is

794
00:45:00,280 --> 00:45:02,640
that difference?
Yeah, I would find it hard to

795
00:45:02,640 --> 00:45:06,640
believe that the evidence showed
that the Indian philosophers in

796
00:45:06,640 --> 00:45:10,360
some way were tacitly advocating
something other than the

797
00:45:10,360 --> 00:45:12,160
relationship between God and the
individual self.

798
00:45:12,160 --> 00:45:15,720
So that also that so that I
think that's that's relevant and

799
00:45:16,200 --> 00:45:18,280
also sorry sorry to.
Continue on.

800
00:45:19,200 --> 00:45:21,600
No, you continue.
I was chatting to know Chomsky

801
00:45:21,600 --> 00:45:24,240
about this and the fact that
Indian philosophy, I mean the

802
00:45:24,520 --> 00:45:26,920
Sanskrit in general.
I mean that language is so

803
00:45:26,920 --> 00:45:28,400
complex.
It was able to transmit so much

804
00:45:28,400 --> 00:45:32,360
knowledge with the amount of
punctuations, the vocabulary.

805
00:45:32,360 --> 00:45:36,400
It was so rich and diverse so it
was able to transmit a lot of

806
00:45:36,400 --> 00:45:38,840
information.
However, it was so ingrained

807
00:45:38,840 --> 00:45:42,480
into religious.
And spiritual teachings.

808
00:45:42,520 --> 00:45:46,080
And that's why a lot of Western
culture was unable to sort of

809
00:45:46,080 --> 00:45:48,800
sift through that information.
It's almost like reading Saint

810
00:45:48,800 --> 00:45:52,040
Augustine's work and it it's so
ingrained in the religion that

811
00:45:52,040 --> 00:45:54,720
you you, you don't have to
necessarily take that out of.

812
00:45:54,880 --> 00:45:58,520
There's still so much teaching
behind it and and we're blinded

813
00:45:58,760 --> 00:46:01,920
by the religious aspect of it
because of it.

814
00:46:02,080 --> 00:46:03,840
Do you think that's a big
problem that sort of hinders us

815
00:46:03,840 --> 00:46:05,280
from understanding it even
deeper.

816
00:46:06,760 --> 00:46:10,680
OK.
So I I I think yeah I definitely

817
00:46:11,000 --> 00:46:16,000
have a an insight into what
you're saying I'll a little bit

818
00:46:16,000 --> 00:46:19,640
differently but I think it's it
is on this this theme.

819
00:46:20,080 --> 00:46:22,760
So one of the things that is
happening in January is my

820
00:46:22,760 --> 00:46:28,360
friend Swami Mehtananda and I
are hosting A2 day conference in

821
00:46:28,360 --> 00:46:31,320
Calcutta on the re emergence of
spirituality and philosophy.

822
00:46:32,160 --> 00:46:34,520
And sort of part of the reason
we want to do this is because

823
00:46:34,960 --> 00:46:38,520
we're interested in drawing out
this connection that occurred.

824
00:46:38,880 --> 00:46:40,960
So again, it's occurred in
Western philosophy before

825
00:46:40,960 --> 00:46:43,480
obviously, you mentioned
Augustine, but there there was a

826
00:46:43,480 --> 00:46:45,560
time period at least for 100
years where it seems like these

827
00:46:45,560 --> 00:46:48,560
things are separated out.
And a lot of it had to do with

828
00:46:49,560 --> 00:46:52,920
the growth of science and the
philosophy of science and what

829
00:46:52,920 --> 00:46:54,120
those people were concerned
with.

830
00:46:55,120 --> 00:46:58,440
So that's kind of like what's
happened and I'm kind of working

831
00:46:58,440 --> 00:47:00,960
on putting those conversations
back together.

832
00:47:01,720 --> 00:47:04,720
So that's an answer to part of
the question, but you also focus

833
00:47:04,720 --> 00:47:09,320
on the hindering it, right?
Is it hindering our ability to

834
00:47:09,320 --> 00:47:14,360
make progress by not discussing
the spiritual aspects that

835
00:47:14,360 --> 00:47:18,480
people have before discussed and
it was ingrained in them?

836
00:47:19,200 --> 00:47:22,640
So I do have something to say
about this, and I did write a

837
00:47:22,640 --> 00:47:25,320
paper where I discussed this a
while back.

838
00:47:25,480 --> 00:47:27,680
Not in this way, but I'll give
you that answer.

839
00:47:28,320 --> 00:47:30,120
I don't see a problem with
trying it out.

840
00:47:30,480 --> 00:47:34,560
I mean, it seems really odd to
me that all these people back

841
00:47:34,560 --> 00:47:39,440
then did talk about it this way
and then somehow we got the

842
00:47:39,440 --> 00:47:42,120
arrogance to think they were
just confused.

843
00:47:42,840 --> 00:47:47,440
And now we can't even bother to
try to think about it critically

844
00:47:47,440 --> 00:47:50,800
with some really smart people
that we have and see what what

845
00:47:50,800 --> 00:47:54,640
progress we can get.
I find that to be an instance of

846
00:47:54,640 --> 00:48:00,840
not being epistemically humble.
I I think that that is a it's

847
00:48:00,840 --> 00:48:03,920
it's, it's it's a cautionary
moment that we would not think

848
00:48:05,840 --> 00:48:08,680
we ought to be like sort of like
why wouldn't we try this out.

849
00:48:08,680 --> 00:48:11,560
So that was the the view I had
in 2015.

850
00:48:11,560 --> 00:48:15,480
I started thinking about those
like yeah, I mean it's not just

851
00:48:15,480 --> 00:48:19,240
an issue of what is the
probability of what theory will

852
00:48:19,240 --> 00:48:25,040
be turn out to be true.
It's the risk of not taking a

853
00:48:25,040 --> 00:48:28,560
road that could have insights
either that suggests that

854
00:48:28,560 --> 00:48:32,680
theories in that area are
correct or that informs and very

855
00:48:32,680 --> 00:48:35,680
progress and this is the
hindering point you made of the

856
00:48:35,680 --> 00:48:37,400
development of the theories that
we're on.

857
00:48:37,640 --> 00:48:41,840
So yeah, it's, I think it's
worth giving it a try.

858
00:48:41,840 --> 00:48:44,400
And I think the people right now
who are sort of working on this

859
00:48:44,400 --> 00:48:48,560
stuff, even in more detail than
I am, are giving it a good try

860
00:48:48,560 --> 00:48:50,040
and let's let's see where it
goes.

861
00:48:50,280 --> 00:48:53,200
I think one thing you have to
realize here is that it's

862
00:48:53,200 --> 00:48:59,480
problematic because religion
often times not always, not

863
00:48:59,480 --> 00:49:01,760
often times.
It always involves things that

864
00:49:01,760 --> 00:49:04,720
are sacred and sort of control
the trajectory of someone's

865
00:49:04,720 --> 00:49:07,040
life.
And the minute you start trying

866
00:49:07,040 --> 00:49:12,520
to define, sorry, argue, debate,
whether these things are true or

867
00:49:12,520 --> 00:49:16,480
not, you can really get some
people upset.

868
00:49:16,480 --> 00:49:22,160
In a way I I personally think
that's how it should go.

869
00:49:22,560 --> 00:49:26,880
But it would be naive to be
insensitive to the way in which

870
00:49:27,240 --> 00:49:32,200
these debates can go down.
I think that's also happens with

871
00:49:32,200 --> 00:49:35,440
illusionism in a sense because
consciousness is also so sacred

872
00:49:35,960 --> 00:49:38,960
to a lot of people and almost
and trying to argue against the

873
00:49:38,960 --> 00:49:40,600
Keith.
And I mean Keith spoke when we

874
00:49:40,600 --> 00:49:42,160
spoke about it, he told me.
I mean, it's almost like he's

875
00:49:42,160 --> 00:49:45,040
attacking people's faith at this
point, yeah, he told me that

876
00:49:45,040 --> 00:49:45,680
too.
He said.

877
00:49:45,680 --> 00:49:50,040
Actually, that's why sometimes
looking at Nicholas Humphrey's

878
00:49:50,040 --> 00:49:54,760
work, especially when he uses
the label surrealism, it can

879
00:49:54,760 --> 00:49:58,640
help people see the beauty and
the magic of illusionism.

880
00:49:58,720 --> 00:50:00,560
So yes, that is correct.
You're right.

881
00:50:00,560 --> 00:50:04,160
Because people do feel.
But it is, I look, I gotta say,

882
00:50:04,160 --> 00:50:07,960
like, I mean, it's, you know,
there are these views that pain

883
00:50:07,960 --> 00:50:10,040
is an illusion.
I mean, this is just like one of

884
00:50:10,040 --> 00:50:12,360
those things where I'm just
like, yeah, OK, that's not

885
00:50:12,360 --> 00:50:14,200
really comforting to tell
someone who's in pain.

886
00:50:14,200 --> 00:50:16,280
OK, I'm not really sure what
you're getting out of that, but

887
00:50:16,280 --> 00:50:19,600
OK, yeah, you get the joke.
There's there's a joke somewhere

888
00:50:19,600 --> 00:50:21,480
in there even for I think that
he can understand.

889
00:50:21,920 --> 00:50:24,840
Does someone who tries to avoid
that is Michael Graziano.

890
00:50:24,840 --> 00:50:27,920
When he he tries to approach, he
just calls it a caricature

891
00:50:28,200 --> 00:50:31,080
rather than an illusion.
It's it's just slightly

892
00:50:31,080 --> 00:50:33,560
different, but it's it is there.
It's definitely something

893
00:50:33,560 --> 00:50:35,800
occurring.
It is, but you're but see again

894
00:50:35,800 --> 00:50:39,120
now Tev, you're pointing to some
very important things that I

895
00:50:39,120 --> 00:50:40,800
actually think can help make
sense of it.

896
00:50:40,800 --> 00:50:44,840
Like I do think the conception
of it is surrealism versus the

897
00:50:44,840 --> 00:50:47,760
conception of it as illusionism.
close to like a visual

898
00:50:47,760 --> 00:50:52,520
illusionism versus a subset of
beliefs or a character or a

899
00:50:52,520 --> 00:50:55,960
system or way of thinking that
allows the Organism to function

900
00:50:55,960 --> 00:50:57,640
properly in various
environments.

901
00:50:57,880 --> 00:51:00,200
I think all of those things.
That's a small part of the

902
00:51:00,200 --> 00:51:03,760
theory by the way.
Very crucial to understanding

903
00:51:03,760 --> 00:51:07,200
like what is really being said
and how people can accept it.

904
00:51:07,960 --> 00:51:13,720
I I but I will say you this like
none of my personal reasons for

905
00:51:13,720 --> 00:51:18,960
rejecting illusionism have to do
with those specific things.

906
00:51:19,280 --> 00:51:22,880
I I I actually literally think
that my main arguments that I've

907
00:51:22,880 --> 00:51:26,880
been working on have to do with
dis analogies with visual

908
00:51:26,880 --> 00:51:30,040
illusion and the fact that there
seems to be an undermining

909
00:51:30,320 --> 00:51:35,720
component to all of the other
forms of knowledge that we have.

910
00:51:35,720 --> 00:51:40,760
So my last conversation with
Keith and other people was to

911
00:51:40,760 --> 00:51:44,720
work out a way in which if
Illusionism is true, it's going

912
00:51:44,720 --> 00:51:47,840
to turn out that a lot of
knowledge that we have goes

913
00:51:47,840 --> 00:51:50,200
away.
And that way in which it goes

914
00:51:50,200 --> 00:51:53,520
away is very different from the
way in which standard skepticism

915
00:51:53,520 --> 00:51:56,520
is argued for, for example in
the work of Rene Descartes.

916
00:51:56,520 --> 00:52:01,000
So Illusionism generates, in my
view, a destruction of even the

917
00:52:01,000 --> 00:52:04,160
knowledge under which we would
know Illusionism to be true.

918
00:52:04,160 --> 00:52:07,000
So Keith thinks this is very
confused and controversial.

919
00:52:07,000 --> 00:52:09,720
He does not agree with me about
this argument at all, and he has

920
00:52:09,720 --> 00:52:12,360
very good responses to what I'm
saying, at least in

921
00:52:12,360 --> 00:52:14,640
conversation.
But part of what I've been

922
00:52:14,640 --> 00:52:18,320
working on for five years is the
idea that illusionist theories

923
00:52:18,320 --> 00:52:21,920
of consciousness undermine the
capacity for all types of

924
00:52:21,920 --> 00:52:24,880
phenomenal knowledge knowledge
based on phenomenal experience.

925
00:52:25,240 --> 00:52:27,440
And I have some pretty well
worked out arguments about how

926
00:52:27,440 --> 00:52:29,880
that goes.
That leaves us with other forms

927
00:52:29,880 --> 00:52:31,720
of knowledge.
But for a lot of people, it's

928
00:52:31,720 --> 00:52:36,000
going to be really depressing if
if this result holds, and I

929
00:52:36,000 --> 00:52:38,200
think it's so.
So my reasons for rejecting it

930
00:52:38,200 --> 00:52:40,440
aren't about, oh, the this, this
personal thing.

931
00:52:40,440 --> 00:52:43,160
It's about I think we do have
knowledge, and I think the

932
00:52:43,160 --> 00:52:46,360
knowledge that we have is
fundamental to the human

933
00:52:46,360 --> 00:52:48,200
condition.
And I think that those things

934
00:52:48,200 --> 00:52:52,480
seem to be inconsistent with
various ways of expressing

935
00:52:53,040 --> 00:52:54,280
illusionism, Right.
Yeah.

936
00:52:54,840 --> 00:52:57,320
Let's go into those arguments
again today and and perhaps

937
00:52:57,560 --> 00:52:59,960
maybe to frame it, I mean your
view, how would you label it at

938
00:52:59,960 --> 00:53:01,520
this point from a philosophical
perspective?

939
00:53:01,520 --> 00:53:03,840
What would you call it and how
would you approach defending it?

940
00:53:04,160 --> 00:53:07,080
Well, I I think no.
It's closing it off a little.

941
00:53:07,960 --> 00:53:09,000
No, no, no, you're doing the
right.

942
00:53:09,000 --> 00:53:10,640
You're right.
I can give you the arguments and

943
00:53:10,640 --> 00:53:13,920
basically the structure of how
they work, but those arguments

944
00:53:13,920 --> 00:53:17,200
don't constitute the the
positive view I have about

945
00:53:17,200 --> 00:53:19,720
consciousness, which we should
talk about later when we get to

946
00:53:19,720 --> 00:53:22,440
the other issues.
Because it's more of a view

947
00:53:22,880 --> 00:53:25,320
about the moral grounding
problem in relationship to

948
00:53:25,320 --> 00:53:27,400
consciousness than it is a
theory of consciousness.

949
00:53:27,640 --> 00:53:30,040
Like, that's gonna.
I don't have some things that's

950
00:53:30,040 --> 00:53:32,440
gonna compete with global
workspace theory or integrated

951
00:53:32,440 --> 00:53:34,520
information theory.
That's not.

952
00:53:34,520 --> 00:53:35,840
I don't work on that at that
level.

953
00:53:35,840 --> 00:53:37,560
That's way above my pay grade,
buddy.

954
00:53:37,560 --> 00:53:40,120
Way above my pay grade.
Hi, I'm mostly reading those

955
00:53:40,120 --> 00:53:42,600
people's work.
But there is an argument here

956
00:53:42,760 --> 00:53:45,520
because I train mostly as an
epistemologist working at the

957
00:53:45,520 --> 00:53:48,600
intersection of philosophy of
mine that I'm concerned with.

958
00:53:48,640 --> 00:53:53,200
And that argument is that when
you take your phenomenal

959
00:53:53,200 --> 00:53:58,720
experience to be an illusion,
you cannot point to your

960
00:53:58,720 --> 00:54:03,160
phenomenal experience to justify
any of your beliefs.

961
00:54:03,160 --> 00:54:06,440
So let's take maybe like it's
not the most common, but it's a

962
00:54:06,440 --> 00:54:08,800
very commonly discussed
knowledge here.

963
00:54:09,040 --> 00:54:10,920
Rough picture of what knowledge
is.

964
00:54:11,160 --> 00:54:14,400
When you know something, it's
because you believe it.

965
00:54:14,520 --> 00:54:18,480
It turns out to be true and you
have the capacity to justify it

966
00:54:18,680 --> 00:54:20,840
in a certain way.
And what is that capacity?

967
00:54:21,200 --> 00:54:25,320
One, if someone challenged your
belief, you could argue in

968
00:54:25,320 --> 00:54:28,560
favour of it.
OK, now there are lots of

969
00:54:28,560 --> 00:54:31,240
problems with this justified
true belief theory of knowledge

970
00:54:31,240 --> 00:54:35,840
that have been known for over
100 years, but at least it can

971
00:54:35,840 --> 00:54:39,280
give us a picture where we can
focus on what Illusionism might

972
00:54:39,480 --> 00:54:41,400
have as a problem in
relationship to it.

973
00:54:42,080 --> 00:54:46,120
Illusionism is telling me that
my phenomenal experience is an

974
00:54:46,120 --> 00:54:49,600
illusion, which means that in
some sense it's false.

975
00:54:49,600 --> 00:54:53,080
It's either all globally false
or some components of it are

976
00:54:53,080 --> 00:54:57,120
false, right?
Which means that when I point to

977
00:54:57,120 --> 00:55:00,360
my phenomenal experience and
say, oh, it's because I felt

978
00:55:00,360 --> 00:55:04,560
that, because I saw that when I
point to my phenomenal

979
00:55:04,560 --> 00:55:10,280
experience, the phenomenality of
it isn't can't do any work, it

980
00:55:10,280 --> 00:55:12,080
has to because it's false,
right.

981
00:55:12,640 --> 00:55:16,000
So the argument is basically
it's a lot more elaborate, but

982
00:55:16,000 --> 00:55:20,000
the outline of it is that when
you want to appeal to something

983
00:55:20,000 --> 00:55:23,880
to justify something, you cannot
appeal to something that you

984
00:55:23,880 --> 00:55:28,200
believe to be false.
So if I believe this not to be a

985
00:55:28,200 --> 00:55:29,840
cup right here, it's one of my
cup right here.

986
00:55:30,320 --> 00:55:34,800
And if I believe this is not a
cup, and then someone asks me

987
00:55:35,040 --> 00:55:38,920
why is the chair further away
from the cup?

988
00:55:39,240 --> 00:55:43,120
I cannot point to the cup and
say it's because a cup is here

989
00:55:43,120 --> 00:55:45,800
and the chair is there because I
don't believe there's a cup

990
00:55:45,800 --> 00:55:50,040
there.
OK, so if you believe in

991
00:55:50,040 --> 00:55:53,920
illusionism, you believe that
your phenomenal experience is an

992
00:55:53,920 --> 00:55:58,320
illusion, which means at some
level all of it is false, or

993
00:55:58,320 --> 00:56:01,200
some component of it is false,
but you don't know each one

994
00:56:01,200 --> 00:56:04,240
component is false.
And then you want to point to

995
00:56:04,240 --> 00:56:08,000
your phenomenal experience to
give you a justification for

996
00:56:08,000 --> 00:56:11,560
believing something.
That seems to me like that's not

997
00:56:11,560 --> 00:56:15,760
going to work right?
And in addition, it's

998
00:56:15,760 --> 00:56:21,800
interesting because this kind of
argument would show that there

999
00:56:21,800 --> 00:56:25,920
is a way to be a skeptic about
knowledge of the external world

1000
00:56:26,280 --> 00:56:29,680
that has nothing to do with the
fact that you can't figure out

1001
00:56:29,680 --> 00:56:32,640
whether or not you're dreaming,
you're in the matrix, you're a

1002
00:56:32,640 --> 00:56:35,840
brain in the VAT.
All it has to do is with the

1003
00:56:35,840 --> 00:56:39,680
claim that your phenomenal
experience is an illusion,

1004
00:56:39,960 --> 00:56:41,760
right?
The mere fact that you now

1005
00:56:41,760 --> 00:56:44,480
believe that proposition, my
phenomenal experience, is an

1006
00:56:44,480 --> 00:56:48,320
illusion.
You're unable to justify beliefs

1007
00:56:48,320 --> 00:56:54,120
on the basis of appeal to your
phenomenal experience.

1008
00:56:54,120 --> 00:56:59,720
Now, there are some very
technical distinctions are used

1009
00:56:59,720 --> 00:57:03,680
to make this argument work.
One is called weak, no false

1010
00:57:03,680 --> 00:57:06,920
lemmas, and another one is
called the basing relation,

1011
00:57:07,760 --> 00:57:09,680
which helped to make this more
clear.

1012
00:57:09,920 --> 00:57:13,960
But in general, the argument
basically works in that way, and

1013
00:57:13,960 --> 00:57:18,960
it has an interesting result.
It means that any evidence in

1014
00:57:18,960 --> 00:57:25,360
favour of illusionism that's
based on scientific reasoning,

1015
00:57:25,800 --> 00:57:30,280
which includes both induction
and observation, will have the

1016
00:57:30,280 --> 00:57:32,600
problem that none of the
observations that are appealed

1017
00:57:32,600 --> 00:57:37,160
to because you believe in your
phenomenal illusion can be

1018
00:57:37,160 --> 00:57:39,960
appealed to, which means that it
undermines itself.

1019
00:57:39,960 --> 00:57:44,160
So that's a side result.
That's a result that says this

1020
00:57:44,160 --> 00:57:48,000
argument will show that if you
believe in illusionism, you're

1021
00:57:48,000 --> 00:57:51,440
forced to have no justification
for that belief, right?

1022
00:57:51,440 --> 00:57:53,480
That's kind of like, that's kind
of what I'm going for.

1023
00:57:54,000 --> 00:57:56,200
The paper is currently like
being looked at by several

1024
00:57:56,200 --> 00:57:59,440
people, but it's those are just
the the rough idea of what I

1025
00:57:59,440 --> 00:58:01,320
want to say.
But now I want to clarify

1026
00:58:01,320 --> 00:58:03,920
something which I've discussed
with some people.

1027
00:58:04,160 --> 00:58:08,760
This means only that a certain
type of knowledge goes away, OK?

1028
00:58:09,160 --> 00:58:11,840
Because there are other ways of
knowing that are well recognized

1029
00:58:12,120 --> 00:58:14,920
in epistemology, such as ways
that have to do not with

1030
00:58:15,680 --> 00:58:18,440
pointing to my phenomenal
experience by having a part of

1031
00:58:18,440 --> 00:58:22,760
my mind that reliably functions
in certain environments in the

1032
00:58:22,760 --> 00:58:26,520
production of cognitive states.
OK, it's called process

1033
00:58:26,520 --> 00:58:29,640
reliabilism.
So this theory is just saying

1034
00:58:29,640 --> 00:58:34,480
that something that we do a lot
of engage in arguing with one

1035
00:58:34,480 --> 00:58:38,960
another by justifying things to
our phenomenal experience turns

1036
00:58:38,960 --> 00:58:40,880
out to not work according to
this view.

1037
00:58:40,960 --> 00:58:45,040
And the only thing that works is
this other sort of like, I'm a

1038
00:58:45,040 --> 00:58:48,080
machine of a certain kind, like
a thermometer, and as long as my

1039
00:58:48,080 --> 00:58:50,600
thermometer brain is working in
the right environment, I'm going

1040
00:58:50,600 --> 00:58:53,600
to get these beliefs that come
out that turn out to be OK,

1041
00:58:53,800 --> 00:58:58,080
which I'm not denying is a way
of knowing, but I'm saying it's

1042
00:58:58,080 --> 00:59:01,400
the other one that goes away
that's a bit drastic.

1043
00:59:01,400 --> 00:59:03,720
And so that's kind of like that
would be.

1044
00:59:05,200 --> 00:59:07,600
So this is not a positive
argument in terms of another

1045
00:59:07,600 --> 00:59:09,120
theory.
I'm not saying that this favours

1046
00:59:09,120 --> 00:59:12,800
panpsychism, because I also
think panpsychism and cosmos

1047
00:59:12,800 --> 00:59:17,400
psychism suffer from problems as
well, but I do.

1048
00:59:17,440 --> 00:59:20,960
I think that this shows that it
reveals that my interest in

1049
00:59:20,960 --> 00:59:24,480
illusionism isn't like this kind
of like oh and this couldn't be

1050
00:59:24,480 --> 00:59:27,920
wrong because it doesn't make
sense of you know, you know, you

1051
00:59:27,920 --> 00:59:29,480
know, like it hurts my, it
hurts.

1052
00:59:29,480 --> 00:59:32,080
No, it's just that I think we
have no, yeah, I'm basically an

1053
00:59:32,080 --> 00:59:34,000
anti skeptic and I always have
been in philosophy.

1054
00:59:34,320 --> 00:59:37,240
I think once we start
encroaching on the way in which

1055
00:59:37,240 --> 00:59:40,240
we don't have knowledge to
various degrees, I think we

1056
00:59:40,240 --> 00:59:44,200
start to lose sense of the human
conditions as opposed to other

1057
00:59:44,200 --> 00:59:46,400
creatures and systems.
So, yeah, so that's kind of

1058
00:59:46,960 --> 00:59:50,440
where I would.
You know, wait, I mean that that

1059
00:59:50,440 --> 00:59:53,280
perspective is almost a similar
to an eliminativism of where

1060
00:59:53,280 --> 00:59:55,440
where I mean a guy working
against it is.

1061
00:59:55,440 --> 00:59:58,320
Because with that you're almost
breaking down the current

1062
00:59:58,320 --> 01:00:01,120
knowledge that we have and you
kind of you got you kind of

1063
01:00:01,120 --> 01:00:03,360
showcasing the fact that, OK, if
you keep doing this, there's a

1064
01:00:03,360 --> 01:00:06,440
point in grounding a lot of your
statements at that point, you

1065
01:00:06,480 --> 01:00:08,840
you at some point you do have an
issue with grounding.

1066
01:00:08,840 --> 01:00:11,640
Anything you do, there's almost
a relativism to everything.

1067
01:00:12,160 --> 01:00:13,960
Is is that it's sort of a
summary.

1068
01:00:15,000 --> 01:00:16,320
No, you got the the, the, the
part.

1069
01:00:16,440 --> 01:00:19,440
The first part you said I think
is a very good description, like

1070
01:00:19,480 --> 01:00:22,400
you're taking the rug out from
what you're standing up on.

1071
01:00:22,800 --> 01:00:26,480
And actually just to be clear,
nothing I'm saying comes from

1072
01:00:26,480 --> 01:00:28,200
me.
These are well understood points

1073
01:00:28,200 --> 01:00:30,760
in the history of phenomenology
and in many other disciplines

1074
01:00:31,040 --> 01:00:33,000
like.
This point I'm making is just to

1075
01:00:33,000 --> 01:00:39,160
reiterate a well known move in
philosophy that certain kinds of

1076
01:00:39,160 --> 01:00:44,080
things that we believe or know
depend on the reality of other

1077
01:00:44,080 --> 01:00:47,760
things.
And because of that, if you

1078
01:00:47,760 --> 01:00:52,800
start to push on that then you
it doesn't lead to a relativism,

1079
01:00:52,840 --> 01:00:54,840
it leads to the absence of
anything.

1080
01:00:54,840 --> 01:00:57,080
In some sense.
There's no, there's no real real

1081
01:00:57,080 --> 01:01:02,400
things going on anymore.
So some people like Jay Garfield

1082
01:01:02,400 --> 01:01:04,600
are kind of happy with this
they're like it's illusions all

1083
01:01:04,600 --> 01:01:06,720
the way down.
He's he's a form of what's known

1084
01:01:06,720 --> 01:01:09,280
as a structural illusionist as
well as a phenomenal

1085
01:01:09,280 --> 01:01:11,280
illusionist.
So I distinguish between four

1086
01:01:11,280 --> 01:01:14,320
types of illusionism basically
phenomenal illusionism

1087
01:01:14,320 --> 01:01:15,560
phenomenal consciousness
illusion.

1088
01:01:15,840 --> 01:01:19,000
Structural illusionism that the
structure of our conscious

1089
01:01:19,000 --> 01:01:21,600
experience as being subject
object is illusion.

1090
01:01:22,920 --> 01:01:25,680
Foundational Illusionism, that
there can be illusions all the

1091
01:01:25,680 --> 01:01:29,520
way down without a bedrock non
illusory bottom and accuracy.

1092
01:01:29,520 --> 01:01:33,120
Illusionism, the belief that our
representational states of our

1093
01:01:33,120 --> 01:01:35,400
external environment are
accurate.

1094
01:01:35,440 --> 01:01:39,920
And I basically think that all
forms of illusionism suffer from

1095
01:01:39,920 --> 01:01:41,680
some philosophical problem or
another.

1096
01:01:41,680 --> 01:01:44,560
The one I talked about now was
the Phenomenal Illusionism.

1097
01:01:45,160 --> 01:01:47,440
OK.
So I mean let's let's try and

1098
01:01:47,440 --> 01:01:50,760
move from the, from the negative
aspect of it to towards your pro

1099
01:01:50,800 --> 01:01:52,240
theory.
What, what would be the positive

1100
01:01:52,280 --> 01:01:55,200
outlook?
What What is your what would

1101
01:01:55,200 --> 01:01:58,360
you, how would if someone had to
ask you what is how would you

1102
01:01:58,360 --> 01:01:59,800
label it philosophically?
What would you say?

1103
01:02:00,960 --> 01:02:05,000
OK, I think it's safer to do the
one that's more closely related

1104
01:02:05,000 --> 01:02:06,560
to something I do have to say
about.

1105
01:02:06,720 --> 01:02:09,040
So am I on the fence about pan
psychism?

1106
01:02:09,360 --> 01:02:11,720
Yeah, I I think I've told other
people that I'm kind of on the

1107
01:02:11,720 --> 01:02:14,400
fence on it.
Do I think certain forms of

1108
01:02:14,400 --> 01:02:17,520
materialism might make sense in
a way?

1109
01:02:17,920 --> 01:02:20,400
Not really.
I guess I'm still, but but it's

1110
01:02:20,400 --> 01:02:24,520
more like, what kind of pan
psychism would I go in for?

1111
01:02:24,520 --> 01:02:26,520
And I do have problems with the
theory.

1112
01:02:26,520 --> 01:02:27,680
I do think there's certain
versions of it.

1113
01:02:27,680 --> 01:02:29,520
This is not going to do anything
or anybody.

1114
01:02:29,880 --> 01:02:33,760
So do I think it makes sense to
talk about consciousness perhaps

1115
01:02:33,760 --> 01:02:35,920
being fundamental to the
universe?

1116
01:02:36,280 --> 01:02:38,040
Yeah, I think that couldn't that
could be helpful.

1117
01:02:38,800 --> 01:02:43,320
But does it really lead to these
combination decommination

1118
01:02:43,320 --> 01:02:46,920
problems in a way where I would
be sleeping less if we couldn't

1119
01:02:46,920 --> 01:02:48,480
solve them?
I'm not sure I don't.

1120
01:02:48,480 --> 01:02:52,000
So again, so let's go to the
thing that's connected to this

1121
01:02:52,440 --> 01:02:56,000
that people want to talk about.
It's very accessible and I think

1122
01:02:56,120 --> 01:02:58,880
it's probably what I think this
Humphreys book is working on,

1123
01:02:58,880 --> 01:03:04,800
which is we definitely have this
idea for quite a while in

1124
01:03:04,800 --> 01:03:08,800
Western philosophy, and at least
it's found in other traditions

1125
01:03:08,800 --> 01:03:13,160
of Indian philosophy as well,
that sentience is the

1126
01:03:13,160 --> 01:03:17,200
explanatory feature for moral
status.

1127
01:03:17,560 --> 01:03:22,800
So the idea is that not
everything has moral standing,

1128
01:03:24,200 --> 01:03:27,520
and the thing that makes it the
case that you have moral

1129
01:03:27,520 --> 01:03:29,560
standing is that you're
sentient.

1130
01:03:30,640 --> 01:03:35,040
Now you can have different views
of sentience in terms of it

1131
01:03:35,040 --> 01:03:38,840
being digital or graded.
That is that either you're

1132
01:03:38,840 --> 01:03:42,880
sentient or not, or there are
degrees of it and these are kind

1133
01:03:42,880 --> 01:03:47,000
of related to each other because
you could it's zero and like the

1134
01:03:47,000 --> 01:03:50,200
degrees of it, but at least it's
it's digital in that it's zero

1135
01:03:50,200 --> 01:03:52,880
or on in some degree, but there
could be different degrees of

1136
01:03:53,200 --> 01:03:54,440
sentience.
That's the idea.

1137
01:03:55,240 --> 01:04:00,520
And I definitely think that this
sort of theory, you know, and

1138
01:04:00,640 --> 01:04:07,920
the sort of view is problematic.
So I have less to say about what

1139
01:04:07,920 --> 01:04:14,080
is the view of consciousness
that is correct, other than

1140
01:04:14,080 --> 01:04:17,040
saying that I'm heavily invested
and still thinking about whether

1141
01:04:17,040 --> 01:04:19,600
or not it's a fundamental
feature of the universe under

1142
01:04:19,600 --> 01:04:21,720
some model.
But I do have something you're

1143
01:04:21,920 --> 01:04:23,280
very much.
Agnostic about the whole

1144
01:04:23,280 --> 01:04:26,040
concept, it seems it's you you.
You're not making any bold

1145
01:04:26,040 --> 01:04:28,320
claims about what it is, but you
know what it could.

1146
01:04:28,680 --> 01:04:30,080
But it's possibly not.
Yeah.

1147
01:04:30,520 --> 01:04:32,960
Well, I mean, like I said, like
it takes a lot of time to like

1148
01:04:32,960 --> 01:04:34,280
work.
This is done a bit conscious of

1149
01:04:34,280 --> 01:04:37,680
studies is like a a mass in some
ways and it's also a really

1150
01:04:37,680 --> 01:04:41,680
exciting place in other days.
So yeah, I'm just, I mean my

1151
01:04:41,680 --> 01:04:44,480
research also, I have to make it
clear I didn't start doing

1152
01:04:44,480 --> 01:04:46,040
philosophy by thinking of the
philosophy of mine.

1153
01:04:46,040 --> 01:04:48,640
It was the last thing I studied
in Graduate School, actually,

1154
01:04:49,040 --> 01:04:50,720
and I did not work on it for a
long time.

1155
01:04:50,920 --> 01:04:53,400
My background was mostly in
mathematical logic and modal

1156
01:04:53,400 --> 01:04:56,400
logic in particular, so I don't.
That's why I'm a little bit

1157
01:04:56,400 --> 01:04:59,440
poor.
I was working on these arguments

1158
01:05:00,200 --> 01:05:03,720
that say that because we can
conceive something, something is

1159
01:05:03,720 --> 01:05:07,360
possible, and because that thing
is possible, materialism about

1160
01:05:07,360 --> 01:05:10,200
consciousness is false.
I was working on just the

1161
01:05:10,200 --> 01:05:13,240
premise that says conceivability
entails possibility, which

1162
01:05:13,240 --> 01:05:16,160
Descartes himself uses and David
Chalmers uses in his first book.

1163
01:05:16,720 --> 01:05:19,400
But I wasn't really interested
in, like, what the result was.

1164
01:05:19,400 --> 01:05:21,360
I was like, interested in why
would you ever think that

1165
01:05:21,360 --> 01:05:23,800
imagining something in your head
is going to lead you to some

1166
01:05:23,800 --> 01:05:27,040
epistemic data that you should
take seriously about the nature

1167
01:05:27,040 --> 01:05:29,560
of the universe?
How did the imagination do that?

1168
01:05:29,560 --> 01:05:31,880
You know, that's a great if
imagination does that, that's

1169
01:05:31,880 --> 01:05:33,840
amazing.
And so we need to figure that

1170
01:05:33,840 --> 01:05:35,680
out.
That seemed to me so the kind of

1171
01:05:35,680 --> 01:05:37,560
philosophy of mine.
But really epistemology.

1172
01:05:37,560 --> 01:05:41,000
That's like I said, so that's
why I'm agnostic about it.

1173
01:05:41,000 --> 01:05:42,560
But let's go to the the positive
thing.

1174
01:05:44,080 --> 01:05:47,800
I'm not agnostic about this.
I don't think you need sentience

1175
01:05:47,800 --> 01:05:53,320
to explain moral standing.
And actually, over the last two

1176
01:05:53,320 --> 01:05:57,080
years I've been giving a lot of
talks and working more with more

1177
01:05:57,080 --> 01:06:00,960
and more people, and I'm pretty
much not on the fence at all

1178
01:06:00,960 --> 01:06:05,120
about the fact that the
grounding property is not

1179
01:06:06,160 --> 01:06:08,600
phenomenal consciousness, so it
can't be sentienced.

1180
01:06:08,600 --> 01:06:10,240
The sentience implies phenomenal
conscious.

1181
01:06:10,600 --> 01:06:13,720
However, there's something
called the grading property,

1182
01:06:15,000 --> 01:06:20,800
which means that if two or more
things have different grades of

1183
01:06:20,800 --> 01:06:23,920
moral standing, one thing having
more than another, another thing

1184
01:06:23,920 --> 01:06:26,760
having more than that, there's a
grade of moral standing.

1185
01:06:27,240 --> 01:06:29,840
There can be properties that
mark the grading points on the

1186
01:06:29,840 --> 01:06:34,960
scale.
I am somewhat of the view that

1187
01:06:34,960 --> 01:06:38,000
phenomenal consciousness,
affective consciousness,

1188
01:06:38,520 --> 01:06:43,680
possession of a self, free will,
rationality, long term planning

1189
01:06:43,960 --> 01:06:47,120
are all grading properties.
So they will mark some.

1190
01:06:47,360 --> 01:06:52,520
But what I am strongly against
in in in relationship to the

1191
01:06:52,520 --> 01:06:57,920
most dominant view out there is
that sentience is the grounding

1192
01:06:57,920 --> 01:07:01,320
property, right.
So there are two debates right

1193
01:07:01,320 --> 01:07:05,200
now that are important here.
One is the view now it will drop

1194
01:07:05,200 --> 01:07:06,880
the word sentience as I actually
told you.

1195
01:07:06,880 --> 01:07:08,480
I don't really think it's a
useful term.

1196
01:07:08,920 --> 01:07:11,960
One group thinks that the
grounding property is affective

1197
01:07:11,960 --> 01:07:14,440
consciousness.
I think that the the type of

1198
01:07:14,440 --> 01:07:19,080
consciousness that grounds moral
status is affect, and this is

1199
01:07:19,080 --> 01:07:21,280
has the common sense notion that
we're all familiar with.

1200
01:07:21,480 --> 01:07:24,080
This is when people say things
like, well, anything that can

1201
01:07:24,080 --> 01:07:26,440
feel pain can suffer, and
anything that can suffer has

1202
01:07:26,440 --> 01:07:28,840
moral standing because it has
interest in not suffering.

1203
01:07:29,280 --> 01:07:33,880
That's the the Singer version.
It's built out of, you know,

1204
01:07:34,880 --> 01:07:37,680
Bentham.
It's also found to a certain

1205
01:07:37,680 --> 01:07:40,600
degree in Jainism.
Buddhists seem to be concerned

1206
01:07:40,600 --> 01:07:43,480
with it too.
So affect, I mean, so Buddhists

1207
01:07:43,480 --> 01:07:45,840
don't actually think there can
be phenomenal consciousness

1208
01:07:45,840 --> 01:07:48,680
without affective consciousness
because they think that the way

1209
01:07:48,680 --> 01:07:51,640
conscious states arises is
always valenced in some way by

1210
01:07:51,640 --> 01:07:53,240
affect.
So they don't take that view

1211
01:07:53,240 --> 01:07:57,200
even seriously, the distinction.
But people like David Chalmers

1212
01:07:57,200 --> 01:08:00,600
has written in his recent book
that phenomenal consciousness is

1213
01:08:00,600 --> 01:08:02,760
not the same as affective
consciousness, but phenomenal

1214
01:08:02,760 --> 01:08:05,720
consciousness is the the
grounding property.

1215
01:08:05,720 --> 01:08:08,480
And so there's that alternative
view of that.

1216
01:08:09,760 --> 01:08:14,120
You can have phenomenal cons,
and there are ways to think

1217
01:08:14,120 --> 01:08:16,720
about this that can make sense.
So here's one way to think about

1218
01:08:16,720 --> 01:08:17,920
it.
You know, there are already

1219
01:08:17,920 --> 01:08:20,479
humans that have a condition
called pain asymbolia.

1220
01:08:20,880 --> 01:08:24,040
And in pain asymbolia, you you
basically don't feel pain,

1221
01:08:24,520 --> 01:08:27,040
right?
But you you have other

1222
01:08:27,319 --> 01:08:30,840
phenomenally conscious states.
They just don't relate to pain

1223
01:08:30,840 --> 01:08:34,000
and pleasure as much.
Or in the same way you can say

1224
01:08:34,000 --> 01:08:35,880
they have moral standing because
they have phenomenal

1225
01:08:35,880 --> 01:08:37,720
consciousness without affective
consciousness.

1226
01:08:37,800 --> 01:08:39,080
Sounds like the right answer to
me.

1227
01:08:39,720 --> 01:08:43,279
So right.
So for me the positive thing

1228
01:08:43,279 --> 01:08:47,279
that's of importance here is
that these are all grading

1229
01:08:47,279 --> 01:08:50,800
properties.
What I find problematic is to

1230
01:08:50,800 --> 01:08:53,600
say that they are the correct
grounding property.

1231
01:08:54,120 --> 01:08:56,000
And the reason why I think
they're not the correct

1232
01:08:56,000 --> 01:09:00,080
grounding property is because I
think there is another property

1233
01:09:00,120 --> 01:09:05,399
that's more basic that captures
a wider net of things and allows

1234
01:09:05,399 --> 01:09:08,160
us to make sense of moral
status.

1235
01:09:08,279 --> 01:09:10,640
And that is the idea of
intelligence.

1236
01:09:11,279 --> 01:09:14,279
But I think intelligence is the
grounding property.

1237
01:09:14,279 --> 01:09:18,120
Now, just as we gave 4 to 5
definitions of consciousness,

1238
01:09:18,120 --> 01:09:21,880
you can give probably 8 to 10
definitions of intelligence.

1239
01:09:22,720 --> 01:09:26,560
OK.
What what I'm primarily focused

1240
01:09:26,560 --> 01:09:32,120
on is a way of thinking about
intelligence that has to do with

1241
01:09:32,560 --> 01:09:36,200
computational systems.
And these can be realized in

1242
01:09:36,200 --> 01:09:38,520
artificial systems or in natural
organisms.

1243
01:09:38,920 --> 01:09:42,800
They're just computational
systems that are goal directed.

1244
01:09:43,240 --> 01:09:45,800
There is some reason why they do
what they are doing.

1245
01:09:46,560 --> 01:09:52,479
And in addition, they are tied
to preference orderings.

1246
01:09:53,240 --> 01:09:56,640
OK, so here here's an example
that can really help you see

1247
01:09:57,000 --> 01:10:01,960
what I'm getting at.
I don't know that's that amoeba

1248
01:10:03,400 --> 01:10:06,960
are phenomenally conscious.
I don't know that.

1249
01:10:07,680 --> 01:10:12,320
But I do know that Amoeba prefer
to be in certain environments

1250
01:10:12,480 --> 01:10:17,200
over others, and they will move
in the direction of being in

1251
01:10:17,200 --> 01:10:23,240
those environments over others
based on very basic ways of

1252
01:10:23,240 --> 01:10:27,360
gaining information in their
environment and computing

1253
01:10:27,560 --> 01:10:31,400
direction to navigate right.
I can't remember the name of the

1254
01:10:31,400 --> 01:10:34,880
creature, but in Graduate School
I wrote a book review of a book

1255
01:10:34,880 --> 01:10:39,080
by Murray Clark where he used to
talk about these sea creatures.

1256
01:10:39,080 --> 01:10:41,760
They're not amoeba, but what
would happen is that they would

1257
01:10:41,760 --> 01:10:48,960
detect polar N through some sort
of magnetic system that they

1258
01:10:48,960 --> 01:10:51,520
had.
And the reason why they did it

1259
01:10:51,520 --> 01:10:58,000
is because polar N correlated
with oxygen rich water and so

1260
01:10:58,000 --> 01:11:00,000
they would always want to go
towards that.

1261
01:11:00,440 --> 01:11:05,520
That's a perfect example of a
system that's computational and

1262
01:11:05,520 --> 01:11:10,720
intelligent and for which the
Organism has preferences that

1263
01:11:10,720 --> 01:11:13,080
are goal direct.
The the, the, the, sorry.

1264
01:11:13,280 --> 01:11:16,400
The system is goal directed in a
way that's related to the

1265
01:11:16,400 --> 01:11:19,840
preferences that need satisfied
in order for it to continue to

1266
01:11:19,840 --> 01:11:21,640
survive.
That could be like.

1267
01:11:22,040 --> 01:11:25,840
A pan protopsychism, in a sense,
is oh wait, no, no, no, don't,

1268
01:11:25,840 --> 01:11:27,760
don't, don't go ahead and get to
pan protocycism.

1269
01:11:28,120 --> 01:11:29,600
Let's let's not.
We'll talk about that in a

1270
01:11:29,600 --> 01:11:31,920
minute, but I don't want to
confuse it with what's going

1271
01:11:31,960 --> 01:11:34,040
going on with just this view,
right.

1272
01:11:34,040 --> 01:11:35,880
So.
So this view is trying to say

1273
01:11:36,280 --> 01:11:44,320
that this kind of computational
intelligence tied, which is goal

1274
01:11:44,320 --> 01:11:48,200
directly and tied to
preferences, is a better ground

1275
01:11:48,800 --> 01:11:54,080
for for moral standing.
Because even if this creature

1276
01:11:54,520 --> 01:11:57,720
isn't phenomenally conscious, it
seems like things go better or

1277
01:11:57,720 --> 01:12:01,280
worse off for it, depending on
what water environment it's in.

1278
01:12:01,520 --> 01:12:05,560
So why do we need phenomenal
conscious?

1279
01:12:05,560 --> 01:12:10,160
What what does the thing have to
be phenomenally conscious for it

1280
01:12:10,160 --> 01:12:12,920
to have moral standing?
For the life of me, I've started

1281
01:12:12,920 --> 01:12:15,680
to, like recently, think I just
cannot understand this at all,

1282
01:12:16,000 --> 01:12:19,000
because it also seems like we
can say something else, which is

1283
01:12:19,000 --> 01:12:21,560
also controversial but also
really relevant.

1284
01:12:22,160 --> 01:12:27,680
If another creature can do the
same thing, it can do, but it

1285
01:12:27,680 --> 01:12:31,920
also feels there may be a reason
to say why, because it feels it

1286
01:12:31,920 --> 01:12:34,720
has higher moral status.
That is also a very

1287
01:12:34,720 --> 01:12:37,640
controversial claim.
Just because you feel it, you

1288
01:12:37,640 --> 01:12:40,120
deserve a higher moral standing
than the person who doesn't feel

1289
01:12:40,120 --> 01:12:41,440
it.
Yeah, I just was just at a

1290
01:12:41,440 --> 01:12:44,400
conference in Ireland and we
were debating this exact point

1291
01:12:44,640 --> 01:12:45,920
and several people were riding
on this.

1292
01:12:45,920 --> 01:12:48,600
We're like, wait, because you
can now feel it.

1293
01:12:48,600 --> 01:12:51,240
You get so higher moral sense of
the thing they can't feel, even

1294
01:12:51,240 --> 01:12:53,160
though you're exactly equivalent
in every other way.

1295
01:12:53,520 --> 01:12:55,840
Some people are trying to say,
yeah, that's the difference.

1296
01:12:55,840 --> 01:12:59,080
Feeling is the difference maker
and me and some other people are

1297
01:12:59,080 --> 01:13:01,440
like that's starting to sound
like a really bad answer

1298
01:13:01,440 --> 01:13:04,560
actually.
So yeah, so you wanted something

1299
01:13:04,560 --> 01:13:07,640
positive.
I would say that on my view,

1300
01:13:07,640 --> 01:13:11,920
moral standing is grounded in a
certain type of computational

1301
01:13:11,920 --> 01:13:15,000
intelligence that's goal
directed and tied to preferences

1302
01:13:15,280 --> 01:13:18,240
that allow the system that uses
the computational intelligence

1303
01:13:18,600 --> 01:13:21,360
to have better or worse outcomes
for its survival.

1304
01:13:21,480 --> 01:13:25,360
That's clearly what, and I would
say that applies directly to

1305
01:13:25,360 --> 01:13:28,640
artificial systems, maybe not to
large language models now, but

1306
01:13:28,640 --> 01:13:33,240
it clearly applies to AI, it
applies to amoeba and other

1307
01:13:33,240 --> 01:13:35,280
creatures, it applies to plants,
it applies to a whole bunch of

1308
01:13:35,280 --> 01:13:36,760
things.
So that's the grounding

1309
01:13:36,760 --> 01:13:38,840
property.
And then the question is what

1310
01:13:38,840 --> 01:13:41,480
are the grading properties, if
there are any grading properties

1311
01:13:41,480 --> 01:13:45,000
that make sense.
And it turns out that perhaps so

1312
01:13:45,200 --> 01:13:47,200
for some people it's going to
turn out that phenomenal

1313
01:13:47,200 --> 01:13:49,560
consciousness is different from
affective consciousness, and

1314
01:13:49,560 --> 01:13:51,600
that things that are effectively
conscious have higher moral

1315
01:13:51,600 --> 01:13:53,720
standing and those that have
only phenomenal.

1316
01:13:53,800 --> 01:13:57,560
And for other people it'll be to
what degree irrational, what

1317
01:13:57,560 --> 01:14:00,480
possess itself have free will.
And then the other component of

1318
01:14:00,480 --> 01:14:03,160
my theory that's really, really
important is the fact that I'm a

1319
01:14:03,160 --> 01:14:06,960
cluster theorist.
So I think that certain

1320
01:14:06,960 --> 01:14:12,440
capacities can be put together
and other capacities

1321
01:14:12,440 --> 01:14:14,880
automatically go together.
So if you have affective

1322
01:14:14,880 --> 01:14:16,520
consciousness, so you have
phenomenal consciousness.

1323
01:14:16,720 --> 01:14:21,120
So you don't ever have just a
single like very few things I

1324
01:14:21,120 --> 01:14:24,680
would say are just
computationally intelligent in a

1325
01:14:24,680 --> 01:14:26,720
goal directed way that's tied to
preferences.

1326
01:14:27,040 --> 01:14:28,880
They have something else going
on.

1327
01:14:29,120 --> 01:14:33,760
And so the cluster that they
have is what I think marks the

1328
01:14:33,760 --> 01:14:37,040
grade.
So the grade is being graded in

1329
01:14:37,040 --> 01:14:39,240
terms of the cluster of
properties they have, not the

1330
01:14:39,240 --> 01:14:42,880
single one, right.
So it's actually my view is more

1331
01:14:42,880 --> 01:14:44,800
complicated.
It's that there are clusters of

1332
01:14:44,800 --> 01:14:49,240
capacities that grade moral
standing above the simple

1333
01:14:49,240 --> 01:14:52,800
property of just having
computational intelligence.

1334
01:14:52,800 --> 01:14:54,600
That's school directed and tied
to preferences.

1335
01:14:54,920 --> 01:14:56,480
Yeah, so now you see a little
bit more of the picture.

1336
01:14:56,720 --> 01:15:00,880
Like, this is interesting
because, for example, you might

1337
01:15:00,880 --> 01:15:04,600
think that machines can't have
emotions, but humans can have

1338
01:15:04,600 --> 01:15:07,760
emotions.
You might think that some

1339
01:15:07,760 --> 01:15:11,200
creatures have a higher degree
of free will than other ones.

1340
01:15:11,480 --> 01:15:13,280
OK, so you get the complexity.
Yeah.

1341
01:15:13,400 --> 01:15:15,600
So it's it's what it's it's
really about.

1342
01:15:15,800 --> 01:15:20,120
For me it it reminds me of the
work being done by Michael Evan.

1343
01:15:20,280 --> 01:15:22,760
And are you familiar with his
work?

1344
01:15:24,000 --> 01:15:28,040
I know his work, but I'm not
sure that what I know is what

1345
01:15:28,040 --> 01:15:31,320
you're referring to.
OK, so I think, did he teach?

1346
01:15:31,400 --> 01:15:33,120
What does he?
Teach.

1347
01:15:33,120 --> 01:15:38,400
So he's a Is he in?
Yes, in Tufts.

1348
01:15:38,880 --> 01:15:41,000
Yes, that's Tufts.
Yeah.

1349
01:15:41,000 --> 01:15:43,840
OK.
Yes, I've seen him talk twice.

1350
01:15:44,080 --> 01:15:45,880
Yes, I've seen him talk.
I've never met him in person,

1351
01:15:45,880 --> 01:15:50,560
but I've seen him talk twice.
Yes, his his account of certain

1352
01:15:50,560 --> 01:15:53,880
intelligences in the creatures
he showed me in one talk is

1353
01:15:53,880 --> 01:15:56,200
exactly the same as the kind I'm
talking.

1354
01:15:56,320 --> 01:15:57,800
Right.
So that kind of intelligence

1355
01:15:58,160 --> 01:16:00,680
that he's talking about, I
remember he, I saw two of his

1356
01:16:00,680 --> 01:16:04,080
talks, actually.
That is very closely related to,

1357
01:16:04,120 --> 01:16:06,440
I would say the other person
who's also wrong here is Stephen

1358
01:16:06,440 --> 01:16:08,640
Wolfram to work on intelligence
and computation.

1359
01:16:09,080 --> 01:16:12,520
You should actually check.
I mean to grow and work on this

1360
01:16:12,720 --> 01:16:15,400
from AI mean because you're
coming from a very philosophical

1361
01:16:15,920 --> 01:16:17,720
background.
When you look at his scientific

1362
01:16:17,720 --> 01:16:19,480
work and you see the things that
they're actually doing, it

1363
01:16:19,560 --> 01:16:21,280
probably strengthens your
argument so much more.

1364
01:16:21,280 --> 01:16:23,000
Because I've, I've spoken to him
twice.

1365
01:16:23,000 --> 01:16:24,360
I'm going to speak to him soon
as well.

1366
01:16:24,600 --> 01:16:26,240
He's doing.
He's got a group of guys

1367
01:16:26,240 --> 01:16:28,600
together and very different
views on consciousness as well.

1368
01:16:28,600 --> 01:16:31,000
I don't know if you know Mark
Solms, Chris Fields.

1369
01:16:32,160 --> 01:16:34,480
There's also called Friston.
There's this group of thinkers.

1370
01:16:35,960 --> 01:16:37,720
So they're doing a lot of work
and they they're calling it the

1371
01:16:37,720 --> 01:16:41,000
field of diverse intelligence
and and and Mike Levin

1372
01:16:41,000 --> 01:16:44,000
specifically he's working on a
technological approach to mind

1373
01:16:44,000 --> 01:16:46,800
everywhere and he goes to
towards what you're talking

1374
01:16:46,800 --> 01:16:49,880
about this this sort of
intelligence moving away and

1375
01:16:49,880 --> 01:16:52,480
seeing that everything has this
level of intelligence and that

1376
01:16:52,480 --> 01:16:55,400
does change the way you perceive
conscious.

1377
01:16:55,400 --> 01:16:58,240
It is a sort of pan psychist
view in a sense, and he's he's

1378
01:16:58,240 --> 01:17:01,040
slowly starting to admit that.
Is it so.

1379
01:17:01,080 --> 01:17:03,080
So The thing is here, one of the
things I want to remind you

1380
01:17:03,080 --> 01:17:05,440
about, OK, And then this will
lead to a discussion.

1381
01:17:05,440 --> 01:17:07,680
I think you're gonna wanna be
engaged and you're gonna look at

1382
01:17:07,680 --> 01:17:09,320
this one.
You basically has to do with

1383
01:17:09,320 --> 01:17:10,840
your question.
You're asking about what's the

1384
01:17:10,840 --> 01:17:14,160
difference between how.
So remember, Pansoccism isn't

1385
01:17:14,160 --> 01:17:18,520
about phenomenal consciousness
as soon as.

1386
01:17:19,120 --> 01:17:23,800
You think that way you can start
to have like you know, like so

1387
01:17:24,040 --> 01:17:29,160
people say IIT is committed to
panpsychism, but what does IIT

1388
01:17:29,160 --> 01:17:32,080
have to say about phenomenality?
It has to talk about integrated

1389
01:17:32,080 --> 01:17:35,960
information, 2 notions which can
be, you know, measured in fee

1390
01:17:35,960 --> 01:17:38,480
without there being the right
substrate to realize the

1391
01:17:38,480 --> 01:17:41,000
phenomenality.
So just having a debate with one

1392
01:17:41,000 --> 01:17:42,960
of my friends about this, I was
like, you know, there's all this

1393
01:17:42,960 --> 01:17:45,680
stuff out there right now about
whether IIT is a pseudoscience.

1394
01:17:45,960 --> 01:17:48,440
And I was like kind of like
upset, like OK, I think it's

1395
01:17:48,440 --> 01:17:51,680
very interesting hypothesis,
it's, it's useful and lots of

1396
01:17:51,680 --> 01:17:53,520
interesting good.
I have friends that work on and

1397
01:17:53,520 --> 01:17:57,120
write good papers and these
people are incredibly smart and

1398
01:17:57,120 --> 01:17:59,840
saying all these things.
And the thing that's being left

1399
01:17:59,840 --> 01:18:03,840
out of the discussion is that
when we distinguish between

1400
01:18:03,840 --> 01:18:06,680
access and phenomenal
consciousness, we can look at

1401
01:18:06,680 --> 01:18:10,240
both of the leading theories,
global workspace theory and IIT.

1402
01:18:10,880 --> 01:18:13,600
And and we can say, well, maybe
these theories are just about

1403
01:18:13,600 --> 01:18:17,000
access consciousness.
So, so, so to say that, that,

1404
01:18:17,000 --> 01:18:22,400
that, that maybe these people's
work is pan psychist, maybe it's

1405
01:18:22,400 --> 01:18:24,560
pan intelligence something or
another.

1406
01:18:24,560 --> 01:18:27,760
At one point I called my I
called my own view.

1407
01:18:27,760 --> 01:18:30,720
I called my own view something
like pan intelligence because I

1408
01:18:30,720 --> 01:18:33,200
wanted to get away from
consciousness type terms and

1409
01:18:33,200 --> 01:18:38,160
psyche and panpsychism means
mental and the roots of the

1410
01:18:38,160 --> 01:18:41,120
word.
So I would be careful about

1411
01:18:41,120 --> 01:18:44,720
doing that because one of the
things I've noticed repeatedly

1412
01:18:44,760 --> 01:18:47,960
in looking at the literature and
how these people talk is we have

1413
01:18:47,960 --> 01:18:50,760
lost sensitivity to the
difference between access and

1414
01:18:50,760 --> 01:18:53,520
phenomenal consciousness.
The thing, and this is going to

1415
01:18:53,520 --> 01:18:55,560
touch now on the issue you
wanted to hear about, which I'll

1416
01:18:55,560 --> 01:19:04,400
I'll say now, when Dave Chalmers
and Philip Goff and Galen

1417
01:19:04,400 --> 01:19:08,600
Strossen are talking about
Cosmos psychism, panpsychism.

1418
01:19:09,800 --> 01:19:13,040
Very important to keep in mind
that the type of consciousness

1419
01:19:13,040 --> 01:19:16,200
that they're talking about being
explained and fundamental is

1420
01:19:16,200 --> 01:19:19,800
phenomenal consciousness in this
what it's like in a Galion

1421
01:19:19,800 --> 01:19:22,200
sense.
The moment you look at classical

1422
01:19:22,200 --> 01:19:28,080
Indian philosophy and you see
Cosmos psychism there, what

1423
01:19:28,080 --> 01:19:33,040
you're seeing is a structural
similarity to a theory that has

1424
01:19:33,040 --> 01:19:36,280
been promoted in analytic
philosophy and has roots in

1425
01:19:36,280 --> 01:19:40,000
ancient Greek philosophy.
But to which I don't know if any

1426
01:19:40,000 --> 01:19:43,200
of them would understand what
I'm talking about when I say

1427
01:19:43,200 --> 01:19:46,000
phenomenal consciousness.
It's not like they would think

1428
01:19:46,560 --> 01:19:51,320
that the cosmos psychism in Pure
Consciousness of Shankara is

1429
01:19:51,320 --> 01:19:58,640
like a big BLOB of unrealized
and unowned moments of F

1430
01:19:58,640 --> 01:20:01,800
sharpness, marinara, Curry
sauce, blue, red and all this

1431
01:20:01,800 --> 01:20:04,080
stuff.
It's on a bunch of first of all,

1432
01:20:04,080 --> 01:20:07,760
in Shankara, pure Consciousness
is Nirbuna without qualities.

1433
01:20:07,920 --> 01:20:10,840
It's only in Ramuja, it's Saguna
with quality.

1434
01:20:10,840 --> 01:20:16,440
So in the cosmos psychism in
Advaita Vedanta, it's impossible

1435
01:20:16,440 --> 01:20:18,440
that it could have anything to
do with phenomenal consciousness

1436
01:20:19,040 --> 01:20:21,040
at best.
Yeah, the conversation goes down

1437
01:20:21,080 --> 01:20:24,600
a completely different Rd.
It's it's about this is the

1438
01:20:24,600 --> 01:20:26,360
thing that I'm seeing more and
more is that.

1439
01:20:26,720 --> 01:20:29,040
You were right in the beginning.
You wanted to say, hey, it's

1440
01:20:29,040 --> 01:20:31,120
important to that people
understand and explain this

1441
01:20:31,120 --> 01:20:33,440
stuff in the right way when they
look at this stuff.

1442
01:20:33,800 --> 01:20:36,640
But one of the things that just
stands out over and over again

1443
01:20:37,040 --> 01:20:41,720
is that you must do some really
important work to figure out

1444
01:20:41,720 --> 01:20:45,160
where you're going to recapture
2 notions that drive most of

1445
01:20:45,160 --> 01:20:48,200
Western philosophy of mind after
Descartes, which is

1446
01:20:48,920 --> 01:20:50,760
intentionality and phenomenal
consciousness.

1447
01:20:51,080 --> 01:20:52,680
Because intentionality is
actually.

1448
01:20:53,120 --> 01:20:55,960
A little bit easier to find, I
just recently reviewed a book by

1449
01:20:55,960 --> 01:21:00,520
Lorelai Bernaki on Abhi Nava
Gupta, The Kashmiri Shivite's

1450
01:21:00,880 --> 01:21:03,560
Theory of Consciousness.
And it was interesting how much

1451
01:21:03,560 --> 01:21:06,520
of her book so carefully and
nicely discussed subjective

1452
01:21:06,520 --> 01:21:10,280
awareness, right, which is the
notion that's more servable in

1453
01:21:10,280 --> 01:21:14,120
certain Indian texts.
But that pure what it's like

1454
01:21:14,480 --> 01:21:18,600
sort of thing, it's it's hard if
you read someone like Staneshwar

1455
01:21:18,600 --> 01:21:22,800
Timilsena's book on theories of
consciousness, Advaita Vedanta.

1456
01:21:23,440 --> 01:21:26,160
The thing in the textual
tradition so and you were trying

1457
01:21:26,160 --> 01:21:30,280
to yourself say you've got to be
somewhat it's easy to misread

1458
01:21:30,480 --> 01:21:33,840
it's so what's easier to misread
it's it's it's not that it's

1459
01:21:34,320 --> 01:21:38,280
what it is is it's easy to see
structural identity independent

1460
01:21:38,480 --> 01:21:42,280
of the point of the structure
and the context of the structure

1461
01:21:42,280 --> 01:21:44,360
being discussed and what the aim
is.

1462
01:21:44,760 --> 01:21:48,080
Those Vedantic philosophers are
very much concerned with this

1463
01:21:48,080 --> 01:21:51,240
relationship between the
individual self and God.

1464
01:21:51,960 --> 01:21:56,080
The moment you side of that, you
will sort of start to see things

1465
01:21:56,080 --> 01:21:59,200
there that might not really be
the best.

1466
01:21:59,200 --> 01:22:00,320
And then.
So let me make another

1467
01:22:00,320 --> 01:22:03,200
clarification here.
That's not really always bad.

1468
01:22:03,480 --> 01:22:07,160
Sometimes you go looking for X
and you actually find Y.

1469
01:22:07,440 --> 01:22:09,800
But Y is actually useful for
what you're doing in your own

1470
01:22:09,800 --> 01:22:12,080
project.
So hey, accidental discoveries

1471
01:22:12,080 --> 01:22:13,720
that aren't really what people
were talking about.

1472
01:22:13,840 --> 01:22:15,840
If someone says that's not a
reason to do cross traditional

1473
01:22:15,840 --> 01:22:17,800
philosophy, I'd be like, that's
totally wrong.

1474
01:22:18,000 --> 01:22:19,800
Sometimes you just find good
stuff when you're looking for

1475
01:22:19,800 --> 01:22:22,160
one thing and it's the other
thing you found.

1476
01:22:22,160 --> 01:22:23,560
So there's nothing wrong with
that.

1477
01:22:23,560 --> 01:22:26,360
But, but, but it is important to
address your main issue that

1478
01:22:26,360 --> 01:22:30,480
you're raising that yeah, be
careful because to me, talking

1479
01:22:30,480 --> 01:22:33,040
about intelligence the way I
want to talk about intelligence

1480
01:22:33,280 --> 01:22:37,040
has no implications at all for
phenomenal consciousness.

1481
01:22:37,320 --> 01:22:39,360
When I'm talking about this
creature that's doing this stuff

1482
01:22:39,360 --> 01:22:43,440
related to magnetic north in
order to track water, I don't

1483
01:22:43,440 --> 01:22:46,560
want to consider whether or not
it's phenomenally conscious as

1484
01:22:46,560 --> 01:22:50,160
an explanation of its behavior,
because I already am aware that

1485
01:22:50,160 --> 01:22:53,120
it does have the mechanisms so
so the the evidence

1486
01:22:54,240 --> 01:22:57,400
probabilistically is going.
To go my.

1487
01:22:57,400 --> 01:23:00,440
Way it's going to go the way of
saying there's far more evidence

1488
01:23:00,440 --> 01:23:02,360
that it has computational
intelligence that's goal

1489
01:23:02,360 --> 01:23:05,520
directed tied to preferential
stakes, that it is going to go

1490
01:23:05,520 --> 01:23:06,800
for it being phenomenally
conscious.

1491
01:23:07,160 --> 01:23:10,160
At a certain other level of
explanation, now we can talk

1492
01:23:10,160 --> 01:23:13,680
about, you know, what are the
markers for phenomenal

1493
01:23:13,680 --> 01:23:17,000
consciousness in AIA.
Recent paper that was discussed

1494
01:23:17,320 --> 01:23:20,200
and put on in nature has been
making the rounds with everyone.

1495
01:23:20,200 --> 01:23:23,240
But again, what is that about?
It's like about those.

1496
01:23:23,640 --> 01:23:27,080
I can already say that a large
language model is intelligent,

1497
01:23:27,160 --> 01:23:29,760
intelligent and oh sure, someone
could be like.

1498
01:23:30,200 --> 01:23:32,600
Yeah, you know, maybe it's not
really intelligent because it

1499
01:23:32,600 --> 01:23:35,960
doesn't really think it doesn't.
It's all you know, and then we

1500
01:23:36,120 --> 01:23:38,320
can we have the touring Cyril
debate about that.

1501
01:23:38,560 --> 01:23:42,200
But but the evidence is still
going to be much higher for

1502
01:23:42,400 --> 01:23:44,040
saying that it's intelligent,
that it's phenomenally

1503
01:23:44,040 --> 01:23:45,640
conscious.
So that's why it's a grounding

1504
01:23:45,640 --> 01:23:48,720
property.
I think it's pernicious in a way

1505
01:23:49,200 --> 01:23:53,080
to not take seriously the idea
that we can ground a lot of

1506
01:23:53,080 --> 01:23:56,520
things as having moral standing
without addressing phenomenal

1507
01:23:56,520 --> 01:23:59,400
consciousness.
And we can put that aside for

1508
01:23:59,440 --> 01:24:02,040
the grading issue.
That's a positive view.

1509
01:24:02,080 --> 01:24:04,160
I do have that I've been working
on for a couple of years.

1510
01:24:04,560 --> 01:24:05,920
I think.
I mean you're touching on

1511
01:24:05,920 --> 01:24:08,640
something very fundamental here
and it and it's the fact that

1512
01:24:09,160 --> 01:24:11,160
even though I know what you're
trying to say and what you're

1513
01:24:11,160 --> 01:24:14,280
talking about and I and I
completely understand it, my own

1514
01:24:14,280 --> 01:24:18,640
Ingrainedness in the way I've
conceptualized this year over

1515
01:24:18,640 --> 01:24:21,920
the years via Western philosophy
still allows me to make that

1516
01:24:21,920 --> 01:24:24,880
slight error of making the
assumption that you're still

1517
01:24:24,880 --> 01:24:26,520
discussing phenomenal
consciousness.

1518
01:24:26,800 --> 01:24:28,520
And that's something that that
that has.

1519
01:24:28,520 --> 01:24:30,600
No, no, I'm I'm saying that's
what happened when I brought it

1520
01:24:30,600 --> 01:24:32,240
up earlier.
But I completely get what you're

1521
01:24:32,240 --> 01:24:35,480
saying and how we can make that
mistake of still bringing it up,

1522
01:24:35,800 --> 01:24:39,400
even though that's not really
the aspect of consciousness

1523
01:24:39,440 --> 01:24:42,640
that's being discussed in the
Advaita Vedanta and Indian

1524
01:24:42,640 --> 01:24:44,920
philosophy.
It it is fundamentally different

1525
01:24:44,920 --> 01:24:48,040
and not directly talking about
phenomenal consciousness.

1526
01:24:48,320 --> 01:24:50,480
And even though it will have
some sort of and I think, well,

1527
01:24:50,480 --> 01:24:52,720
let's make that even more clear,
let's make that even more clear.

1528
01:24:52,880 --> 01:24:56,200
I think the evidence will be
born out that in Advaita

1529
01:24:56,200 --> 01:25:00,840
Vedanta, whatever is Brahman
consciousness, it is not to be

1530
01:25:00,840 --> 01:25:03,160
identified with phenomenal
consciousness or a field of

1531
01:25:03,160 --> 01:25:06,360
phenomenal consciousness.
My best guess is that that is

1532
01:25:06,360 --> 01:25:09,800
not.
What that is supposed to be, it

1533
01:25:09,800 --> 01:25:15,280
does seem to me that there is
one important thing that we have

1534
01:25:15,280 --> 01:25:17,480
to keep into mind, and that's
this.

1535
01:25:17,960 --> 01:25:24,440
It is often times said that the
state that one would be in has

1536
01:25:24,440 --> 01:25:29,480
to do with sakchit ananda.
And ananda means bliss here, and

1537
01:25:29,480 --> 01:25:31,680
bliss is a phenomenal property,
right?

1538
01:25:32,280 --> 01:25:35,400
So this leads to this.
Interesting, sort of.

1539
01:25:36,800 --> 01:25:41,040
Thing where if someone is saying
in Shankara system that

1540
01:25:41,600 --> 01:25:46,560
Brahman's essential property is
bliss, then you're saying two

1541
01:25:46,560 --> 01:25:47,880
things.
You're saying something that has

1542
01:25:47,880 --> 01:25:52,400
no qualities, has a quality and
#2 you're saying something that

1543
01:25:52,400 --> 01:25:56,600
isn't phenomenal, has a
phenomenal property, right.

1544
01:25:56,640 --> 01:26:00,080
So this is a classical sort of
problem, both for the argument I

1545
01:26:00,080 --> 01:26:03,960
gave and also for the arguments
that that you can understand.

1546
01:26:04,840 --> 01:26:07,680
Shunk through a system by
talking about something that has

1547
01:26:07,680 --> 01:26:10,160
no qualities when it has at
least two qualities.

1548
01:26:10,640 --> 01:26:14,760
OK, so here's the answer to at
least one of the problems you

1549
01:26:14,760 --> 01:26:20,160
shouldn't understand.
Bliss in Ananda as attributed to

1550
01:26:20,160 --> 01:26:24,560
Brahman on the model of
happiness in a human being.

1551
01:26:25,040 --> 01:26:26,800
That's the root of the error,
basically.

1552
01:26:27,320 --> 01:26:32,480
So depending on how you read
bliss, you could say that an

1553
01:26:32,480 --> 01:26:35,640
Advaita Vedanta.
Purely is something like

1554
01:26:36,400 --> 01:26:40,960
phenomenal consciousness in like
a pure form like sometimes.

1555
01:26:40,960 --> 01:26:44,120
I like to use the idea.
Of the canvas and the painting

1556
01:26:44,120 --> 01:26:48,200
on it, right?
So the canvas is white, it has a

1557
01:26:48,200 --> 01:26:52,000
colour, right?
But that's not really considered

1558
01:26:52,600 --> 01:26:55,920
quality of the canvas really,
because the canvas is the thing

1559
01:26:55,920 --> 01:26:57,840
for which other things will go
on it, right?

1560
01:26:58,240 --> 01:27:01,520
So the illusory qualities of
experience.

1561
01:27:02,360 --> 01:27:03,960
Are superimposed on this pure
canvas.

1562
01:27:03,960 --> 01:27:06,920
Sure, it has a quality, it's
bliss, but that isn't really a

1563
01:27:06,920 --> 01:27:09,160
quality in the same sense
because it's the ground upon

1564
01:27:09,160 --> 01:27:12,240
which the illusory qualities
rest and is revealed.

1565
01:27:12,240 --> 01:27:14,680
So it's just the nature of the
thing that's a way to understand

1566
01:27:14,680 --> 01:27:17,880
it too.
But I would say overall that I

1567
01:27:17,880 --> 01:27:20,960
don't think, at least in this.
Now, in other traditions like

1568
01:27:20,960 --> 01:27:24,320
Kashmiri shiism, I'm not so sure
that there isn't already

1569
01:27:24,320 --> 01:27:27,400
cropping around between three
different words, this thing that

1570
01:27:27,400 --> 01:27:30,480
can be put together.
What is interestingly important

1571
01:27:30,480 --> 01:27:33,720
is that.
When Nagle even talks about

1572
01:27:33,720 --> 01:27:36,360
phenomenal consciousness or the
what it's like aspect of

1573
01:27:36,360 --> 01:27:39,800
experience, you know, there is
the talk of subjectivity, there

1574
01:27:39,800 --> 01:27:42,520
is a talk of awareness.
What's it like to be about, you

1575
01:27:42,520 --> 01:27:44,880
know, and so so there are those
things there.

1576
01:27:44,880 --> 01:27:49,200
So, but there's this, this
singular notion of phenomenal

1577
01:27:49,200 --> 01:27:53,960
consciousness that's cut away
from everything harder to find,

1578
01:27:53,960 --> 01:27:56,200
and probably because, you know,
some concepts are what we call

1579
01:27:56,200 --> 01:27:59,280
network concepts.
To talk about that, one concept

1580
01:27:59,280 --> 01:28:02,360
is to imply these other concepts
that are networked related to

1581
01:28:02,360 --> 01:28:04,160
it.
Like the concept of color is

1582
01:28:04,480 --> 01:28:10,040
network related to the concept
of a shade, a hue scarlet versus

1583
01:28:10,040 --> 01:28:11,040
red.
They're they're networked.

1584
01:28:11,040 --> 01:28:13,560
And so there's no reason to
think phenomenal consciousness

1585
01:28:13,560 --> 01:28:15,160
isn't networked also.
Yeah.

1586
01:28:15,960 --> 01:28:17,920
OK, I think at this point let's
let's get into.

1587
01:28:18,080 --> 01:28:21,080
I mean the moral responsibility
aspect of of understanding this

1588
01:28:21,080 --> 01:28:23,000
framework.
I mean what what type of

1589
01:28:23,160 --> 01:28:26,520
implications does this have on
on our understanding of AI,

1590
01:28:26,520 --> 01:28:30,400
animal intelligence, what how
can we approach this then

1591
01:28:30,400 --> 01:28:35,600
differently or better?
OK, so here things are.

1592
01:28:35,640 --> 01:28:39,200
Speculative, and they get
sometimes a bit too politically

1593
01:28:39,200 --> 01:28:40,960
charged.
So I'm going to stay very close

1594
01:28:40,960 --> 01:28:44,920
to the things I I'm most
confident that our.

1595
01:28:45,720 --> 01:28:47,240
Implications from what I'm
saying.

1596
01:28:47,720 --> 01:28:53,720
So I think at at a broad level,
one of the things is it changes

1597
01:28:54,080 --> 01:28:58,200
what we should be looking for
when we're trying to think about

1598
01:28:58,200 --> 01:29:01,960
moral standing.
We need to be thinking about

1599
01:29:02,200 --> 01:29:05,720
goal directed intelligent
behaviour and we need to be

1600
01:29:05,720 --> 01:29:08,600
thinking about what that goal
directed intelligent behaviour

1601
01:29:08,840 --> 01:29:11,720
means for the survival of the
system, OK?

1602
01:29:11,760 --> 01:29:14,680
And that cuts across artificial
systems.

1603
01:29:15,360 --> 01:29:17,480
And all sorts of plants and
animals, right?

1604
01:29:17,480 --> 01:29:21,080
That just changes the framework
right off the bat by looking at

1605
01:29:21,080 --> 01:29:23,560
what the orientation is towards
it.

1606
01:29:24,440 --> 01:29:26,880
Now it turns out that by making
that.

1607
01:29:26,880 --> 01:29:30,400
Subtle change there.
Are no immediate policy

1608
01:29:30,400 --> 01:29:34,640
implications, except for one
that the kinds of things that

1609
01:29:34,640 --> 01:29:38,560
aren't going to get intrinsic
moral status, sort of intrinsic

1610
01:29:38,560 --> 01:29:42,600
moral value, and therefore moral
status in a certain way, are

1611
01:29:42,600 --> 01:29:45,080
things like rocks.
For which we cannot understand

1612
01:29:45,080 --> 01:29:46,920
what it would be.
It is called a rock, an

1613
01:29:46,920 --> 01:29:49,880
intelligent, goal directed
system with preferences.

1614
01:29:50,760 --> 01:29:55,800
However, other things will get
in there, and that will begin to

1615
01:29:55,800 --> 01:29:59,320
give us a proper understanding
of the moral sphere.

1616
01:29:59,320 --> 01:30:00,880
What What falls in the moral
sphere?

1617
01:30:01,200 --> 01:30:05,880
And then of course this leads
into distinctions about whether

1618
01:30:05,880 --> 01:30:09,400
or not something has to be alive
or living, or what it means to

1619
01:30:09,400 --> 01:30:11,520
be living in order to be in the
moral sphere.

1620
01:30:11,520 --> 01:30:14,760
Are viruses alive?
You know are AI alive.

1621
01:30:14,760 --> 01:30:17,200
I mean, they can exhibit all
sorts of intelligent, goal

1622
01:30:17,200 --> 01:30:20,320
directed behavior, some of them
nefarious always.

1623
01:30:20,320 --> 01:30:24,880
Other ones can be beneficial.
But so So it changes that

1624
01:30:24,880 --> 01:30:27,120
framework.
The hard work that has to be

1625
01:30:27,120 --> 01:30:30,360
done, and I'm actually working
on a this issue right now, is

1626
01:30:31,160 --> 01:30:34,280
the question of grading versus
digital theories.

1627
01:30:34,600 --> 01:30:38,400
So a digital theory of moral
standing says that once you have

1628
01:30:38,400 --> 01:30:40,280
moral, any two things have moral
status.

1629
01:30:40,280 --> 01:30:43,000
They have it to the same degree
because it's impossible.

1630
01:30:43,640 --> 01:30:47,600
To conceive of a way to
rationally ground moral

1631
01:30:47,600 --> 01:30:51,400
differences and the grading view
says that X&Y can both have

1632
01:30:51,400 --> 01:30:54,640
moral status even though they
have differential moral status.

1633
01:30:54,960 --> 01:31:00,680
Now, unless this technical
problem is, the debate is put to

1634
01:31:00,680 --> 01:31:05,760
rest in favour of grading the
moral implications from saying

1635
01:31:05,760 --> 01:31:09,600
that you have a wide net given
by intelligent, goal directed

1636
01:31:09,600 --> 01:31:12,160
behaviour tied to preferences
plus.

1637
01:31:12,800 --> 01:31:15,200
Everything that has moral
status, has the same moral

1638
01:31:15,200 --> 01:31:19,920
status leads to an explosion of
moral standing and that is a

1639
01:31:20,200 --> 01:31:24,200
massively huge shift in our
understanding of the nature of

1640
01:31:24,200 --> 01:31:27,760
morality.
So if that if the non graded

1641
01:31:27,760 --> 01:31:34,720
view is the winner under this
grounding theory, then the

1642
01:31:34,720 --> 01:31:37,280
explosion of moral status is
extremely high.

1643
01:31:37,880 --> 01:31:40,840
However if the other view is
correct.

1644
01:31:41,360 --> 01:31:44,960
Then we need to have a very good
explanation about why, for

1645
01:31:44,960 --> 01:31:48,800
example, phenomenal
consciousness make something

1646
01:31:49,040 --> 01:31:53,840
matter more, and in what sense
is there a direct policy

1647
01:31:53,840 --> 01:31:55,720
implication for it mattering
more.

1648
01:31:56,160 --> 01:31:59,640
OK, so one distinction that
helps here with this is to

1649
01:31:59,640 --> 01:32:05,560
recognize that there can be a
difference between moral.

1650
01:32:05,560 --> 01:32:08,000
Standing of.
Something and what is known

1651
01:32:08,000 --> 01:32:12,520
already as legal standing.
OK, so because morality and

1652
01:32:12,520 --> 01:32:18,080
legality are not the same thing,
it's possible to hold any number

1653
01:32:18,280 --> 01:32:22,000
of views.
So for example, A&B have the

1654
01:32:22,000 --> 01:32:26,280
same moral standing, but either
A or B has different legal

1655
01:32:26,280 --> 01:32:31,040
standing.
A&B have differential moral

1656
01:32:31,040 --> 01:32:34,600
standing, but A&B have the same
legal standing.

1657
01:32:34,600 --> 01:32:37,200
And of course, by this I mean
there's a, there's a, there's a

1658
01:32:37,200 --> 01:32:38,960
hidden variable.
It's actually something more

1659
01:32:38,960 --> 01:32:42,200
like.
A&B have the same moral standing

1660
01:32:42,200 --> 01:32:46,840
with respect to C context C, and
they have differential legal

1661
01:32:46,840 --> 01:32:51,080
standing with respect to context
C So because we can draw that

1662
01:32:51,080 --> 01:32:55,960
distinction, this gives us a
nice rich textured matrix to

1663
01:32:55,960 --> 01:32:59,840
give different arguments for why
you would want to occupy one.

1664
01:32:59,840 --> 01:33:03,600
And this is all work that would
take like over, you know, half a

1665
01:33:03,600 --> 01:33:05,960
decade for several philosophers
to like work through.

1666
01:33:05,960 --> 01:33:07,560
Some of it has already been
worked through, but.

1667
01:33:08,680 --> 01:33:11,520
And there's some new work coming
out right now about degrees of

1668
01:33:11,520 --> 01:33:13,480
moral status.
I'm reviewing a book right now

1669
01:33:13,480 --> 01:33:15,520
and looking at the arguments and
people talking.

1670
01:33:15,520 --> 01:33:17,800
So it's coming up.
But there are these other moves

1671
01:33:17,800 --> 01:33:20,080
that are related.
There's also this, this sort of

1672
01:33:20,080 --> 01:33:22,840
thing, which I just said, which
is on a lot of people's minds

1673
01:33:22,840 --> 01:33:26,520
now where they're like, well,
how do I make sense of the fact

1674
01:33:26,520 --> 01:33:29,120
that when something has
phenomenal consciousness, it has

1675
01:33:29,120 --> 01:33:32,120
more moral status than something
it doesn't If.

1676
01:33:32,320 --> 01:33:34,880
And now here's the thing.
If phenomenal consciousness is

1677
01:33:34,880 --> 01:33:39,120
just an illusion, like what?
Would make.

1678
01:33:39,120 --> 01:33:43,520
It the case.
That the illusion makes you have

1679
01:33:43,560 --> 01:33:46,560
a higher moral standing than
something that doesn't.

1680
01:33:46,760 --> 01:33:51,040
So you can just imagine super
intelligent artificial systems

1681
01:33:51,040 --> 01:33:55,800
in the future, for which good
arguments have convinced us that

1682
01:33:55,800 --> 01:33:58,160
the kind of thing that they're
housed in cannot give

1683
01:33:58,160 --> 01:34:00,360
realization to phenomenal
consciousness.

1684
01:34:00,600 --> 01:34:03,160
It only gives realization to
access consciousness through

1685
01:34:03,160 --> 01:34:06,360
artificial general intelligence.
Suppose that's true.

1686
01:34:08,000 --> 01:34:10,240
All of a sudden you're gonna
tell me because you've got some

1687
01:34:10,240 --> 01:34:15,520
funking illusion going on inside
of you given to you by years and

1688
01:34:15,520 --> 01:34:19,560
generations, whatever evolution
that now you.

1689
01:34:19,720 --> 01:34:22,400
I mean there could be good
reason to have that argument and

1690
01:34:22,400 --> 01:34:26,800
say yes but but that's starting
to sound a little a little bit

1691
01:34:27,160 --> 01:34:29,640
weird.
It definitely, it definitely

1692
01:34:29,640 --> 01:34:32,920
would write like even a nice
little book to explain that that

1693
01:34:32,920 --> 01:34:34,480
argument.
So I assume that maybe.

1694
01:34:35,000 --> 01:34:37,680
Some of the people who are in
the Illusionists, surrealists,

1695
01:34:37,760 --> 01:34:42,160
you know, hyper realist, hyper
illusion view are probably

1696
01:34:42,160 --> 01:34:47,080
thinking about this because it
seems to me obviously an issue.

1697
01:34:47,240 --> 01:34:52,720
Also if you have something like
the view that says pain can be

1698
01:34:52,720 --> 01:34:55,680
felt but it can also be
unconscious, so for example

1699
01:34:55,680 --> 01:34:58,360
pains can be unconscious, then
you might think.

1700
01:34:58,800 --> 01:35:02,000
Well, why does the thing that
feels the pain matter more than

1701
01:35:02,000 --> 01:35:04,280
the thing that just has a bunch
of unconscious pains, Right.

1702
01:35:04,440 --> 01:35:06,480
This is what has to do with the
what philosophical theory of

1703
01:35:06,760 --> 01:35:09,120
pain you have.
But there are people who argue

1704
01:35:09,120 --> 01:35:13,000
that you can have unconscious
pains and then what?

1705
01:35:13,000 --> 01:35:14,800
Why is becoming aware of the
pain?

1706
01:35:15,640 --> 01:35:17,640
Why does the feeling of
suffering matter more than the

1707
01:35:17,640 --> 01:35:19,320
suffering?
This is kind of like what I'm

1708
01:35:19,720 --> 01:35:24,280
also saying, Like we can clearly
say that the system that is in

1709
01:35:24,320 --> 01:35:27,680
an oxygen low environment is
suffering.

1710
01:35:28,800 --> 01:35:30,880
And not doing as well as it
could be than if it wasn't an

1711
01:35:30,880 --> 01:35:33,920
oxygen rich environment.
It doesn't matter if it feels

1712
01:35:33,920 --> 01:35:36,160
it.
I mean it's objectively true of

1713
01:35:36,160 --> 01:35:39,680
the system as long as we hold
constant that surviving is

1714
01:35:39,680 --> 01:35:43,400
better than not surviving.
In many cases it will be true

1715
01:35:43,400 --> 01:35:46,200
that because it's not going to
continue to survive and this

1716
01:35:46,400 --> 01:35:48,920
environment is better off in the
other environment, it doesn't

1717
01:35:48,920 --> 01:35:53,760
have to feel it to to to get it.
So I think that's sort of like.

1718
01:35:54,400 --> 01:35:57,320
The the broad things now, now if
you want to say and ask me

1719
01:35:57,320 --> 01:36:00,120
something more specific about
what comes from this kind of

1720
01:36:00,120 --> 01:36:05,040
framework, I would hesitate to
think it's good to mention

1721
01:36:05,040 --> 01:36:09,320
anything else because people
like to sometimes over

1722
01:36:09,320 --> 01:36:11,600
politicize things and at this
stage I don't think this is a

1723
01:36:11,600 --> 01:36:14,680
very politically savvy.
Yeah.

1724
01:36:14,680 --> 01:36:17,600
It's more of a, it's more like
technical things we have to work

1725
01:36:17,600 --> 01:36:18,720
out.
And I think there's still so

1726
01:36:18,720 --> 01:36:21,080
much yeah there's there's so
much more room for improvement

1727
01:36:21,080 --> 01:36:23,720
from your and I'm pretty sure
you feel that way where you can

1728
01:36:23,720 --> 01:36:25,920
still fine tune this a lot more
and there's no point in reading

1729
01:36:27,440 --> 01:36:27,720
it.
Yeah.

1730
01:36:27,720 --> 01:36:28,960
I think another thing that might
play a big.

1731
01:36:28,960 --> 01:36:30,880
Role I mean we're we're looking
at these intelligent agents at

1732
01:36:30,880 --> 01:36:33,000
some point.
I mean at what point do we

1733
01:36:33,000 --> 01:36:35,720
consider things like volition
and freedom of the world to

1734
01:36:35,720 --> 01:36:38,360
adjust and change that moral
standing and behaviour.

1735
01:36:39,240 --> 01:36:41,080
That's right.
So I I think it's a grading

1736
01:36:41,080 --> 01:36:41,920
property.
So from.

1737
01:36:41,920 --> 01:36:45,160
On my view as of now.
Free will is a grading property.

1738
01:36:45,160 --> 01:36:48,840
And in addition, the way I think
about it is that there are

1739
01:36:48,840 --> 01:36:52,440
degrees of freedom itself, so
grading is going to be

1740
01:36:52,440 --> 01:36:55,200
relativized to degrees of
freedom.

1741
01:36:55,200 --> 01:36:59,880
So one of the things that comes
up in the discussion is the

1742
01:36:59,880 --> 01:37:03,600
relationship between free will
as it's understood in the case

1743
01:37:03,680 --> 01:37:06,480
of humans and how it's
understood in the case of

1744
01:37:06,480 --> 01:37:10,120
artificial systems, right?
So there is a relationship

1745
01:37:10,160 --> 01:37:14,680
between the programming.
Of an artificial system and what

1746
01:37:14,680 --> 01:37:17,640
kind of behaviour can be an
output of it.

1747
01:37:17,920 --> 01:37:21,120
And there is something going on
in the human case where we talk

1748
01:37:21,120 --> 01:37:24,080
about us as having free will.
And those issues about free will

1749
01:37:24,080 --> 01:37:27,800
have to be at least coherently
understood in a way that there's

1750
01:37:27,800 --> 01:37:33,400
a framework for attributing free
will across the two things in a

1751
01:37:33,400 --> 01:37:36,880
way that makes sense.
Otherwise, there's no grading to

1752
01:37:36,880 --> 01:37:38,440
talk about it if what we mean
by.

1753
01:37:38,440 --> 01:37:41,040
Free will in the human case.
Is so drastically.

1754
01:37:41,680 --> 01:37:45,720
Different than free will star in
the AI case some other concept

1755
01:37:45,720 --> 01:37:48,240
that's different.
So yes it is it.

1756
01:37:48,240 --> 01:37:50,720
It does seem to be important.
But again, one of the top first

1757
01:37:50,720 --> 01:37:54,120
things you asked me about is
what's the definition of the

1758
01:37:54,120 --> 01:37:55,920
self.
And one of them I gave you was

1759
01:37:55,920 --> 01:38:00,160
the principal actor notion
versus you know, and and I said

1760
01:38:00,160 --> 01:38:03,880
the principal actor notion and
the true self can be understood

1761
01:38:03,880 --> 01:38:06,000
in different ways related to the
free will problem.

1762
01:38:06,000 --> 01:38:08,960
So, you know, what does it mean
to say that an artificial system

1763
01:38:09,360 --> 01:38:12,320
has a self?
What does that really amount to

1764
01:38:12,320 --> 01:38:15,360
in terms of its free will and
stuff like this?

1765
01:38:15,680 --> 01:38:18,840
And I think that those questions
are definitely going to, they're

1766
01:38:18,840 --> 01:38:22,000
much further out because the
framework that can address them

1767
01:38:22,400 --> 01:38:25,080
has to settle one of the hardest
debates in all of them.

1768
01:38:27,000 --> 01:38:29,280
Philosophy.
Have you ever heard of Humes

1769
01:38:29,280 --> 01:38:32,880
Fork?
Yeah, So I think there's two

1770
01:38:32,880 --> 01:38:33,880
versions of Humes.
Fork.

1771
01:38:33,880 --> 01:38:35,480
I'm going to do the one about.
Free will.

1772
01:38:35,760 --> 01:38:39,440
So either the thing, system,
whatever is determined or not.

1773
01:38:40,520 --> 01:38:43,360
If it's determined, well it's
determined.

1774
01:38:44,480 --> 01:38:47,720
If it's not determined though,
we still have a problem and

1775
01:38:47,720 --> 01:38:49,640
that's how does that non
determined thing get to the

1776
01:38:49,640 --> 01:38:52,800
thing that is the action, the
agent causation relation.

1777
01:38:53,040 --> 01:38:55,680
So it's like so it's a hard
problem.

1778
01:38:55,680 --> 01:38:58,880
I mean, there's a lot of smart
people working on this and and

1779
01:38:58,960 --> 01:39:01,760
it and actually and now to touch
back to your larger point from

1780
01:39:01,760 --> 01:39:03,640
the beginning.
It's also clear that it has a

1781
01:39:03,640 --> 01:39:07,440
lot of ramifications across
cultures this free will is

1782
01:39:07,440 --> 01:39:11,000
conceived very differently in
the Islamic traditions,

1783
01:39:11,360 --> 01:39:13,960
conceived differently in certain
Indian traditions, very

1784
01:39:13,960 --> 01:39:18,120
different in Christianity can be
argued to be the theodicies of

1785
01:39:18,360 --> 01:39:23,280
Christian philosophy in terms of
divine God's divine properties

1786
01:39:23,280 --> 01:39:26,480
of omnipotence.
Omniscience and omnipotence in

1787
01:39:26,480 --> 01:39:29,080
relationship to the problem of
free will are just in one way.

1788
01:39:29,280 --> 01:39:31,200
So there's different
ramifications there too.

1789
01:39:31,560 --> 01:39:35,200
And that's the thing.
Tell me Anand it seems that

1790
01:39:35,240 --> 01:39:38,440
overall I mean the overarching
theme and and and I think with

1791
01:39:38,440 --> 01:39:41,440
Indian philosophy in general is
is that non dualism, that non

1792
01:39:41,440 --> 01:39:45,040
duality of of of of mind let's
say.

1793
01:39:45,360 --> 01:39:48,920
But do you have you ever
considered that non dual aspect

1794
01:39:48,960 --> 01:39:51,240
to be ideal like an idealist
perspective?

1795
01:39:51,240 --> 01:39:54,960
Have you ever thought of it
maybe from the consciousness is

1796
01:39:54,960 --> 01:39:59,360
all there is and reality?
What are your thoughts on that?

1797
01:40:01,680 --> 01:40:06,560
Oh, so first clarification.
I would hesitate to be like non

1798
01:40:06,560 --> 01:40:08,560
dualism is a big idea to
generalize.

1799
01:40:08,680 --> 01:40:13,600
I'm sorry.
I think it's also not that I

1800
01:40:13,600 --> 01:40:16,040
think it's president in in, in a
lot of Western philosophy.

1801
01:40:16,200 --> 01:40:18,680
It's just that I think it's
president in Chinese philosophy.

1802
01:40:18,680 --> 01:40:19,680
Yes, true.
I don't know.

1803
01:40:19,920 --> 01:40:22,280
I think.
I think if you go the other

1804
01:40:22,280 --> 01:40:24,400
direction, you're gonna.
Find that there could be this

1805
01:40:24,400 --> 01:40:28,680
notion floating around there and
other things, yeah.

1806
01:40:31,080 --> 01:40:33,960
So one of the things that.
Is interesting to me.

1807
01:40:34,040 --> 01:40:38,440
Is this thing that David
Chalmers discusses in Reality

1808
01:40:38,440 --> 01:40:42,360
plus his new book, which he also
discussed a long time ago at a

1809
01:40:42,360 --> 01:40:46,680
conference in Germany right all
the time he was working on a

1810
01:40:46,680 --> 01:40:48,560
paper called The Matrix in
Metaphysics.

1811
01:40:49,320 --> 01:40:53,560
And sometimes it can be talked
about in contemporary

1812
01:40:53,880 --> 01:40:57,440
information theory or sort of
physics through the work of John

1813
01:40:57,440 --> 01:41:00,080
Wheeler with the idea if from
bed.

1814
01:41:00,840 --> 01:41:05,760
So I don't know.
I mean, that's difficult.

1815
01:41:05,920 --> 01:41:07,360
That's like the free will
problem.

1816
01:41:07,360 --> 01:41:12,160
Like, I guess I'm a I'm a
bedrock substance.

1817
01:41:12,160 --> 01:41:16,400
Realist in some ways like I.
I don't think it comes from bit

1818
01:41:16,480 --> 01:41:21,080
without coming from bit, but
Dave discusses this in his book

1819
01:41:21,080 --> 01:41:23,840
and says it's an it bit thing
all the way down.

1820
01:41:23,840 --> 01:41:25,400
There doesn't have to be a
fundamental level.

1821
01:41:25,400 --> 01:41:28,520
That's bits at the bottom.
Sorry, sorry.

1822
01:41:28,520 --> 01:41:33,120
It's at the bottom.
Yeah, so, so I I yeah, I I

1823
01:41:33,120 --> 01:41:36,280
definitely think this is a is a
difficult one and I think some

1824
01:41:36,280 --> 01:41:42,160
of it has to do with this.
It's actually a problem that

1825
01:41:42,160 --> 01:41:44,120
occurred.
In a lot of.

1826
01:41:44,440 --> 01:41:46,800
The modern period of philosophy
with people like Locke and

1827
01:41:46,800 --> 01:41:52,600
Barkley and Robert Boyle and
Bale and so this thing about

1828
01:41:53,280 --> 01:41:57,560
what is the sensation of
pressure and force that we feel?

1829
01:41:58,280 --> 01:42:01,040
That we feel there's this thing.
So the question was what is

1830
01:42:01,040 --> 01:42:03,520
solidity?
Basically they're going so, so

1831
01:42:03,520 --> 01:42:08,240
if there's an if from bit
problem, it's related to me to

1832
01:42:08,240 --> 01:42:11,640
this issue of solidity that was
so heavily debated at this time

1833
01:42:11,640 --> 01:42:13,280
period.
It also turns out to be the case

1834
01:42:14,160 --> 01:42:19,520
in direct relationship to this
that people like Sri Ramakrishna

1835
01:42:20,040 --> 01:42:24,440
and Galen Strossen and Michael
Lockwood have all argued that

1836
01:42:24,440 --> 01:42:27,360
the problem of consciousness is
not.

1837
01:42:28,040 --> 01:42:30,840
The most important problem right
now it's the problem of

1838
01:42:31,080 --> 01:42:35,600
materiality, because materiality
is related to the notion of

1839
01:42:35,600 --> 01:42:38,680
solidity for all.
For most humans, that's the

1840
01:42:38,680 --> 01:42:42,760
connection.
Like what is material or solid

1841
01:42:42,760 --> 01:42:44,800
bodies?
Even though we would talk, we

1842
01:42:44,800 --> 01:42:49,680
know know that phases of water
such as vapor are material too.

1843
01:42:50,080 --> 01:42:53,000
That's not where our hardcore
notion is tied into.

1844
01:42:53,000 --> 01:42:56,440
It's tied into materiality.
When Strassen wrote in the New

1845
01:42:56,440 --> 01:42:59,200
York Times a paper where he
argued this is actually the

1846
01:42:59,200 --> 01:43:03,240
hardest thing to explain, I
agree that this actually is

1847
01:43:03,240 --> 01:43:07,360
interdirectly related to
thinking about consciousness and

1848
01:43:07,360 --> 01:43:10,120
even what makes sense.
It makes to talk about it from

1849
01:43:10,120 --> 01:43:13,560
bit, insofar as it sorry Bit is
an abstract information

1850
01:43:13,560 --> 01:43:17,040
relationship that's can be
mathematically defined and stuff

1851
01:43:17,040 --> 01:43:18,960
like this.
So yeah, there there's there's

1852
01:43:18,960 --> 01:43:20,760
something there.
Ramakrishna also made this

1853
01:43:20,760 --> 01:43:22,880
point.
Michael Lockwood made this

1854
01:43:22,880 --> 01:43:25,440
point.
Several Indian philosophers have

1855
01:43:25,440 --> 01:43:30,680
been like yeah, consciousness
being fundamental hey, you're

1856
01:43:30,680 --> 01:43:33,120
conscious just imagine
everything else is fundamentally

1857
01:43:33,120 --> 01:43:34,640
that way.
At least you got evidence for

1858
01:43:34,640 --> 01:43:36,360
it.
How do you explain this material

1859
01:43:36,360 --> 01:43:40,360
thing that's going on that's the
that's the odd thing out there.

1860
01:43:41,080 --> 01:43:45,400
Now whether or not that's
idealist is again a thing that

1861
01:43:45,400 --> 01:43:51,800
is I think somewhat to to to be
careful about also and then this

1862
01:43:51,800 --> 01:43:53,960
is like.
Most people don't really care

1863
01:43:53,960 --> 01:43:56,040
about this stuff because it's
about picking about the right

1864
01:43:56,040 --> 01:43:58,560
way to describe things in the
words that are commonly used.

1865
01:43:59,040 --> 01:44:02,960
But consciousness only doesn't
lead me to the conclusion that

1866
01:44:02,960 --> 01:44:05,160
it's an idealist view as opposed
to a realist view.

1867
01:44:05,840 --> 01:44:09,760
What it leads me to is a
question about asymmetric

1868
01:44:09,760 --> 01:44:14,840
relations, such that what is
real can ground something that

1869
01:44:14,840 --> 01:44:18,280
is less real or unreal.
And this is precisely what

1870
01:44:18,840 --> 01:44:20,800
Shankara and Ramanuja are
debating.

1871
01:44:21,040 --> 01:44:23,680
Right, so.
One of them can often times be

1872
01:44:23,680 --> 01:44:27,080
red shunker as sort of like a
relative realist or an

1873
01:44:27,080 --> 01:44:29,480
illusionist, where everything
other than pure consciousness,

1874
01:44:29,480 --> 01:44:35,200
which is Brahman, is less real
or illusory, and where Ramanuja

1875
01:44:35,200 --> 01:44:38,240
is being like, No, that doesn't
make any sense, like they're

1876
01:44:38,240 --> 01:44:40,680
just real in a different sense
or in a different way, but

1877
01:44:40,680 --> 01:44:44,240
they're equally real, and so
they're worrying about that real

1878
01:44:45,120 --> 01:44:49,520
realist relation versus
idealist, I think even Berkeley

1879
01:44:49,520 --> 01:44:53,080
to a certain degree.
We use the word idealist.

1880
01:44:53,080 --> 01:44:57,440
They're somewhat differently
than what we mean when we talk

1881
01:44:57,440 --> 01:45:00,200
about like the Yogachara school
of Buddhism which is what you're

1882
01:45:00,200 --> 01:45:03,720
kind of it's all this is
consciousness only right type of

1883
01:45:03,760 --> 01:45:06,520
sort of statement.
I think that's in Vasubandu

1884
01:45:06,520 --> 01:45:10,720
actually if I'm correct.
But yeah it's yeah I think

1885
01:45:10,720 --> 01:45:12,680
you're there there there's
something there.

1886
01:45:12,800 --> 01:45:17,960
I I personally am a a strong
form of a I'm a realist for sure

1887
01:45:17,960 --> 01:45:20,480
and the schools of Indian
philosophy I like are Ramanuja

1888
01:45:20,480 --> 01:45:23,160
and.
So Gesha is not because they're

1889
01:45:23,160 --> 01:45:25,640
realists in a sense that I
identify with.

1890
01:45:26,200 --> 01:45:29,720
I don't find much leaning
towards Illusionism, idealism

1891
01:45:30,520 --> 01:45:32,640
and things like that.
What I think is the truth in all

1892
01:45:32,640 --> 01:45:37,120
of those things is that there
are clearly illusions present in

1893
01:45:37,120 --> 01:45:41,080
our life.
What I can't take seriously is

1894
01:45:41,080 --> 01:45:44,120
anything that comes close to
Global illusionism or self

1895
01:45:44,120 --> 01:45:48,080
undermining Illusionism.
So it would be weird to be a

1896
01:45:48,080 --> 01:45:52,120
realist and not think that.
Illusions are present

1897
01:45:52,640 --> 01:45:57,280
everywhere, all the time, most
of the time or something like

1898
01:45:57,280 --> 01:46:01,440
that.
But it would be really weird to

1899
01:46:01,440 --> 01:46:03,880
not think that.
What is the best explanation for

1900
01:46:03,880 --> 01:46:05,680
those illusions is that there
are things that aren't

1901
01:46:05,680 --> 01:46:08,080
illusions.
Yeah, that's sort of the

1902
01:46:08,080 --> 01:46:10,320
difference between.
Me and some of the.

1903
01:46:10,320 --> 01:46:15,720
Proponents of Buddhism is that
I'm more inclined towards a view

1904
01:46:16,160 --> 01:46:20,920
that says that.
Somewhere in there, there's

1905
01:46:20,920 --> 01:46:24,240
something that's not an
illusion, which explains

1906
01:46:25,160 --> 01:46:27,120
illusoriness for a son.
Also, the other thing to

1907
01:46:27,120 --> 01:46:31,000
remember here is that as we
understand that our our

1908
01:46:31,000 --> 01:46:34,160
illusions, like if you're having
an illusion, I might not be

1909
01:46:34,160 --> 01:46:38,520
having an illusion.
Something's got to explain that.

1910
01:46:39,000 --> 01:46:41,920
I guess I can understand.
Why I'll There's all illusions

1911
01:46:41,920 --> 01:46:43,880
everywhere.
It's not understanding that.

1912
01:46:43,880 --> 01:46:45,720
Then then who's having the
illusion?

1913
01:46:45,760 --> 01:46:47,840
An illusion.
So this is what they tell me.

1914
01:46:47,840 --> 01:46:50,320
And we have these debates and I
just get logged like, oh, this

1915
01:46:50,320 --> 01:46:51,800
isn't it's an illusion having an
illusion.

1916
01:46:51,800 --> 01:46:54,520
OK Can't someone in a dream have
another dream?

1917
01:46:54,520 --> 01:46:56,040
Can't there be dreams embedded
in a dream?

1918
01:46:56,280 --> 01:46:58,360
Can't the movie Inception make
perfect sense?

1919
01:46:59,400 --> 01:47:00,960
Yeah.
But didn't the movie Inception

1920
01:47:00,960 --> 01:47:03,480
only make sense because actually
there was one level at which

1921
01:47:03,480 --> 01:47:06,000
there wasn't a dream?
I mean, wasn't that why the

1922
01:47:06,000 --> 01:47:09,560
movie did make sense?
Otherwise what was going on?

1923
01:47:09,760 --> 01:47:13,040
So this that's that's goes back
to the to what we called.

1924
01:47:13,600 --> 01:47:16,080
Foundational illusionism.
So foundationalism is that, the

1925
01:47:16,080 --> 01:47:18,760
claim that it can be illusions
all the way down right?

1926
01:47:18,760 --> 01:47:21,200
And so so one of the things I
have a problem with is also

1927
01:47:21,200 --> 01:47:24,840
foundational illusionism.
If if you had to sort of give

1928
01:47:25,280 --> 01:47:28,120
give what me even though because
I'm I'm I'm very curious I mean

1929
01:47:28,120 --> 01:47:31,720
there was a time where as as
growing up where I read a lot of

1930
01:47:31,920 --> 01:47:36,080
Indian philosophy and then I
mean in school from from once

1931
01:47:36,080 --> 01:47:39,800
you enter school and once I'm in
western schools and universities

1932
01:47:39,800 --> 01:47:43,800
I mean it's it's sort of seems
to to me at least to have been

1933
01:47:43,960 --> 01:47:47,680
ingrained out of me and and at
this time of my life I I find

1934
01:47:47,680 --> 01:47:50,800
myself sort of drawn back to it.
If if for someone like me or

1935
01:47:50,800 --> 01:47:52,800
anyone who's curious out there,
what would you recommend in

1936
01:47:52,800 --> 01:47:55,560
terms of Indian philosophy
reading for understanding the

1937
01:47:55,560 --> 01:47:58,280
nature of mind reality?
What are some of the best

1938
01:48:00,080 --> 01:48:01,400
philosophy?
OK, so one of the things.

1939
01:48:01,440 --> 01:48:02,960
So so one of the.
Things I'll say is that.

1940
01:48:03,280 --> 01:48:07,000
Now it's supposed to, like, you
know, when you're really young,

1941
01:48:07,840 --> 01:48:10,720
it's real easy.
Actually, it's it's not, it's

1942
01:48:10,720 --> 01:48:14,400
not hard.
And in fact, there already are

1943
01:48:14,400 --> 01:48:20,720
lists out there of books.
I can send you a link or I can.

1944
01:48:20,720 --> 01:48:23,120
I think it's on Brian Van
Norden's website where he has a

1945
01:48:23,120 --> 01:48:27,600
whole list just for Indian
philosophy, where he has a

1946
01:48:27,600 --> 01:48:30,160
reading list of like, you know,
things that people can read that

1947
01:48:30,160 --> 01:48:32,360
are accessible and stuff like
that.

1948
01:48:33,200 --> 01:48:35,760
And I think it's about also the
level of depth you want to get

1949
01:48:35,760 --> 01:48:37,520
into.
Like some of the stuff I read is

1950
01:48:37,520 --> 01:48:39,520
really technical and in the
weeds.

1951
01:48:39,520 --> 01:48:42,400
And most people just even if
there is an Indian falsi would

1952
01:48:42,400 --> 01:48:45,080
not really want to wade through
all of that because it's just

1953
01:48:45,080 --> 01:48:47,440
it's it's at another level and
it's about something else.

1954
01:48:47,680 --> 01:48:49,720
A lot of popular explanations of
things.

1955
01:48:49,960 --> 01:48:53,160
I mean some of the writers that
I read and enjoy the most are

1956
01:48:53,160 --> 01:48:55,920
people like Damal Krishnamati,
Law, he's, I think he's a great

1957
01:48:56,200 --> 01:48:58,360
person.
Chetendra Mohanty who just

1958
01:48:58,360 --> 01:49:01,720
passed away.
Arindam Chakrabharthi, Puerto

1959
01:49:01,720 --> 01:49:05,600
Mabila, Moria.
Mark Sidoretz, Jay Garfield,

1960
01:49:05,600 --> 01:49:08,600
Moni Machada, Genardi Canary,
Steven Phillips.

1961
01:49:09,080 --> 01:49:10,400
These are all friends of mine
who I read.

1962
01:49:10,400 --> 01:49:13,240
I think they write totally
accessible things, but it also

1963
01:49:13,240 --> 01:49:15,200
is about popularity to a certain
degree.

1964
01:49:16,800 --> 01:49:19,800
What kind of you know?
You could read someone like

1965
01:49:20,120 --> 01:49:23,920
Amita Chatterjee talking about
cognitive science and Indian

1966
01:49:23,920 --> 01:49:27,160
philosophy and read a really
interesting paper, but I'm not

1967
01:49:27,160 --> 01:49:30,760
sure it'd be as accessible.
As reading, like, you know, a

1968
01:49:30,800 --> 01:49:35,400
popular work that presents, you
know, like Lorelei Bernanke's

1969
01:49:35,400 --> 01:49:38,760
book on Abhinava Gupta, which
presents sort of like an

1970
01:49:38,760 --> 01:49:43,200
accessible, popular, engaged,
scholarly sort of engagement

1971
01:49:43,200 --> 01:49:46,240
with other things.
So it depends kind of like what

1972
01:49:46,240 --> 01:49:50,080
you what you what you're looking
for and going, you know, one of

1973
01:49:50,080 --> 01:49:52,920
the books that I taught in my
class is Waking, Dreaming Being

1974
01:49:52,920 --> 01:49:57,160
by by Evan Thompson.
Excellent read, and actually

1975
01:49:57,160 --> 01:49:59,680
many of the kids in the class.
Had no experience with

1976
01:49:59,680 --> 01:50:01,440
philosophy and they just thought
it was a wonderful book to read.

1977
01:50:01,440 --> 01:50:02,680
They just loved it, thought it
was great.

1978
01:50:02,680 --> 01:50:04,600
It's mostly about Buddhism and
neuroscience.

1979
01:50:04,960 --> 01:50:07,920
There's a lot of stuff in that
area on Buddhism and

1980
01:50:07,920 --> 01:50:10,120
neuroscience that are really
good.

1981
01:50:10,160 --> 01:50:14,960
There's a A a very recent book
that came out by Jay Garfield

1982
01:50:14,960 --> 01:50:17,920
and Nalini Bhushan where they
collected together, I think,

1983
01:50:17,920 --> 01:50:21,680
over 20 papers from the history
of 20th century Indian

1984
01:50:21,680 --> 01:50:25,360
philosophy by writers.
Like Casey Bhattacharya, AC

1985
01:50:25,440 --> 01:50:29,040
Mukherjee, all these people that
are not really well known, that

1986
01:50:29,040 --> 01:50:31,600
are really great people nearly
part of the 20th century,

1987
01:50:32,040 --> 01:50:34,640
forming a new sort of period in
Indian philosophy that's not

1988
01:50:34,640 --> 01:50:37,080
often discussed and very
interesting period.

1989
01:50:37,080 --> 01:50:39,200
And it's still important to
recognize that there's like this

1990
01:50:39,200 --> 01:50:42,960
tendency in studying Indian
philosophy that goes multiple

1991
01:50:42,960 --> 01:50:46,040
ways.
But at least one is that there

1992
01:50:46,040 --> 01:50:48,080
are people who are very
interested in the purity of the

1993
01:50:48,080 --> 01:50:50,920
Sanskrit language.
So what they're interested in

1994
01:50:50,920 --> 01:50:53,440
doing is learning how to read
and write.

1995
01:50:53,840 --> 01:50:56,880
Read mostly not write, but it
involves writing also.

1996
01:50:57,440 --> 01:51:02,200
Read and write Sanskrit so that
they can read the text and also

1997
01:51:02,200 --> 01:51:05,560
engage in chanting practices.
So for them it's the whole

1998
01:51:05,560 --> 01:51:09,840
process of engaging with Indian
philosophy is that reading it in

1999
01:51:09,840 --> 01:51:12,840
Sanskrit and chanting it is a
very spiritual exercise.

2000
01:51:12,840 --> 01:51:16,400
And so for them the whole
dimension is based in the

2001
01:51:16,400 --> 01:51:18,400
practice of doing those two
things.

2002
01:51:18,640 --> 01:51:21,080
Were there other people who want
to read Sanskrit because they

2003
01:51:21,080 --> 01:51:22,800
just want to be able to read the
original text?

2004
01:51:23,440 --> 01:51:25,560
For the stuff they're working on
and translating and trying to

2005
01:51:25,560 --> 01:51:27,360
explain.
And then there are other people

2006
01:51:27,360 --> 01:51:30,840
who want to read Indian
philosophers who write in

2007
01:51:30,840 --> 01:51:33,920
English like you know and and
write in pretty like one of the

2008
01:51:33,920 --> 01:51:36,720
things I'll tell you is that
it's it's it's not it's not a

2009
01:51:36,720 --> 01:51:40,360
joke at all.
It's if you read Radhakrishnan's

2010
01:51:40,680 --> 01:51:45,240
work his popular books on Indian
philosophy like science and

2011
01:51:45,240 --> 01:51:46,840
spirituality is the short ones
you might like.

2012
01:51:47,840 --> 01:51:50,680
The writing is so good.
Like the writing, the prose in

2013
01:51:50,680 --> 01:51:54,440
English is it's top.
It's like really well written.

2014
01:51:54,440 --> 01:51:59,800
Like, I mean his ability to
write was just really good.

2015
01:51:59,920 --> 01:52:03,320
And like, it's no joke.
Like like the prose paragraphs

2016
01:52:03,320 --> 01:52:06,280
are excellent.
Just so in a completely

2017
01:52:06,280 --> 01:52:11,720
different way.
Krishnamoorthy also a great

2018
01:52:11,720 --> 01:52:16,320
writer, a lot more spiritual
than Radhakrishnan, but a lot

2019
01:52:17,040 --> 01:52:19,000
easy to read.
I think those are all, there's a

2020
01:52:19,000 --> 01:52:21,160
lot of stuff out there.
So I would say basically what it

2021
01:52:21,160 --> 01:52:23,960
is, is that.
You need to sample two things.

2022
01:52:24,320 --> 01:52:26,440
What is the level you're looking
for?

2023
01:52:27,120 --> 01:52:31,320
What is the purity you're
looking for, and what is it in

2024
01:52:31,320 --> 01:52:32,800
topics that you want to get out
of it?

2025
01:52:32,800 --> 01:52:36,200
So in terms of level, on any one
of these topics, I can take you

2026
01:52:36,200 --> 01:52:38,760
to some super scholarly article
all the way up to a popular

2027
01:52:38,760 --> 01:52:43,840
explanation.
In terms of engagement, I can

2028
01:52:43,840 --> 01:52:47,720
take you to someone who purity,
someone who's it always got all

2029
01:52:47,720 --> 01:52:49,560
going to be in Sanskrit and
that's it.

2030
01:52:49,880 --> 01:52:51,800
Or someone who's gonna talk in
the language of cognitive

2031
01:52:51,800 --> 01:52:56,240
neuroscience, Sanskrit, English,
contemporary Western philosophy,

2032
01:52:56,360 --> 01:52:58,000
classical Indian philosophy in
English.

2033
01:52:58,560 --> 01:53:00,280
Sorry, it translated it into
English.

2034
01:53:01,240 --> 01:53:04,000
Mix of all that.
And then in terms of areas, it

2035
01:53:04,000 --> 01:53:07,240
can be anything from ethics and
political life to ahimsa and

2036
01:53:07,240 --> 01:53:10,640
veganism, all the way down to,
you know, states of

2037
01:53:10,640 --> 01:53:13,960
consciousness and the 54
different versions of states of

2038
01:53:13,960 --> 01:53:17,480
consciousness in the Abhidharma
Kosha of the Abadara school of

2039
01:53:17,480 --> 01:53:20,360
Buddhism.
This is a lot lot of stuff like

2040
01:53:21,200 --> 01:53:25,800
that you can get access to, and
I think the only way to do it as

2041
01:53:25,800 --> 01:53:28,840
a novice is really just to be
honest about trying things out

2042
01:53:28,920 --> 01:53:32,960
and seeing where they go.
I think one book that I read

2043
01:53:33,720 --> 01:53:40,120
early on was not a popular book.
It was a short book and because

2044
01:53:40,120 --> 01:53:42,400
I had some philosophical
training it was helpful.

2045
01:53:42,960 --> 01:53:46,280
It was An Introduction to
Classical Indian Philosophy by

2046
01:53:46,280 --> 01:53:51,000
Jitendra Mohanty.
Published in the 80s and I

2047
01:53:51,000 --> 01:53:52,760
thought it was really good.
I thought it was.

2048
01:53:53,320 --> 01:53:58,560
I mean, it was unlike the other
things I had read before that

2049
01:53:58,560 --> 01:54:01,320
only seems to me to be
discussing aspects of

2050
01:54:01,320 --> 01:54:02,960
spirituality.
Not that that wasn't important,

2051
01:54:03,200 --> 01:54:06,240
but it it seemed to be.
Oh, here's some, you know, these

2052
01:54:06,240 --> 01:54:08,400
are some core ideas about what
is knowledge, what is

2053
01:54:08,400 --> 01:54:10,160
consciousness, What is
reasoning?

2054
01:54:10,160 --> 01:54:15,560
What And like, what are these
terms that mean in, in, in, in,

2055
01:54:16,160 --> 01:54:17,520
in these classical Indian
schools?

2056
01:54:18,040 --> 01:54:20,120
And then from there, you know,
all the time, you know, I

2057
01:54:20,160 --> 01:54:24,080
actually got to to other things.
Probably the most favorite read

2058
01:54:24,080 --> 01:54:28,760
I've ever had is Perception, an
essay in classical and Neat Ways

2059
01:54:28,760 --> 01:54:30,360
of Knowing by Bimal
Krishnamanthi Law.

2060
01:54:30,360 --> 01:54:33,440
I think it's a top, probably the
most influential book in Indian

2061
01:54:33,440 --> 01:54:35,440
philosophy on my current
thinking.

2062
01:54:35,760 --> 01:54:37,960
So yeah, yeah, I'm definitely
going to look into this because,

2063
01:54:37,960 --> 01:54:39,880
I mean, that's the purpose of
this podcast as a whole.

2064
01:54:39,880 --> 01:54:43,480
Is this just this curiosity
about all of these, this field,

2065
01:54:43,480 --> 01:54:45,560
no matter whether whether you're
looking at it from the West or

2066
01:54:45,560 --> 01:54:47,560
the East?
It it's, it's just very

2067
01:54:47,560 --> 01:54:49,560
fascinating overall.
And I think when you are a

2068
01:54:49,560 --> 01:54:51,800
novice and you're trying to
start out and read through it,

2069
01:54:52,080 --> 01:54:54,120
you have to have some sort of a
basic understanding at least

2070
01:54:54,120 --> 01:54:56,720
because it gets quite tough And
and a big concern for me was

2071
01:54:56,720 --> 01:54:58,080
translations.
And I think you already

2072
01:54:58,080 --> 01:55:00,920
addressed that because I get
concerned sometimes something

2073
01:55:00,920 --> 01:55:04,080
else you're not going to, it's
not going to go away.

2074
01:55:04,080 --> 01:55:07,240
I mean these translation issues
are difficult.

2075
01:55:07,240 --> 01:55:11,600
There are some well established.
So what is going on in Western

2076
01:55:11,600 --> 01:55:13,200
philosophy?
That isn't always the case with

2077
01:55:13,200 --> 01:55:15,880
Indian philosophies.
Then not only are there

2078
01:55:15,880 --> 01:55:18,800
established translations of
Descartes, for example, OK, or

2079
01:55:18,800 --> 01:55:22,480
Aristotle, but there's also
pretty well established

2080
01:55:22,720 --> 01:55:25,040
rudimentary explanations.
So, like I've been teaching

2081
01:55:25,040 --> 01:55:28,760
Descartes for years, I read them
in English, not in Latin or

2082
01:55:28,760 --> 01:55:33,160
French.
And basically, yeah, I mean, I

2083
01:55:33,160 --> 01:55:35,400
know that when I tell my
students something about

2084
01:55:35,400 --> 01:55:38,120
Descartes theory that it's.
It's kind of a lie, so a little

2085
01:55:38,120 --> 01:55:41,240
bit of an illusion.
But I also know, I also know the

2086
01:55:41,240 --> 01:55:44,440
trajectory to reveal the
illusion as we're sort of

2087
01:55:44,640 --> 01:55:47,760
learning more and more and
getting deeper into what

2088
01:55:47,800 --> 01:55:49,480
Descartes could be talking
about, right?

2089
01:55:49,480 --> 01:55:51,120
Is he even really a duelist at
all?

2090
01:55:51,120 --> 01:55:52,880
I mean, we could like, get
really deep in there,

2091
01:55:53,080 --> 01:55:55,560
contradicting very
straightforward claims in the

2092
01:55:55,560 --> 01:55:59,360
book.
But in Indian philosophy, I

2093
01:55:59,360 --> 01:56:01,880
think there are in some cases
established translations.

2094
01:56:01,880 --> 01:56:05,200
But are there established, core,
easy ways of explaining it?

2095
01:56:05,720 --> 01:56:07,240
OK.
If you go to some places in

2096
01:56:07,240 --> 01:56:10,320
India, they'll say yes, you
always read.

2097
01:56:10,880 --> 01:56:12,720
So I was just at a reading group
and they think what it was.

2098
01:56:12,720 --> 01:56:17,240
Oh, you read in Vedanta and
you're studying epistemology.

2099
01:56:18,280 --> 01:56:21,080
The Vedanta Paribasha by Dharma
Raja, you read this book.

2100
01:56:21,080 --> 01:56:24,120
It's a very short book, but it's
a very good, very core ideas

2101
01:56:24,120 --> 01:56:27,960
about epistemology in Vedanta.
You read the Tanakam Sanghra Ha

2102
01:56:28,320 --> 01:56:31,200
by Anambatam when you were
studying Nyaya.

2103
01:56:31,200 --> 01:56:32,640
I believe that's the texts that
people.

2104
01:56:32,800 --> 01:56:34,920
So there are texts like this
that are established.

2105
01:56:35,600 --> 01:56:37,760
Is there an established like,
you know, here's a story you

2106
01:56:37,760 --> 01:56:40,280
tell in this book and then
you're really like, I don't

2107
01:56:40,280 --> 01:56:43,080
know, I never trained with those
people, so I can't speak to that

2108
01:56:43,080 --> 01:56:45,200
issue.
They just only go read that, you

2109
01:56:45,200 --> 01:56:48,280
know, as they want to read it.
But there might be in certain

2110
01:56:48,280 --> 01:56:52,320
sunscreen medium schools where
sunscrien debates are going on

2111
01:56:52,640 --> 01:56:55,560
and stuff like that.
But for a modern person who

2112
01:56:55,560 --> 01:56:58,440
doesn't really read sunscrien
and wants to learn in English,

2113
01:56:58,480 --> 01:57:03,560
there definitely are texts that
are explained nicely by people,

2114
01:57:03,640 --> 01:57:05,960
or at least.
And this is the crucial thing.

2115
01:57:06,240 --> 01:57:09,040
They're explained in the way
we're knowing it and

2116
01:57:09,040 --> 01:57:12,760
understanding is clearly,
clearly useful.

2117
01:57:13,000 --> 01:57:16,040
So one example I can give that I
think is very valuable is Mark

2118
01:57:16,040 --> 01:57:18,760
Sidoritz wrote a really nice
kind of introductory book.

2119
01:57:18,760 --> 01:57:21,120
Buddhism is Philosophy.
They re released it recently

2120
01:57:21,120 --> 01:57:25,040
with the shorter version of it.
That book, whatever you think

2121
01:57:25,040 --> 01:57:28,360
about the core tenets of
Buddhism I would say is just

2122
01:57:28,360 --> 01:57:31,920
really good if you never really
want got into anything that was

2123
01:57:31,920 --> 01:57:34,240
technical about Buddhism and you
wanted to read something.

2124
01:57:34,640 --> 01:57:38,320
That was technical enough, but
really actually got you further

2125
01:57:38,320 --> 01:57:40,960
into understanding and gave you
an orientation that you can

2126
01:57:40,960 --> 01:57:43,280
navigate from.
Dude, absolutely.

2127
01:57:43,480 --> 01:57:44,040
Yeah.
I'm sorry.

2128
01:57:44,160 --> 01:57:45,520
I mean like, yeah, I would say
yeah.

2129
01:57:45,520 --> 01:57:48,560
So it doesn't have to be the end
all, be all.

2130
01:57:49,280 --> 01:57:53,120
You can read Stephen Phillips
and Matthew Dasty's translation

2131
01:57:53,320 --> 01:57:57,800
with commentaries of the Nyaya
Sutra from Gautama, let's say

2132
01:57:57,800 --> 01:58:01,920
Anna and Udya Takara.
They've got the original text

2133
01:58:01,920 --> 01:58:04,240
there, plus explanations.
Outstanding book.

2134
01:58:04,240 --> 01:58:05,480
No problem.
You should be fine.

2135
01:58:06,120 --> 01:58:07,280
Yeah.
So I think there are things like

2136
01:58:07,280 --> 01:58:08,680
that.
I think if you look at the Brian

2137
01:58:08,680 --> 01:58:14,320
van Norden website where he has
the complete reading list for

2138
01:58:15,040 --> 01:58:17,960
introductory, sort of like
learning things across various

2139
01:58:17,960 --> 01:58:21,680
traditions, you'll find
Actually, now that I just

2140
01:58:21,680 --> 01:58:23,360
remembered, I don't know why I'm
always talking about other

2141
01:58:23,360 --> 01:58:25,560
people.
If you go to my website and you

2142
01:58:25,560 --> 01:58:28,520
go to my class called Classical
Indian Philosophy.

2143
01:58:29,000 --> 01:58:31,840
I also have categorized, just in
the case of classical Indian

2144
01:58:31,840 --> 01:58:35,560
flossie, about 30 papers and 18
resources.

2145
01:58:35,560 --> 01:58:38,160
I don't know why I'm mentioning
Brian's work only I already I

2146
01:58:38,160 --> 01:58:40,960
already did myself.
I did this long before he had

2147
01:58:40,960 --> 01:58:42,200
that list.
But because now I can at least

2148
01:58:42,200 --> 01:58:44,560
put a I'll put a link to that
directly as well.

2149
01:58:44,600 --> 01:58:47,720
Yeah, but but I will say this,
my list is.

2150
01:58:47,760 --> 01:58:50,560
Very much like these are the
scholarly articles that I would

2151
01:58:50,560 --> 01:58:54,160
actually teach someone because
this is going to bring you up to

2152
01:58:54,160 --> 01:58:56,640
speed about these kind, but
there are papers in there about.

2153
01:58:57,160 --> 01:59:00,720
You know, Sankhya, theories of
consciousness, just their papers

2154
01:59:00,720 --> 01:59:04,880
about, you know, the nature of
inference in Nyaya.

2155
01:59:04,920 --> 01:59:07,960
There's papers in there by about
perception by me and Matthew

2156
01:59:07,960 --> 01:59:09,120
Dosti.
Yeah.

2157
01:59:09,400 --> 01:59:10,560
So yeah.
So it's a link to that.

2158
01:59:10,560 --> 01:59:13,160
It's under my courses.
It's called classical Indian

2159
01:59:13,160 --> 01:59:15,960
philosophy.
I mean it's this has been such

2160
01:59:15,960 --> 01:59:18,840
an intriguing conversation as a
whole and and anything from your

2161
01:59:18,840 --> 01:59:24,160
side that you feel that you want
to mention or I think OK I I

2162
01:59:24,160 --> 01:59:26,320
think as a closing statement one
of the things I.

2163
01:59:26,320 --> 01:59:31,280
Think that's speaks to like how
I approach things and and I

2164
01:59:31,280 --> 01:59:33,360
think it reflects something
about what you yourself want is

2165
01:59:33,360 --> 01:59:39,680
like curiosity is helpful here
it's it's not something to be

2166
01:59:39,680 --> 01:59:44,960
like you know get rid of it or
like.

2167
01:59:45,200 --> 01:59:46,800
It kills a cat or something like
that.

2168
01:59:47,160 --> 01:59:50,720
I think in as I think.
I think VN Jaw said this to me

2169
01:59:50,720 --> 01:59:53,080
one time.
He said if you're curious about

2170
01:59:53,080 --> 01:59:57,360
Indian philosophy, you're going
to find more than 18 lifetimes

2171
01:59:57,640 --> 01:59:59,480
worth of stuff to read that
you'll enjoy.

2172
01:59:59,840 --> 02:00:01,640
There's so much out there.
He told me this.

2173
02:00:01,640 --> 02:00:03,320
I was at one of his reading
groups.

2174
02:00:03,360 --> 02:00:06,040
I had to get up at like 4:30 in
the morning to catch him at 6:30

2175
02:00:06,040 --> 02:00:09,520
in the morning in India or
something like that, and 6:30 in

2176
02:00:09,520 --> 02:00:11,520
the evening.
And he said and he was just

2177
02:00:11,520 --> 02:00:13,600
like, yeah, he was trying to
tell all these students in

2178
02:00:13,600 --> 02:00:15,360
India.
We really aren't scholars.

2179
02:00:15,360 --> 02:00:17,320
Like, I was one of the few, like
scholars that would come to his

2180
02:00:17,320 --> 02:00:18,840
courses.
A lot of them are just, you

2181
02:00:18,840 --> 02:00:21,200
know, people who were in their
60s, retired and want to learn

2182
02:00:21,200 --> 02:00:23,520
Indian philosophy.
And he's just like, there's just

2183
02:00:23,520 --> 02:00:25,200
so many great, you know,
debates.

2184
02:00:25,200 --> 02:00:29,320
And we read The Tukwa Boda by
Shankara, and he gave this

2185
02:00:29,320 --> 02:00:33,960
wonderfully lucid explanation of
it and then followed it up by

2186
02:00:34,040 --> 02:00:38,080
Jayanta Bhatta's critique of the
Tukwa Boda in one of his texts.

2187
02:00:38,080 --> 02:00:40,080
And I was just like, Oh my God,
this is just like so fun.

2188
02:00:40,080 --> 02:00:42,440
It's like, I mean, if you
studied philosophy and you liked

2189
02:00:42,440 --> 02:00:45,760
reading Locke and Barkley debate
one another, I mean, which is a

2190
02:00:46,080 --> 02:00:47,440
it's fun.
It's super fun, actually.

2191
02:00:47,880 --> 02:00:49,960
I understood teach that stuff.
It's fun.

2192
02:00:49,960 --> 02:00:52,440
It's just great to talk about,
like, you know, the Buddhists

2193
02:00:52,440 --> 02:00:55,200
and the Nyaya squaring off about
the nature of the true self.

2194
02:00:55,200 --> 02:00:58,800
And yeah, it's just it's a form
of enjoyment and curiosity.

2195
02:00:59,200 --> 02:01:01,320
If you're not a professional
philosopher like me who actually

2196
02:01:01,320 --> 02:01:04,480
has to do like hard labourous
work every day serving this out,

2197
02:01:04,480 --> 02:01:07,200
you can just enjoy it and stuff
like that and not, you know,

2198
02:01:07,200 --> 02:01:08,880
come home crying and pulling
your hair out.

2199
02:01:08,880 --> 02:01:12,960
So my word is to to, to people
is like enjoy the curiosity of

2200
02:01:13,240 --> 02:01:15,840
exploring it And I really value
the time we had together.

2201
02:01:15,840 --> 02:01:19,080
Tom and thank you very much.
Thank you so much and it's such

2202
02:01:19,080 --> 02:01:20,360
a pleasure.
I can't wait to re watch.

2203
02:01:20,360 --> 02:01:22,320
This and actually listen to
everything, get all the names

2204
02:01:22,320 --> 02:01:24,320
down and actually make a list
for myself as well.

2205
02:01:24,560 --> 02:01:27,200
It takes multiple listenings for
myself, and I know that the

2206
02:01:27,280 --> 02:01:29,480
viewers and the listeners also
enjoy doing this, so I'm looking

2207
02:01:29,480 --> 02:01:31,360
forward to them seeing it as
well.

2208
02:01:31,360 --> 02:01:33,280
All right.
Thank you very much for the

2209
02:01:33,280 --> 02:01:33,880
conversation.